



NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY
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**A MUSLIM AZEF, OR ONE MORE
ORIENTALIST: PLAYING THE
OTHER IN IMPERIO-
ORIENTALIST MIRRORS**

BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

WORKING PAPERS

SERIES: HUMANITIES
WP BRP 158/HUM/2017

**A Muslim Azef, or One More Orientalist:
Playing the Other in Imperio-Orientalist Mirrors²**

The paper discusses constructing various versions of Muslim identity by politically opposite actors, the government and Muslim activists, involved in ‘placing’ Muslims in modernizing late-imperial Russia. The problem is approached through the extreme case of M.-B. Hadjetlaché (ca 1870-1929), a baptized Jew reinventing himself as Circassian and Muslim and as such working as a State agent against Muslim opposition and vice versa. His strategies of deceit and reasons to trust him in different cultural and political milieus reveal reciprocal and often shared *Orientalisms* of the ‘regimes of truth’ defining the processes under study.

JEL Classification: Z

Key words: Russia, late 19th–early 20th centuries, M.-B. Hadjetlaché, Muslims in Russia, Muslim opposition, ‘pan-Islamism’, Orientalism, progressive discourse, tricksters, deceit, trust.

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² The research for this project was sponsored by the ACLS grant (2006), the Fulbright stipend at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, 2008), the Kone Foundation, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies (2011), and a number of the MSH grants (Paris). The MSH support allowed me to find and meet, in 2001, Hadjetlaché’s grandsons, Joël and Michaël, as well as his elder daughter Léïla (1906-2004) together with the caring family of her friends, whose daughter, Célia de Barros, inherited the archives. I thank all of them for their help and care; my respect goes to Léïla’s memory. I was able to get Celia’s consent and initiate, with the help of Mme Hélène Kaplan (to whom goes my special gratitude), the archives’ transmission to the BDIC (Nanterre), where they are now deposited (Cotes F delta rés 914 and GF delta rés 124; strangely, in the BDIC description of the archives, my participation was limited to the help in the archives’ inventorying). I thank Svante Lundberg and Lars Björilin for the great help they gave me during my work in the Stockholm archives in summer 2011. The first version of this paper was published in French with unauthorized significant changes (introduced by Dany Savelli, the ‘Directeur de la publication’) as: «Un agent-provocateur musulman, ou un orientaliste de plus : “ jouer à l’autre ” dans les miroirs impéριο-orientalistes», in: Anna Pondopoulo (éd.), “Les Orients dans la culture russe”, *Slavica Occitania*, 35, 2012, p. 83-126. The present paper is not only addressed to a broader English-speaking audience, but restores the author’s genuine approaches and reinforces the argument by the new archival findings and literature.

Introduction

On May 11, 1909, Sergei Nikolaevich Syromiatnikov got a letter from Paris. By that time, he was known as a writer and journalist engaged in the discussions on Russia's position between East and West, and an important person in the editorial board of the semi-governmental newspaper *The Rossiia*, having close connections with high officials, P.A. Stolypin among them. The letter came from a certain Akhmet Bek Allaev who suggested sending to *The Rossiia* his articles exposing Russian revolutionary immigration in Paris, whom Allaev called "Azef's comrades" (the exposure of Evno Azef, a leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and a police informer on the side, just at that time raised in Russia a great hue and cry).³ Syromiatnikov accepted Allaev's proposal, and the correspondence started. Within a month he got, besides the author's gratitude, two more letters concerning a close, yet a somewhat different matter. A "support" was needed for an endeavor of vital importance, the publication of the magazine *Moussoulmanine (the Muslim)* whose first two issues addressed to the mountaineers of the Russian Caucasus were already published in Paris in 1908⁴. The importance of the magazine, according to Allaev, was due to its influence that allowed saving the Russian mountaineers from the harmful impact of both socialism (in all its manifestations, social-revolutionarism-maximalism and anarchism included) and the Young Turks separatist propaganda. Yet at the same time, *Moussoulmanine*'s mission was to "open the eyes" of the "blind" Russian officials and generals in the North Caucasus, "wandering in the dark", as they failed to understand the real situation there. The problem with the publication was also by no means simple, but due, again, to the detrimental effects of the Young Turk revolution of 1908. As soon as it happened, according to Allaev, the initial publisher, "a circle of the intelligent (*intelligentnykh*) Circassians" settled in Paris and comprising 8 persons of means, demanded that the editor should change the trend of the magazine and make it "revolutionary". The editor, characterized by Allaev as a man of firm convictions, deep education, energy and talent and a writer well-known in the Muslim press, whose name was Magomet-Bek Hadjetlaché, rejected the demand. As the "circle" didn't have any comparable figure to edit the magazine, its publication stopped (Allaev himself, whom the circle had initially invited to lead the magazine, had refused from the very

³ IRLI. F. 655. D. 15, l. 1.

⁴ *Moussoulmanine* is the original Roman-letters spelling of the title, used along with the Russian one (whose precise transcription it was) on the cover of the magazine since 1910; the same word was also depicted there, against the background of the rising sun over the (Caucasian) mountains, in the Arabic letters at first, and later on, in their stylization. The contents were fully in the Russian language and characters.

beginning, as to his opinion, it should have been somebody of more influence and popularity; hence Hadjetlaché was chosen); instead, the circle assembled a “whole party” to lead the pro-Turkey separatist propaganda in the Caucasus. Now, Hadjetlaché, though still eager to continue his mission, lacked money for the publication – as is characteristic of “all idealists”.

Allaev’s first letter on the matter came to Syromiatnikov earlier than a week after their first contact. Having found it “interesting”, Syromiatnikov transmitted the paper to the Special section of the Police Department, but hardly bothered to inform Allaev on that⁵. Getting no response, Allaev mailed another one (received on June 16). Repeating his arguments on the crucial importance of the *Moussoulmanine* for his “brothers in the Caucasus”, he informed Syromiatnikov of his sacrifice for the sake of the publication: he was sending him, in the registered parcel, the “most precious thing he had”, “the highest gift of the Great Princess Victoria Fedorovna⁶ – a diamond pin”. He asked him to find a person in Russia for whom it would be as dear as for himself and who could, instead, send the editor a sum of money to support a few more issues of the magazine. He was sure that Syromiatnikov would understand him “in his heart”. Yet Syromiatnikov apparently took the gift for a bribe, and answered with an indignant letter (noting, for an instructive example, that he would have never allowed himself to ask Allaev to order a suit for him in Paris)⁷.

Allaev’s answer was decisive. He took Syromiatnikov’s reaction to be “the best proof of how badly the Russians understand us...” and he did his best to explain that he had addressed Syromiatnikov, and not anybody else, out of pride, because Syromiatnikov’s “views were consonant with his own”; as a Muslim and mountaineer, he acted out of “passion”, not by etiquette (and, no doubt, would be happy to order a Paris suit for him). For Syromiatnikov he would thus remain an “*incorrigible*” and “*uncultured Asiatic*”. Syromiatnikov did respond and stated that if Allaev wished to be understood by the Russians, he should first try to understand them. Such was the consequence of the general relationship existing between the East and Europe whose part Russia formed, according to Syromiatnikov’s views in that period⁸. At the

⁵ GARF. F. 102. O. 316. 1909. D. 234, l. 1-6. The letter was transmitted on May 15, 1909.

⁶IRLI. F. 655. D. 15, l. 4, 7. Victoria Fedorovna, the spouse of the Great Prince Kirill Vladimirovich, was entitled the Great princess in 1907, after their marriage, at first forbidden, was legalized by Nikolai II; in 1909 the family resided in Paris.

⁷ Syromiatnikov’s letters to Allaev are apparently lost; I have to restore their contents by Allaev’s responses to them.

⁸ Syromiatnikov’s views on the cultural configuration of the triangle Europe–Russia–East changed a number of times, shifting between those of the *westerners* and *easterners*, and back (he took the easterners’ position under the influence of count E. Uxtomskij and his journey together with him to China in 1897, and went back to the westerners’ during the Russo-Japanese war, which was again questioned by World War I). See Boris Mezhuev. Zabytyi spor: o nekotorykh vozmozhnykh istochnikakh "Skifov" Bloka: <http://www.archipelag.ru/authors/mezhuev/?library=1919>, retrieved October 15, 2013. Syromiatnikov is briefly mentioned in: David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War*

same time, however, Syromiatnikov put the editor of the *Moussoulmanine*, M.-B. Hadjetlaché (who, in fact, himself wrote to Syromiatnikov with the similar request even before Allaev did, on March 15, 1909⁹), in touch with the Head of the Foreign Confessions Department (Ministry of Interior), A.N. Kharuzin. As a result, Hadjetlaché got a government subsidy for his magazine, established connections in a number of the MI and other ministries departments, and fulfilled a number of missions for them, and, to some extent, obviously influenced P.A. Stolypin's vision of the Muslim question in Russia.¹⁰

