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MANAGED COMPETITION AND VOTING STABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIAN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS (2003-2011)

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Does limited competition promote voting stability and party system institutionalization? Since Russian political parties face administrative impediments to participating in elections, only those who adapt to the changing rules remain in the game. Thus, voters have a limited number of parties to support and with no alternatives they might tend to stick to their choice. In this paper, I take stability in electoral support as an indicator of party system institutionalization and test whether limited competition in non-democratic Russia leads to voting stability and party system institutionalization. Empirical evidence is taken from the Russian State Duma elections in 2003-2011.

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Introduction

What determines the strength and stability of party systems? This issue has been widely examined in democracies with long running party systems, since old democracies are considered to have the characteristics which contribute to the longevity of parties and party systems. These include internal, external, structural and environmental features that enforce extended voter support. Most of them can be combined under the single umbrella concept of institutionalization (see for instance Huntington 1968; Burnell 2004; Randall and Svåsand 2002 etc.).

In the most general approach, institutionalization serves as an analytical tool for examining these characteristics. It explains to what extent the dimensions contribute to the stability, viability and reproduction of the party system. Thus, the institutionalization of parties and party systems has become one of the central issues for comparative political studies as it captures the overall nature of stability. On the contrary, institutionalization's too general understanding gives no clue to where its boundaries are and how to measure it (Randall and Svåsand 2002). Scholars still argue about the concept operationalization and appropriate measurement techniques and strategies to disclose the essence of what institutionalization level truly indicates in diverse party systems and political regimes (Janda 1980; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Levitsky 1998; Rose and Mishler 2010).

Russian conditions for party competition differ from democratic countries. Under moderated elections, the Russian electoral law limits the competition so that only a few parties remain in the game (Golosov 2006; Ross 2011). Institutionalization in a non-democracy can exist as well, however, resulting not from gradual party routinization as in democracies, but usually from state-level decisions enforcing artificial institutionalization practices. Logically, limited competition in Russia might promote voters to make their choice from the stable set of parties—the ones which have continuously existed during the whole analysed period and which have achieved a reputation, recognition and core support. The more or less constant set of election participants with well-recognized blueprints might serve the stability of voter choice. I argue that with no or low opportunity for new parties to enter the electoral market, voters might divide their preferences between those who remain stable in the list of participants. Stable support of the continuous parties might serve the increase of the party system institutionalization level.

To examine this assumption, I work out a voting stability measurement approach that indicates the level of the party system institutionalization level, and

then I investigate whether limited competition in Russia contributes to voter loyalty to the continuous parties. The evidence is taken from the Russian parliamentary elections from 2003 to 2011.

Theoretical framework: Approaches to institutionalization

The first scholars of political institutionalization defined the baseline institutionalization criteria to explain institutionalization processes in the democracies. Samuel Huntington (1968) pioneered the first wave of institutionalization studies. He defined the fuzziest criteria and proposed four dimensions of institutionalization: adaptability/rigidity, complexity/simplicity, autonomy/subordination, and coherence/disunity. Evidently, Huntington examined institutionalization from a functional viewpoint with an emphasis on its instrumental characteristics. His approach, however, did not provide clear guidelines for operationalization and measurement. Alexis de Tocqueville (1969) pioneered the social approach to institutionalization claiming the importance of the value dimension. Furthermore, he largely defined institutionalization as a by-product of the society, arguing that specific social characteristics emerge in response to internal social processes and contribute to the learning of common habits, ideas, which in turn shape the national identity. Thus, he referred to this type of national identity as a feature of political institutionalization.

Critics or Huntington's approach developed his theoretical dimensions and suggested more structured measurement criteria. Ben-Dor (1975) found Huntington's theory contradictory and argued that in Huntington's understanding of institutionalization, stability and value (as well as other dimensions) seem consistent and conclusive. On the contrary, Ben-Dor emphasized that 'valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their stability; while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be valued' (Ben-Dor 1975: 313). With this statement, he demonstrated that the four dimensions may not exist in the same systems and some of them may even distinctly diverge from one another. Janda (1970) focused on values and considered them a dimension of a party's external relations rather than internal. He emphasised the perception of a party by the wider society. Thus, he stated the importance of a party's reification in the public mind and argued that its perception functions as a party's value measure within a society. Disagreeing with Panebianco's idea of loyalty to the party leader (1988), Janda highlighted the importance for a party to retain symbolic independence from its leaders.

Defining a minimum set of dimensions similarly to Panebianco (1988), I assume that one or two dimensions are sufficient to judge the party system institutionalization overall.

Turning specifically to parties, Panebianco applied Huntington's criteria of institutionalization to political parties and examined political parties as a type of political organizations. In particular, he claimed that parties solidify and cumulate value becoming more independent of changing of voter preferences. For the same reason, the party's survival became valuable both for the party itself and for its supporters. Finally, Panebianco stated the importance of two criteria for a party's institutionalization: the party's ability to remain autonomous from the environment and its internal structure systemness. Levitsky (1998) emphasised that researchers of institutionalization often leave aside the initial conception of institutionalization which is based on 'value infusion' (Selznick 1957), that is, when a party's value is deeply rooted in society, it implies an organizational routinization and contributes to the party's external value and internal order.

However, there are major differences between party systems in democracies and non-democracies. The third wave of democratization revealed the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes with party systems possessing a different logic of institutionalization. My theory mostly builds on Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Randall and Sväsand (2002), and Rose and Mishler (2010) whose findings show the specific features of parties, and party system institutionalization in non-democratic regimes. According to Mainwaring and Scully, institutionalization and democratic consolidation emerge with the stabilization of rules for party competition, since in non-democratic regimes with relatively free and fair elections, legislation crucially determines the 'rules of the game'. Thus, the same as in democracies parties in autocracies parties need to meet the minimum institutionalization criteria. First, the major parties need to be rooted in society. Second, major political actors and institutions have to regard parties as key legitimate bodies receiving power through legitimate elections. Third, parties have to remain loyal to their leaders. On the contrary, Randall and Sväsand (2002) argued that Mainwaring and Scully's approach underestimated the difference between the dimensions of a party and a party system institutionalization. To fill the gap, the scholars provided a simple two-dimensional analytical model. It distinguished between internal and external dimensions, and between structural and attitudinal aspects to yield four key elements: 'systemness', 'value infusion', 'decisional autonomy' and 'reification' (Randall and Sväsand 2002:

24). The scholars concluded that during the institutionalization process parties acquire reification and sustainability contributing to their long existence.

