



NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY
HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

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BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

WORKING PAPERS

SERIES: SOCIOLOGY
WP BRP 23/SOC/2013

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BASIC HUMAN VALUES OF RUSSIANS: BOTH DIFFERENT FROM AND SIMILAR TO OTHER EUROPEANS³

The basic values of the Russian population and the population of 31 European countries were compared with data obtained by the Schwartz Questionnaire, embedded into the fourth round of the European Social Survey. Conclusions about similarities and differences of basic human values between Russia and other European countries confirm the thesis that Russia is a country which shares a general logic of cultural and social development with the rest of the world and which has a lot in common with countries of a similar economic level and recent political history. In most value comparisons, Russia appeared to be closer to Post-Communist and Mediterranean countries than to Western European or Nordic countries.

The fact that Russians are less committed than most Europeans to the values of caring, tolerance, equality, and ecology, and, conversely, more committed than most Europeans to the competitive “zero-sum” values of personal success, wealth, and power, confirms the validity of current moral criticisms of mass values and morals in Russia. The other disturbing fact is the relatively low commitment of Russians to the values of Openness to Change and, conversely, a strong focus on Conservation. So basic values of Russians create a cultural barrier to the development of an innovation-based economy and to the societal development as a whole.

Thanks to a shift from country-level analysis to individual- and group-level analysis, we challenge the notion of the “average Russian” and demonstrate that the Russian *value majority* consists of two subtypes. Russia also has a sizable *value minority* and its members share values non-typical for most Russians. Two value minorities, which embrace 19% of the Russian population, are more committed to values of Openness and Self-Transcendence than the rest of the Russian population. These value groups are typical for European countries with more prosperous and happy populations and we can hypothesize that in Russia they are also resource groups for the country’s advancement.

JEL Classification: Z10.

Keywords: basic values, European Social Survey, cross-country comparisons, within-country heterogeneity, culture barrier.

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³ This paper is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). It is prepared for a collection of papers based on the Samuel P. Huntington Memorial Symposium on Culture, Cultural Change, and Economic Development, which took place at the National Research University Higher School of Economics on May 24-26, 2010. The event was organized in coordination with the Cultural Change Institute (Prof. Lawrence Harrison) and the Higher School of Economics (Prof. Evgeny Yasin) <http://huntington.hse.ru/en/>. The authors are grateful to V. Gimpelson, M. Zhamkochyan, A. Lukyanova, G. Monusova, A. Zudin, A. Poletaev, and S. Schwartz for their valuable comments and suggestions, and to Nancy Dogerty and Grant Newman for text editing.

There is much debate as to the European (“Western”) or non-European nature of Russian identity and, accordingly, whether its path of development is similar to or distinct from that of other European countries. This study of similarities and dissimilarities of basic human values between Russians and other Europeans appears closely related to broader discussions on how Russia should proceed.

We believe that the results presented below will confirm the general thesis put forward by Shleifer and Treisman in their article “A Normal Country” [Schleifer, Treisman, 2004; see also the more recent publication: Treisman, 2011]. The essence of this thesis is that “compared to other countries at a similar level of economic and political development, Russia looks more the norm than the exception.” In line with their ideas, we can expect that Russian values are relatively close to the values of those European countries which share a similar recent historical experience or a similar level of economic development. We can thus expect that Russia will resemble Post-Communist countries, as well as those older capitalist countries with a lower level of economic development – particularly Southern Europe, rather than Western and Northern Europe.

Russia’s basic values have been the subject of comparative cross-country analysis in a number of studies [Inglehart, 2010; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz, Bardi, 1997; and others], but most of these studies were not focused on Russia specifically. And most of the findings in these earlier studies were based on aggregate data. This means that the whole country was represented by a single point corresponding to the average estimate of its population’s values.

The purpose of this paper is to describe the similarities and differences in basic values between Russians and other Europeans. Specifically, we will: a) compare Russia with other countries on the country averages; b) undertake a more detailed study of within-country heterogeneity in terms of shared values, which will provide a more detailed picture of similarities and dissimilarities between residents of different countries; and, c) apply a multiple regression analysis to identify the role of various determinants of basic values in order to assess the balance of influences that stem from national identity and from individual socio-demographic variables.

Data and Method

Russia has been participating in the European Social Survey (ESS) since 2006 [Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald, Eva, 2007].⁴ This has allowed researchers to draw a value portrait of the Russian population in comparison with the populations of other European countries.

This paper is based mainly on data from the fourth round of the ESS conducted in 2008 and in the beginning of 2009, which are combined with the data from previous rounds of ESS for several countries from the third round held in 2006 for Austria and Ireland, and from the second round held in 2004 for Iceland and Luxembourg. This paper analyzes data from thirty-two countries using a division of European countries into four areas [Norris, Davis, 2007]: Post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine), Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey), Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), and Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The ESS data were weighted by the design and population weights [Weighting ESS Data, 2003].

Our study relies on Shalom Schwartz's approach to basic human values, which he defines as "desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity" [Schwartz, 1994, p. 21].

In the ESS, values are measured by a modification of the Portrait Values Questionnaire developed by Schwartz [Schwartz, Lehmann, Roccas, 1999; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, and Harris, 2001; Schwartz, 2005]. This questionnaire is built upon a ten-value classification that includes the values of Security, Conformity, Tradition, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Benevolence, and Universalism [Schwartz, Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz, 1992]. Later, Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz [2008] demonstrated that the structure of the ESS value measures did not reproduce all the elements of the structure outlined by Schwartz. For example, it is not possible to differentiate between Conformity and Tradition, Benevolence and Universalism, and between Achievement and Power. It is therefore reasonable to merge Conformity with Tradition, Benevolence with Universalism, and Achievement with Power. That is why in this paper we analyze seven value indices instead of ten.