I'm quoting this strange and multidimensional correspondence at some length not simply for a curious beginning, and not just to describe how the subsidy for the *Moussoulmanine* was got, and its editor – who is the protagonist of this paper – penetrated the upper levels of the State administration engaged with Muslim politics. The most intriguing here is the very method of communication between the two correspondents, Allaev and Syromiatnikov, leading to Allaev's success and based on the premise – shared by both of them – of a deep cultural difference, cultural *distance* between them: an “incorrigible Asiatic” and an established representative of the Russian (European and Christian in this context) imperial core. Indeed, it was Allaev's appeal to his *otherness*, his inherited spirit and manner of conduct distinguishing a mountaineer and Muslim, that finally made Syromiatnikov fulfill Allaev's request, most probably, feeling ashamed for the mere suspicion of his incapability to “understand” that otherness. Thus, appealing to the cultural distance – the very distance created by Orientalism as a complex of common imaginings about the Orient and Oriental people, “the *Asiatics*”, – Allaev turned his otherness into a kind of *symbolic capital*. The capital that appeared to be much easier bought by Syromiatnikov, than Allaev's connections with the upper circles of Russian society, which he had at first tried to exploit sending that man of power Victoria Fedorovna's pin to prove his good intentions (it was hardly just a bribe, indeed). Consequently, *via* advertising his otherness Allaev succeeded to construct a space of confidence with Syromiatnikov: it was a kind of otherness and distance that allowed closeness in their “consonant” convictions and patriotic feelings, in the

with Japan. DeKalb, 2001; on E. Ukhtomskii see *ibid*, ch. 3. Syromiatnikov's biography is somewhat romantically related in: B.D. Syromiatnikov. *Strannye puteshestviia i komandirovki Sigmy*. St. Petersburg, 2004.

⁹ RGIA. F. 821. O. 8. D. 1203, L. 1.

¹⁰ Stolypin's correspondence on Hadjetlaché's proposals: GARF. F.102. DP OO. 1910. D..74, č. 1, l. 21-23, 32, 47-50, 52, 68, 211. Hadjetlaché's information, most probably, underlies some of his Circulars. Generally, many of the clichés in the Ministry's of the Interior reports on the Muslim question may be traced back to Hadjetlaché's authorship, keeping in mind, though, that due to the highly stereotypical character of such reports, restoring their concrete sources requires a special textual analysis and still often remains hypothetical.

view on the mission of the writer in Russia (to whose rank Allaev felt certain to belong), who opposes both revolutionaries and “blind” officials for the sake of the State’s and its peoples’ welfare (not to mention Allaev’s attempt to extend the relations to a personal level, which the issue of the Paris suit vividly reveals).

A rich capital indeed – not only for its bearer, but for a student of the ideas of the Orient and imperial diversity in Russia too, as the case allows pursuing the ideas’ construction in the *everyday* practice and from the positions of different, and even opposite in regard to the “Oriental border”, actors. Its richness is stressed by yet another circumstance. As we’ll have to concede, Allaev and Hadjetlaché were neither native mountaineers, nor born Muslims. Moreover, these two were one and the same person, better known as Hadjetlaché¹¹. He had invented Allaev as his alter ego, in this case to make a better use of that capital and push his correspondent to surrender to the Oriental illusion, but also for some other needs.

There’s more deceit in that correspondence. A circle of the *Musoulmanine* initial publishers corrupted by the Young Turks and menacing both the Russian State and the mountaineers, hardly ever existed; if its shadow did, Hadjetlaché’s conflict with them was caused by some other reasons than his opposition to their views on the magazine’s proper trend. The *Moussoulmanine*’s first issue was published on July 28, 1908 (new style), a few days *after* the Young Turk revolution (24.07.1908), and not before it; there was no time gap for the eight “intelligent Circassians” to change their demands so radically and *due* to the occurred revolution. The *Moussoulmanine* seems to have been Hadjetlaché’s personal project. But that way of producing information (and that very piece of information would be repeated, up to 1916, in all the Special section’s of the Police Department reports on Hadjetlaché) was one of Hadjetlaché’s essential methods of self-presentation: a man of principle and importance, he was highly needed in an enemy’s camp, yet quite immune to the enemy’s temptations.

This is another dimension of the correspondence quoted. It demonstrates *in vivo* how the deceit is constructed to work out, a number of devices combined in the strategy consistently pursued by Hadjetlaché through his entire career. We are dealing, in fact, with a con-man, an adventurer and impostor (impostor not so much because he had reinvented his identity rather drastically, but as he made use of that invention as a capital to sell). Just to trail his itinerary could make a good adventure story on Orientalist topics. Yet here I’d prefer to take it as an

¹¹ The evidence is a draft letter addressed to Syromiatnikov and signed by a certain Abdurakhmanov; the signature is crossed and Hadjetlaché’s hand writes “A.-B. Allaev”, adding on the reverse: “This letter rewrite and send *recommandé*, possibly even from Villemomble (the Hadjetlachés’ residence since 1909. – *O.B.*), all the same [...]. Many kisses” (so, the instructions seem to have been addressed to his wife). Syromiatnikov did receive it, in typescript, from Le Raincy bordering Villemomble, whose ‘poste restante’ used to stand on Allaev’s letters for his address. BDIC, F delta rés 914(10) 6(2); IRLI. F. 655. D. 15, l. 28.

extreme case, a cluster of problems and trends of the era when modernity was growing on the whole body of late-imperial Russia, its different confessional and ethnic communities included¹², and a number of Orientalist discourses intercrossed all over Russia's imperial space. Indeed, if the core of the case is deceit, it's notably good for the task, as the strategies of *deceit* and the people's reactions to it seem to be most apt to reveal the very *regime of truth* (or simply, what to believe and what not to), which ruled the languages of the Other- and self-description, whose part those Orientalist discourses formed. But before discussing how the task is to be implemented concretely, let's get acquainted with the main stages of the protagonist's itinerary.

I. Orientalism, Empire, and the Individual Itinerary

The hero was known under different names. First, in the late 1890-s, as Iurii Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov (or, according to one of his presentations of his full name in official papers, Iurii Semenov[itich] Kazi-Bek-Akhmetukov Akhmet-Bey-Bulat[ov]¹³) – that same Kazi-Bek who is branded up till now among narrow erudite circles as a Circassian writer in illustrated magazines¹⁴ and author of several books¹⁵, mainly on Caucasian and oriental topics (as well as a correspondent on 'Eastern questions' and, in particular, 'Constantinople', in various newspapers), the one who enjoyed a certain success at that time, until it transpired that he was, probably, Jewish¹⁶. In line with the dominating mood of that popular Russian literature¹⁷, whose

¹² Cf.: Mustafa Tuna, *Imperial Russia's Muslims: Islam, Empire and European Modernity, 1788–1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

¹³ RGIA. F. 776., O. 8. D.. 1146, l. 1.

¹⁴ E.g.: *Vokrug sveta* [The 'Around the World']; *Priroda i liudi* [The Nature and People]; *Niva* [The Cornfield]; *Zhivopisnoe obozrenie* [The Fine Arts Review], *Zvezda* [The Star], *Mirovye otgoloski* [The World Echoes], etc.

¹⁵ *Cherkesskie rasskazy* [Circassian stories], vol.1, M., 1896; *Vsego ponemnogu* [A Little of Everything], M., 1897; *Sovremennaia Turtsiia* (Contemporary Turkey), SPb., 1897; *Cherty iz zhizni Ego Velichestva Sultana Khamida II* [Some Traits of The Life of His Majesty Sultan Hamid II], SPb., 1897; *Povesti serdtsa* [Stories of the Heart], Odessa 1901; *Tiazhelyi dolg* [The Heavy Duty]: Drama in 5 acts, Bobrujsk, 1901; *Mest': Kavkazsko-gorskaia legenda* [Vengeance: A Caucasian Mountaineer Legend], Vladikavkaz, 1902; *V chasy dosuga* [In The Leisure Time], Vladikavkaz, 1902. M.-B. Hadjetlaché also published a number of books, e.g.: *Sovremennaia Turcija*; *Nachalnik eshelona v Afriku* [Contemporary Turkey; The Chief of the echelon to Africa], Paris (The Moussoulmanine library)/Moscow, 1910; *Mrachnye vremena: Iz Zapisok nachal'nika tainoj policii v Turtsii* [The Dark Times: From The Notes of The Chief of The Turkish Secret Police], Paris (The Moussoulmanine library), 1911; *Šrutel'-Islam: Sushchnost' dogmaticheskogo i npravstvennogo veroucheniia musul'man s kratkim ob"iasneniem bogosluzheniia i religioznykh obriadov* [Šrutel'-Islam: The meaning of the dogmatic and moral Muslim doctrine, with a brief explanation of the liturgy and religious rites], Paris (The Moussoulmanine library), 1911; *Ubiitsa na trone* [A Murderer on the Throne], P., 1918. There're lots of unpublished works in his archives (BDIC).