My argument is most closely related to the one presented in Rose and Mishler (2010), where the authors argued that in a non-democratic regime, party system institutionalization can be measured with the sets of influences: stability in election law (Mainwaring and Scully stated the same idea), persisting commitments to parties by political elites and voters, and learning by elites and voters. Similarly, I outline the electoral legislation amendments in 2003-2011 and examine their influence on party competition in Russia. Second, I operationalize voter and elite commitment to the parties by measuring region-by-region party electoral support stability (i.e. voting geography reproduction). The more stable the support and the more accurate the party voting geography reproduction, the more loyal voters to their parties.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The two empirical sections examine the evolution of Russian electoral legislation and analyse the national level electoral campaigns from 2003 to 2011. The next sections outline the electoral and historical context, which influenced the development of the Russian party system. Then, I present my approach to party system institutionalization measurement and calculate the level of electoral support stability of the permanent parties on the national and regional levels. Further, I examine the main findings and explain the measurement results. To conclude, I sum up the main arguments and outline the area for further studying.

The evolution of the competitors list

The electoral law amendments since 2002 significantly contributed to the limitation of Russian party competition and authoritarian electoral practices endorsement. In turn, with each new electoral cycle parties faced more, and more severe obstacles to registration. Eventually, those who failed to fulfil the registration requirements vanished leaving the five stable parties to run for the Duma. This section delves into the major benchmarks which influenced the present composition of the competitors list for the Duma.

Supported by the highly popular president Putin, newly established in 2003 United Russia (UR) saw the rise of its commanding majority in the Duma—the party managed to gain 38% of votes by the proportional representation and 24% in the majority constituencies. The 2003 Duma elections resulted in UR 223 Duma seats out of 450. Nevertheless, the fast-rising popularity of the presidential party showed

the high-level public approval of both Putin and the party he unofficially headed. Furthermore, UR gained the immediate support of the regional governors followed by their further assistance it in gaining the highest results in the regions (Reuter 2010). Obviously, receiving larger support than the ex-leading communists was the primary function of UR; finally it achieved the target with various techniques of electoral manipulations (Gill 2012).

While in 2003 the Communist Party (KPRF), the successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, received the second largest share of the Duma seats (40 mandates), the share for the liberal parties significantly lowered from 16 and 26 to 4 and 3 seats for the social liberal Yabloko and liberal conservative SPS (The Union of Right Forces) respectively. The far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Rodina[2] succeeded in clearing 5% threshold as well and received 36 and 37 seats respectively. Remarkably, more than one third of the total votes in 2003 remained without representation as the majority of political slates obtained from 3% to 5% of the electoral support and failed to gain any Duma seats. The 5% threshold and a large share of misrepresented votes resulted in UR getting the majority of the Duma seats in spite of receiving only 38% of the proportional voters support (Ivanchenko, Kynev, Lyubarev 2005). Before the 2003 campaign started there was no clear understanding of whether the older KPRF or the newly established UR would win the elections. After 2003, the outcome became more predictable.

The parliamentary campaign of 2007 was the first to demonstrate the most stabilized composition of participants with the largest expected support of the Putin's UR. By 2006, UR already provided the majority of the regional governors with its membership, as being a member of UR meant having access to policy and rents (Kynev 2006). Consequently, UR steadily gained the leading position in the majority of regions. It won 64% of proportional vote and a constitutional majority in the 2007-2011 Duma. However, a quasi-opposition, based on Rodina, called A Just Russia (JR) was established in October 2006[3] to demonstrate emerging dissatisfaction in the ruling party performance and following the need to form a quasi-alternative party of power (Gill 2012; Bunce and Wolchik 2010).

By 2007, the electoral campaigns started to demonstrate more visible violations of freedoms. The OSCE reported the elections after this date not free because of

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2 The Rodina slate succeeded from three small parties that are Russian Party of Regions, the Socialist Unity Party of Russia and 'Narodnaya Volya'. The general federal list of the party also contained ex-KPRF members who changed their political affiliation in favor of another strong left-wing participant.
3 The Rodina party, a predecessor of Just Russia, successfully played the role of quasi-opposition as well.

widespread abuses. Estimating the impact of falsifications in the voting outcome and the accompanying authoritarian electoral practices, scholars concluded that by 2007 the Russian party system under Putin had transformed into a dominant party system. Since then UR has been widely regarded as a ruling party with no alternative participants able to get full-scale access to the competition (Gel'man 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010: 197).

The latest 2011 State Duma elections saw seven competing parties receive approval to participate in the campaign. Three of them failed to get sufficient electoral support and clear the introduced in 2007 7% threshold to receive representation in the Duma. However, UR's declining electoral support in 2011 and the protests which followed in Russian cities highlighted a critical moment in post-Soviet Russia's development, marking the beginning of the erosion of UR's high long-term support (Gill 2012). However, in 2011 UR still obtained the outright majority of the Duma seats gaining just under 50% of the proportional vote.

Finally, what features of the Russian party system formation served the most to achieve the present inter-party relations? Fragmentation and the unwillingness of the first years' elections participants (candidates to different-level governing bodies) to get public affiliation with any party explains one of the key factors that undermined trust in the party institutions from the very beginning (Gel'man 2006). Further, weak party structures led to competitive authoritarianism as the rising cost of endorsing free elections made them unfavourable. Third, from the outset UR was an effective means for the Putin regime to gain electoral legitimation, as it could mobilize the electorate effectively and easily win against the weakened opposition.

The next section shows the legal institutional mechanism of enforced limitation of competition which contributed to the gradual stabilization of the competitors list and the artificial survival and institutionalisation of the five stable elections participants.

