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ATTITUDES IN DIFFERENT
TYPES OF WELFARE STATES:
PERSONAL INTERESTS
AND VALUES**

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FACTORS AFFECTING WELFARE ATTITUDES IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF WELFARE STATES: PERSONAL INTERESTS AND VALUES²

This study examines the effect of personal interests and basic human values on the degree of support for a welfare state. Data from the European Social Survey, round 4 (2008) for 29 European countries (total n = 56,752) was used for the study. Results show that values such as collectivism and altruism promote demand for state intervention in welfare, while values like individualism and egoism negatively affect it. Income has the strongest negative effect on support for a welfare state among all the factors tested, even more so than gender and employment status in all types of welfare states. Compared to other countries (familialistic, social-democratic, conservative, and liberal), former USSR and ex-communist countries seem to be more influenced by collectivistic and individualistic values, and education. In addition, in ex-communist countries, altruistic and egoistic values have a crucial impact on the demand for a welfare state. In liberal, conservative, and social-democratic countries, values and education do not have much impact.

JEL Classification: Z13.

Keywords: Welfare state, welfare attitudes, welfare regimes, basic human values, self-interest, cross-cultural comparative researches.

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Introduction

This paper discusses values and self-interest factors that shape the high demand for state welfare support in different types of welfare states. The principal question of our study is to determine factors affecting demand for state social support. The paper is an investigation into whether individual presuppositions or structural peculiarities shape welfare support in different welfare cultures.

Government plays an important role in providing people with a definite set of welfare packages in contemporary Europe. This is possible through a redistribution of tax revenues. There is a problem of equilibrium between input and output. European scholars show great concerns about rising welfare demands and an overburdened welfare state [Kumlin, 2007]. There is also difficulty in gauging the determinants of the rising demand, such as whether people are simply used to receiving social benefits, whether it is do to their beliefs, whether it is rooted in their needs, or whether we encounter the same causes of the high demand in different types of welfare states?

This paper is divided into several sections. The first section discusses the theoretical framework and contributions of previous research in the field. The second part is devoted to the research model, indicators, data details, and model specifications that I use for the study. The third section describes the results of the models. It concludes by returning to the theoretical framework and considering some implications of the results.

1. Theoretical framework

A discussion of welfare attitudes necessarily engages “left-right” concepts, and turn to both political discourse and moral arrangements. What is fair and just? What is better: liberty or equality? What is more productive: competition or cooperation? Generally, this discussion can be reduced to two alternative positions about the role of government, as stated by Keynes and Friedman. All these questions form the base of different schemes of resource distribution in different countries. Answers are deeply rooted both in the national culture and structural arrangements of a given society.

Why do we need to look at welfare attitudes? On the one hand, social policy is a kind of institutionalized activity provided by the state. But it involves not only the provision of public goods and services, but is also affected by the people’s preferences regarding the amount and method of distributing public goods and services [Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003]. This is made

possible by the electoral process in democratic societies, through which people support definite political leaders and political parties.

Regarding the preferred level of government intervention, a citizen faces a choice where he or she has to express preference. Considering the motives of the individual decision, Kangas distinguishes between economic and sociological approaches and suggests two models of welfare behavior: *Homo Economicus* and *Homo Sociologicus*. The first is in favor of rational and utilitarian reasons. Personal advantages are considered as prevailing arguments when he weighs gains and costs. The second model follows the normative basis of individual action in accordance with social contracts of different kinds, sometimes in spite of self-interest [Kangas, 1997, p. 467; Gevers, et al., 2000, pp. 302-303]. Lindenberg united both explanations, suggesting that both interests and collective norms have an impact on human action [Lindenberg, 1990; Kangas, 1997].


As long as the demand for state social guarantees is considered, the decision-making process is determined by the amount of available information. Rational decisions have two important limitations. First, people must be aware of the personal interest in government intervention, and, secondly, people must have enough information about the functioning of the welfare state, including its profits and costs. A lack of information limits rationality and reinforces intuitive reasons shaped by a cultural context [Mueller, 1989; Simon, 1978; Kangas, 1997]. If people are unaware, they make their decisions based more on feelings or intuition and less on rational arguments [Kangas, 1997, p. 480]. Decisions can be made rationally only if a person has all the necessary information on the subject [Elster, 2007]. But with regard to welfare, a person usually lacks all information, and so his or her rationality is bounded in different degrees. That is why it is reasonable to take into consideration not only affecting rational arguments, but also basic principles of human life, such as values.

Attitudes to government welfare intervention have animated European sociological discourse [Papadakis, 1992; Kangas, 1997; Andreß and Heien, 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Svallfors, 2004; Jæger, 2009; Pfeifer, 2009; van Oorschot, 2010; Jakobsen, 2011]. The large body of literature on welfare attitudes may be divided into two principal parts: macro-level explanations and individual-level models. Based on previous studies, I have systematized all the findings and expressed them graphically. Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual framework pushing this research forward. It describes a mechanism of shaping welfare attitudes by institutions and personal presuppositions.

As long as welfare state policy is a macroeconomic fact, state institutional peculiarities have an influence on in-country individual welfare preferences [Jakobsen, 2011, p. 336]. The

degree of economic development, taxation systems [Prasad and Deng, 2009], government redistributive practices [Jakobsen, 2011], social structures [Svallfors, 1997; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Edlund, 1999], and other national characteristics predict a definite welfare environment with its own strengths and weaknesses. This affects the demand for state social guaranties.

Fig. 1. Conceptual framework



1.1. Individual-level determinants

Most researchers justify and use a combination of individual-level factors in their models. **Self-interest** factors are pointed out by the most of them. These combine characteristics that define an individual as a “client” of a welfare state and reflect his or her position in the social structure [Svallfors, 1991; d’Anjou, et al., 1995; van Oorschot, 2010]. An individual’s socio-economic status influences his or her perception and evaluation of social reality: “Low status groups perceive greater social inequality than high status groups” [Staerklé, et al., 2012].

Andrass and Heien suggest dividing taxpayers, consumers, and producers of social security and services. Women, pensioners, young families with children, people with low income and low levels of education, ethnic minorities, the unemployed, and the disabled are all referred to as consumers. They are in support of the welfare state more than taxpayers are [Andreß and Heien, 2001, p. 339]. However, attitudes towards the welfare state are heterogeneous among taxpayers. Representatives of the middle class are more likely to express a positive attitude, because they get health care and education services from the state [Papadakis and Bean, 1993, p. 258]. Svallfors makes similar conclusions regarding personal interest and labor market positions: The weaker an individual’s position in the labor market, the higher his or her request is for government intervention [Svallfors, 2003, p. 507]. And the weakest in the labor market are

women, workers, the unemployed, pensioners, and the disabled [Linos and West, 2003; Jæger, 2006]. But it is also worthwhile to point out that studies suggest low moral support for welfare among workers, and the reason for this being aversion to a heavier tax burden [Andreß and Heien, 2001, p. 340]. However, there are studies that argue otherwise [Svallfors, 2006; Jæger, 2006; Pfeifer, 2009].

The effect of education is quite controversial on the demand for a welfare state [Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989, p. 1031]. Linos and West show a high level of variation in support of welfare-state intervention among people with high income and high education levels. This may be a consequence of a conflict within socio-economic elites [Linos and West, 2003, p. 405]. However, following Bourdieu, Staerklé and his colleagues justify the necessity to include education as an indicator of an individual's social position, because this characteristic is closely connected with income, social status, and prestige [Staerklé, et al., 2012].

In addition to those factors of interest that reflect the rational position of an individual that characterize him or her as *Homo Economicus*, researchers also propose analyzing **cultural dimensions**. This consists of values, norms, socialization experiences, national culture of the welfare state [Andreß and Heien, 2001, p. 339], ideology, knowledge, historical background and gender differences [d'Anjou, et al., 1995, p. 357], political ideology [Jæger, 2006, p. 322], values of solidarity and altruism [Kangas, 1997], ideological preferences [Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Groskind, 1994; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003], ideational factors [van Oorschot, 2010], “normative worldviews, such as political ideologies and religious beliefs, as well as particularistic normative ideas, such as people's perceptions of just desert and merit, their family values, their work ethic and so on” [van Oorschot, 2007].

In general, the described factors can be divided into two groups: individual assessments of the social environment, and values. Assessment of the social environment is considered to be individual ideas about various aspects of social life relating to economics, politics, social issues, the quality of state institutions, health and education systems, and political and social trust.