The seven values are measured by 21 value items, which we call "first-level" value variables. Respondents were provided with 21 descriptions of people characterized by certain

⁴ The Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI) conducts the European Social Survey in Russia with the participation of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Anna Andreenkova serves as a national coordinator of ESS in Russia (www.cessi.ru).

values (see table 1) and were asked to assess each of the portraits on a six-point scale: “Very much like me” (6 points), “like me” (5 points), “somewhat like me” (4 points), “a little like me” (3 points), “not like me” (2 points), and “not like me at all” (1 point). In this paper, a stronger commitment to a value is denoted by a higher score (in the ESS Questionnaire and in the original ESS data base the scale direction is reversed).

The seven value indexes (“second-level” value variables) listed in table 1 are calculated as averages of the first-level variables combining each index. To adjust for an individual response set or tendency to use a certain part of the rating scale (e.g. to provide just low, high, or medium ratings in all the answers), Schwartz suggested using the so-called “centering procedure” [Schwartz, 2005; Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky, Sagiv, 1997]. Each of the seven value indices was centered by subtracting the individual average from its raw score for all 21 value items. The implication of the centering procedure is that it “converts absolute value scores into scores that indicate the relative importance of each value in the individual’s whole value system, i.e., the individual’s value priorities” [Schwartz, 2005, ch.4, p.5].

Previous studies by Schwartz showed that the value indexes might in turn be grouped into four higher-order values, which we call value categories (“third-level” variables). Pairs of these value categories are related reciprocally: With the increase of the subjective importance of one value category, the importance of its opposite decreases. These relations allow for the construction of two higher order (“fourth-level”) value dimensions, or value axes (table1).

The value category of Conservation includes Security, Conformity, and Tradition, and the opposing value category of Openness to Change includes Stimulation, Self-Direction, and Hedonism. These two categories constitute the first value dimension, or axis: Conservation – Openness to Change. The second dimension of Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence reflects the opposition between Self-Transcendence, meaning the importance of social equality, tolerance, caring for others, and caring for the environment, and Self-Enhancement, meaning the importance of wealth, power, and personal success.

The scores for the value categories of Openness to Change, Conservation, Self-Transcendence, and Self-Enhancement are calculated as averages of the value indices combining each category. The scores for value dimensions are calculated by subtracting the individual score for Conservation from that for Openness to Change, and the score for Self-Enhancement from that for Self-Transcendence. Thus, value dimensions can be treated as measures of two *value preferences*, a positive Conservation – Openness to Change score reflects a preference for Openness over Conservation and a positive Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence score shows a preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. Negative scores correspond to

Table 1

The hierarchy of value variables (according to Schwartz, 1992, 2003 with revision of Davidov, Schwartz and Schmidt, 2008)

| Value dimensions (fourth level) | Aggregate value categories (third level) | Typological value indices (second level) | 21 questionnaire items (first level) |
|--|--|--|--|
| <i>Conservation – Openness to Change</i> | <i>Openness to Change</i> | <i>Self-direction</i> | Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way. |
| | | | It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others |
| | | <i>Stimulation</i> | He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life |
| | | | He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life |
| | | <i>Hedonism</i> | Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself |
| | | | He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure. |
| | <i>Conservation</i> | <i>Security</i> | It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety |
| | | | It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens |
| | | <i>Conformity and Tradition</i> | He believes that people should do what they’re told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching. |
| | | | It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong |
| | | | It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself. |
| | | | Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family |
| <i>Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence</i> | <i>Self-Transcendence</i> | <i>Benevolence and Universalism</i> | It’s very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being |
| | | | It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him |
| | | | He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life |
| | | | It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them he still wants to understand them. |
| | | | He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him. |
| | <i>Self-Enhancement</i> | <i>Achievement and Power</i> | It’s important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does. |
| | | | Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements |
| | | | It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things. |
| | | | It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says |
| | | | It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him |

the opposite preferences, either for Conservation or Self-Enhancement. Scores of zero correspond to no preference⁵.

An average Russian versus average residents of other European countries

We start with comparisons of country averages for the seven *second-level value indices*. Figures 1-3 show the averages for each of the 32 countries included in the European Social Survey. Each figure presents countries in descending order by importance of the relevant value index. Sample sizes range from 533 (Iceland) to 2740 (Germany). The statistical significance of differences between Russia and other countries (indicated in the figures) was determined using Tamhane's criterion ($p < 0.05$).

The figures show that most differences between Russia and other European countries on value indices are statistically significant and that Russian averages differ from those of other countries more often than they coincide with them. Along the 6 value-indices, Russia occupies an extreme or near extreme position among 32 European countries. Still, Russia shares this position with other countries, usually Post-Communist and Mediterranean.

Russia exceeds most of the countries on Security and occupies a medium-high position on Conformity and Tradition (figure 1). As to those values related to Openness to Change, Russia, by contrast, yields to most European countries on Self-Direction, Hedonism, and Stimulation (figure 2). In the other two value categories – Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence (figure 3) – Russia is on the edge or close to the edge. Russians are committed to Achievement and Power *more* than residents of most other countries under consideration. On the other hand they are committed to Benevolence and Universalism *less* than residents of most other countries. This conclusion about a strong commitment to the values of Self-Enhancement (which includes, in particular, the value of wealth) is consistent with the fact that throughout the 1990s Russia ranked consistently among the world leaders on “materialism” and similar value indicators developed by Ronald Inglehart [Andreenkova, 1994; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, Baker, 2000]. It is also consistent with the conclusion about the increase of “materialistic” work motivation in Russia in the first decade of the 21st century [Magun, 2006].