¹⁶ This erudite knowledge is most probably based on: V.G. Korolenko, "Sovremennaia samozvanshchina" [Contemporary Imposture], in V.G. Korolenko, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, SPb., 1914, vol. 3, p. 271-368, here: p. 324; V. Ian, "Golubye dali Asii" [The Blue Expanses of Asia], in V. Ian, *Ogni na kurganakh*, Moscow, Sovetskij pisatel', 1985, p. 606-607. See also a

part Kazi-Bek in fact was, he looked quite loyal to the State. Moreover, he displayed his loyalty in many various ways, not forgetting to point out the early recognition of his talent by reputable figures in the State's service, like one "Moscow censor S.I.S."¹⁸ (obviously, Sergei Ivanovich Sokolov, a secretary of the famous conservative journalist M.N. Katkov, scoffed at by liberal and populist authors for his verily touching ignorance and stiffness in his care for the ideological purity of the literary works to be published¹⁹). So, but for that embroidered demonstration, we could, perhaps, believe Kazi-Bek, when, applying for the permission to establish a magazine in winter 1898 (already that early – and, probably, for the first time in his life), whose proposed title was *Kavkaz i narody Vostoka* (The Caucasus and the Peoples of the Orient), he stated the aim of the magazine to be "proving that the well-being and cultural development of the Asian peoples, both Christians and Muslims, was possible *but* under the protection of powerful Russia" (italics added)²⁰. Yet at that time (and in spite of his three prominent references indicated²¹), he was refused for various reasons, to which I'll return later.

By the autumn of the same year Kazi-Bek was arrested²² and soon to some extent publically demystified. A couple of provincial newspapers observed in 1899²³ that a person known as the writer of some recognition under the pen-name of Iurii Kazi-Bek was brought fettered from St. Petersburg to Kishinev for identification and appeared to be a private of the infantry regiment he had deserted as far back as 1891, named Gersh Etinger, i.e. a Jew (hardly

highly competent essay: V.M. Bokova, « Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov, Jurij », in *Russkie pisateli, 1800-1917: Biograficheskii slovar'*, Moscow, BSE, Vol. 2, 1992, p. 436.

¹⁷ Jeffrey Brooks, *When Russia learned to read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917*, Princeton (N.J.), Princeton UP, 1985; A.I. Reitblat, *Ot Bovy k Bal'montu i drugie raboty po istoričeskoj sociologii russkoj literatury* [From Bova to Balmont, and other works in historical sociology of Russian Literature], M., NLO, 2009.

¹⁸ *Živopisnoe obozrenie* (SPb), 34, 1894, p. 134.

¹⁹ V. Giliarovskii, *Moskva gazetaia* [Moscow of Newspapers], ch. "Redaktory" [The Editors], on http://az.lib.ru/g/giljarovskij_w_a/text_0060.shtml (retrieved 05.04.2012); Chuzhoi (N. Ėfros), "Vmesto nekrologa (Vospominaniia)" [Instead of obituary: Reminiscences], in *Rech'* (SPb.), 126, 1912, (10/V); I. Belousov, "Moe pervoe znakomstvo s cenzorom" [My first meeting with a censor], in *Put'* (M.), 4, 1913, p. 36-37.

²⁰ RGIA. F. 776., O. 8. D. 1146, l. 1-2.

²¹ RGIA, Ibid, l. 4. Here, these were: a "well-known writer I.I. Iasinskii"; another "Moscow censor, Count N.V. Shaxovskoi", and the "Director of the Department of the international (sic. – *O.B.*) relations of the Foreign Office, N.A. Malevskii-Malevich". Iasinskij was indeed well known as a writer, but rather of the "second row", in that period publishing, partly, in the same illustrated magazines as Kazi-Bek did, and often characterized as "lacking principles"; Shaxovskoi and Malevskii-Malevich were prominent State officials, the former becoming, in 1900-1906, the Director of the Main Direction on the Affairs of Press, and the latter – a Russian ambassador in Japan (1908-1916); at the time of Kazi-Bek's referring to him, he was the Director of the Department of *Inner* (not "international") relations at the Foreign Office, a mistake that may indicate a rather fable Kazi-Bek's acquaintance with him.

²² GARF. F. 102. DP, 3 D-vo. 1898. D. 15, l. 259-261.

²³ *Samarskaia gazeta* (The Samarian Gazette), 06.04.1899, with reference to another newspaper, *Bessarabets* (The Bessarabian).

known widely, this very information was used by Korolenko²⁴). Meanwhile, Kazi-Bek, aka Grigorii Ettinger (as his baptismal name went), held in a disciplinary battalion in the town of Bobruisk till 1901 for “desertion, living abroad [with no permission], and concealment of his real name and military rank [...]”²⁵, had time to lose his loyalty (if that ever existed) and – in unison with the coming revolutionary upheaval of 1905-1907 – pretended to have been a political prisoner. As a fighter for the peoples welfare (representing a “world organization” with those aims), he was now going, among other things, to establish a newspaper in Bobruisk to “waken up the town from its eternal sleep”²⁶. Yet after his last publications appearing in Vladikavkaz in 1901-1902, he more or less disappeared from view (however, V. Ian’s memoirs related to late 1901-1904 place him in Askhabad in Russian Turkestan²⁷; and his earlier works were republished in 1905 and then in 1911-1913²⁸).

The hero reemerges, as Grigorii Ettinger, in the police files in 1907²⁹, and, in 1908, in the files of the “Sherlock Holms of the Russian revolution”, Vladimir Burtsev (the famous exposé of Evno Azef), – as Magomet Aishin³⁰. He became now a leader of the “Central and Executive committee of the combatant flying squad of the Caucasian Mountaineers Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries-Maximalists”, or, according to the police qualification, a “blackmailer on revolutionary grounds” (bombarding, on the part of the “Committee”, the bourgeoisie in the Ukrainian boroughs, but also his own relatives in St. Petersburg, with letters demanding money for revolutionary needs, under the threat of death or public discredit). The police pursuit brought him to Galicia, where he met, among others, one of Burtsev’s future correspondents, an illegal Russian emigrant, anarchist-communist Samuel Bekker and his comrade (the hero was recommended to them as a “genuine Magomet” – meaning the spirit of the Prophet of Islam – by the chief-editor of the *Burevestnik*³¹, N.I. Rogdaev-Muzil’). Magomet’s stay in Bekker’s hired room in the town of Brody, and, later on, their living together in Paris, allowed Bekker to

²⁴ V. Korolenko, *Sovremennaiia samozvanshchina*, *op.cit.*

²⁵ GARF. F. 102., DP, OO. 1901. D. 235, l. 26. Initially, he was charged with heavier articles, including subjecthood or service to a foreign State, which meant Siberian exile: GARF. F. 102. DP, 3 D-vo. 1898. D. 15, l. 259.

²⁶ GARF. DP, OO. 1901. D. 235, l. 1.

²⁷ V. Ian. Golubye dali, *op.cit.*

²⁸ Iu. Kazi-Bek, “Na chernyi materik” [To The Black Continent], *Kazbek* (Vladikavkaz), 1905, 1st pub. *Vokrug sveta*, 1898 (several issues), and seven short stories, mainly from his book *Vsego ponemnogu* (*op.cit.*), were republished in *Neva* (SPb) in 1911-13.

²⁹ GARF. F. 102. DP, OO. 1907. D. 297.

³⁰ GARF. F. 5802. O 2. D. 456.

³¹ *Burevestnik* (The Petrel) – one of the main press organs of Russian anarchists, in 1908-1910 published in Paris and edited by N. Rogdaev, since August 1909 becoming the organ of the Union of Russian anarchists-communists.

observe his active communications with that very “pigging out bourgeoisie” that he, in his leaflets and speeches, so ardently urged to eradicate; those included editors of the most conservative Russian press to whom Magomet was proposing his correspondences denouncing Turkey, and the Young Turks in particular, as well as revealing Russian “comrades” making their “dirty tricks” in Europe (with one of such letters, let’s recall it, Allaev’s correspondence with Syromiatnikov started). For some time, though, Magomet was able to justify that as “conducted in the interests of the mountaineers and leading in the proper direction”³².

On April 10, 1908 all of them moved to Paris where Magomet soon announced the publication of the *Moussoulmanine*³³. It was now, and along with the so called “Muslim question” in Russia gaining political tension, that Magomet Aishin turned into Magomet-Bek Hadjetlaché (though keeping “Aishin” for some time as one of his well-known pen-names³⁴) – a Russian Muslim journalist settled, together with his family, in Paris, the “cultural capital of the world”, as it was then commonly called. The *Moussoulmanine*, retrieved in 1910 (after its first two issues of 1908, and with the help of the subsidy we already know about), attracted a number of Russian Muslim authors and some readership. In 1911 Hadjetlaché added to it a newspaper, *V mire musul’manstva* (In the Muslim world), published in St. Petersburg. Yet by the end of that year, there arose a scandal among the writing and reading Muslim public, caused by suspicion (justified as we can presume) that Hadjetlaché might be a government agent among the Muslim opposition, a “provocateur”, and that he published his Muslim editions with the government’s subsidy. His Muslim editions were stopped, but he continued his activities – with other Muslims and other officials – till 1919, when he was again arrested and now sentenced for life, yet in another country. That was Sweden where he was charged with criminal murders for gain; he claimed, to the contrary, that as the leader of the “Military organized group for the restoration of the Russian State” (and the editor, once again, of a newspaper, now entitled the *Ekho Rossii* [The Echo of Russia]) he had waged a war against Bolshevik agents settled in Sweden. There were suspicions, though, that he was a Bolshevik agent himself. He died in the prison of Långholmen in Stockholm, in 1929³⁵.