Another group of predictors concern the values dimension. This means values guiding the communication of individuals, social institutions, and a state [Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003]. Religiosity, political values, egalitarianism, authoritarianism, and basic human values (the methodology of Shalom Schwartz) are referred to as the values dimension.

In most cases, researchers apply the concepts of egalitarianism and individualism. Seymour Martin Lipset distinguishes between achievement and equality [1963], Deutsch speaks of equity, need, and equality [1975], Hochschild analyzes distributive justice [1981], McClosky

and John Zaller look at economic individualism and social equality (capitalist and democratic values) [1984], and Kluegel and Mateju consider egalitarian and inegalitarian principles of distributive justice [1995]. Some research emphasizes endorsement of the concept of social rights [Sears, et al., 1980; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989]. All these studies demonstrate that individualistic values (in one version or another) have a negative impact on welfare support, while egalitarian values have a positive impact.

The effect of basic human values on welfare attitudes has not been substantially studied. Only two studies consider basic human values as predictors of welfare attitudes. S. Svallfors et al use a value axis along with perceived personal vulnerability, assessment of social problems, and social stability as independent variables. But the relationship between values and welfare attitudes was declared to be not evident [Svallfors, et al., 2012]. Gryaznova and Magun [2012] estimated the effect of basic human values and showed that the values of conservation and self-transcendence promote a higher level of government welfare intervention.

1.2. Institutional-level determinants

The normative environment is a principal determinant of welfare attitudes. This is the product of the institutional arrangement within a country [Staerklé, et al., 2012], i.e., attitudes toward various objects rooted in the value structures formed within a national context [Jakobsen, 2011, p. 327]. This refers to a set of historically institutionalized practices relating to the redistribution of resources and support for vulnerable social groups [Monusova, 2012]. Consequently, residents of a single country are more likely to have similar ideas about redistribution principals than of another. This brings us to the classification of welfare states.

There are several conceptual approaches concerning the macro-level direction. The first and the most powerful approach is to regard welfare regimes as a complex factor dividing countries into several groups based on general institutional principals and criteria of redistribution. The most well-known is the Esping-Andersen theory of three worlds of welfare capitalism. This classification is based on three main criteria: An index of decommodification³ (dependency of personal welfare – pensioners, the unemployed, the sick, etc. – on market conditions) [Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 35-54]; government influence on the degree of social stratification [Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 55-78]; and social agents responsible for individual welfare (state, family, charity) [Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 79-104]. Based on the above,

³ There was an attempt to revise the commodification index by Scruggs and Allan (2006) and Bamba (2007).

Esping-Andersen divides welfare regimes into Liberal, Conservative, and Social Democratic. Since then, more than a dozen welfare state typologies have come into being. Bambra [Bambra, 2007, p. 1099] describes twelve of them, including the typologies of Esping-Andersen [1990], Leibfried [1992], Castles and Mitchell [1993], Kangas [1994], Ragin [1994], Ferrera [1996], Bonoli [1997], Korpi and Palme [1998], Pitzurello [1999], Navarro and Shi [2001], Kautto [2002], and Bambra [2005].

In particular Ferrera and Bonoli indicate the existence of a “southern” or “Mediterranean” welfare regime [van Oorschot & Finsveen, 2009], also called familialistic [Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2011, Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997]. Post-communist or East-European welfare regimes are singled out by Andress and Hein [2001] and Jakobsen [2011].

A large number of comparative studies aim to find the correlation between welfare regimes and welfare attitudes for different empirical dimensions of welfare state principles, policies, and programs [Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Svallfors, 1997; Edlund, 1999; Andreß and Heien, 2001; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003].

The classification of different countries into worlds of welfare is closely related to domestic macroeconomic indicators and, in particular, to state public expenditures [Jakobsen, 2011, p. 336]. Staerklé et al prove that the desire for government intervention becomes higher when social spending is low and, conversely, decreases when social spending is high. “In countries where government already plays an important social role, citizens are less likely to ask for even more government responsibility” [Staerklé, et al., 2012]. Van Oorschot and Meuleman suggest an “improvement – overburden” explanation: “In low-performing welfare states, public opinion on welfare-state responsibilities reflects a common feeling that extension is necessary to improve general standards of living”, and, to the contrary, people realize the overburden of the welfare state in well-performing countries [van Oorschot, et al., 2012].

1.3. Hypotheses

Based on previous studies, it is possible to assume that the type of welfare state not only shapes welfare attitudes, but also moderates the effect of self-interest factors and values on it. As long as rational decision making is bounded by the amount of available information – the more information we have, the more rational our decision is [Kangas, 2007] – it is possible to assume that values have the strongest effect on demand for government welfare intervention in countries that have vague schemes of welfare redistribution, taxation, and receiving social benefits.

Accordingly, the first hypothesis is: *Values have the strongest effect on welfare support in low performing welfare states: familialistic, ex-communist, and former USSR countries (description of types of welfare states are given below). Collectivism and altruism have a significantly positive effect on welfare support, while individualism and egoism negatively affect this.* As we have seen above, a weak social position at the individual level [Svallfors, 2003, p. 507; Linos and West, 2003; Jæger, 2006] and low-performing welfare states on a macro level [Staerklé, et al., 2012; van Oorschot, et al., 2012] increase the demand for government welfare intervention. So, it is possible to assume that in well performing countries (where demand for government welfare intervention is satisfied) the effect of self-interest factors is lower. The second hypothesis is: *Personal interest has the most significant impact in low-performing welfare states, specifically in ex-communist and former USSR countries. The stronger the social position of an individual, the less supportive he or she is of government welfare intervention.*

2. Research model, data, and indicators

The added value of this paper is an attempt to estimate how the type of welfare state moderates the effect of basic human values and a number of self-interest factors on welfare attitudes by means of multilevel modeling. The research model is presented in figure 2.

Fig. 2. Research framework



Welfare attitudes are the result of the individual decision-making process concerning the question of government intervention in welfare provisions. It shows the level of welfare demand of different social groups in a country.

*Values*⁴ are guiding principles of human life that shape different kinds of attitudes, including attitudes toward welfare. Two sets of values – or value dimensions, in the terminology

⁴ I follow Shalom Schwartz in his conceptualization of values “as desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, which serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” (Davidov, et al., 2008, p. 423). Schwartz’s theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992), which is supported by a number of empirical studies, offers ten individual-level universal value types: Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, Security, Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction. These 10 value

of Shalom Schwartz – are analyzed in this paper: individualism versus collectivism (openness to change versus conservation) and altruism versus egoism (self-transcendence versus self-enhancement)⁵.

Self-interest factors are indicators of an individual's social position. They are introduced into regression models by a set of factual variables: Gender, age, education, income, employment status, type of settlement, and number of children. Women, the elderly, those with a low level of income or education, the unemployed, parents, and beneficiaries are supposed to have a more vulnerable social position and are more supportive of government intervention.

The *type of welfare state* refers to the normative and institutional environment within a country. An individual is driven not only by his or her own interests and values, but also by redistributive norms and practices that are typical in his or her society. And these norms can even moderate the impact of personal interest and values upon welfare attitudes. The variable for "type of welfare state" is defined by a newly generated variable based on theoretical background and principle-component analysis.

One of the most principal *assumptions* in the research is that values have an effect on welfare attitudes. Davidov et al sum up the theoretical basis for the causal relationship between values and attitudes: "Human values are general standards that underpin concrete attitudes and behavior" [Davidov, et al., 2008, p. 585]. Understanding attitudes as "an enduring organization of several beliefs focused on a specific object or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner" or as "consistent tendencies to evaluate a particular object positively or negatively" [Davidov, et al., 2008, p. 585], support of government welfare intervention is referred to in this category. In our case, the object of evaluation is the level of government welfare intervention.

2.1. Data and indicators

The next question to be addressed in this study is the measurement of concepts. The fourth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) provides us both with a solid set of cross-cultural

types (indices) are transformed into four value categories of higher order and two axes: "openness to change versus conservation" and "self-enhancement versus self-transcendence".