Legal framing of the competition

The 20-year history of post-Soviet parliamentary elections has shown the critical importance of the electoral law for the outcome of electoral campaigns. In poorly introduced democracies with little or no experience in democratic elections even small changes in the electoral rules have a great impact on the outcome (McFaul 1994). With the introduction of the electoral legislature before the 2003 elections, scholars reported a significant limitation of party competition (Gel'man

2000; Golosov 2006; Ross 2011). First, under the Federal Law 'On political parties' political parties remained the only entity allowed to participate in the parliamentary elections[4]. Furthermore, they needed to satisfy a number of requirements including a minimum number of members, which obliged parties to have an extensive network of regional party offices. Then, the new Federal Law 'On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in Referenda in the Russian Federation' ruled that every electoral bloc could have up to three members, while at least one bloc member had to be a party (Ivanchenko, Kynev, Lyubarev 2005). Thus, tightening the requirements to eliminate the majority of political parties and contribute to gradual authoritarian transformation (Golosov 2012).

Since 2004, the electoral law has been continually amended. The earlier introduced in 2001 Law 'On Political Parties'[5] and the 2004 amendments raised the entrance fee to elections. To be registered parties were required to have not less than 50,000 members, which meant that only national parties with a wide network of regional branches could fulfil the requirement. Preceding the 2007 campaign amendments candidates could no longer stay in two or more parties at the same time or change their membership after an election. Those parties with no representation in the previous Duma faced more difficulties for nomination: they needed to pay a 60 million ruble deposit or collect 200,000 signatures. Similarly, none of the above (NOTA)—also known as the option to vote 'against all'—was abolished while the electoral threshold went up from 5% to 7%. The registered parties remaining had no chance to form a bloc to clear the 7% threshold (Golosov 2006). Raising the threshold served as an open contradiction between raising the entrance cost which limited regional representation (abolishing parties with no representation in the majority of regions) and the proportional system introduced to promote better representation of even minority parties (Golosov 2012).

Further, the mixed electoral system was replaced with a purely proportional representation. The introduction of the closed party-lists for proportional representation served as an informed measure to reduce the influence of regional authorities on the final composition of the State Duma (Ivanchenko, Kynev, Lyubarev 2005). By this logic, the major beneficiary of proportional voting was UR, being the most confident to secure massive success by 2006. Under the new law,

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4 Earlier political associations could run a campaign as well.
5 See http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4375

there remained no guarantee for any region to receive sufficient representation in the Duma.

Finally, the latest electoral cycle of 2011 was not presided by any sufficient electoral change. The threshold for eligibility remained 7%. However, parties receiving between 5% and 6% were guaranteed to get one seat in the Duma while those to obtain between 6% and 7% received two seats – though, no minor party succeeded in clearing even a 5% threshold. The outcome of the elections showed that the same four parties already presented in the Duma were re-elected while no other party received at least a minimum representation.

The electoral reforms, starting from 2003, resulted in the stable composition of the Duma by the four parliamentary parties. Furthermore, the deteriorating state of freedoms and rights in the country and decrease of election competitiveness contributed to diverting Russia from a nascent democracy to a full-scale authoritarian regime with a facade democratic features (Schedler 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). From 2003 with a legally enforced institutionalisation of the limitation of competition, the Russian party system fixed the list of the participants, so that the five parties—parliamentary UR, KPRF, LDPR, and JR and non-parliamentary Yabloko—maintained almost the same structure between 2003 and 2011. The next section provides the institutionalization measurement and estimates whether the apparent stability in the party competition resulted in party voter support stability.

Data and Measurement

The party system institutionalization measurement builds on the analysis of the parties' electoral geography stability and 'the flow' of its electoral support region-by-region. Obviously, the stability of the parties' electoral support is not regarded as the only factor to determine the party system institutionalization. For example, taking that Huntington's internal integrity dimension can be analysed through the observation of a party leader's public behaviour—a visible internal party split can lead to a reduction of the party's electoral support, so that the voter loyalty measurement is responsive to other non-observable determinants that implicitly are taken into consideration while not measured directly. Further, various scholars especially those who studied the logic of institutionalization in non-democracies put the same emphasis on the stability indicator, leaving other dimensions aside. Taylor-Robinson emphasizing the difference between a democracy and a non-democracy pointed that: 'Institutionalization is concerned with order and stability rather than

democracy' (2001: 582). Following this logic, order and stability can be measured by the stability of party electoral success and the stability of people's loyalty to the parties—which is the measurement of voting stability and an indicator of the party system institutionalization level at the same time. Furthermore, measuring only voting stability provides us with hidden information about party integrity, adaptability, rootedness since the 'voting stability' indicator serves as a measuring instrument sensitive enough to fluctuations in these dimensions.

Other scholars measured voting stability (or volatility) as well. However, the most commonly used Pedersen Index of Volatility (Pedersen 1979) captures only how electoral support of a party changed between two electoral periods. It estimates the change of a party support but gives no clue about the tendency and provides no information about the regional differences in these changes. Overall, this index suggests only a broad approach to measurement of volatility, I questioned, first, how volatile a party electoral support is over a longer period; second, how volatility changes region-by-region and whether this change contributes to the high level of party electoral support return. Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin (2009) presented their approach aimed at finding appropriate measurement of electoral fraud and applied their model to Russian and Ukrainian politics. Using publicly available data on elections results, they estimated electoral return of a candidate or a party between the two consecutive elections to find evidence of electoral manipulations. The similar measurement technique can be applied for estimating the parties electoral support stability.

This paper suggests a two-step measurement of voting stability. The first estimates the reproduction of electoral support and indicates how a party copes with remobilizing its electoral support over time 'weighted' for its average result for the three periods. For this purpose, I gathered a dataset of the electoral results of the State Duma parliamentary elections of 2003, 2007, 2011[6]. The five parties I take for stable participants in the legislature campaigns are UR, KPRF, LDPR, JR, and Yabloko who were the only continuous participants within the observed period.

For measuring the reproduction of electoral support, I computed the Spearman rank correlation coefficients by regions between the party results for the two consecutive elections for the three electoral cycles. This calculation estimated density of connections between the three electoral results of each of the five parties on the national level and shows the overall party electoral support reproduction level. Then,

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6 See Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation web site (http://cikrf.ru/eng/).

I calculated the average of the correlation coefficients for each party to 'weigh' the changes in the electoral support over time. If a party's level of electoral support reproduction differs significantly from period to period—which is what we see in the UR's case comparing its results in 2003 and 2011— then the overall party result will be relatively low. The lower the average of the electoral reproduction level, the lower a party is institutionalized. (See Table 1).