³² GARF. F.. 5802. O. 2. D.. 456, l. 5-12.

³³ GARF. Ibid, l. 9 retro.

³⁴ The name of Aishin is composed of the first name of Hadjetlaché’s wife, Aisha (also invented), and the possessive ending; later, in 1916, he constructed, by analogy, a pen-name Leilin, from the first name of his elder daughter Léila.

³⁵ Svante Lundberg, *Ryssligan: Flyktningarna från öst och morden i Bollstanäs 1919*, Lund, Nordic Academic Press, 2004.

There're two main questions of evidence in this reconstruction of the protagonist's itinerary. First, it's the identification of Iurii Kazi-Bek with Magomet Aishin aka Hadjetlaché; second it's the question of his ethno-confessional origins.

The honor of confirming the previously circulating hypothesis of Kazi-Bek finally turning into Hadjetlaché belongs to a prolific Kabardian scholar Raisa Khashkhozheva (d. 2009)³⁶. Yet she practically didn't provide references to the sources found, with the exception of the one referring to the "special" (i.e. classified) funds of the Kabardino-Balkarian Institute for the Humanities. During my meeting with the author in Nal'chik, in 2002, those appeared to be her handwritten extractions from the materials of the Russian central archives (with no references to the files, and even the funds, either), partly classified at the time of her research in the late 1960–early 1980-s, which she had got access to, due to her high rank in the Soviet republic hierarchy³⁷. Stimulated, in part, by her effort to overcome the long-lasting influence of L. Klimovich's vision of Hadjetlaché as a venal double-dealer representing a "type of those who made the weather in the religious life of the Muslims in the tsarist Russia"³⁸, she makes of the protagonist not only a national writer, but a kind of national hero, and uncritically adopts his own statements (while those of his opponents are seen as "insinuations" against him)³⁹. Hence she

³⁶ R.Kh. Khashkhozheva, «Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov: zhizn' i tvorchestvo» [Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov: Life and Works], in Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia*, Nal'chik, El'brus, 1993, p. 5-78; Idem, «Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov (Magomed-Bek Hadjetlaché): Ocherk zhizni i deiatel'nosti» [Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov (Magomed-Bek Hadjetlaché): A Review of life and activities], in Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov (Magomed-Bek Hadjetlaché), *Izbrannoe*, Nal'chik, Institut gumanitarnykh issledovaniï Pravitel'stva KBR i KBNC RAN, 2008; Cf. Z.Ia. Khapsirokov, «O khudozhestvennykh istokakh tvorchestva Iurii Kazy-Beka Akhmetukova» [On the artistic sources of Iurii Kazy-Bek Akhmetukov's works], in *Izvestiia Severo-Kavkazskogo nauchnogo tsentra vysshei shkoly: Obshchestvennye nauki*. (Rostov/Don), 3, 1979, p. 71-75.

³⁷ My critique of R.Kh. Khashkhozheva's methods and conclusions doesn't minimize my gratitude for her sharing her information with me.

³⁸ L.I. Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii* [Islam in Tsarist Russia], Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe antireligioznoe izdatel'stvo, 1936, p. 233- 267, the quotation is at p. 242-243.

³⁹ For more details: O. Bessmertnaya, «"Akhmetukovedenie": sozdanie natsional'nogo pisatel'ia v adygeiskom literaturovedenii» ["Akhmetukovedenie": Construction of a National Writer in Adyg Literature Studies], in V.A. Shnirel'man, A.E. Petrov (eds.), *Fal'sifikatsii i konstruirovaniie etnokraticheskikh mifov*, Moscow, IARKH RAN, 2011, p. 268-274, 367-370. The same refers to Mairbek Vachagaev's reading of Hadjetlaché's personal archives kept in BDIC, even if he radically opposes Khashkhozheva's vision of the hero as a Bolshevik agent, seeing in him a self-sacrificing Circassian defender of the Empire. Not being acquainted with other sources and literature, he blames as "partial scholars" both R. Khashkhozheva (who uses sources known only to her and makes Hadjetlaché "a kind of dummy figure") and O. Bessmertnaya ("a summary of whose presentation", comparing Hadjetlaché to Ostap Bender, he has found online, and who thus corrupted Hadjetlaché's writings and documents she had "a chance to see"): M. Vachagaev, «Mokhamed-Bek Islamovich Hadjetlaché–Skhaguaché: mezhdû Parizhem i Stokgolmom» [Mokhamed-Bek Islamovich Hadjetlaché–Skhaguaché: between Paris and Stockholm], at: <http://graun.livejournal.com/16991.html> (Feb. 13th, 2010; retrieved Oct. 23, 2017; previously published in *Istoriko-kul'turnyj*

overestimates the problem of identification. It looks quite evident, in the comparison of Burtsev's files and those of the police, quoted above, that Grigorii Ettinger (aka Iurii Kazi-Bek) and Magomet Aishin (aka Magomet-Bek Hadjetlaché) not only follow one and the same route and write in one and the same hand (both on paper and in manner), but conduct one and the same correspondence and author similar letters and leaflets on the part of one and the same "squad", signed by one and the same signature, "Magomet". So, a letter directly identifying Magomet Aishin with Iurii Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov, addressed to Burtsev (quoted by Khashkhozheva), should not be of any surprise to us. It was written in Ukrainian and signed by Burtsev's acquaintance M. Filipenko connected with the hero in the days the latter was calling himself Iurii⁴⁰.

As for Kazi-Bek–Aishin–Hadjetlaché–Ettinger's ethno-confessional origins, I had up till recently to base my conclusions on the juxtaposition of two versions, both coming from the police sources concerning his Bobruisk activities of 1901⁴¹ (his authentic birth and baptism certificates don't seem to have been saved). The shortest information came from the chief of Odessa gendarmerie, where the Ettingers had for some time resided, and presented the hero as a native Kabardian, a Muslim "baptized and adopted" by the family "in his childhood", and having chosen his native Kabardian name, Kazi-Bek, as his pen-name. Another version, much more detailed, was from Minsk (sent by the counterpart of Odessa's gendarmerie chief), where the information related to his trial of 1899 and data of his previous activities had been assembled; here he arrived as the Ettingers' own son. Though one (especially with the Soviet experience) could presume that the latter version might be prejudiced (what Khashkhozheva in fact did,

zhurnal "Prometheus", 4); for my polemics with the author online see: <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/1927/posts/22755> (Oct. 16, 2015; retrieved Oct. 23, 2017). I compared Hadjetlaché to Ostap Bender at first in: O. Bessmertnaya, «Russkaia kul'tura v svete musul'manstva: tekst i postupok» [Russian culture in the Muslim light: Text and act], in A.V. Zhuravskii (ed.), *Musul'mane i khristiane: problemy dialoga*, M., BBI, 2000, p. 469-530. On R. Khashkhozheva's romantization of Hadjetlaché, see also: D.I. Arapov, *Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia islama v Rossiiskoj imperii* [The system of the State regulation of Islam in the Russian Empire], M., MPGU, 2004, p. 11-12. For the disputes on Hadjetlaché on-line, see: O. Bessmertnaya, «Kem zhe byl M.-B. Hadjetlaché, ili nuzhda v obmane», in *Ya evam veda... - Kto tak znaet... Pamiati V.N. Romanova*. [Sb.st.] Moscow: RGGU, 2016, pp. 135-190, quot.: pp. 137-146 (<https://publications.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share//direct/210194030>).

⁴⁰ GARF. F. 5802. O. 2. D. 456, l. 23-23a; R. Khashkhozheva, Kazi-Bek, *art. cit.*, p. 28. Khashkhozheva, ignoring the difference in the initials, identifies M. Filipenko with Gavriil Leontievich Filippenko allied with G. Ettinger in 1907, at the time of the "squad's" activities in the Ukraine. A link between these two Filip(p)enkos can't be excluded. The address of one Filippenko in Lemberg (L'vov) was given to the victim of one of Ettinger's blackmailing letters, to send the money to (GARF. F. 102. DP, OO. 1907. D. 297, l. 10, 15 retro, 23v). Curiously, S.Bekker's comrade, known to us under his legal name only (the documents being provided to him, as well as to Bekker who became Alexandr Torin, by Hadjetlaché via the Russian consulate in Paris) was called *Maksim Filenko* (GARF. F. 5802. O. 2. D. 456, l. 16; *Moussoulmanine*, 1, 1908, available in: GARF. F. 102. DP, OO., 1913. O. 14. D. 194, l. 30-50).

⁴¹ GARF. F. 102. DP, OO. 1901. D. 235, l. 16-16 retro, 26-29.

though having not mentioned the very existence of this information)⁴², it appears to be confirmed by a number of details. According to the Russian laws of that time, the Jews were forbidden to adopt anybody except Jews, and it's not accidental that Odessa mentions baptism together with Kazi-Bek's adoption by the Ettingers. Yet Minsk gives the precise year, 1886, for the baptism of the whole family, which is much later than the time when Kazi-Bek could be, presumably, adopted as a child. Moreover, later, in 1907, G. Ettinger–M. Aishin's activities inflicted a complaint, addressed to Odessa mayor, from Mme Prang, born Ettinger, blackmailed by the hero in anti-Semitic and sexual terms. She wrote in desperation that “to her bitter regret that person was her *own* brother (*rodnoj brat*, i.e. brother of kin)”, and shared with the mayor her “great sorrow to have such a brother”⁴³. Knowing already some of the protagonist's devices of self-presentation, one could imagine how the legend of his adoption by a Jewish family disseminated in his home town of Odessa.