⁵ Welzel has justified that Schwartz's value categories are similar to other concepts widely used in the social sciences. Openness to change is the equivalent of individualism, conservation of collectivism, self-enhancement of egoism, and self-transcendence of altruism (Welzel, 2010, p. 154). This terminology facilitates the interpretation of basic human values as predictors and allows us to consider an analysis of basic human values as a part of a discourse around individualism and egalitarianism as factors shaping welfare attitudes. And, correspondingly, it is possible to hypothesize that openness and self-enhancement lower welfare paternalism, while conservation and self-transcendence increase welfare paternalism.

data on welfare attitudes and a 21-item measure of human values developed by Shalom Schwartz. The fourth wave of the survey was conducted in 2008 in 29 countries⁶ (N=56,752).

To measure welfare attitudes, self-interest factors, and values, I have chosen data from the ESS database. A set of items is presented in tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. Indicators of welfare attitudes and a set of self-interest variables are presented in table A1. Table A2 presents the typology of basic human values, as suggested by Shalom Schwartz, and the steps of aggregating initial items into value indexes and indexes into value axis are described.

Welfare attitudes were measured by the Government Intervention Index. This is a composite index calculating the mean of answers for six questions. Every item estimates the demand for government intervention into six domains of state welfare policy: Employment, adequate health care, a reasonable standard of living for the elderly, a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed, sufficient child care services for working parents, and paid leave from work to care for sick family members. This index was also considered by Svallfors [2012] and Monusova [2012]. It was tested by using Cronbach's Alpha, and results showed a rather good internal consistency for the index. Cronbach's Alpha is 0.7 and higher for all the countries. The index varies from 0 to 10, where 0 means that "government should not provide a welfare mix" and 10 means "government must provide the population with all the components of a welfare mix".

Self-interest is measured by a set of six socio-demographical characteristics: Gender, age, highest level of education (this six-point scale is recorded into a four-point scale: 0 = no secondary education, 1 = uncompleted secondary, 2 = secondary, 3 = uncompleted and completed tertiary and higher), and income (feeling about household's income: 1 = very difficult to live on present income, 4 = living comfortably on present income). The employment status of a person is based on the employment status in the last 7 days: 0 = employed without experience of unemployment, 1 = employed with experience of unemployment, 2 = students, 3 = unemployed, 4 = pensioners or disabled. The type of settlement is divided into farm, village, town, suburbs, and city. Employment, type of settlement, and having children are introduced in models as dummy variables.

Values are measured by the method suggested by Shalom Schwartz. Table A2 in the appendix describes the basic principles of aggregating 21 initial items into 10 value indexes (Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, Security, Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction), and then 10 indexes into 4 value categories (Conservation,

⁶ This study was conducted in 30 countries. However, Lithuania was included into the dataset only later.

Openness to change, Self-Enhancement, and Self-Transcendence), and then finally 4 categories into 2 value axes (Openness to change – Conservation, and Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement). Only the value-axes were entered into the models [Schwartz, 1992; Magun & Rudnev, 2008].

The *type of welfare state* is a rather complicated variable. On the one hand, there are a number of typologies, but, on the other hand, each typology is elaborated for definite purposes and for a definite set of countries. The most relevant to the present research is the typology of Reeskens and van Oorschot, but it does not include Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Turkey, and Israel in its analysis. I would like to fill this gap. My assumption is that, after adding these countries, we have to divide Central and Eastern Europe countries in two parts: former USSR and ex-communist countries, as was done by Fenger [2007]. This assumption was tested by principle-component analysis at the national level. Descriptions of the results are in the appendix (table A3, figure A1). The classification of countries is presented in table 1.

Tab. 1. Types of welfare states

Social-democratic	Conservative-corporatist	Liberal	Familialistic	Former-USSR	Ex-communist European
Finland	Switzerland	United Kingdom	Spain	Russia	Bulgaria
Denmark	Belgium	Ireland	Greece	Estonia	Croatia
Norway	France		Portugal	Latvia	Czech Republic
Sweden	Germany		Turkey	Ukraine	Hungary
Netherlands			Israel		Poland
			Cyprus		Romania
					Slovakia
					Slovenia

It is necessary to give a description of the basic traits of different types of welfare states. The main feature of *liberal* welfare states is minimal government intervention in the economy and welfare support of population. Social support is provided only for those who are in need, the amount of welfare benefits is small, and it is derived from previous contributions [Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 42; Arts and Gelissen, 2002, p. 141]. This type of welfare state stimulates the market economy, active individual participation in concurrent relationships, employment of both men and women, personal responsibility for financial wellbeing, and private insurance for a variety of social risks. So, on the one hand, individuals are more actively included in economic life, while on the other hand, it creates a high level of inequality and dependency on market conditions.

The *conservative-corporatist* type assumes, to some extent, a higher level of government intervention. But existing practices in welfare policy are oriented to support the actual status quo

of different social groups and social hierarchy. Personal welfare benefits are dependent on previous contributions to welfare state through taxes, years of work, and professional status [Fenger, 2007, p. 6]. The level of decommodification here is higher than in liberal countries. Women are at a disadvantaged position, but an effort has been made in recent years to correct this imbalance [Bonoli, 1997, p. 63].

In *social-democratic* countries, we can see the highest level of decommodification. Welfare benefits are available to all people regardless of personal contributions. “Social policy within this type of welfare state is aimed at a maximization of capacities for individual independence. Women in particular – regardless of whether they have children – are encouraged to participate in the labor market, especially in the public sector” [Arts and Gelissen, 2002, p. 142]. One of the basic features of this type is a high level of statism [Arts and Gelissen, 2010, p. 571].

There is no determined minimum of welfare support in *familialistic* countries. The system of welfare provision is fragmented [Bambra, 2007, p. 1100]. In some studies, the level of welfare support has been described as “rudimentary” because of a lack of commitment to universal goals, such as healthcare [Leibfried, 1992; Bambra, 2007, p. 1100]. Countries of this type were not included in the first classifications of welfare states because scholars did not believe that a welfare state existed there. But Ferrera has attempted to introduce Mediterranean countries into the discourse on welfare states, showing that most elderly people have pension benefits [Ferrera, 1996, p. 19]. The church – Catholic, in most cases – plays an important role in welfare provision in these countries, as it endorses traditional institutions such as the family [Bonoli, 1997, p. 354].

Post-socialist countries were included in the classifications later than the others. “Low levels of spending on social protection and the weakness of social rights are common in post-socialist societies” [Whelan and Maître, 2010, p. 321]. The number of social programs is small, social policy does not strongly affect personal welfare, and the general level of social trust is low [Fenger, 2007, p. 27]. Ferge shows that “the switch from dictatorial state socialism to capitalism in its rather wild form took its toll” [Ferge, 2008, p. 149]. The transition time escalated the level of different social risks; people lost the opportunity to predict their own future and social security, and, concomitantly, there was a rise in demand for state social support [Ferge, 2008, pp. 149-150]. During this time, we see a strong emphasis on personal responsibility and the withdrawal of the state from public and social policies. Privatization and marketization entered all spheres of social life, including the pension system and medical care services. This description refers both to former USSR and ex-communist countries [Ferge, 2008, p. 150].

2.2. Model specifications

Two specifications of the following multilevel model can be presented as a statistical output of the research framework. I prefer multilevel modeling, because welfare attitudes are measured at the individual level, but the strongest predictor of it is the country-level variable. This technique of data analysis is good for hierarchical data structures and especially for nested models [Hox, 2002]. I utilize both individual-level and country-level variables.

The first hypothesis is tested by means of multilevel regression modeling, where the Government Intervention Index (GII) is considered as the dependent variable, values as the independent variable, the type of welfare state as the moderator, and a set of self-interest factors as control variables. Two specifications are considered in the research: The Conservation – Openness to change axis is introduced in the first model, and the Self-enhancement – Self-transcendence axis is used in the second one. A cross-level interaction term of values and type of welfare state is introduced into both specifications in order to test how the type of welfare state moderates the effect of values on GII.


The second hypothesis is tested by means of the same models, but self-interest factors are considered as independent variables and values as control variables. Cross-level interaction terms for four self-interest factors (gender, age, education, and income) and the type of welfare state are introduced into the specification, where both value axes are controlled. Using this procedure, I tested how the type of welfare state moderates the effect of them on GII. Eight models were estimated: 2 main-effect models and 6 cross-level-interaction-effect models. Additionally, I have changed reference groups in types of welfare states for each specification to test whether the interaction effect of values and self-interest factors is significant for all types of welfare states. Generally, 20 additional models are run for this purpose.