TABLE 1
Level of electoral support reproduction (2003-2011)

Party	2003-2007	2007-2011	2003-2011	Average
UR	.434**	.656**	.235	.44
KPRF	.689**	.637**	.521*	.62
LDPR	.631**	.712**	.718**	.69
JR	.276*	.547**	.356**	.39
Yabloko	.741**	.701**	.627**	.69

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

The correlation results show Yabloko, LDPR and KPRF keep the most stable electoral support, while UR and JR lack voting stability. The explanation is twofold. First, the three leaders retained the same blueprint and structure in contrast to JR between 2003 and 2007, which succeeded Rodina and quite predictably lost part its supporters with the blueprint change. UR support in 2011 differs significantly from its support in 2003. Taking into account that the regions reported massive falsifications and were excluded from the calculations (to be explained further), the high volatility of voting for the party can be explained by its significant decrease in support in 2011 in comparison with 2007 and 2003. Thus, we have only three of five stable parties, which more or less satisfy the criteria of favourable conditions for institutionalization that are long time existence, routinization, internal structural and external stability. They all are survivors of Russian politics: KPRF, the successor of The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, LDPR, established in 1989, and Yabloko, established in 1993; further they all retained the same public image that contributed to their organizational routinization and the value infusion from certain electoral groups loyal to the parties.

Second, the 2011 campaign brought to the surface a rising share of protest voting, which contributed to UR's significant loss of support in the vast majority of regions and the opposition parties (mainly JR, KPRF) and minority parties collecting the UR lost vote (Kynev 2011). At the same time, a decrease in turnout showed growing absenteeism, which also contributed to overall voting instability and undermined the institutionalization level of all parties. The voting stability measurement mechanistically captures all aspects of voting instability so that even absenteeism leaves its trace on the overall institutionalization results. The size of a party has no or limited effect on its volatility level as the minority and the majority parties appeared in both groups meaning that other factors contribute more to their stability or instability.

Summing up the national-level measurement findings, the blueprint change in the JR case, and the rising protest vote (voter disloyalty) in the UR's case, emerged as the main instability of voter support within the 2003-2011 electoral cycles. At the same time the dimensions important for party system institutionalization mentioned by previous scholars occurred in the Yabloko, KPRF and LDPR's cases contributing to their higher level of institutionalization.

For the second step of the party system institutionalization measurement, I carried out region-by-region party support stability calculation. The regional dimension shows the stability of party support in comparison to its average result for each region. For this purpose, first, I computed the difference between the party voting results in each region for two consecutive campaigns, i.e. 2003-2007 and 2007-2011. The difference or the 'electoral flow' showed the percentage of change in party support within the two consecutive elections. Then, I sum the 'electoral flow' results in modulo to calculate the party 'sum of change' for each region. Further calculation divided the 'sum of change' result by the average party's support in the region for each party in each region. Thus, this calculation shows the level of party support volatility in each region.

A change in the regional party's support greater than 1.0 means that the share of the volatile support is higher than the share of its loyal voters (the average). The summing of the regional volatility result estimates the overall party volatility level and denotes the overall level of institutionalization. The higher the final score, the more volatile a party's support. The more the continuous parties in a party system have a high score, the less the party system is institutionalised. The higher the share of the majority party, the more it influences the party system institutionalization level

overall. The more volatile and the more majority parties in a party system, the more they deinstitutionalize the party system.

However, we know that Russian elections are widely accompanied by electoral fraud, so to control for the possible influence of factors that cannot be thoroughly investigated I excluded from the analysis the regions reported to have high rates of falsifications, which significantly distorted the results[7]. Second, I excluded those regions, which had changed their boundaries within 2003-2011[8], as I again fail to control whether the change of boundaries could influence the change of the voter territorial identification and electoral preferences. The results of the measurement are presented in the Appendix in Table 2. The total meaning of volatile voting for the parties is presented in Table 3.

[TABLE 2 about here]

TABLE 3 Total meaning of volatile voting (2003-2011)

UR	KPRF	LDPR	JR	Yabloko
74.67	38.73	31.82	46.96	86.82

Surprisingly Yabloko, the least of the five electorally successful, turned out to have the most volatile support with 56 out of 62 regions to demonstrate higher volatility than the average party's result in the regions. The Republic of Karelia showed the highest and the most stable support for the party (i.e. from 3 to 4% at various electoral cycles), while others stable and unstable voting regions revealed no clear voting patterns. Having the average support of 1.5% on the national level, a decline or increase of 1-2% in support was very sensitive for the minority party.

UR received almost similar volatility result. The regional-level volatility analysis showed that the party has the second highest result in number of regions, which demonstrated the electoral support change higher than the average party's regional result: 46 out of 62 regions revealed relatively low stability in the parties support within the three analysed campaigns. Noteworthy that the electoral results for each party were calculated from the total number of the registered voters in all regions

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7 I exclude the regions proved to have the highest rate of falsifications in 2011, that are Chechen Republic, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Dagestan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Mordovia, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Republic of Tatarstan, Tyva Republic, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Moscow, Saint-Petersburg (Source: http://kireev.livejournal.com/714400.html).
8 I exclude from the analysis Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug, Chita Oblast, Evenki Autonomous Okrug, Irkutskaya Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Kamchatka Oblast, Koryak Autonomous Okrug, Komi-Perm Autonomous Okrug, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Perm Krai, Perm Region, Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug, Zabaykalsky Krai, Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug.

to consider the turnout decrease in the interpretation as well. Those regions to demonstrate the highest scores of volatility for UR voting—Primorsky Krai, Amur, Kurgan, Sverdlovsk, and Lipetsk Oblasts—were the ones, which showed a relatively high increase in the support between 2003 and 2007 (about 20 to 35 percentage points of growth). While between 2007 and 2011, they showed the biggest decline of the party support. The Komi Republic, The Republic of Kalmykia, The Republic of Adygea, Krasnodar and Saratov Oblasts showed the most loyal UR support, though they demonstrated moderate support for UR in 2003, 2007 and were among the regions with the highest voting for the party in 2011.

JR was third in voting volatility, having 11 out of 62 regions with relatively high volatility. Novgorod, Vologda, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts were the most volatile and at the same time demonstrated the highest support to the party in 2011, while the moderate during the two previous electoral cycles. Logically, the latest cycle electoral support instability determined the overall volatile result. The Republic of Kalmykia, and Tula, Nizhny Novgorod, and Tambov Oblasts revealed the most stable party support. The Republic of Kalmykia and Tambov Oblast ensured voting stability with continuously low party support, while the other mentioned regions demonstrated moderate support and slight deviations from the average level of voting during the whole analysed period.