The archival data I found in 2014 give, to my mind, the final proof. They are the investigation files preceding the 1899 trial.⁴⁴ The research done by a St. Petersburg investigating officer involved inquiries in Russia and abroad (Turkey and Egypt) and almost all the persons mentioned by the self-styled ‘Kazi-Bek’ to prove his identity, yet the evidence was against him.⁴⁵ In spite of his stubborn resistance, he was finally found guilty: it was that very sentence to imprisonment in the Bobruisk disciplinary battalion, we already know about.⁴⁶ All together (not excluding his rabid, though rather pragmatic, anti-Semitism, often especially sharp when it's Jewish) makes me think he was born Ettinger.

The suspicion of his Jewish origins follows the hero along his way, but that is not a proof. If his birth origins are important for us, it's but a characteristic of his way to invent his identity (or, rather, identities) and the relation of that to the then ideas of the Orient and the ‘Asiatics’. Hence it's even more interesting how the way was started. According to the same Minsk report, Gersh-Berk Ettinger was born in 1870 (the hero also gave 1868 and 1872 as his birthdates), in the multi-confessional city of Tiflis. This merchant family moved, when he was about 17 (1886),

⁴² Cf. the rigueur with which the prosecutor of St. Petersburg court endeavors to establish the true facts of Kazi-Bek–Ettinger's biography, as well as the mitigation of the initial charges: GARF. F. 102. DP, 3 d-vo. 1898. D. 15.

⁴³ GARF. F. 102. DP, OO. 1907. D. 297, l. 21-21a.

⁴⁴ TsGIA. F. 487. O. 2. D. 82. For parallels between historical research and investigation in court, see: C. Ginzburg, *Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian // Critical Inquiry*, 1991. Vol. 18, No. 1. P. 79-92; C. Ginzburg & A. Shugaar, *The Judge and the Historian: Marginal Notes on a Late-Twentieth-Century Miscarriage of Justice*. London & N.Y., 2002.

⁴⁵ For more details, see: O. Bessmertnaya, «Kem zhe byl M.-B. Hadjetlaché», op.cit.

⁴⁶ RGVIA. F. 14323. O. 1. D. 601. L. 299-299rev.

to another dynamic city, Odessa, and it was then and there that they chose to be baptized to Orthodoxy. Two years later, in 1888, Grigorij left the family to take part in the expedition of another adventurer and master of persuasive word, ataman Nikolai Ashinov⁴⁷, with whom he sailed from Odessa via Constantinople and Port-Said to Somalia. On his return to Russia (and, actually, while in the expedition, where the North Caucasians, namely, the Ossets, had a privileged position near Ashinov⁴⁸), he claimed to be a Circassian noble, named Grigorii (sometimes, Georgii) Akhmetov, and a “Turkish subject”⁴⁹. As such, he was settled in the town of Ardon in Ossetia, under the auspices of the leading Osset participant of the expedition, an Orthodox, S. Dzeranov, registered there. At that moment, Grigorii presented himself still an Orthodox, yet baptized nowhere else than Constantinople in 1879 by archimandrite Paisii himself (the leader of the Christian mission of Ashinov’s 1888 expedition, who, in 1879, was a monk of the Athos Russian St. Pantaleon monastery, heading its church in Constantinople); for that fact the hero had a certificate that later appeared faked (faking documents became his usual practice up to the end of the way). He “entered” the Russian subjecthood in 1893⁵⁰ (though, simultaneously, for a time, keeping in his practice his status of a “Turkish” foreigner), and received a number of foreign passports, while his second name Akhmetov gradually turned into Akhmet-Bei-Bulat Akhmetov, Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov.

In that way the first elements of his “auto-biography” were born, further on developed together with the birth of Kazi-Bek himself as a writer, and precisely along the lines of the plots and style of his passionate fiction. The fiction that belonged to that new wave, characteristic of the period, of the Caucasian (and Oriental) theme in Russian literature, broadcasted by illustrated magazines and mass literature, that is described by S. Layton as now deprived (in contrast to Pushkin, Lermontov or Bestuzhev-Marlinskii) of its early Romantic ambivalence and striving to

⁴⁷ A.V. Lunochkin, “*Ataman vol’nykh kazakov*” *Nikolai Ashinov i ego deiatel’nost’* [The “Ataman of Free Cossaks” Nikolai Ashinov and His Activities], Volgograd, Izdatel’stvo Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1999.

⁴⁸ A.V. Lunochkin, op. cit.; GARF. F. 102. DP, 3 d-vo. 1894. D. 598, Vol. 1, l. 247-269retro.

⁴⁹ It was supposed that he joined the expedition in Constantinople. In fact, he embarked in Odessa (GARF, ibid, l. 249 retro), and, according to the witness for the prosecution in 1898, M. Tseil’, who was responsible for recruiting the participants of the expedition (GARF, ibid, l. 116 retro), – under the name of “Terenko” (GARF. F. 102. DP, 3e d-vo. 1898. D. 15, l. 259). It’s worth noting that in the common usage the term “Circassian” used to be a general designation of the North Caucasians at large. The police investigation on the return of Ashinov’s team to Russia was quite chaotic. When interrogated in 1898, Paisii denied that he had ever baptized Akhmetov or given him any certificates, except for the certificate of his participation in the expedition of Ashinov (TsGIA. F. 487. O. 2. D. 82. L. 38 39).

⁵⁰ RGIA. F. 1284. O. 246. D 153a, l. 20; D. 19, l. 59; D. 2488, l. 12, 26, 78-79.

acknowledge, after the end of the Caucasian wars, the civilizing imperial mission in the region⁵¹. Even if the wave was quite complex – including (e.g. in the works of V. Nemirovich-Danchenko, V. Svetlov, and Kazi-Bek himself) such motifs as the conflict of duty and feeling, of the historical fate and the poetry of freedom, and the evident nostalgia for the Northern Caucasus romantic past – it reflected, indeed, both the frustrations of the Russian *fin de siècle* and the quest for the glorified national/Imperial past and identity. *Domesticating*, in response to that quest, the “wild” and “passionate” Caucasus⁵², it was putting a border-line between its past and present. And the wave obviously caught Kazi-Bek up.

According to thus born “biography” published in 1894⁵³, Kazi-Bek’s real name was Akhmet-Bei Bulat, and he was actually a born in Turkey offspring of the well-known Caucasian hero Akhmet-Bei-Bulat, sung by Lermontov⁵⁴, and the younger son of an Abadzekh prince Akhmet Axmet Bei who had emigrated to Turkey in 1863⁵⁵ with 30 thousand of his people, and perished as a chief of bashi-bazouk troops in the battle of Lovcha (1877) in the Russian-Turkish war, waging wars against the Russians together with Shamil’s son, Magoma (i.e. Kazi-Magomet). The hero lost simultaneously his mother too, who in desperation killed his sister and committed suicide. He lived with his teacher, a cruel *mulla* (whose authentic narratives became the source of the writer’s works), until his relatives took him back to the Caucasus. Thus, the tragic guilt of his father was now to be redeemed by the son returned to his Caucasian motherland and loyal to the Russian State.

This story became the base for the hero’s further “autobiographies”, though its elements, as well as the scale of its romantization, were undergoing changes according to the situation. Besides the changing parents’ names (along with his own), his birthplace fluctuated too: the Russian officials knew Hadjetlaché as born in Russia and taught in the Ekaterinodar gymnasium⁵⁶ (which presupposed his native Russian subjecthood and closer ties with the

⁵¹ Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy*, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2005, p. 252-261.

⁵² S. Layton, «Nineteenth-Century Russian Mythologies of Caucasian Savagery», in *Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917*, ed. by D. R. Brower and E. J. Lazzarini, Bloomington, Indiana UP, 1997, p. 80-100.

⁵³ Zhivopisnoe obozrenie, 34, 1894, p. 134.

⁵⁴ Akhmet-Bei Bulat is a hero of Iu. Lermontov’s early poem *Khadzhi Abrek*, whose prototype was a real historical personage, Bei-Bulat Taimazov also mentioned by Pushkin in his *Puteshestvie v Arzrum* (Travel to Arzrum). On him: L.P. Semenov, *Lermontov na Kavkaze* [Lermontov in the Caucasus], Piatigorsk, 1939, p. 56-62. Cf.: Iu. Kazi-Bek, «Khadzhi Abrek», in *Zvezda* (SPb.), 36, 1894, p. 702-708.

⁵⁵ I.e. by the end of the Caucasian war, when large numbers of Adygs were pushed to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. See especially: A. Jersild, *Orientalism and Empire*, Montreal et al., McGill-Queen’s UP, 2002.

⁵⁶ RGIA. F. 821. O. 133. D. 449, l. 28.