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables

The distribution of means for the GII proves the previous findings: Well performing welfare states demonstrate lower levels of demand for government welfare responsibility compared to poorly performing countries. Figure 3 shows a high level of support for government welfare intervention in all the countries, and dispersion within countries is rather significant. But in strong welfare regimes (social-democratic, conservative, and even in liberal regimes) the support and, correspondingly, demand for government welfare intervention is lower than in weak welfare regimes (former USSR, ex-communist, and familialistic countries).

Fig. 3. Mean scores for GII in 29 countries



A comparison of means for GII in six types of welfare states was performed in this study in order to test if there is any merit to introduce the variable “type of welfare state” into the regression models. The results of the analysis of variance indicate a statistically significant difference in the average levels of welfare support between all 6 types of welfare states. The highest demand for state social support is in former USSR countries (8.43), second to these are familialistic countries (8.22), then comes the ex-communist countries (7.78), social-democratic (7.56), liberal (7.23), and conservative countries (7.11). The means, difference of means, and significance of this difference for each type of welfare state are provided in table A4 in the appendix. Means of GII differ in all the types of welfare states, so it is possible to introduce this variable into the regression models.

3.2. Results of multilevel analysis with cross-level interaction effects

Welfare attitudes proved to be contextually determined. The type of welfare state explains over 60% of the GII’s variance, while personal presuppositions explain just 11%. The results of the regression models appear in tables 2 and 4. Nevertheless, most of the individual-level predictors (values, gender, education, income, employment status, and having children) have a significant effect on welfare attitudes. Main-effect models (tables 2 and 4) show a confirmation of the theoretical assumption – that a preference of collectivism over individualism (value axis Conservation – Openness to change) leads to higher support for government welfare intervention while a preference of egoism to altruism (value axis Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence)

leads to lower support. The same can be said about self-interest factors: The stronger one's social position is, the lower the demand for government welfare intervention is. Males, the highly educated, those who have high income and children, as well as those who are employed and do not have any experience of unemployment are all less supportive of the welfare state compared to women, the poorly educated, low-income individuals, those who do not have children, those who are employed but have experience with unemployment, the unemployed, pensioners, and the disabled. Age and type of settlement proved to be insignificant. In former USSR countries the demand for government welfare intervention is the highest compared to all other types of welfare state.

3.2.1. Analysis of the cross-level interaction effects between the type of welfare state and values on GII

Cross-level interaction effect models allow us to test both research hypotheses as a whole. The interaction effect between preferences of collectivism to individualism and the type of welfare state is presented in table 2. There is no statistically significant difference in the slopes showing the effect of a preference of collectivism over individualism on welfare attitudes between former USSR and ex-communist countries. In these countries, the effect of collectivism – individualism dyad is the strongest comparing to other types of welfare states: The higher the support for collectivist values is, the stronger the demand for government welfare intervention is. And, on the contrary, the higher the support for individualistic values is, the lower the demand is. The difference between collectivists and individualists in familialistic, liberal, and conservative countries is not significantly strong. In order to test whether there is any effect of these values on welfare attitudes in these countries, I calculated the conditional effects for all other types of welfare states and performed five additional regression analyses. Every type of welfare state was marked as a reference group. The conditional and interaction effects are presented in table 3.

Tab. 2. Results of multi-level analyses for support for government intervention and Conservation-Openness to change

		Multilevel Regression (Main-Effect Model)		Multilevel Regression (Cross-Level-Interaction- Effect Model)	
Level 1 (49796 Respondents)	R ²	11.4%		11.5%	
Level 2 (29 Countries)	R ²	61.8%		60.6%	
		b	T	b	t
Intercept		8.91	88.42***	8.81	54.25***
Former USSR					
Ex-communist		-0.76	-7.17***	-0.77	-4.71***
Familialistic		-0.06	-0.55***	0.05	0.27
Liberal		-1.08	-13.59***	-0.93	-4.17***

Conservative	-1.13	-10.32***		-0.99	-5.30***	
Social-Democratic	-0.90	-4.82***		-0.78	-4.30***	
Conservation-Openness to change (Former USSR)	0.14	6.55***		0.21	4.77***	
<i>Interaction effects</i>						
Ex-communist				0.04	0.73	
Familialistic				-0.12	-2.24*	
Liberal				-0.15	-2.28*	
Conservative				-0.13	-2.31*	
Social-democratic				-0.11	-2.06	
Gender (1 = Male)	-0.12	-5.47***		-0.12	-5.32***	
Age	-0.02	-1.4		-0.02	-1.24	
Education	-0.07	-3.50**		-0.07	-3.31**	
Income	-0.18	-7.95***		-0.18	-7.82***	
(Employed without experience of unemployment)						
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.18	7.03***		0.18	6.794***	
Students	0.04	1.38		0.04	1.34	
Unemployed	0.10	3.78***		0.10	3.32**	
Pensioners, disabled	0.10	3.52**		0.10	3.14**	
Farm						
Village	-0.02	-0.441		0.01	0.12	
Town	-0.02	-0.53		0.01	0.18	
Suburbs	-0.10	-1.762		-0.07	-1.19	
City	0.00	-0.019		0.03	0.48	
Children	-0.04	-2.396*		-0.04	-2.58*	
Variance Components (Random Effects) Level 2	Variance Component	χ^2	d.f.	Variance Component	χ^2	d.f.
Intercept	0.246	105.059	23	0.257	111.373	23
Conservation-Openness to change	0.013	342.995	28	0.012	293.948	23
Gender (1 = Male)	0.009	71.660	28	0.009	71.656	28
Age	0.004	149.686	28	0.004	149.680	28
Education	0.010	134.521	28	0.010	134.265	28
Income	0.013	171.543	28	0.013	171.522	28
Employed without experience of unemployment						
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.009	48.511	28	0.008	48.493	28
Students						
Unemployed	0.012	46.191	28	0.012	46.184	28
Pensioners, disabled	0.016	58.379	28	0.016	58.363	28
Farm						
Village	0.055	58.911	28	0.052	57.731	28
Town	0.032	41.832	28	0.022	40.663	28
Suburbs	0.064	56.716	28	0.053	56.641	28
City	0.066	56.559	28	0.058	55.169	28
Children						
Level 1	2.096			2.09606		

Note: * p 0.05; ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001; Restricted Maximum Likelihood; Convergence: Main-Effect Model: 51 iterations; Cross-Level-Interaction Model: 23 iterations; the pseudo R2 for the multilevel regression models is calculated according to the simplified formula of Snijders and Bosker (1999)

The results show that the preference of collectivism to individualism (“Conservation – Openness to change” values dimension) has the strongest effect in the former USSR and in ex-communist countries (B=0.21 and 0.24, respectively, both are significant at level $p<0.001$ and there is no statistically significant difference of parameters). In familialistic and social-democratic countries, this effect is not so strong: 0.09 and 0.1, respectively ($p<0.05$). And in liberal and conservative countries there is no impact of these values on welfare support. This means that people holding collectivist (or conservative) values are more supportive of government welfare intervention compared to individualists predominantly in former USSR countries and in ex-communist countries. The difference in the level of welfare support is not so strongly determined by these values in familialistic and social-democratic countries, and there is no difference in the welfare attitudes of those who have collectivist values and those who hold individualist values in liberal and conservative countries. But if we look at the significance of differences in the slopes, we will see that there is no difference in the effects between familialistic countries, where a slight effect was indicated, and in liberal and conservative countries, where there was no effect. A visualization of these regularities is presented in figure 4.

Referring to collectivist – individualist values, the first hypothesis has been proved. In poorly performing welfare states, values have a stronger effect on welfare attitudes compared to well performing countries.

Table 3. Significance of the values Conservation – Openness to change in different types of welfare states

	FU	EC	F	L	C	SD
Conservation-Openness to change (conditional effects)	0.21***	0.24***	0.09*	0.06	0.08	0.10*
Former USSR (FU)		-0.04	0.12*	0.15*	0.13*	0.11
Ex-communist (EC)	0.04		0.16**	0.19**	0.17**	0.15**
Familialistic (F)	-0.12*	-0.16**		0.03	0.01	-0.01
Liberal (L)	-0.15*	-0.19**	-0.03		-0.02	-0.04
Conservative (L)	-0.13*	-0.17**	-0.01	0.02		-0.02
Social-democratic (SD)	-0.11	-0.15**	0.09*	0.04	0.02	

The interaction effects of the preference of egoism over altruism (value axis self-enhancement – self-transcendence) and the type of welfare state are presented in table 4. There is a significant negative effect of preference for egoism over altruism on the demand for government welfare responsibility in former USSR countries. And there is no statistically significant difference in effects between former USSR countries and familialistic, liberal, conservative, and social-democratic countries. The strongest effect of values of this type is in ex-

communist countries. In order to estimate the significance of slopes in ex-communist, familialistic, liberal, conservative, and social democratic countries, I have run five additional regression models where all the types of welfare states were considered as reference groups (table 5).