The Altai Republic, Kostroma and Murmansk Oblasts were the only regions to demonstrate relatively high volatility in the KPRF's support. The vast majority of the regions showed no extreme differences in voting (that is lower than 1.0 meaning of volatile voting). Altai Krai, Samara, Krasnodar, Chelyabinsk and Tambov Oblasts demonstrated the highest stability in the party vote. Altai Krai and Tambov Oblast in 2003 and 2007 demonstrated the highest support for the party as well; while in 2011, Altai Krai remained the only highly loyal region with a high vote for the party.

The leading in voting stability LDPR saw only Stavropol and Volgograd Oblasts demonstrate higher volatility in voting than other regions. Both regions showed an increase of two and three percentage points in the party's support respectively between 2003 and 2007 and the same decrease of two and three percentage points between 2007 and 2011. Among the stable regions Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, Vladimir, Magadan, and Kirov Oblasts we found two tendencies in the party support: Magadan and Kirov Oblasts demonstrated continuous high electoral support for LDPR, averaged from eight to ten per cent. The three other regions—Novgorod, Chelyabinsk, and Vladimir Oblasts demonstrated a moderate level of support.

To sum up, the region-by-region measurement results revealed the following trends. The least electorally successful and the least stably supported party Yabloko enjoyed the high-level electoral support reproduction. This effect was due to generally low support for the party which equals or somewhat exceeds its average support in the regions, however, the party's volatile voters tend to return to contribute the overall support stability. JR's relatively low voter support reproduction is compensated by its middle-low level of voting volatility. In contrast with Yabloko, JR's volatile voting did not occur in the same regions, which significantly changed the party's voting geography in each new electoral cycle and impeded the party's voting reproduction. UR's volatile support had the second highest result in the sum of changes, twice as high as the three remaining parties. The significant decrease in turnout together with the large outflow of votes in 2011 contributed to UR's high instability. The LDPR and KPRF's high results for both the level of support reproduction and voting stability measurements show that in the logic of this paper LDPR and KPRF are the most institutionalized. However, the overall level of institutionalization is relatively low: three of the five parties showed low results while the most electorally successful UR's high volatility contributed to high electorate mobility and significantly destabilized the institutionalization level overall.

Concluding remarks

This paper provides measurement strategy for the level of party system institutionalization in a non-democracy. Previous scholars described and operationalized the concept of institutionalization (in general and applying to parties and party systems) suggesting possible dimensions to capture the essence of the complex and sandy field of institutionalization. Yet, very few of them made the distinction between institutionalization in democratic regimes and in autocracies leaving behind the difference in the parties and party systems logic of survival and overall existence in the latter. Those who differentiated the institutionalization process from democratization, pointed out that stability and order (as the products of routinization and value infusion etc.) could be the clue to understanding party system institutionalization in non-democracies. Moreover, obeying the rules to 'remain in the game' the parties contribute to their own long existence. Adapting this approach, I suggest the level of party support stability (or volatility) and the level of party electoral support reproduction as the key aspects for estimating the level of party system institutionalization in Russia and electoral authoritarianisms.

The historical background of the formation of political parties in Russia and their development amid constant legislative amendments sheds light on their adaptability, which contributes to their survival. Within the logic of an authoritarian regime, only those parties, who have specific adaptability features (which differ from those in democracies) remain in the elections. In electoral autocracies, the managed elections restrict the party autonomy; albeit, in the Russian case, impediments for new parties to enter the electoral market provided the stable ones with unique competition conditions. However, the five analysed continuous parties demonstrated different levels of electoral stability.

The grounds for high-level institutionalization mentioned by the previous scholars, which include routinization, long-existence, value infusion, and internal stability, provided LDPR and KPRF with highly stable electoral support. Nonetheless, Yabloko showed a twofold tendency: the party received low-level stable and high-level reproducible support at the same time. Overall the low party result which equals its floating support in the majority of the regions contributed to the party's instability, however, in the longer perspective the lost voters between 2003 and 2007 returned between 2007 and 2011.

The poor institutionalization of UR and fit the previously described explanatory theories as well. The change of the blueprint of A Just Russia prevented it from 'taking root' and winning stable electoral loyalty, however, the party still reproduces its support with moderate success. Further, as pointed out in Randall and Svåsand (2002), the institutionalization of one party might be harmful for others. However, we see the opposite effect in the UR's case, when high volatility in voting for UR destabilize the overall level of the party system institutionalization by making a significant share of voters float between the remaining parties or abstain.

Finally, the analysed period from 2003 to 2011 provides very short-term vision for drawing conclusions about the longevity of the current level of parties and party system institutionalization, though it shows how the parties with different backgrounds, amounts of resources and levels of support succeeded in voters remobilisation and retention. Further study will explain the regional differences in voting stability or volatility more precisely and investigate whether this stability or volatility can be explained with stable regional patterns of voting, regional social characteristics or cleavages.

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Appendix

TABLE 2.
The changing of the continuous parties' electoral support in 2003-2011[9].