⁵ In our other publications, we defined the structure of value dimensions with exploratory factor analysis [Magun, Rudnev, 2008, 2010].





Figure 1. The national averages for Security and Conformity and Tradition in 32 European countries.

This Figure, as well as all the Figures and Tables in this paper, is mainly based on data collected in 2008 and in the beginning of 2009. The data for Austria and Ireland were collected in 2006, and the data for Iceland and Luxembourg were collected in 2004.



■ Difference with Russia is statistically non-significant at the 0.05 level

Figure 2. The national averages for Self-direction, Stimulation, and Hedonism in 32 European countries




Figure 3. The national averages for Benevolence and Universalism and Achievement and Power in 32 European countries

Figure 4 depicts Russia and the other 31 European countries in a two-dimensional value space. Moving from left to the right, country averages progress from a preference for Conservation over Openness to Change to a preference for Openness over Conservation, and moving from bottom to top country averages progress from smaller to larger preferences for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. The variation of European countries along the axis of Conservation – Openness to Change is less than along the axis of Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence.

Russia is located almost at the bottom of the Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence dimension and close to the conservative extreme of the Conservation – Openness to Change dimension. This means that *Russians (compared with other Europeans) have one of the lowest preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement and one of the highest preference for the values of Conservation over those of Openness to Change.* The high preference for Conservation over Openness to Change for the average Russian is similar to that of residents of six other countries: There are no statistically significant differences between Russia and Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Cyprus, and Spain. In his or her low preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement, the average Russian has no statistically significant differences only with the average residents of Greece and Israel.

The value map shown in figure 4 demonstrates that, in accordance with the thesis that it is a normal country, Russia is rather close to other Post-Communist countries that have similar levels of economic and political development. Russia is relatively close on the value map to Mediterranean countries – with the exception of Spain – apparently because they have more in common with Russia in terms of economic and political development than Western European or Nordic countries do.

In general, this more holistic value portrait of Russia, which is provided by comparing dimensional averages, corroborates the portrait based on a comparison of seven second-level value indices.




Figure 4. Country averages for preferences for Openness to Change over Conservation and for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement values in 32 European countries

Note: The vertical rectangle includes countries that do not have statistically significant differences from Russia on Conservation – Openness to Change. The horizontal rectangle includes countries that do not have statistically significant differences from Russia on Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence.

On the basis of all the comparisons described in this section, we can depict today’s average Russian as a person who, compared to residents of most other European countries, highly appreciates the security and protection provided by a strong state and who is less

committed to the values of novelty, creativity, freedom, and independence, as well as to risk, fun, and pleasure. The same level of commitment to these values is typical for the people from several other Post-Communist or Mediterranean European countries. The average Russian is more committed to the values of wealth and power, as well as to personal success and social recognition than are residents of most European countries. A strong focus on self-interest leaves less room in the minds of Russians for concerns about equality and justice, about tolerance, about nature and the environment, and even about those that they are very close to. There are very few countries similar to Russia with such a weak preference for the interests of other people over self-interest.

Note that a strong commitment to the values of personal success and wealth is not combined in the minds of Russians with equally pronounced courage, a willingness to act in an innovative way, or a willingness to take risks and to make independent decisions. Even for the sake of success and wealth the people are not ready to challenge actions that go beyond the scope of routine work and that require increased energy and emotional cost. These results demonstrate that there is no adherence whatsoever to collectivist values, which are considered essential for the “Russian soul” by traditionally minded ideologists. Just the opposite, public concern about the low level of altruistic, solidarity values and the exaggerated importance of self-interest orientations in Russian society is well founded.

The reasons for the strong commitment to self-interest are more or less obvious. The rejection of communist ideology and the formation of market institutions during the great social transformation peaked in 1991 have changed the moral priorities of society. Self-interest and competitiveness, previously denounced, have moved into the category of approved behaviors while concern for the welfare of others, by contrast, has lost its highly positive moral evaluation [Magun, 1996]. But as seen from the data above, in most capitalist countries in Europe, a market economy and a non-Communist ideology perfectly coexist with a commitment to altruistic values that is stronger (often a much stronger) than in Russia. This means that the lack of balance between the values of competitive individualism and solidarity established in Russia may well shift toward solidarity, provided that society and the country’s leaders will be ready to make the effort required to achieve this goal.

It is important to reiterate that our conclusion regarding the extremely strong prominence of individualistic values refers to values of Self-Enhancement that are directly related to self-interest and competition, and clearly oppose values of Self-Transcendence, which all in all might be interpreted as a zero-sum game. Self-Direction is another individualistic value that refers to independent decision-making and self-reliance and does not oppose the interests of other people.

Russian society and economy would benefit from independence and self-reliance and the issue is that the average Russian has a rather low commitment to this value.

Comparing countries considering within-country value heterogeneity

Within each country there are people with differing values, and the within-country value diversity is rather big. The average standard deviation from a country's mean is 1.18 for Conservation – Openness to Change and 1.06 for Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence, respectively. Given the normal distribution of these value dimensions, two thirds of the country's population lies within the range of one standard deviation from the mean – in other words, within the range of ± 1.18 for Conservation – Openness and ± 1.06 for Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence. This implies that the magnitude of a within-country range is larger than the distance between the two most distant country means (for instance, between Romania and Iceland, see Figure 4). This means that there are clear grounds to analyze country values with more detailed consideration of within-country value diversity. To accomplish this task, we have started by constructing a typology based on the values of respondents involved in the study. In compiling this typology, we put together the respondents from all the countries without considering their country of residence – only their values.