Tab. 4. Results of multi-level analyses for support for government intervention and Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence

		Multilevel Regression (Main-Effect Model)		Multilevel Regression (Cross-Level-Interaction- Effect Model)	
Level 1 (49796 Respondents)	R ²	11.5%		11.7%	
Level 2 (29 Countries)	R ²	61.6%		62.4%	
		B	t	b	T
Intercept		8.91	88.68***	8.93	56.02***
Former USSR					
Ex-communist		-0.82	-7.03***	-0.91	-5.60***
Familialistic		-0.19	-1.66	-0.19	-1.14
Liberal		-1.11	-10.40***	-1.12	-5.00***
Conservative		-1.29	-10.65***	-1.30	-7.01***
Social-Democratic		-1.00	-5.30***	-1.04	-5.77***
Self-Enhancement - Self- Transcendence		-0.16	-6.98***	-0.11	-2.54**
<i>Interaction effects</i>					
<i>(Former USSR)</i>					
Ex-communist				-0.13	-2.40**
Familialistic				-0.01	-0.19
Liberal				0.00	-0.07
Conservative				-0.03	-0.63
Social-democratic				-0.06	-1.26
Gender (1 = Male)		-0.10	-5.04***	-0.10	-4.93***
Age		-0.01	-0.69	-0.01	-0.60
Education		-0.09	-4.47***	-0.09	-4.25***
Income		-0.18	-8.22***	-0.18	-8.11***
(Employed without experience of unemployment)					
Employed with experience of unemployment		0.16	6.13***	0.16	5.92***
Students		0.00	0.11	0.00	0.11
Unemployed		0.09	3.05**	0.08	2.72*
Pensioners, disabled		0.11	3.64***	0.11	3.32**
Farm					
Village		0.01	0.16	0.02	0.38
Town		0.01	0.21	0.02	0.46
Suburbs		-0.08	-1.45	-0.07	-1.11
City		0.01	0.18	0.03	0.38
Children		-0.05	-3.52***	-0.05	-3.56***

Variance Components (Random Effects)	Variance Component	χ^2	d.f.	Variance Component	χ^2	d.f.
Level 2						
Intercept	0.24	99.47	23	0.24	101.41	23
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	0.02	333.33	28	0.02	324.29	23
Gender (1 = Male)	0.01	64.87	28	0.01	64.88	28
Age	0.00	148.78	28	0.00	148.78	28
Education	0.01	140.90	28	0.01	140.66	28
Income	0.01	167.33	28	0.01	167.41	28
Employed without experience of unemployment						
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.01	48.49	28	0.01	48.50	28
Students						
Unemployed	0.01	48.93	28	0.01	48.93	28
Pensioners, disabled	0.02	62.79	28	0.02	62.78	28
Farm						
Village	0.08	66.46	28	0.08	66.41	28
Town	0.05	44.69	28	0.04	44.66	28
Suburbs	0.06	59.33	28	0.06	59.40	28
City	0.09	66.18	28	0.09	65.69	28
Children						
Level 1	2.09			2.09		

Note: * p 0.05; ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001; Restricted Maximum Likelihood; Convergence: Main-Effect Model: 41 iterations; Cross-Level-Interaction Model: 41 iterations; the pseudo R2 for the multilevel regression models is calculated according to the simplified formula of Snijders and Bosker (1999)

The direction of the effect of preference for egoistic values to altruistic values (“Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence” values) is universally the same: The more egoistic values are preferred, the weaker the support for government welfare intervention is. But the significance of this effect varies across different types of welfare states. The greatest negative effect of these values on welfare support is observed in ex-communist and social-democratic countries. These countries are followed by former USSR, familialistic, and conservative countries. In these countries the effect is moderate, while in liberal countries the effect is negligible.

Referring to egoistic – altruistic values, the first hypothesis is rejected. The highest parameter of effect for these values is in ex-communist countries (-0.24, p<0.001). But after comparing the slope demonstrating this effect in ex-communist countries with slopes showing effects in other types of welfare states, it is evident that there is no difference in the effects in ex-communist countries and liberal, conservative, and social-democratic types. And in former USSR and familialistic countries this effect is even lower. Visual results are given in figure 5.


Thus, our first hypothesis is partially confirmed. The effect of values is conditionally determined. The values of collectivism and individualism shape welfare attitudes in weak

welfare states (former USSR and ex-communist countries), after controlling for personal self-interest. But this is not the case in strong welfare states. As for altruistic and egoistic values, there is no such regularity. The effect of these values is stronger in ex-communist and social-democratic countries, moderate in former USSR and conservative countries, and the lowest in liberal countries. But the difference in the slopes here is not evident. There is no difference in slopes for ex-communist, liberal, conservative, and social-democratic countries. There is a difference when we compare the slopes in ex-communist countries with slopes in former USSR and familialistic countries. But as we compare the slope in former USSR countries with that in other countries, we see that there is just one difference, specifically with ex-communist countries (table 5, figure 4). So it is possible to conclude that the size of the effects is basically the same in all types of welfare states. As a result, the first hypothesis is rejected for egoistic and altruistic values.

Tab. 5. Significance of Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence values in different types of welfare states

	FU	EC	F	L	C	SD
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence (conditional effects)	-0.11**	-0.24***	-0.12**	-0.12*	-0.15**	-0.18***
Former USSR		0.13*	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.06
Ex-communist	-0.13**		-0.11*	-0.12	-0.09	-0.06
Familialistic	-0.01	0.11*		-0.01	0.02	0.05
Liberal	0.00	0.12	0.01		0.03	0.06
Conservative	-0.03	0.09	-0.02	-0.03		0.03
Social-democratic	-0.06	0.06	-0.05	-0.06	-0.03	

Fig. 4. Effect of values in different types of welfare states



3.2.2. Analysis of cross-level interaction effects of the type of welfare state and four components of self-interest on GII

In order to test the second hypothesis, it is necessary to estimate the cross-level interaction effects of the components of self-interest (gender, age, education, and income) with the type of welfare state on the demand for government welfare intervention. The results of the full specification of cross-level interaction effect models for these components are presented in the appendix (tables A5-A8). Most important for testing the second hypothesis are parameters and terms for significance of interaction.

It is not true that women everywhere are more supportive of the welfare state. The most remarkable impact of gender on welfare attitudes can be seen in social-democratic countries (-0.19, $p < 0.001$). The effect is weaker in liberal (-0.15, $p < 0.05$), ex-communist (-0.11, $p < 0.01$), and conservative countries (0.1, $p < 0.05$), and there is no effect of gender in former USSR and familialistic countries (table 6). So the second hypothesis can be rejected here. Women support government welfare intervention stronger in both well (social-democratic) and poorly performing (ex-communist) countries. And there is no difference in welfare attitudes between males and females in former USSR and familialistic countries. The slopes of these regularities are presented in figure 5a.

Main-effect models showed that there is no effect of age on welfare attitudes. But it is not evident that in all types of welfare states the situation is the same. The interaction effects of age and the type of welfare state were analyzed. In order to test the significance of conditional effects for all types of welfare states, I have run six models. In each model a reference group was changed in the “type of welfare state” variable. A slight effect of age on welfare attitudes was found in familialistic, liberal, and conservative countries. But the direction of the effect does not go along with previous findings: Elderly people are less supportive of government welfare intervention in these countries. And in former USSR, ex-communist, and social-democratic countries there is no effect of age (table 6, figure 5b). Regarding age, the second hypothesis is also rejected.

Education can be regarded as a predictor of welfare support only in former USSR and in ex-communist countries. Here a higher level of education results in lower demand for government intervention in welfare regulation. As for strong welfare states and familialistic countries, both highly and poorly educated individuals have the same attitudes regarding this question (table 6, figure 5c). As long as we consider tertiary education as a marker of high social

status and, correspondently, of a strong social position, it is reasonable to assume that the second hypothesis is proved here.