Russian Regions	UR 2003-2007	UR 2007-2011	Sum of changings UR (mod)	Average result of a party by region	UR changing (of the average support)	KPRF 2003-2007	KPRF 2007-2011	Sum of changings KPRF (mod)	Average result of a party by region	KPRF changing (of average support
Altai Krai	16,07	-13,8	29,87	23,36	1,28	-0,16	2,69	2,85	11,23	0,25
Amur Oblast	30,77	-23,82	54,59	29,13	1,87	-1,34	3,46	4,80	8,50	0,57
Arkhangelsk Oblast	8,44	-14,84	23,28	23,02	1,01	1,59	4,05	5,64	6,88	0,82
Astrakhan Oblast	19,22	-2,56	21,78	28,91	0,75	-2,76	1,36	4,12	7,42	0,55
Belgorod Oblast	26,48	-9,9	36,39	36,37	1,00	1,21	5,30	6,51	12,97	0,50
Bryansk Oblast	16,44	-5,1	21,54	27,91	0,77	-1,08	4,24	5,32	11,48	0,46
Vladimir Oblast	19,69	-15,85	35,54	22,21	1,60	2,12	1,43	3,55	8,41	0,42
Volgograd Oblast	18,10	-14,31	32,42	21,96	1,48	-0,89	2,91	3,80	10,19	0,37
Vologda Oblast	17,05	-20,17	37,21	26,55	1,40	1,04	3,47	4,51	6,78	0,66
Voronezh Oblast	24,83	-6,28	31,10	28,05	1,11	2,25	3,22	5,48	11,13	0,49
Ivanovo Oblast	16,25	-12,11	28,36	23,98	1,18	0,15	5,95	6,10	7,95	0,77
Kaliningrad Oblast	17,87	-12,54	30,41	22,63	1,34	2,30	6,05	8,35	9,13	0,91
Kaluga Oblast	15,64	-11,24	26,88	25,53	1,05	0,69	5,10	5,80	8,98	0,65
Kemerovo Oblast	30,49	-15,38	45,87	44,62	1,03	1,09	1,69	2,78	5,80	0,48
Kirov Oblast	19,76	-20,52	40,28	25,94	1,55	1,68	3,96	5,64	9,04	0,62
Kostroma Oblast	15,20	-17,09	32,30	23,93	1,35	2,07	8,35	10,42	10,26	1,02
Krasnodar Oblast	20,78	0,56	21,34	33,43	0,64	0,36	3,40	3,75	10,35	0,36
Kurgan Oblast	22,66	-17,9	40,57	22,60	1,80	-1,58	3,71	5,29	9,14	0,58
Kursk Oblast	23,15	-14,64	37,78	27,06	1,40	-0,93	4,04	4,97	8,95	0,56

9 The difference (electoral flow) between the consequent elections results for each party are calculated on the parties' results in percent from the total number of registered voters.

Leningrad Oblast	14,05	-14,76	28,81	22,14	1,30	1,57	3,16	4,74	6,31	0,75
Lipetsk Oblast	25,82	-17,78	43,60	26,05	1,67	-0,75	4,53	5,28	10,25	0,52
Magadan Oblast	15,79	-11,81	27,60	24,15	1,14	0,96	4,90	5,86	8,36	0,70
Moscow Oblast	18,91	-20,36	39,27	23,96	1,64	3,40	4,39	7,79	8,92	0,87
Murmansk Oblast	11,34	-15,45	26,80	23,09	1,16	2,55	4,78	7,33	7,22	1,02
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	19,68	-8,49	28,17	25,32	1,11	0,49	9,73	10,22	10,28	0,99
Novgorod Oblast	21,27	-20,63	41,90	26,19	1,60	0,94	4,13	5,07	7,95	0,64
Novosibirsk Oblast	18,05	-15,03	33,07	23,22	1,42	-0,69	7,77	8,46	12,23	0,69
Omsk Oblast	20,54	-16,62	37,15	26,27	1,41	0,54	4,70	5,24	10,91	0,48
Orenburg Oblast	18,77	-16,23	35,01	22,42	1,56	-3,03	5,90	8,92	10,48	0,85
Orel Oblast	9,56	-17,29	26,85	33,55	0,80	0,46	8,20	8,66	15,06	0,57
Penza Oblast	23,07	-12,49	35,57	37,16	0,96	1,04	3,74	4,78	10,03	0,48
Primorsky Krai	18,41	-15,18	33,59	20,02	1,68	-0,06	4,56	4,63	8,32	0,56
Pskov Oblast	16,07	-17,75	33,82	25,85	1,31	0,78	3,91	4,69	10,42	0,45
Republic of Adygea (Adygea)	16,04	-3,08	19,12	36,88	0,52	-0,64	4,56	5,20	9,18	0,57
Altai Republic	31,72	-13,55	45,27	32,37	1,40	-1,14	8,24	9,38	8,58	1,09
Republic of Buryatia	20,65	-10,57	31,23	28,06	1,11	-1,38	7,60	8,97	9,25	0,97
Republic of Kalmykia	17,02	-6,61	23,63	40,50	0,58	1,26	3,78	5,04	8,66	0,58
Republic of Karelia	11,45	-15,23	26,68	22,55	1,18	1,71	3,78	5,48	6,59	0,83
Komi Republic	22,85	2,23	25,08	33,54	0,75	1,56	3,55	5,11	6,87	0,74
Mari El Republic	33,54	-15,8	49,34	36,59	1,35	-0,01	6,46	6,47	10,47	0,62
The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	16,76	-15,5	32,26	34,25	0,94	0,11	3,17	3,28	7,69	0,43
Republic of Khakassia	17,54	-10,11	27,65	23,45	1,18	-2,42	6,22	8,64	9,95	0,87
Rostov Oblast	27,33	-18,76	46,10	33,17	1,39	-0,89	5,24	6,13	9,16	0,67
Ryazan Oblast	15,73	-11,73	27,46	23,54	1,17	1,67	3,49	5,16	9,54	0,54
Samara Oblast	12,43	-8,34	20,77	22,25	0,93	-0,12	3,43	3,55	9,99	0,36
Saratov Oblast	13,22	3,48	16,70	36,74	0,45	-2,52	1,63	4,15	9,00	0,46
Sakhalin Oblast	18,61	-13,68	32,29	23,48	1,38	1,72	3,58	5,30	8,54	0,62
Sverdlovsk Oblast	20,85	-20,86	41,71	23,68	1,76	0,77	3,96	4,74	5,70	0,83