The unit of analysis was a single respondent and a statistical algorithm (k-means cluster analysis included in SPSS software) was used to distribute people across types (clusters) on the basis of their responses to 21 value items from the questionnaire, regardless of the country of residence. Using gap-statistics to define the optimal number of clusters [Tibshirani, Walther, Hastie, 2001], we decided on a typology consisting of four clusters. In total, the analysis involved 58,742 respondents. There were 8504 (14%) respondents in cluster I, 22,247 (38%) respondents in cluster II, 13,255 (23%) respondents in cluster III, and 14,736 (25%) respondents in cluster IV.

Figure 5 shows the location of four clusters in the Conservation – Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence two-dimensional value space. The respondents comprising *cluster I* are characterized by the strongest preference for Openness over Conservation and by a weak preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. Respondents in *cluster II* are characterized by a weak (close to zero) preference for Conservation over Openness to Change and by the weakest (close to zero) preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement, which means the strongest commitment to the values of Self-Enhancement. *Cluster III* is located in the figure in opposition to cluster II, as these respondents are characterized by a weak (close to zero) preference for Conservation over Openness to Change and by the strongest preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. *Cluster*

IV is located diagonally across from cluster I and is characterized by the strongest preference for Conservation over Openness to Change, as well as a strong preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement.⁶ Thus, we find that four clusters are located at the peaks of a rhombus: the members of each cluster (compared to members of the other clusters) have a higher or lower score on one of the two value axes and a relatively moderate score on another one. The shorter rhombus diagonal corresponds to the direction of the vertical value axis and the longer diagonal is closer in its direction to the axis for Conservation – Openness to Change.




Figure 5. Value clusters comprising the residents of 32 European countries located in the two-dimensional value space (N = 58,742)

Note to Figure 5. The clusters are based on respondent answers to the 21 questionnaire items. The cluster position on the figure is determined by the average estimate of the respondents comprising that cluster on the two value dimensions. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of respondents in the cluster. The respondents who have not answered more than half the items were excluded from the data.

As we already mentioned, the classification of respondents between clusters was based on their responses to 21 questionnaire items without taking into account their country of residence.

⁶ In another paper we have applied a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to classify the same data [Magun, Rudnev, Schmidt, 2012]. The location of classes we received with LCA in the two-dimensional value space overlaps with clusters that we consider in the current paper.

But we can look at how the inhabitants of different countries were distributed among different clusters. Figure 6 shows the proportion of the population of each country in each cluster. It is clear that each country has representatives of all four value clusters. The cross-country differences in values arise due to the fact that people are distributed differently among these types in different countries. By that same token, there are representatives of all countries in each of the four value clusters. There are country-leaders and country-outsiders in each cluster – countries that “contribute” to the cluster the highest or lowest proportion of its population compared to other countries, respectively.

Austria, Iceland, Switzerland, and Denmark are the leaders in cluster I, whose members are characterized by the strongest preference for Openness to Change and by a weak preference for Self-Transcendence. Each of these countries contributes to the cluster at least a quarter of its population. The smallest contribution to cluster I comes from three Post-Communist countries (Romania, Slovakia, and Poland) and three Mediterranean ones (Turkey, Portugal, and Spain), with no more than 10% of each population in the cluster. Overall, this cluster includes 14% of the total sample, making it the smallest among the four. The leading countries in cluster II are Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Israel, Greece, and Portugal) as well as Post-Communist countries (Romania, Slovakia, and Russia). Each of these countries contributes to this cluster from about half to three quarters of its population. The smallest contribution to this cluster (no more than one-fifth of the population) comes from the Nordic and Western European countries – Iceland, Finland, France, and Switzerland. This cluster is the largest one and includes 38% of the total sample. Respondents belonging to cluster III are characterized by a weak (close to zero) preference for Conservation over Openness to Change and by the strongest preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. The countries leading in this cluster are France, Sweden, Switzerland, and Iceland (they contribute from 41% to 55% of their population). The smallest contribution comes again from four Post-Communist countries (Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine) and one Mediterranean country (Turkey); each contributes no more than 8% of the population. This list overlaps with the list of outsiders of the first cluster. The third cluster is of average size and includes about a quarter of the entire sample. Cluster IV is approximately the same size as cluster III. The respondents located in this cluster are characterized by the strongest preference for Conservation over Openness to Change, as well as a strong preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. The countries leading in cluster IV are four Post-Communist countries (Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria), and one Mediterranean country (Spain). These countries contribute to the cluster 35% to 38% of their population. The least represented in this cluster are Nordic countries (Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark) and Western

European ones (Austria, France, and the Netherlands). The contribution of each country ranges from 11% to 13% of their population.

It is noteworthy that the leading countries and outsiders in terms of contribution to a given cluster are always from the same categories of countries – Post-Communist and Mediterranean countries on the one hand, and Scandinavian and West European countries on the other. When representatives of one of these categories contribute a large share of their population, representatives from the other category contribute a small share, and vice versa. Figure 7 presents the distributions between value clusters of populations from the four European regions: Nordic, Western European, Mediterranean, and Post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (excluding Russia).