Income has a significant negative effect in all types of welfare states. If we compare the effects between countries, we see that there is no statistically significant difference. But if we estimate the significance of slopes, we can see that it is the strongest predictor of welfare attitudes in former USSR and ex-communist countries (-0.19 and -0.21, respectively, $p < 0.001$), and also in social-democratic countries (-0.18, $p < 0.001$). The effect is lower in liberal⁷ and conservative countries (-0.19 and -0.17, respectively, $p < 0,01$), while the lowest effect is in familialistic countries (-0.11, $p < 0.05$) (table 6, figure 5d). Accordingly, the second hypothesis is also rejected regarding income.

Tab. 6. Significance and differences in conditional effects of four components of self-interest in different types of welfare states

	FU	EC	F	L	C	SD
Gender (conditional effects)	0.04	-0.11**	-0.05	-0.15*	-0.10*	-0.19***
Former USSR		0.15*	0.09	0.19*	0.14*	0.23***
Ex-communist	-0.15*		-0.06	0.04	-0.01	0.08
Familialistic	-0.09	0.06		0.10	0.05	0.14*
Liberal	-0.19*	-0.04	-0.10		-0.05	0.04
Conservative	-0.14*	0.01	-0.05	0.05		0.09
Social-democratic	-0.23***	-0.08	-0.14*	-0.04	-0.09	
Age (conditional effects)	0.03	-0.02	-0.05*	-0.08*	-0.05*	-0.01
Former USSR		0.05	0.08*	0.11**	0.08*	0.04
Ex-communist	-0.05		0.02	0.06	0.03	-0.01
Familialistic	-0.08*	-0.02		0.03	0.00	-0.03
Liberal	-0.11**	-0.06	-0.03		-0.03	-0.06*
Conservative	-0.08*	-0.03	0.00	0.03		-0.03
Social-democratic	-0.04	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.03	
Education (conditional effects)	-0.15***	-0.16***	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.01
Former USSR		0.00	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.17***
Ex-communist	0.00		-0.12**	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.17***
Familialistic	0.12*	0.12**		-0.01	-0.01	-0.05
Liberal	0.12*	0.13*	0.01		0.00	-0.04
Conservative	0.12*	0.13*	0.01	0.00		-0.04
Social-democratic	0.17*	0.17***	0.05	0.04	0.04	
Income (conditional effects)	-0.19***	-0.21***	-0.11*	-0.19**	-0.17**	-0.18***
Former USSR		0.02	-0.08	0.00	-0.02	-0.01
Ex-communist	-0.02			-0.02	-0.04	-0.04
Familialistic	0.08	0.10	-0.10	0.08	0.06	0.06
Liberal	0.00	0.02	-0.08		-0.02	-0.01
Conservative	0.02	0.04	-0.06	0.02		0.00
Social-democratic	0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.01	0.00	

⁷ It is lower because the significance is lower ($< 0,01$).

Fig. 5. Effects of four components of self-interest on GII in different types of welfare states



4. Conclusion

Previous studies have shown that egalitarian values and a weak social position increase individual demand for state welfare support. The basic task of this study was to analyze how the type of welfare state moderates the effect of values and components of self-interest on demand for government welfare intervention. Schwartz's value dimensions were introduced into the research as indicators of collectivistic – individualistic and egoistic – altruistic values. Multilevel regression analyses for six specifications of cross-level interaction effect models were performed. At first I considered how the type of welfare state moderates the effect of two types of values (preference of collectivism to individualism and egoism to altruism, or, using Schwartz's terminology, Conservation – Openness to change and Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence) on the demand for government welfare intervention.

In discussing the results, the first thing we should highlight is that welfare attitudes are strongly context-dependent. The type of welfare state explains over 60% of the variance of demand for government welfare intervention. This means that welfare culture and institutional arrangements shape a common style of welfare legitimacy in general for all the citizens. Poorly performing social policy increases demand for government welfare intervention among citizens, while high performance satisfies this demand and decreases it.

The principle question of this study is whether the type of welfare state moderates the effect of individual-level predictors (values and self-interest) and, if so, in what way. Two hypotheses were tested in the study. The first one considered collectivistic and altruistic values as the stronger predictors of welfare attitudes in poorly performing welfare states. The theoretical background here was the idea of bounded rationality: The less information a person has, the stronger is the effect of values on his or her decision making [Elster, 2007; Kangas, 2007]. In poorly performing countries, where personal welfare does not depend on social policy, social protection and social rights are weak, the rules of welfare redistribution are unclear, people do not have sufficient information to judge about social policy in the country, and, concomitantly, their decisions about government welfare intervention are guided by values [Whelan and Maître, 2010, p. 321; Ferge, 2008, p. 149]. Results show that this hypothesis proved to be true only for the collectivistic – individualistic dyad. The difference between collectivists and individualists in the level of support for government welfare intervention is greater in former USSR and ex-communist countries compared to all well performing types of welfare states, including familialistic countries. But, referring to the egoistic – altruistic dyad, the hypothesis was rejected. The quality of a welfare state's performance does not significantly moderate the effect of these values on welfare attitudes. The effect of preference for egoism over altruism is negative and significant in all cases. It is a little bit stronger in ex-communist and social-democratic countries, but the difference in slopes between the two types is almost insignificant. So, it is possible to assume that altruists require intensive government welfare intervention in all countries, regardless of the quality of the welfare state and the amount of information.

The main effect models confirmed the results of previous studies: The weaker the social position of an individual, the stronger his or her support for a welfare state is. Most components of self-interest are significant: Gender, education, income, employment status, and children. The cross-level interaction effect models were run in order to test the second hypothesis, that a weak social position promotes a higher demand for government welfare intervention in poorly performing countries. This hypothesis was derived from the “improvement – overburden” theory, suggested by van Oorschot and Meuleman. Personal interest was expected to have a

stronger impact in poorly performing countries, such as ex-communist and former USSR, because the demand for government welfare intervention is not satisfied and people want to improve the quality and quantity of social programs [van Oorschot, et al., 2012]. It was expected that people with a weak social position would have a significantly higher degree of welfare support than most people in these countries because of the higher level of income inequality and a lack of existential security there. Four cross-level interaction effect models were used to test how the type of welfare state moderates the effects of gender, age, education, and income on the demand for government welfare intervention in different types of welfare states. The second hypothesis was confirmed only for education: The higher the level of education is, the lower the demand for government welfare responsibility is. But this is true only in former USSR and ex-communist countries. In other types of welfare states there is no effect of education on welfare attitudes: Both highly educated and poorly educated individuals can support government welfare intervention, as well as object to it. This might be explained by a consensus about the level and degree of government welfare intervention between educational groups in well performing countries and shaped by public discussion on the topic. In the former USSR and ex-communist countries, highly educated people are more liberal compared to poorly educated individuals, which is why they express a weak demand for the welfare state. But still, the level of demand of highly educated people in poorly performing countries is higher than in well performing countries.

Income is the strongest determinant of social position and individual-level predictor of welfare attitudes in all types of welfare states. The slope of this regression lines is almost universal everywhere, which means that poor individuals morally support the welfare state more than the rich do regardless as to the performance of the social policy that is typical for a definite country. Moreover, welfare culture and institutional arrangements do not significantly moderate this regularity. The conditional effects of income, moderated by the type of welfare state, are the highest in former USSR, ex-communist, and in social-democratic countries. It is moderate in liberal and conservative countries, and the smallest in familialistic societies. But the difference in slopes is insignificant. Therefore, the second hypothesis was rejected for income.

A stronger effect of gender and age on welfare attitudes was not observed in former USSR and ex-communist countries. So, the second hypothesis here is also rejected. The effect of gender proved to be significant in ex-communist and social-democratic countries. However, a slight effect was observed in liberal and conservative countries, while no effect was noted in former USSR and familialistic countries. This may be explained by the gender peculiarities of labor markets or the specifics of female adaptation in former USSR countries. Age has a slight effect

in conservative, liberal, and familialistic countries: Contradicting theoretical assumptions, the elderly in these countries are less supportive of state welfare intervention. The results, therefore, offer room for discussion on the causes and reasons for irregularities and regularities. To begin with, it is worth having a look at values – the idea that welfare attitudes are guided by different ideological reasons in different cultures. First, concepts such as “collectivism” and “altruism” need to be specified in detail. What do we mean by “collectivism” or “conservation”? Having analyzed initial items suggested by Schwartz (see table A2 in the appendix), it is possible to say that individuals adhering to these values want security. Yet they do not want to contradict existing norms and rules, and therefore reinforce the existing social order. They are collectivists in the sense that such groups do not look for new experiences and personal pleasure. They are devoted to society. Accordingly, they want society (government) to take care of them. And this group is larger in former USSR and ex-communist countries. What does one mean by altruists? Altruists are people oriented not towards order, but basically towards the welfare and wellbeing of others. They oppose egoists who only follow their own interests or espouse survival values. So, the main demarcation here is the attitude to one’s social surroundings: Encouraging conformity or cooperative activity. These may be seen as passive and active values regarding welfare participation.