Russians, and was, probably, a response to some of the reasons for the refusal he got regarding his earlier proposal of the *Kavkaz i narody Vostoka*, i.e. his lack of education and living in Constantinople). During the Stockholm trial, he appeared again to be born in Turkey, in Constantinople, and the cruelty of his father (whose rank in the Turkish army became much higher) was painted in bright colors to justify his own rage shown in the murders he had committed⁵⁷. Finally, after his ultimate disappointment in Europe together with the Swedish verdict of his guilt, he sent to his children a letter of the history of their kin, now written in the manner resembling Islamic genealogical chain, and arising to a companion of Prophet Muhammad as their forefather, whose descendants came to the Caucasus via India⁵⁸. Paradoxically enough, that same life story of 1894, though rationalized and combined with the Odessa version of Kazi-Bek being a native Kabardian adopted by the Ettingers and the Minsk report of his further activities, as well as with some “biographical” plots of his fiction, formed the conventional biography of Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov in today’s Adyg literary studies⁵⁹.

The ambiance of the poly-ethnic and multi-confessional cities of Odessa and Tiflis, where the hero spent his early years; the baptism as a change of identity and name (perhaps, too easy and/or shocking) and, supposedly, a conflict with the family; the exotic expedition, and its Ossetian participants’ and Ashinov’s personal influence, – are among the circumstances that, most probably, helped the hero to estrange himself from the roots and both to deny his origins and discover the Orient, the Caucasus in particular. One could term it an individual case of “Orientalism in reverse”⁶⁰, of self-imposing – as a matter of choice (the choice made even if one prefers to believe in the hero’s Circassian origins) – the romanticized Oriental, Circassian and, after all, Muslim identity as opposed to the “shameful” Jewish one, albeit baptized⁶¹. Characteristically enough, the choice was not for the dominating Russian and Christian Orthodox

⁵⁷ Riksarkivet (Marieberg, Stockholm), Justitierevisionen, 1929-07-29, Nr. 676, vol. 1, l. 1301-1317; Statens Polisbyrå, 1919, F 1 A: 16, l. 124, fl.; S. Lundberg, *Ryssligan, op. cit.*

⁵⁸ BDIC, F delta rés 914 (1).

⁵⁹ The authority of R. Khashkhozheva who (re)constructed this biography led to its being taken for granted (e.g.: S.R. Agerzhanokova, *Khudozhestvennoe osmyslenie zhizni adygov v tvorchestve adygskikh prosvetitelei kontsa XIX – nachala XX vv.* [The Artistic Interpretation of the Adygs’ Life in the Works of Adyg Enlighteners of Late XIX – Early XX Centuries], Maikop, Adygeia, 2003. Earlier and in quite a different academic tradition, V.M. Bokova (Kazi-Bek, art. cit.), basing her study on his contemporaries’ knowledge of Kazi-Bek, also combined, in fact, the Odessa and Minsk versions of his story, which seem incompatible, due, at least, to the difference in the date of the Ettingers’ baptism.

⁶⁰ A. Etkind, « Orientalism Reversed: Russian Literature in the Times of Empires », *Modern Intellectual History*, 4, 3, 2007, p. 617–628, the quotation is at page 625.

⁶¹ Whether baptism did free one from Jewishness or not, became by that time a problem facing Russian officials (and society), see: Eugene M. Avrutin, *Jews and the Imperial State. Identification Politics in Tsarist Russia*, Ithaca – London, Cornell UP, 2010.

belonging, yet, obviously, not for a simple subjection either. Keeping a cultural (and political) difference-distance from those in power and manipulating it became, precisely (let me stress it once again), the means in the protagonist's search for personal authority, influence, and money. The choice for the "Oriental" identity made, there appeared no other space for his creativity, in the context partly already described, as to turn, in a new reverse, into an "Orientalist" himself, as his literary production has shown and further enterprises (which we're going to turn to) confirmed.

II. The Muslim Question through the lens of Hadjetlaché's strategies

It's time to get out of the purely personal dimension of the story. As the hero entered the *Muslim space*⁶² of the Russian Empire and represented – and was taken as – a Muslim in his relationships, the case is much more about that Muslim space, than about the Jews. I'm turning now to one of the episodes of his career, which is related to Hadjetlaché's Muslim editions, perhaps, one of the most multicolored by the then ideas of the Orient. How to use it as a historical cluster and make the case representative – yet avoiding making *a representative* of the hero? (Not to avoid that would mean losing his individual specificity and plunging into a too direct generalization, e.g. *à la* Klimovich or those called namely "the Orientalists" in the Saidian meaning of the word, – even if the protagonist was not unique in the manipulation, by those from the *Muslim* side, of the Russian administration's obsession with the "Muslim question"⁶³, and was not the only Muslim ready to work for the Government against some factions of his coreligionists⁶⁴, and even not the only Jew who pretended to be born Muslim⁶⁵.) I take the hero as a *trickster*, a figure whose function is to cross social *borders* by tricking the others⁶⁶. This allows exploring how the borders were constructed, both by the hero and those others. Here, it's precisely the borders between the Muslims (and more specifically, the Muslim modernized circles and political opposition) and the Imperial agents, which were crossed and are to be

⁶² By the "Muslim space" of the Empire I mean the space of interaction between different Muslim communities, their social and political groups, and those of the Imperial core, the Imperial administration particularly.

⁶³ E.g., Alexander Morrison, « "Applied Orientalism" in British India and Tsarist Turkestan », in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2009, 51(3), p. 619–647, here: p. 634-636.

⁶⁴ See the lists of Muslim "agents-provocateurs" in a number of issues of *Kaspj* (The Caspian, Baku) of 1917.

⁶⁵ A parallel in the next generation is presented in: Tom Reiss, *The Orientalist: Solving the Mystery of a Strange and Dangerous Life*, New York, Random House, 2005.

⁶⁶ Literature on tricksters' social functions has been piling up recently. To quote just two titles in the Russian field (and different enough in the approach): Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia*, Princeton, NJ, PUP, 2005; Mark Lipovetsky, *Charms of The Cynical Reason: The Trickster's Transformations in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture*, Boston, Academic Studies Press, 2011.

considered. To do that, I'm shifting the focus of the study from the hero to the others involved – the Muslim circles, the Russian administration, – and back. More concretely, I put three questions: why did people on each side of the border believe Hadjetlaché, what made them lose their trust, and what were his means of deceit. To *trust* means in this case to accept him as 'ours', as one of 'us' or close to that; to *deprive* of trust is to alienate; and the means of deceit characterize the hero's own perception of the borders and differences most relevant for the people whom he tricks.⁶⁷ In other words, these questions are about how Muslim belonging and Muslim otherness were conceived by the actors on the different sides of the border – and how the ideas of the Orient revealed themselves in the processes of such border-marking. Thus, I'm going to treat *Orientalism in action*, i.e. put in practice, or, to extend A. Morrison's term, "applied Orientalism"⁶⁸.

But what, indeed, to invest in the term "Orientalism" after 40 years of the controversies on and developments of E. Said's argument⁶⁹? The famous debate on whether "Russian Orientalism has a Russian soul" (the question put by M. Todorova though ironically, but, in the context, not quite), provoked by N. Knight and held in *Kritika* and *Ab Imperio*⁷⁰, has been by no means extinguished since the early 2000-s; recent years have seen nearly a boom of the studies on Russia's attitudes towards the "Orient" (and "its own Orient" particularly) in comparison with those in the West⁷¹. Having in view the continental character of the Russian Empire holding no geographical boundaries with its Asiatic territories/colonies, and, even more importantly, its standing as the Orient for (Western) Europe and Europe for the Orient (often illustrated by Dostoevskij's famous saying: "In Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia we, too, are Europeans"⁷²), the proponents of the Russian Orientalism's specificity see it, roughly speaking, in two qualities: 1) a *lesser distance* put by the Russian Orientalists between Russian and "Oriental" cultures than

⁶⁷ Hence, my studying 'trust' (as well as 'deceit') is rather instrumental, which differs from G. Hosking's approach suggested in: Geoffrey Hosking, *Trust: A History*. Oxford, Oxford U. Press, 2014.

⁶⁸ A. Morrison (*art. cit.*, p. 622, 623) defines "applied Orientalism" as « ...the actual impact of "Orientalist" attitudes on colonial governance and law »; « the points at which the study of Oriental languages, religions, and societies and the exercise of imperial power intersected ».

⁶⁹ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York, Vintage Books, 1994 (1st ed. 1978).

⁷⁰ Nathaniel Knight, « Grigor'ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the service of Empire? », *Slavic Review*, 59, 2000; *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 1/4, Fall 2000 (New Series), p. 691-728 (articles by A. Khalid, N. Knight, M. Todorova); *Ab Imperio* (Kazan), 1, 2002, p. 239-311 (D. Schimmelpennik van der Oye; A. Etkind; N. Knight; E. Campbell).

⁷¹ Quoted further on.