The shares of different regions are unevenly represented inside each cluster (compare the length of the lines inside each column in figure 7), and, by the same token, each region contributes unevenly to different clusters (compare the width of the columns inside each line). Notably, the inequality of contributions in different clusters is expressed most dramatically in Post-Communist and Mediterranean countries: Each of them has two large contributions (in most cases in the second and fourth clusters) and two much smaller contributions (usually in the first and third clusters).

Such inequality is characteristic for Russia also. The majority of Russians (81%) are found in the second (48%) and fourth (33%) clusters, where Post-Communist and the Mediterranean countries are the leaders. There are also two value minorities in Russia, whose values are atypical for the country population, but these groups are not so minor in size: Every eighth Russian (13% of the Russian sample) is found in the first value cluster and another 6% belong to the third value cluster (the most advanced Nordic and West European countries are leaders in both of these clusters).




Figure 6. Distribution of the population of 32 European countries among value clusters, % of row

Note to Figure 6. Cluster I: the strongest preference for Openness over Conservation and a weak preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement; Cluster II: a weak (close to zero) preference for Conservation over Openness to Change and the weakest (close to zero) preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement; Cluster III: a weak (close to zero) preference for Conservation over Openness to Change and the strongest preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement; Cluster IV: the strongest preference for Conservation over Openness to Change as well as strong preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement.




Figure 7. Distribution of the Russian population and of four groups of European countries among value clusters

As we demonstrated previously, Russia’s value averages, compared with those of other countries, are extremely low on the Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence and Conservation – Openness to Change value dimensions (see figure 4). We can now see that these averages result from putting together two Russian value majorities. *Thus, the Russian majority belongs to value types that have either a weaker preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement or the strongest preference for Conservation over Openness to Change compared to all other types.* The strongest preferences for either Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement or for Openness over Conservation are not characteristic of the Russian majority at all, but are preferences characteristic for the two minor fractions of Russian society. The 13% of Russians in the first cluster expressed the strongest preference for Openness to Change over Conservation, combined with a weak preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. The 6% of Russians in the third cluster are characterized by the strongest preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement, combined with close to zero preference for Conservation over Openness to Change.

Thus, due to the transition from country-level to individual-level analysis and to the construction of a classification of individuals, we have managed to split the portrait of the “average Russian” into two subtypes that together form the *Russian value majority*. We have also managed to detect two groups of *Russian value minorities*, which are radically different in their values from the value types predominant in Russia. Still, every fifth Russian belongs to these minority groups.

Since each value type is represented in each European country, Russia has some commonality with each of these countries. Russian value minorities, for example, are more similar in their values to value majorities in such countries as France, Switzerland, or Sweden, than they are to the majority of their fellow citizens. In turn, however, these European countries

have portions of their populations whose values are closer to the Russian value majority than to their compatriots who adhere to different beliefs.

The refined cross-country comparisons of values: results of multiple regression analysis

The results presented in the previous sections have demonstrated the impact of one's country of residence on value commitment, but these effects may be mixed with effects of other individual variables. In order to check if a country's effects on values described above will sustain while controlling for individual differences, we employed a multiple regression analysis.

Table 2 contains the coefficients for linear regression models with two value dimensions of Conservation – Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence as dependent variables. The main independent variable is the country of residence, which is the focus of our attention here. Control variables include such predictors as gender, age, and characteristics of parents (Does either parent have a higher education? Did the respondent have a father when he or she was 14 years old? Did either parent have subordinates when respondent was fourteen? Was either parent an immigrant?) Each of these characteristics may affect a respondent's values, but a reciprocal influence on these characteristics from the values is improbable, so these variables are exogenous.

We constructed two versions of regression models for each dependent variable. The first version contains individual countries as the independent variable and the second version contains country categories instead of individual countries. The model quality measured by R^2 ranged from 0.16 to 0.26.

The purpose of regression analysis is to compare other countries with Russia. This is why whether a respondent resides in Russia was selected as a control group for the country variable. Therefore, the regression coefficients describing country effects indicate how values are influenced by living in that country as compared to living in Russia.

Table 2 demonstrates that the differences between Russia and other countries or country categories have a statistically significant impact on individual scores for both value dimensions. Most of the regression coefficients for the country dummy variables are statistically significant. This means that the value differences between Russia and other countries are sustained while controlling for the socio-demographic composition of the countries being compared. In other words, these differences are not reducible to cross-country differences in the socio-demographic

structure and are explained by economic, political, or cultural features of the countries studied, stretching beyond their socio-demographic composition.

The significant regression coefficients indicate that Russia is characterized by a stronger preference for Conservation over Openness to Change when compared to the 27 other countries. There are only three countries with insignificant differences with Russia along this dimension. Additionally, in relation to one country (Ukraine) Russia is less committed to Conservation. Controlling the socio-demographic variables in the regression analysis maintains the same general pattern of cross-country differences for Conservation – Openness to Change. This is confirmed by a high positive correlation (0.98, $p < 0.001$) between country average scores on this dimension (figure 4) and regression coefficients (table 2, model I, left column).

For the value dimension of Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence, controlling for socio-demographic variables in the regression analysis causes little change with relation to an unrefined comparison of country averages. Regression coefficients indicate that Russia is characterized by a weaker preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement compared to 27 other European countries (there were 26 such countries in unrefined comparisons). Russia has stronger committed to Self-Transcendence compared to only three countries – Romania, Latvia, and Turkey. There is a high positive correlation (0.99, $p < 0.001$) between country average scores on this dimension (figure 4) and regression coefficients (table 2, model I, right column).