Smolensk Oblast	9,71	-11,59	21,30	22,46	0,95	0,38	3,61	3,99	9,49	0,42
Stavropol Oblast	18,72	-9,61	28,33	25,10	1,13	-0,61	3,18	3,79	7,43	0,51
Tambov Oblast	21,45	8,56	30,01	32,50	0,92	0,89	-0,60	1,49	11,30	0,13
Tver Oblast	14,24	-13,78	28,02	24,97	1,12	1,14	4,69	5,83	8,90	0,66
Tomsk Oblast	15,70	-15,65	31,35	24,12	1,30	-0,57	4,87	5,45	8,23	0,66
Tula Oblast	19,69	9,46	29,15	31,70	0,92	0,43	3,34	3,77	8,59	0,44
Tyumen Oblast	31,83	-11,84	43,68	44,60	0,98	-0,05	3,51	3,56	6,60	0,54
Udmurtia	12,47	-11,63	24,10	29,07	0,83	0,77	4,54	5,32	7,76	0,69
Ulyanovsk Oblast	23,67	-16,05	39,72	29,09	1,37	-0,51	6,68	7,19	9,65	0,74
Khabarovsk Krai	21,08	-17	38,08	24,56	1,55	1,02	4,15	5,16	7,78	0,66
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	22,14	-21,76	43,90	29,62	1,48	0,43	4,09	4,52	5,96	0,76
Chelyabinsk Oblast	23,30	-11,1	34,40	29,61	1,16	1,07	1,31	2,38	7,49	0,32
Chuvash Republic - Chuvashia	22,19	-17,23	39,42	30,85	1,28	-1,55	3,95	5,51	10,76	0,51
Yaroslavl Oblast	11,74	-16,92	28,65	23,58	1,22	1,72	6,16	7,88	8,72	0,90
Total meaning of volatile voting					74,67					38,73

Russian Regions	LDPR 2003-2007	LDPR 2007-2011	Sum of changings LDPR (mod)	Average result of a party by region	LDPR changing (of average support)	JR 2003-2007	JR 2007-2011	Sum of changings JR (mod)	Average result of a party by region	JR changing (of average support)	Yabloko 2003-2007	Yabloko 2007-2011	Sum of changing Yabloko (mod)	Average result of a party by region	Yabloko changing (of the average support)
Altai Krai	-2,06	2,34	4,41	7,82	0,56	1,30	3,13	4,43	5,93	0,75	-0,82	0,10	0,93	1,48	
Amur Oblast	-2,58	4,45	7,03	9,22	0,76	-0,18	2,88	3,06	3,69	0,83	-1,40	0,56	1,96	1,11	0,63
Arkhangelsk Oblast	-1,93	3,31	5,25	7,51	0,70	0,46	5,06	5,52	7,52	0,73	-0,53	-1,08	1,61	2,05	1,77
Astrakhan Oblast	-3,01	0,44	3,45	5,36	0,64	6,36	-4,44	10,80	8,97	1,20	-0,93	0,09	1,02	0,81	0,79
Belgorod Oblast	-2,95	2,50	5,45	6,60	0,83	-1,96	3,91	5,87	6,78	0,86	-1,21	0,85	2,07	1,41	1,26

Bryansk Oblast	-2,57	2,66	5,22	5,45	0,96	0,14	1,91	2,06	5,36	0,38	-0,79	0,75	1,54	0,94	1,47
Vladimir Oblast	-0,42	0,29	0,71	6,30	0,11	0,57	5,04	5,61	7,02	0,80	-1,17	0,93	2,10	1,50	1,63
Volgograd Oblast	-2,38	-2,95	5,33	4,93	1,08	-0,08	6,47	6,55	7,12	0,92	-1,03	1,08	2,10	1,41	1,40
Vologda Oblast	0,51	1,60	2,11	7,45	0,28	1,22	9,60	10,82	8,47	1,28	-1,03	1,22	2,25	1,48	1,49
Voronezh Oblast	-0,28	-1,04	1,32	6,49	0,20	-4,33	3,16	7,49	8,63	0,87	-0,68	0,68	1,36	1,19	1,52
Ivanovo Oblast	-1,61	2,15	3,76	6,96	0,54	-0,27	3,82	4,09	5,84	0,70	-1,47	1,15	2,62	1,57	1,15
Kaliningrad Oblast	-1,43	1,89	3,32	6,91	0,48	-0,09	2,57	2,66	5,55	0,48	-1,07	1,74	2,81	2,20	1,67
Kaluga Oblast	-1,79	3,66	5,45	6,42	0,85	-2,05	4,71	6,76	6,53	1,04	-1,16	1,48	2,64	1,77	1,28
Kemerovo Oblast	-1,71	2,71	4,42	7,32	0,60	-0,86	2,90	3,76	3,87	0,97	-1,45	0,80	2,25	1,46	1,49
Kirov Oblast	-0,16	0,44	0,60	8,78	0,07	1,12	4,89	6,01	7,05	0,85	-1,22	0,56	1,78	1,50	1,54
Kostroma Oblast	-1,84	2,73	4,57	7,95	0,57	1,43	3,80	5,23	7,63	0,69	-1,56	1,08	2,65	1,53	1,19
Krasnodar Oblast	-1,31	2,40	3,71	6,42	0,58	-0,49	2,68	3,17	6,21	0,51	-0,77	0,76	1,52	1,22	1,73
Kurgan Oblast	-4,04	2,70	6,74	9,08	0,74	0,69	4,38	5,08	5,01	1,01	-1,21	0,61	1,81	1,12	1,25
Kursk Oblast	-2,67	1,84	4,51	7,04	0,64	1,96	1,03	2,98	6,56	0,45	-0,79	0,70	1,49	1,05	1,62
Leningrad Oblast	-0,95	3,07	4,02	5,97	0,67	1,75	6,21	7,96	8,28	0,96	-1,05	1,67	2,72	1,81	1,42
Lipetsk Oblast	-0,85	1,90	2,75	7,20	0,38	-0,43	4,26	4,69	6,82	0,69	-0,80	0,81	1,62	1,15	1,50
Magadan Oblast	-0,77	-0,18	0,95	9,49	0,10	1,08	0,86	1,94	5,16	0,38	-1,50	0,98	2,48	1,67	1,41
Moscow Oblast	-0,17	1,66	1,82	5,41	0,34	-3,91	3,68	7,59	6,92	1,10	-1,74	1,69	3,43	2,55	1,49
Murmansk Oblast	-0,59	1,84	2,43	8,34	0,29	1,60	3,37	4,97	7,40	0,67	-1,77	1,33	3,09	2,17	1,35
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	0,04	1,34	1,38	5,36	0,26	1,35	0,20	1,55	5,65	0,27	-0,68	0,95	1,63	1,26	1,42
Novgorod Oblast	-0,34	0,40	0,74	6,33	0,12	0,55	10,57	11,12	8,61	1,29	-1,75	0,94	2,69	1,72	1,30
Novosibirsk Oblast	-1,83	3,86	5,69	6,96	0,82	-0,71	3,03	3,74	5,42	0,69	-1,75	1,52	3,27	2,02	1,57
Omsk Oblast	-1,85	1,83	3,67	7,29	0,50	-0,03	3,42	3,45	5,19	0,66	-1,33	0,95	2,28	1,77	1,62
Orenburg Oblast	-3,57	3,44	7,01	7,54	0,93	1,32	3,36	4,68	5,92	0,79	-1,33	0,66	1,99	1,21	1,29
Orel Oblast	-2,45	2,08	4,53	7,34	0,62	-1,06	2,10	3,16	6,21	0,51	-0,89	0,75	1,64	1,13	1,65
Penza Oblast	-1,63	2,48	4,11	5,46	0,75	-0,69	2,13	2,82	4,43	0,64	-0,93	0,68	1,61	1,23	1,45
Primorsky Krai	-1,27	1,43	2,70	8,56	0,32	2,35	3,06	5,41	6,00	0,90	-2,32	0,54	2,86	1,92	1,32
Pskov Oblast	-0,03	1,34	1,37	6,48	0,21	2,69	1,39	4,07	6,86	0,59	-0,66	1,57	2,23	1,87	1,49