⁷² As quoted in the epigraph to the Editorial « Introduction: Russia's Orient, Russia's West », in *Orientalism and Empire in Russia*, ed. Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander Martin, *Kritika Historical Studies* 3, Bloomington, IN, Slavica Publishers, 2006, p. 3-19.

that set by the West European ones between them and their “Orient”, and 2) a *larger distance* between the Orientalists and the State, i.e. their different relation to power⁷³. (To a great extent, this seems to be stimulated by and stimulate, in its turn, the further orientalizing of Russia in its perception today in the West and in Russia itself.) In an even more simplistic rendition, this would mean that the Russian Orientalists’ attitudes to Russia’s Eastern peoples might be less negative than those in the West (as regards its colonies), while their relations with the State might be less positive. To a large extent, this is a critique of E. Said’s too bold dichotomies (perhaps, more so, than a fruit of the real exclusivity of the Russian material, even if quite variable in different cases)⁷⁴. So, the opponents of that Russocentric position (especially, A. Khalid and, recently, A. Morrison who compared the Russians in Turkestan with the British in India⁷⁵) insist that Russia’s encounter with her Eastern peoples, since the mid-18th c., was quite comparable with other European powers meeting their colonies⁷⁶. As the editors of the *Ab Imperio* added, the late Russian Empire, with its inner heterogeneity described by means of modernity’s Occident-Orient divisions, appeared as a *microcosm* within which all the

⁷³ As the editors remarked in their «Introduction» (*art.cit.*, p. 7), discussing N. Knight’s contention that knowledge didn’t always serve power – and even more so in Russia: « Knight implicitly takes one of those famous Russian peculiarities—the oft-noted alienation of the late imperial intelligentsia, which built on Russia’s powerful tradition of state service but arguably redirected its service ethos from the state to the “people”— and amplifies it into a challenge to a universalistic (in particular, the Saidian one. – *O.B.*) model ». Vera Tolz (*Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods*, Oxford, OUP, 2011), avoiding those dichotomies and contesting the view that Orientalists in Russia (as regards the group under her discussion, i.e. Rosen’s school) distanced themselves from the State’s interests and politics, yet strongly insists on the specificity of Russia’s academic Orientalism (“Orientology”, as she puts it); for the discussion of the book, see *Ab Imperio*, 11, 2011, with M. Dolbilov, S. Glebov, V. Bobrovnikov, and V. Tolz participating. Though Lorraine de Maux (*La Russie et la tentation de l’Orient*, Fayard, 2010) mentions neither E. Said, nor the debate, her vision seems to be close to that “uniqueness (or “distinctiveness”) approach” (as distinguished in: M. Todorova, « Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul? A Contribution to the Debate between Nathaniel Knight and Adeeb Khalid », in *Kritika*, 1/4, 2000, p. 717-727).

⁷⁴ For a rich bibliography of the works contesting and/or sophisticating the Saidian construction outside the Russian field, see V. Tolz, *op.cit.*, *passim*. On the changing moods of the Russian «representative figures’» attitudes towards the East (yet with a general tendency to ‘orientalize’ Russian Orientalism), see especially: David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian mind from Peter the Great to the emigration*, New Haven; London, Yale University Press, 2010.

⁷⁵ Adeeb Khalid, « Russian History and the Debate over Orientalism », *Kritika*, 2000, 1/4, p. 691-699; A. Morrison, *art.cit.*; see also: Elena Campbell, « K voprosu ob orientalizme v Rossii (vo vtoroj polovine XIX veka – načale XX veka) » [On the question of Orientalism in Russia (in the Second Half of the 19th – Early 20th Centuries)], *Ab Imperio*, 1, 2002, p. 311-322.

⁷⁶ For broader analyses of the debate, see Morrison, *art. cit.*, especially, p. 622-624, 627-630; Vera Tolz, « Orientalism, Nationalism, and Ethnic Diversity in Late Imperial Russia », in *The Historical Journal*, 48 (1), 2005, p. 127-150, here: p. 129-131.

complexities of those world relations were reproduced, even if that might stimulate Russia's own "western(iz)ers" feeling "Oriental" outside, in relation to Europe⁷⁷.

What, indeed, is at issue here, is how the cultural distance/difference (hence the cultural border and the criteria of cultural belonging) was posed and thought to be managed – no matter how positive, negative, or mixed was the attitude to the Other. Treating those questions, I understand Orientalism broadly. Scholars now rightly insist on distinguishing between groups and different backgrounds of those whom we usually call Orientalists (those who produce expert knowledge of the Orient, like scholars, and government or military officials in scholars' role, and missionaries, or depict it as writers and artists)⁷⁸. Yet these different productions didn't exist independently and, though often coming in conflict, intersected and mixed up in the common perceptions and in the practice of power. It is this inconsistent complex of stereotypes, imaginings, views and concepts regarding the Islamic Orient, which homogenizes, generalizes and exoticizes it as the Other, and puts it at a cultural distance, establishing hierarchies, that I mean by Orientalism here (and it's in this sense that I extend A. Morrison's term of "applied Orientalism").

Yet partaking of the elements of the complex, rather expectedly, involves the Muslims themselves, and not only as victims of "othering" by the "Russian side", but as actors of self-distinguishing (self-Orientalization and self-exoticization included), and not only as the subjects ripe for colonial domination, but as agents of resistance and/or subversion⁷⁹. Orientalism in this sense (and period) appears rather a reciprocal enterprise, and, one may say contrary to the original post-colonial studies argument, not only as means of colonial domination, but, rather, of concurrence of different political projects, even if unequal in their relation to power. That's why Hadjetlaché's border-crossing and the questions of trusting and distrusting him on both sides

⁷⁷ Il'ia Gerasimov, « Ot redaktsii. Obnovlenie Rossiiskoi imperii i paradoksy orientalisa » [Editors. Modernization of Russian Empire and Paradoxes of Orientalism], in *Ab Imperio*, 1, 2002, p. 239-247. On the mirrored character of the visions of Europe and the Orient in Russia see, among others, « Introduction », *art. cit.*; A.V. Juravskii, « Musul'manskii Vostok v russkoi religiozno-filosofskoi mysli » [Muslim Orient in Russian religio-philosophical thought], in *Rossia i Musul'manskii mir: Inakovost' kak problema*, ed. A.V. Smirnov, Moscow, Iazyki slavianskikh kultur, 2010, p. 161-196.

⁷⁸ V. Tolz, *art. cit.*, p. 130-131.

⁷⁹ Cf. Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, New York: Routledge, 1994; Paul W. Werth, « From Resistance to Subversion: Imperial Power, Indigenous Opposition, and Their Entanglement », in *Kritika* 1(1), 2000, p. 21–43. The question of the Orientalist/colonial discourse taken up by the Orientals/colonized and making them ripe for Western domination was put already by E. Said, but reinterpreted by H. Bhabha and developed in postcolonial studies. A brief critical overview: Tolz, *op. cit.*, p. 111-112. On the reception of the discourse in the Caucasus, see: V. O. Bobrovnikov, *Musul'mane Severnogo Kavkaza: Obyčaj, pravo, nasilie* [The Muslims of the Northern Caucasus: Lore, Law, Violence], Moscow, Vostochnaja literatura, 2002, p. 16-41; Rebecca Gould, « Transgressive Sanctity: The Abrek in Chechen Culture », in *Kritika*, 8 (2), 2007, p. 271–306; idem, *Writers and Rebels: The Literature of Insurgency in the Caucasus*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016.

may be of interest here. It will show, as I hope, how Orientalism, in this case, influenced the very criteria of truth (the criteria aesthetic, ethical, and political) in perceiving cultural belonging, and formed a single complex with the ideas of the primordial (and even genetically transmitted) culture, of nation and race.

I argue that, with the rise of Romantic nationalism, Muslim culture was conceived by the Muslim modernizers and the Imperial agents, to a large extent, analogically (though usually oppositely evaluated)⁸⁰, modeled by the idea of the primordial romantic nation, and substantialized to the extent that the true belonging to it was seen in one's originating from it (so, the hero's subject of choice – his origins – was quite to the point as another manifestation of their importance). Consequently, the two sides faced, at least on the surface of the political scene, a number of symmetrical problems in dealing with the “Muslim question”, in their vision of Muslim cultural belonging and Muslim otherness.⁸¹ It was these Imperial mirrors – Orientalist to a great extent – that Hadjetlaché appeared to be capable of discovering and making use of, so as to sell his invented identity to both sides, when pursuing his strategy which I call *playing the Other*.⁸²

Hadjetlaché did in fact gain trust on both sides. Starting from 1910, the Muslim authors of different ethnic backgrounds and political orientation, the oppositional included, who would become well-known on Russia's Muslim scene (H. Atlasov, Sh. Sunchali, G. Baimbetov, G. Bammatov, A. Tsalikov, S. Gabiev⁸³, et al.) contributed to the *Moussoulmanine*. Moreover, when establishing his newspaper in early 1911th (with partial government subsidy), and looking for the Muslim intelligentsia's support in St. Petersburg and the Volga-Urals region, Hadjetlaché personally was recommended by a member of the State Duma Muslim faction as a “*vigorous man...sincerely wishing to work for the common good of our coreligionists...*” and “*...absolutely*

⁸⁰ A close, yet different position: Christian Noack, « State Policy and its Impact on the Formation of a Muslim Identity in the Volga-Urals », in *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early XVIII to Late XX Centuries)*, ed. by S.A. Dudoignon & Komatsu Hissao, London, Kegan Paul, 2001, p. 3-26.