Table 2

Unstandardized linear regression coefficients (B) for two value dimensions (N = 57,501)

| | Model I – with individual countries | | Model II – with country categories | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dependent variable – individual scores on value dimension <i>Conservation – Openness to Change</i> ; $R^2=0.26$ | Dependent variable – individual scores on value dimension <i>Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence</i> ; $R^2=0.23$ | Dependent variable - individual scores on value dimension <i>Conservation – Openness to Change</i> ; $R^2=0.24$ | Dependent variable - individual scores on value dimension <i>Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence</i> ; $R^2=0.16$ |
| Respondent's country (<i>Russia is reference group</i>) | | | | |
| Austria | .92* | .48* | - | - |
| Belgium | .65* | .77* | - | - |
| Bulgaria | -.02 | .49* | - | - |
| Croatia | .16* | .44* | - | - |
| Cyprus | .22* | .52* | - | - |
| Czech Republic | .41* | .28* | - | - |
| Denmark | 1.06* | .88* | - | - |
| Estonia | .49* | .72* | - | - |
| Finland | .60* | 1.19* | - | - |
| France | .86* | 1.24* | - | - |
| Germany | .76* | .83* | - | - |
| Greece | .43* | .13* | - | - |
| Hungary | .52* | .38* | - | - |
| Iceland | 1.00* | 1.11* | - | - |
| Ireland | .39* | .71* | - | - |
| Israel | .45* | -.03 | - | - |
| Latvia | .59* | -.23* | - | - |
| Luxembourg | .45* | 1.01* | - | - |
| Netherlands | .92* | .70* | - | - |
| Norway | .56* | .74* | - | - |
| Poland | .00 | .41* | - | - |
| Portugal | .46* | .21* | - | - |
| Romania | .15* | -.21* | - | - |
| Slovakia | -.02 | .15* | - | - |
| Slovenia | .62* | .33* | - | - |
| Spain | .12* | 1.20* | - | - |
| Sweden | 1.01* | .90* | - | - |
| Switzerland | .98* | .88* | - | - |
| Turkey | .21* | -.16* | - | - |
| Ukraine | -.08* | .19* | - | - |
| United Kingdom | .60* | .78* | - | - |
| Respondent's country group (<i>Russia is reference group</i>) | | | | |
| Post-Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe | - | - | .24* | .26* |
| Mediterranean countries | - | - | .29* | .33* |
| Western European countries | - | - | .73* | .82* |

| | | | | |
|--|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Nordic countries | - | - | .81* | .96* |
| Respondent's gender – female | -0,23* | 0,35* | -.23* | .34* |
| Respondent's age (14-20 years old is reference group) | | | | |
| age 21-25 | -.13* | .09* | -.14* | .10* |
| age 26-30 | -.36* | .21* | -.38* | .25* |
| age 31-35 | -.53* | .28* | -.54* | .32* |
| age 36-40 | -.62* | .34* | -.63* | .38* |
| age 41-45 | -.73* | .42* | -.72* | .46* |
| age 46-50 | -.80* | .50* | -.80* | .55** |
| age 51-55 | -.94* | .60* | -.94* | .64* |
| age 56-60 | -1.04* | .65* | -1.05* | .70* |
| age 61-65 | -1.21* | .74* | -1.22* | .79* |
| age 66-70 | -1.37* | .77* | -1.36* | .82* |
| age older than 70 | -1.64* | .83* | -1.64* | .91* |
| Respondent's parental family characteristics | | | | |
| When respondent was 14 father was absent | .05* | .08* | .08* | .09* |
| When respondent was 14 mother was absent | -.02 | .02 | -.03 | .07 |
| At least one of the respondent's parents has a higher education | .28* | -.09* | .27* | -.09* |
| When respondent was 14, at least one of his/her parents was a supervisor | .15* | .03 | .17* | .04* |
| At least one of the respondent's parents is an immigrant | -.06* | -.04* | -.09* | .11* |
| Constant | -.21* | .30* | -.30* | .14* |

* - coefficient is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$

The regression model II with country categories as predictors represents the peculiarity of Russia in a more compressed form (table 2). According to these comparisons, Russians are more committed to the values of Conservation (to the detriment of Openness to Change) and Self-Enhancement (at the expense of Self-Transcendence) than people located in any of the four country categories. All the relevant regression coefficients are statistically significant, but they vary for different country categories. In their commitment to Conservation, Russians are way above inhabitants of Nordic and Western European countries and closest to representatives of Post-Communist and Mediterranean countries, although these are statistically behind Russians as well. In their commitment to Self-Enhancement, Russians surpass Scandinavians and Western Europeans and are closer to inhabitants of Post-Communist and Mediterranean countries (the regression coefficients for these countries are statistically significant, as well). Note that the regression models with country categories confirm the assumption (expressed in the beginning of

this paper) that Russia will be closer in its values to Post-Communist countries, with whom it has a common recent historical experience and similar level of economic development, and closer to Mediterranean countries than to Western European and Nordic countries.

We now describe the statistically significant regression coefficients of socio-demographic predictors. The regression coefficients indicate that women, more so than men, are committed to Conservation and Self-Transcendence. The parental family characteristics exert significant influence on values also: The absence of a father increases the importance of both Openness and Self-Transcendence. A parent's higher education and their managerial status at work increase the importance of Openness to Change at the expense of Conservation. As to the second value dimension, the preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement becomes weaker with a parent's higher education. A parent's immigrant status definitely increases the preference for Conservation over Openness to Change and provides inconsistent evidence related to the Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence dimension.