Republic of Adygea (Adygea)	-1,36	1,53	2,89	4,54	0,64	-1,19	2,38	3,57	4,38	0,82	-0,54	0,69	1,22	0,89	1,19
Altai Republic	-0,76	2,37	3,13	5,45	0,57	4,37	-0,11	4,47	5,07	0,88	-1,16	0,62	1,78	0,95	1,38
Republic of Buryatia	-1,60	1,34	2,94	5,03	0,58	3,48	1,15	4,63	5,26	0,88	-1,15	0,54	1,69	1,09	1,87
Republic of Kalmykia	-0,96	0,29	1,25	2,67	0,47	-0,21	0,73	0,94	4,12	0,23	-0,83	0,55	1,37	0,81	1,54
Republic of Karelia	-1,92	3,32	5,24	7,44	0,70	2,31	4,18	6,48	6,79	0,95	-1,88	0,93	2,81	3,13	1,69
Komi Republic	-1,02	1,20	2,22	8,17	0,27	0,88	2,84	3,72	6,13	0,61	-2,14	0,24	2,38	1,65	0,90
Mari El Republic	-0,70	2,45	3,14	6,95	0,45	0,93	2,52	3,46	5,55	0,62	-0,66	0,74	1,40	1,15	1,44
The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	-1,34	0,68	2,02	5,08	0,40	2,81	3,82	6,63	9,61	0,69	-1,22	0,49	1,71	1,08	1,22
Republic of Khakassia	-1,65	2,79	4,45	7,69	0,58	-1,71	4,77	6,47	5,08	1,27	-1,59	0,99	2,58	1,37	1,58
Rostov Oblast	-2,53	2,40	4,94	5,27	0,94	-0,37	3,35	3,73	5,75	0,65	-1,22	0,87	2,09	1,52	1,88
Ryazan Oblast	-0,33	2,22	2,56	6,56	0,39	-0,13	2,92	3,05	6,04	0,50	-0,62	0,53	1,16	1,47	1,37
Samara Oblast	-2,04	3,44	5,49	6,70	0,82	0,57	2,79	3,36	5,46	0,62	-1,23	1,34	2,58	1,61	0,79
Saratov Oblast	-1,81	1,01	2,82	4,78	0,59	1,66	1,08	2,74	5,48	0,50	-0,78	0,14	0,92	1,30	1,60
Sakhalin Oblast	-4,22	2,37	6,58	7,67	0,86	-1,60	2,52	4,12	4,63	0,89	-2,14	0,94	3,07	1,77	0,71
Sverdlovsk Oblast	-0,13	1,50	1,63	7,23	0,22	1,36	8,08	9,45	6,78	1,39	-1,72	0,95	2,67	2,13	1,74
Smolensk Oblast	-0,47	0,74	1,21	6,98	0,17	0,95	3,87	4,82	6,33	0,76	-1,18	0,64	1,82	1,39	1,26
Stavropol Oblast	-3,59	3,95	7,53	6,34	1,19	2,57	-1,47	4,04	6,12	0,66	-0,75	0,48	1,23	1,01	1,31
Tambov Oblast	-1,17	0,10	1,27	5,15	0,25	-0,36	0,47	0,83	3,90	0,21	-0,74	0,26	1,00	1,05	1,22
Tver Oblast	-1,73	0,66	2,39	6,38	0,37	-0,87	5,74	6,62	7,04	0,94	-1,39	1,13	2,52	1,72	0,95
Tomsk Oblast	0,16	1,19	1,35	8,16	0,17	1,12	2,19	3,31	4,92	0,67	-2,16	1,17	3,33	2,29	1,47
Tula Oblast	-1,98	2,64	4,62	5,60	0,83	-1,16	0,58	1,75	6,15	0,28	-1,46	1,55	3,02	1,99	1,46
Tyumen Oblast	0,64	2,96	3,59	8,51	0,42	0,79	2,27	3,06	3,84	0,80	-0,78	0,87	1,65	1,21	1,51
Udmurtia	-0,86	2,65	3,51	7,89	0,44	1,29	1,04	2,33	5,19	0,45	-0,86	1,03	1,89	1,20	1,37
Ulyanovsk Oblast	-1,76	2,51	4,27	6,51	0,66	-0,14	4,15	4,29	6,70	0,64	-1,28	0,85	2,12	1,23	1,57
Khabarovsk Krai	-0,07	2,31	2,38	9,01	0,26	1,08	3,30	4,38	4,92	0,89	-1,82	0,93	2,75	1,93	1,72
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	-0,95	3,51	4,46	10,33	0,43	1,57	3,38	4,94	4,82	1,03	-1,52	0,78	2,30	1,54	1,43

Chelyabinsk Oblast	0,07	0,67	0,74	6,55	0,11	3,44	3,24	6,68	6,61	1,01	-1,50	0,75	2,25	2,07	1,49
Chuvash Republic - Chuvashia	1,11	0,58	1,69	5,82	0,29	3,79	4,29	8,08	7,45	1,08	-0,91	0,46	1,37	0,98	1,09
Yaroslavl Oblast	1,32	0,46	1,78	7,90	0,23	-0,33	5,12	5,45	9,34	0,58	-1,40	1,69	3,09	2,01	1,39
Total meaning of volatile voting					31,80					46,96					86,82

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