And here we have several possible explanations. In a poorly performing welfare state, the level of welfare support is insufficient and people want the government to be more involved in solving social problems. And those who are concerned with order and welfare in society (collectivists) feel more deprived and demand more initiatives from the government than individualists. In well performing welfare countries, collectivists are more satisfied by the amount of welfare goods and services. Therefore, there is no difference or a minimal difference between collectivists and individualists in their attitude to government welfare intervention. As for altruists, they have different motivations. Altruists usually demand equal opportunities for all. In the strongest welfare countries (social-democratic) as well as in ex-communist countries, we can see a significant difference in welfare attitudes between altruists and egoists. And it is clear that people who highly estimate achievements and power (egoists) will be against a higher level of government intervention and resist contribution to a welfare state in both weak and strong welfare states.

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Appendix

Tab. A1. Indicators of welfare attitudes and set of self-interest variables

Concepts	Indicators	Items from ESS'04 (2008)
Welfare attitudes	Government intervention index	<p>People have different views on what the responsibilities of government should or should not be. For each of the tasks I read out, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think government should have. 0 means it should not be the government's responsibility at all and 10 means that it should entirely be government's responsibility. Firstly, to...</p> <p>D15 ...ensure a job for everyone who wants one? D16 ...ensure adequate health care for the sick? D17 ...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old? D18 ...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed? D19 ...ensure sufficient childcare services for working parents? D20 ...provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members?</p>
Self-interest factors	Gender	F2 CODE SEX
	Age	F3 In what year were you/was he/she born?
	Education	F6 CARD 67 What is the highest level of education you have achieved? Please use this card: 0. not completed primary education, 1. primary or first stage of basic, 2. lower secondary or second stage of basic, 3. upper secondary, 4. post secondary, non tertiary, 5. first stage of tertiary, 6. second stage of tertiary (Recoded into 4 groups)
	Income	F33 CARD 74 Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household income nowadays? 1. Living comfortably on present income, 2. Coping on present income, 3. Finding it difficult to cope on present income, 4. Finding it very difficult to cope on present income.
	Employment	<p>F8c STILL CARD 69 Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)? Please select only one. 01. in paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business); 02. in education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation; 03. unemployed and actively looking for a job; 04. unemployed, wanting a job, but not actively looking for a job; permanently sick or disabled; 06. retired; 07. in community or military service; 08. doing housework, looking after children or other persons; 09. other)</p> <p>F27 Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months? (yes/no)</p>
	Type of settlement	F5 CARD 66 Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?
Children	F4. Coded form a table of household structure	

Tab. A2. Hierarchy of value indicators developed by Schwartz (for ESS, 21 person descriptions)⁸

Value axis (values of “fourth level”)	Aggregated value categories (values of the “third level”)	Typological value indices (values of the “second level”)	21 personal descriptions (values of the “first level”)
<i>Openness to change – Conservation</i>	<i>Conservation</i>	<i>Security</i>	E It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety. N It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
		<i>Conformity</i>	G He believes that people should do what they are told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching. P It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
		<i>Tradition</i>	I It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself. T Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.
	<i>Openness to change</i>	<i>Self-direction</i>	Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way. K It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others.
		<i>Stimulation</i>	F He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life O He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.
		<i>Hedonism</i>	J Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself. U He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.
<i>Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement</i>	<i>Self- Enhancement</i>	<i>Achievement</i>	D It is important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does. M Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements.
		<i>Power</i>	B It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things. Q It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says.
	<i>Self- Transcendence</i>	<i>Benevolence</i>	L It is very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being. R It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him.
		<i>Universalism</i>	C He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. H It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them. S He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.

⁸ Cited from Magun V., Rudnev M. 2008. Zhiznennye cennosti rossijskogo naselenija: shodstva i otlichija v sravnenii s drugimi evropejskimi stranami. *Vestnik obshhestvennogo mnenija. Dannye. Analiz. Diskussii*, 1 (93), p. 37.

Types of welfare states. Results of principle component analysis

The theoretical assumption that European countries can be divided into six types of welfare states was tested by means of principle component analysis. The Government Intervention Index, Expenditure on Social Protection as a proportion of GDP, the ratio of female to male income tax revenue (% of GDP), the Gini Index, and long-term unemployment (% of unemployed) were selected as items for analysis. Expenditures on social protection and tax revenue reflect the level of redistribution, and, consequently, the higher the level of redistribution is, the weaker individual dependency is on market conditions. A low level of long-term unemployment is also an indicator of weak dependency on market conditions. This corresponds to the index of decommodification constructed by Esping-Andersen. The Gini Index indicates the degree of income inequality; the index is inversely related to social stratification. Finally, the ratio of female to male income partly indicates the responsibility of social agents towards individual welfare: A high ratio indicates a more or less equal position of men and women in the labor market. This also implies that family care is not just the woman's responsibility and material security is not completely the task of men.

The results of the principle component analysis and a description of indicators are given in table A3. The most important results here are factor dimensions. The first dimension I called "Government intervention in equality maintenance", and the second I named "Effectiveness of the labor market". Every country has its own score and can be located in a definite place on a welfare map (figure A1).

Tab. A3. Principle component analysis

Name	Label	Source	N of countries	Component	
				1	2
welfare_state	GII	ESS	29	-0.401	-0.109
soc_expend	Expenditure on social protection as % GDP	Eurostat	29	0.74	0.307
gid_rfmi	Ratio of Female to Male Income	OECD*	28**	0.701	0.289
wdi_tr	Tax Revenue (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators*	29	0.212	0.752
wdi_gini	Gini Index	World Development Indicators*	28**	-0.852	0.253
wdi_lue	Long-Term Unemployment (% of Unemployed)	World Development Indicators*	27***	-0.046	-0.832

* data from QoG data set [Samanni, Marcus, Jan Teorell, Staffan Kumlin & Bo Rothstein. 2010. The QoG Social Policy Dataset, version 11Nov10. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>]


** No data for Cyprus

*** No data for Israel and Ukraine

If we have a look at the "welfare map" (figure A1), we can test our theoretical assumption about the division of welfare states into six types: former USSR, ex-communist countries, familialistic, liberal, conservative, and social-democratic countries. But this still leaves out three

countries due to a lack of indicators: Ukraine, Cyprus, and Israel. Based on previous classifications, a decision was made to define Ukraine as a former USSR country [Fenger, 2007, p. 24], and Cyprus as a familialistic country [Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2011, p. 12]. As for Israel, in the absence of a theoretical base, we could not give it the status of a familialistic country. But it is possible to indicate that the rates of demand for state welfare support, of social stratification, of tax revenues, and of female to male income is rather similar between Israel and other familialistic countries. There is another problem. Germany is very close to ex-communist countries. This fact contradicts our theoretical assumption. Here we can suggest that indicators of Eastern Germany strongly affect aggregate indicators for Germany as a whole. Nevertheless, in this study East and West Germany are analyzed together. Table A4 presents the classification of welfare states.

Fig. A1. Welfare map



Tab. A4. Comparison of the GII means in different types of welfare countries

	Mean	Former USSR	Ex-communist	Familialistic	Liberal	Conservative	Social-democratic
Former USSR	8.43		.649*	.208*	1.160*	1.446*	.867*
Ex-communist	7.78	-.649*		-.440*	.512*	.798*	.220*
Familialistic	8.22	-.208*	.440*		.952*	1.238*	.659*
Liberal	7.27	-1.160*	-.512*	-.952*		.286*	-.293*
Conservative	6.98	-1.446*	-.798*	-1.238*	-.286*		-.579*
Social-democratic	7.56	-.867*	-.219*	-.659*	.293*	.579*	

*. Mean difference is significant at 0.05 (Anova, Tamhein criteria).