The effects of age are consistent and much stronger than the effects of other socio-demographic predictors just mentioned for both value dimensions. Every age group over twenty years old is more strongly committed to the values of Conservation (at the expense of Openness to Change) and to the values of Self-Transcendence (at the expense of Self-Enhancement) compared with the youngest group of 14 to 20 years old. The magnitude of regression coefficients grows steadily with age, which means that there is a linear relationship between a respondent's age and commitment to Conservation and Self-Transcendence.

The effects of age are stronger for the Conservation – Openness to Change dimension (the average magnitudes of regression coefficients for age equal 0.85 for Model I and 0.86 for Model II) and weaker for Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence (the average magnitudes of regression coefficients for age equal 0.49 for Model I and 0.54 for Model II).

With regard to the individual position along the dimension of Conservation – Openness to Change, a respondent's age is the stronger determinant and one's country has less influence. The average magnitude of regression coefficients for age equals 0.85 (or 0.86 for Model II) and the average magnitude of the country regression coefficients equals 0.50 (0.52 for Model II). As for the individual position on the dimension of Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence, the respondent's country determines it as strong as age does. The average magnitude of the regression coefficients for age is equal to 0.49 (0.54 for Model II) and the average magnitude for the country regression coefficients equals 0.58 (0.59 for Model II). Thus, to predict an individual's value preference along the dimension of Conservation – Openness to Change, it is more important to know his or her age, and to predict an individual's value preference along the

dimension Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence, it is equally helpful to know either a respondent's age or in which country he or she lives.

Thus, the regression analysis confirms the influence of country affiliation on basic human values and demonstrates that this influence remains intact or becomes even more salient when the impact of socio-demographic composition of a country is controlled for. The next task is to find out what exactly are the characteristics of countries that affect the values under consideration.

The work of Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues [Inglehart, Baker, 2000] demonstrates that one of the key correlates of a country's values is its level of economic development. Applying this approach to our data, we correlated country averages on the two value-dimensions, with the country's level of gross national income (GNI) per capita as the key indicator of economic development.

The correlations of country averages for both value dimensions with GNI per capita are high. The correlation coefficient equals 0.81 ($p < 0.01$) for Openness to Change – Conservation and 0.72 ($p < 0.01$) for Self-Transcendence – Self-Enhancement (figures 8 and 9), which means that as GNI increases the country averages change to a weaker preference for Conservation over Openness and to a stronger preference for Self-Transcendence over Self-Enhancement. These findings are consistent with those of Inglehart and his colleagues on the correlations of country economic development with the Traditional/Secular-Rational and Survival/Self-Expression values [Inglehart, Baker, 2000; Inglehart, Welzel, 2005] and with the ideas of Abraham Maslow [Maslow, 1970] regarding strengthening the needs of higher levels as “physiological”, and security needs become saturated.

Figures 8 and 9 confirm the thesis mentioned earlier that describes Russia as a country that conforms to the general logic of social development (and in this sense, as a “normal” country). The reader can see that the points corresponding to Russian averages on Conservation – Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence are located close to the trend-lines characteristic for the entire set of European countries. And the position of the average Russian along the two value dimensions are close to the average positions of other countries with the similar levels of GNI. Still, it is worth mentioning that Russia is a bit lower than both regression lines, especially the line for Conservation – Openness (Figure 8). This means that the average preference for Conservation over Openness to Change is stronger for the average Russian than it might be when relying on a country's level of economic development.




Figure 8. The relationship between GNI per capita and country averages of the value dimension for Conservation – Openness to Change. The correlation coefficient equals 0.81 (Luxembourg and Norway are excluded as outliers).




Figure 9. The relationship between GNI per capita and country averages of the value dimension for Self-Enhancement – Self-Transcendence. The correlation coefficient equals 0.72 (Luxembourg and Norway are excluded as outliers)

In spite of the remarkable correlation between country averages for value dimensions and country GNI per capita, we should not reject other ways (unrelated to increasing GNI) to influence Russian values in the direction of Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence. Even if we assume that the level of wealth produced by the country is really the cause and values are the result, the correlation level is not 100 percent (R^2 equals 0.64 and 0.49, respectively) which leaves enough space for proactive social actors: For leaders who are ready to be role models for openness or altruism, for government officials who control schooling, for the media, for civil society activists, and the like.

Conclusion

We compared basic values of the Russian population with the values of the population of 31 European countries with data obtained by the Schwartz Questionnaire, which was embedded in the 4th round of the European Social Survey.

According to a comparison of country averages, compared to residents of most other European countries, Russians highly appreciate security and protection from a strong state and are not committed to the values of novelty, creativity, freedom, and independence, as well as to risk, fun, and pleasure. The same level of commitment to these values is typical for inhabitants of several other European countries, mostly Post-Communist and Mediterranean countries. Controlling for socio-demographic variables has demonstrated that the general pattern of cross-country differences along value dimensions stay robust.

In regard to the importance of another group of values, the average Russian is more peculiar and similar to residents of only a small number of European countries. These reflect a strong commitment to the values of wealth and power, as well as to personal success and social recognition. Compared to those surveyed in other countries, this strong focus on self-interest leaves less room in the minds of Russians for concerns about equality and justice in their own country and in the world, about tolerance, the nature and environment, and even about people they are very close to.

In the minds of Russians, a strong will for personal success and wealth is not combined with equally pronounced values of courage, a willingness to act in an innovative way, to take risks, and to make independent decisions. Even for the sake of success and wealth, Russians are not ready to take actions that go beyond the scope of performing routine duties and require increased energy and emotional costs.

Conclusions about the similarities and differences of basic human values between Russia and other European countries confirm the thesis that Russia is a country that shares a general logic of cultural and social development with the outside world and that has a lot in common

with countries of a similar economic level and that have a common recent political history. In most value comparisons, Russia appears to be closer to Post-Communist and Mediterranean countries than to Western European or Nordic countries. Moreover, Russia appeared to be close to the trend line characteristic for the whole set of European countries, demonstrating a relationship between a country's GNI per capita and averages on two value dimensions.

The fact that Russians are less committed than most Europeans to the values of caring, tolerance, equality, and ecology and, conversely, more committed than most Europeans to the competitive "zero-sum" values of personal success, wealth, and power, confirms the validity of current moral criticism of mass values and morals in Russia. The other disturbing fact is the relatively low commitment of Russians to the values of Openness to Change and conversely a strong focus on Conservation. So, Russia's basic values create a cultural barrier [Harrison, 2008; Yasin and Snegovaya, 2009] to the development of an innovative economy and to societal development on the whole.

However, a look at within-country value heterogeneity challenged the country averages, demonstrating that there are four value clusters in Europe and that each of the 32 countries studied has residents in each of these value clusters. The distribution of populations among these clusters varies by country and the majority of Russians were found in the two clusters that consist mainly of other Post-Communist and Mediterranean populations. Thanks to the shift from country-level analysis to individual- and group-level analysis, we challenge the notion of the "average Russian" and demonstrate that the Russian *value majority* consists of two subtypes. Russia also has a sizable *value minority* and its members share values that are non-typical for most Russians. Two value minorities that embrace 19% of the Russian population are more committed to the values of Openness and Self-Transcendence than the rest of the Russian population. These value groups are typical for European countries with more prosperous and happy populations, and we can hypothesize that they are also resource groups for social advancement in Russia. Since they are different from the dominant Russian value types, it is crucial for the Russian government and society to provide these minority value groups with opportunities to interact smoothly with majority groups and to exert their influence on the path of country development.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1

The sample details in various countries

| | Type of probability sample frame | Type of sampling procedure | Achieved response rate, % | Final net sample size* | Mode of survey | Schwartz Portrait Values Questionnaire |
|----------|----------------------------------|--|---------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| Austria | Address | Stratified three-stage probability | 64 | 2432 | Paper and pencil interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Belgium | Individual | Stratified two-stage probability | 59 | 1760 | Computer assisted personal interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Bulgaria | Address | Stratified three-stage probability | 75 | 2231 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Croatia | Address | Stratified probability sampling | 46 | 1483 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Cyprus | Household | Geographically stratified two-stage random | 81 | 1215 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|------------|--|----|------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Czech Republic | Address | Three-stage stratified random | 70 | 2018 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Denmark | Individual | Simple random | 54 | 1596 | Computer assisted personal interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Estonia | Individual | Systematic random | 57 | 1660 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Finland | Individual | Single-stage equal probability systematic | 68 | 2195 | Computer assisted personal interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| France | Household | Stratified three-stage probability | 50 | 2074 | Computer assisted personal interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Germany | Individual | Stratified two-stage probability design separately for East and West Germany | 43 | 2751 | Computer assisted personal interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Greece | Household | Stratified clustered three-stage probability | 74 | 2073 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Hungary | Individual | Stratified two-stage mixed random/cluster | 61 | 1542 | Paper and pencil interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Iceland | Individual | Simple random | 48 | 578 | Computer assisted personal interview | No information |
| Ireland | Address | Three-stage probability | 49 | 1766 | Paper and pencil interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Israel | Household | Three-stage probability | 77 | 2489 | Paper and pencil interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Latvia | Address | Stratified two-stage probability | 57 | 1981 | Paper and pencil interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Luxembourg | Household | Stratified two-stage probability | 50 | 1752 | Paper and pencil interview | Face to face interview |
| Netherlands | Address | Unstratified two-stage probability | 50 | 1777 | Computer assisted personal interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Norway | Individual | A one-stage systematic random | 60 | 1548 | Computer assisted personal | Self-completion questionnaire |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|------------|--|----|------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | | | | | interview | |
| Poland | Individual | A simple random for large cities and clustered for smaller towns | 71 | 1615 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Portugal | Household | Stratified three-stage probability | 76 | 2368 | Computer assisted personal interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Romania | Household | Stratified three-stage probability | 69 | 2147 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Russia | Address | Stratified four-stage probability cluster | 67 | 2513 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Slovakia | Address | Stratified four-stage probability | 73 | 1808 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Slovenia | Individual | Stratified two-stage probability | 59 | 1284 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Spain | Individual | Stratified two-stage probability | 67 | 2578 | Computer assisted personal interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Sweden | Individual | One-stage equal probability without clustering | 62 | 1827 | Computer assisted personal interview | Self-completion questionnaire |
| Switzerland | Household | Two-stage probability | 49 | 1818 | Computer assisted personal interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Turkey | Household | Stratified four-stage probability | 65 | 2480 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| Ukraine | Address | Stratified four-stage probability | 62 | 1846 | Paper and pencil interview | Face-to-face interview |
| United Kingdom | Address | Stratified three-stage probability | 54 | 2345 | Computer assisted personal interview | Mixed |

* Final net sample size is equal to the number of respondents that had general consent to collaborate and have answered at least a part of the questionnaire. It does not account for non-responses to certain items.

SOURCES FOR TABLE A.1:

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