Tab. A5. Cross-Level Interaction Effect Model: Interaction of types of welfare state and gender

	Multilevel Regression (Cross-Level Interaction Effect Model)		
Level 1 (49796 Respondents) R ²	11.4%		
Level 2 (29 Countries) R ²	61.7%		
	b	T	
Intercept	8.67	50.14***	
Former USSR			
Ex-communist	-0.61	-3.37**	
Familialistic	-0.04	-0.19	
Liberal	-0.87	-3.53**	
Conservative	-1.05	-5.04***	
Social-Democratic	-0.66	-3.29**	
Gender (1 = Male)	0.04	0.82	
<i>Interaction effects</i>			
Former USSR			
Ex-communist	-0.15	-2.56*	
Familialistic	-0.09	-1.49	
Liberal	-0.19	-2.45*	
Conservative	-0.14	-2.12*	
Social-democratic	-0.23	-3.67***	
Openness to change-Conservation	0.11	5.57***	
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	-0.12	-5.29***	
Age	-0.03	-2.08*	
Education	-0.07	-3.48**	
Income	-0.18	-7.80***	
Employed without experience of unemployment			
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.17	6.18***	
Students	0.03	0.9	
Unemployed	0.08	2.71*	
Pensioners, disabled	0.09	2.76*	
Farm			
Village	0.01	0.14	
Town	0.01	0.19	
Suburbs	-0.08	-1.27	
City	0.03	0.41	
Children	-0.04	-2.66**	
Variance Components (Random Effects)	Variance	χ^2	d.f.
Level 2	Component		
Intercept	0.27	113.10	23
Conservation-Openness to change	0.01	259.72	28
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	0.01	274.17	28
Gender (1 = Male)	0.01	53.18	23
Age	0.00	141.06	28

Tab. A6. Cross-Level Interaction Effect Model: Interaction of types of welfare state and age

	Multilevel Regression (Cross-Level Interaction Effect Model)		
	11.5%		
	61.6%		
	b	T	
Intercept	8.83	55.22***	
Former USSR			
Ex-communist	-0.79	-4.89***	
Familialistic	-0.09	-0.54	
Liberal	-1.07	-4.85***	
Conservative	-1.18	-6.33***	
Social-Democratic	-1.00	-5.54***	
Age	0.03	1.1	
<i>Interaction effects</i>			
Former USSR			
Ex-communist	-0.05	-1.76	
Familialistic	-0.08	-2.58*	
Liberal	-0.11	-2.90**	
Conservative	-0.08	-2.43*	
Social-democratic	-0.04	-1.4	
Openness to change-Conservation	0.11	5.53***	
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	-0.12	-5.29***	
Gender (1 = Male)	-0.09	-4.19***	
Education	-0.07	-3.64***	
Income	-0.18	-7.77***	
Employed without experience of unemployment			
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.17	6.18***	
Students	0.03	0.94	
Unemployed	0.08	2.73*	
Pensioners. disabled	0.09	2.73*	
Farm			
Village	0.00	0.08	
Town	0.01	0.14	
Suburbs	-0.08	-1.3	
City	0.02	0.35	
Children	-0.04	-2.72**	
Variance Components (Random Effects)	Variance	χ^2	d.f.
Level 2	Component		
Intercept	0.25	103.46	23
Openness to change-Conservation	0.01	259.59	28
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	0.01	274.14	28
Gender (1 = Male)	0.01	63.22	28
Age	0.00	113.78	23

Education	0.01	133.88	28	Education	0.01	135.05	28
Income	0.01	167.52	28	Income	0.01	167.36	28
Employed without experience of unemployment				Employed without experience of unemployment			
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.01	48.29	28	Employed with experience of unemployment	0.01	48.25	28
Students				Students			
Unemployed	0.01	46.09	28	Unemployed	0.01	46.07	28
Pensioners, disabled	0.02	58.93	28	Pensioners. disabled	0.02	58.92	28
Farm				Farm			
Village	0.07	62.15	28	Village	0.07	62.22	28
Town	0.04	43.03	28	Town	0.04	43.07	28
Suburbs	0.06	57.46	28	Suburbs	0.05	57.45	28
City	0.08	62.25	28	City	0.08	62.40	28
Children				Children			
Level 1	2.07			Level 1	2.07		

Tab. A7. Cross-Level Interaction Effect Model: Interaction of types of welfare state and education

	Multilevel Regression (Cross-Level-Interaction-Effect Model)	
Level 1 (49796 Respondents) R ²	11.9%	
Level 2 (29 Countries) R ²	63.6%	
	b	T
Intercept	9.14	49.60***
Former USSR		
Ex-communist	-0.87	-4.12***
Familialistic	-0.56	-2.58*
Liberal	-1.57	-5.51***
Conservative	-1.68	-7.05***
Social-Democratic	-1.57	-6.87***
Education	-0.15	-3.97***
<i>Interaction effects</i>		
Former USSR		
Ex-communist	0.00	-0.04
Familialistic	0.12	2.59*
Liberal	0.12	2.21*
Conservative	0.12	2.43*
Social-democratic	0.17	3.39*
Openness to change-Conservation	0.11	5.53***
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	-0.12	-5.30***
Gender (1 = Male)	-0.09	-4.22***
Age	-0.03	-2.02
Income	-0.18	-7.76***
Employed without experience of unemployment		
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.17	6.22***
Students	0.03	0.87
Unemployed	0.08	2.76*
Pensioners, disabled	0.09	2.75*
Farm		
Village	0.01	0.12
Town	0.01	0.16
Suburbs	-0.08	-1.28

Tab. A8. Cross-Level Interaction Effect Model: Interaction of types of welfare state and income

	Multilevel Regression (Cross-Level-Interaction-Effect Model)	
Level 1 (49796 Respondents) R ²	11.7%	
Level 2 (29 Countries) R ²	63.0%	
	b	T
Intercept	8.89	55.75***
Former USSR		
Ex-communist	-0.82	-4.97***
Familialistic	-0.24	-1.42
Liberal	-1.17	-5.21***
Conservative	-1.29	-6.77***
Social-Democratic	-1.05	-5.56***
Income	-0.19	-3.96***
<i>Interaction effects</i>		
Former USSR		
Ex-communist	-0.02	-0.38
Familialistic	0.08	1.3
Liberal	0.00	-0.02
Conservative	0.02	0.27
Social-democratic	0.01	0.21
Openness to change-Conservation	0.11	5.55***
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	-0.12	-5.30***
Gender (1 = Male)	-0.09	-4.25***
Age	-0.03	-2.11*
Education	-0.07	-3.48**
Employed without experience of unemployment		
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.17	6.26***
Students	0.03	0.93
Unemployed	0.08	2.70*
Pensioners. disabled	0.09	2.76*
Farm		
Village	0.01	0.12
Town	0.01	0.16
Suburbs	-0.08	-1.3

City Children	0.03 -0.04	0.4 -2.64**		City Children	0.02 -0.04	0.38 -2.67**	
Variance Components (Random Effects) Level 2	Variance Component	χ^2	d.f.	Variance Components (Random Effects) Level 2	Variance Component	χ^2	d.f.
Intercept	0.20	91.08	23	Intercept	0.23	97.60	23
Openness to change-Conservation	0.01	259.66	28	Openness to change-Conservation	0.01	259.64	28
Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	0.01	274.11	28	Self-Enhancement - Self-Transcendence	0.01	274.11	28
Gender (1 = Male)	0.01	63.25	28	Gender (1 = Male)	0.01	63.25	28
Age	0.00	141.13	28	Age	0.00	141.03	28
Education	0.01	103.49	23	Education	0.01	133.92	28
Income	0.01	167.26	28	Income	0.01	146.66	23
Employed without experience of unemployment				Employed without experience of unemployment			
Employed with experience of unemployment	0.01	48.27	28	Employed with experience of unemployment	0.01	48.28	28
Students				Students			
Unemployed	0.01	46.09	28	Unemployed	0.01	46.08	28
Pensioners, disabled	0.02	58.90	28	Pensioners. disabled	0.02	58.92	28
Farm				Farm			
Village	0.07	62.17	28	Village	0.07	62.17	28
Town	0.04	43.05	28	Town	0.04	43.05	28
Suburbs	0.07	57.48	28	Suburbs	0.06	57.47	28
City	0.08	62.26	28	City	0.08	62.32	28
Children				Children			
Level 1	2.07			Level 1	2.07		

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