⁸¹ The symmetry between the *jadids*' (namely, I. Gasprinskii) and Russian missionaries' (namely, N. Il'minskii) projects is in different terms analyzed in: M. Tuna, «Gaspirali v. Il'minskii: Two Identity Projects for the Muslims of the Russian Empire», in: *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2002, pp. 265–289. It was took up by E. Campbell, in *The Muslim Question and Russian Imperial Governance*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana UP, 2015.

⁸² My approach to this individual case is similar to: Willard Sunderland, «The Baron's Cloak: A History of the Russian Empire in War and Revolution». Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2014. Yet it originates from the French 'pragmatic turn' and its reinterpretation in Russia's case studies (i.e. 'Casus') school, founded by Iu.L. Bessmertnyi.

⁸³ The transliteration is given in the way (mainly, russified) the names appeared in the *Moussoulmanine* and *V mire musulmanstva*.

trustworthy in all respects”⁸⁴. And in the government circles, he was characterized as “acting in the spirit of the Government interests”, and the Special Section of the Police Department even defended him from the Okhranka suspicions that he was, actually, a pan-Islamist⁸⁵. The trust of both sides was caused, roughly speaking, by three aspects: pragmatic needs, ideology/discourse, and the hero’s image. I’ll start with the first two, and then return to the latter.

Why did the Muslims accept him? One of the main messages of his Muslim editions, as well as, apparently, in his personal contacts, was urging the Muslims’ enlightenment, that is, the civilizing mission of the Muslim intelligentsia in regard to the “backward” (“Oriental” in this sense) Muslim masses. The pledge of the enlightenment, its indispensable condition, was seen in all-Russia’s Muslim *cultural* union. Culture meant here the enlightenment again, and, by the same token, the Muslims’ communion with the universal culture and progress manifested, in that Eurocentric age, in Europe. These “cultural objectives” showed also the Muslims aspirations to the common good of the Russian State as a whole. That was, certainly, a reproduction of the stereotypes with which the Muslim press developing the Jadids’ line was permeated. (The fact that Hadjetlaché chose to stress them, and that it propelled other Muslims to trust him, suggests that these motifs acquired in this period a conventional character, and the reformist line of the Muslim discourse was not so marginal, as previously.) The accent on the work for the “*common good of our coreligionists*” in the character sketch of Hadjetlaché, quoted above, is another manifestation of the same idea of unity, whose part Hadjetlaché appeared to be. His acceptance by the leaders of the Muslim movement (those from the capital, the Volga-Ural region and the Northern Caucasus) shows their urgent need of a Russian-language (i.e. lingua franca) edition that would “unite”, on those enlightenment lines, all the Muslims of Russia (and also give the *true* information on them to the Russian public and government), and of an editor standing formally *outside* the established political camps⁸⁶. Hadjetlaché appeared there just in time.

⁸⁴ The recommendation was given by Galiaskar Syrtlanov representing the Orenburg *guberniia* in the State Duma, in his letter to F. Karimov, editor of the Orenburg newspaper *Vakyt* (NART. F. 1370. O. 1. D. 22, l. 20).

⁸⁵ GARF. DP, OO. 1913. D. 194, l. 87, 89-93. Hadjetlaché’s editions were also taken as Pan-Islamist by A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemerrier-Quelquejail, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920*, Paris, Mouton & Co, 1964, p. 172-173.

⁸⁶ On the necessity of a Russian-language newspaper published in the capital, see, e.g. Topchibashi’s correspondence: NART. F. 186. O. 1. D. 6, l. 1-5; D. 9, l. 1; D. 11; D. 65. After Hadjetlaché’s editions were closed, there were other attempts realized in the *Musulmanskaia gazeta* (the *Muslim gazette*) published in St. Petersburg by S. Gabiev and I. Shagiakhmetov. On the search for an editor “independent” of the State Duma Muslim faction, see: D. Usmanova, *Musul’manskaia frakciia i problemy “svobody sovesti” v Gosudarstvennij Dume Rossii (1906-1917)* [Muslim faction and the problems of “freedom of conscience” in the Russian State Duma], Kazan’, Master Line, 1999, p. 61; assessment by the Russian side: *Musul’manskaia pechat’ v Rossii v 1910 godu* [The Muslim press in Russia in 1910], ed. by V. Gol’strem [SPb, 1911], Oxford, Society for Central Asian Studies, Reprint series N^o 12, 1987, p. 60.

Yet the *unity* comes out differently under the Muslims' shock at losing trust in that "vigorous man". I don't only mean the implication of its oppositional character, which was already evident in Hadjetlaché's private contacts with the Muslim intellectuals during the period of trust (suffice it to note, that "trustworthy in all respects" implies something unsaid). The Muslim unity now reveals itself as modeled on the pattern of ethno-national culture. The idea of the *genuine* Muslim origins, "Islamic blood"⁸⁷, ensuring genuine "*Muslimness*", appears here to be crucial.

The suspicions that something was wrong were born due to various reasons. One of them was Hadjetlaché's exceedingly ambitious conduct. Sometimes, a sharp criticism of the contents of his writings was also heard, up to accusing him of "dancing to the Government tune"⁸⁸. Yet along with all that, went the suspicion of his alien origin: it arose due to the rumors about Hadjetlaché's dubious past, reaching some Muslim activists' ears, who tried to collect information on this bold figure previously quite unknown to them⁸⁹. The suspicions lead to detailed investigation; the discovery was really shocking: Hadjetlaché's indecent behavior as a journalist and his harsh political double-dealing (I'll return to the things discovered later). And this discovery was *the* proof of what before had only been suspected: his being a Jew. As a result, Hadjetlaché got a nickname among the Muslims, which referred to that very person, whom Hadjetlaché himself scorned when writing, under the name of Allaev, to Syromiatnikov: the *Muslim Azef*⁹⁰. Quite evidently, Hadjetlaché was associated with Evno Azef both in his political strategies and his Jewishness: "*Some nobleman or maybe even a prince, some Muslim, or maybe even a Jew in Muslim skin*" – wrote his former colleague about him, developing a verse of Ivan Krylov's fable "The Liar"⁹¹.

So, the Muslims, in fact, *constructed* Hadjetlaché's origins, proceeding from political and ideological presumptions. To put it briefly: the suspicion of Hadjetlaché's alien origins caused investigation of his political double-dealing, while his political double-dealing was *the* proof of his alien origins. It was the origins that the Muslim public imagined to determine the real Muslim

⁸⁷ Akhmad Kamal condemning the *Moussoulmanine's* criticism of the new Turkey, doubted if the editors had "a drop of *Islamic blood* in their veins" (*Jeni Fejuzat*, 01.02.1911, in GARF. DP, OO. 1911. D. 74, pt. 6, l. 9-9 retro, my italics).

⁸⁸ *Rech'* (*The Speech*, SPb), No. 353, 24.12. 1911/ 6.01.1912), quoting an earlier private letter to Hadjetlaché from one of the Muslim activists (supposedly, Ibragim-Bek Gaidarov). The accusation was, perhaps, due again to the *Moussoulmanine's* criticism of Turkey and opposing Russia to her as the best place for Muslims to live in.

⁸⁹ Namely, it was the Ufa deputy to the State Duma, Salim-Girey Dzhantiurin who shared his worries with F. Karimov (NART. F. 1370. O. 1. D. 22, l. 28-28 retro).

⁹⁰ *V mire mousulmanstva*, No. 8, 20.04 / 3.05, 1912.

⁹¹ "*Kakoi-to prints, a mozhet byt', i kniaz', kakoi-to musul'manin, a mozhet byt', i musul'manstvuiushchii evrei*", – S. Gabiev's remark in *Musulmanskaia Gazeta*, No.18, 25.5.1913.

behavior, psychology, and morality – indeed, what born Muslim could behave like Hadjetlaché did?!

Certainly, under the surface, the situation was more complex. From the North-Caucasian corner of the Russian Muslim world, an Adyg folklorist and teacher, Pago Tambiev, engaged more in constructing the ethnic national identity, than the Muslim one, contradicted Hadjetlaché's opponents (though before their final discoveries). Meaning, perhaps, the very creation of the organ for discussing the North-Caucasian problems and the magazine's openness to the authors of different positions and confessions (as well as, probably, Hadjetlaché's ideas, including his sharp opposition to the Circassians' emigration to Turkey, sustained by quite Orientalist exoticized depictions of the beauty of the Caucasian motherland), he argued that Hadjetlaché as an Adyg public figure was beyond comparison, and must be Adyg by origin, because "no Karaim or any other outsider would ever so deeply understand the *national psychology* alien to him"⁹² (meanwhile, Hadjetlaché's origins were all the same constructed here ideologically).

Divergently, Islam as religion (together, at times, with ethnically marked borders again) was at issue among Hadjetlaché's opponents: the *Vakyt's* evaluation published before his final uncovering, insisted on the necessity of the *Moussoulmanin* for the Russian Muslims unity, yet cutting, in fact, the magazine off the Tatar reader (it was characterized as useful for those who didn't read Tatar) and contrasting it to the Islamic authenticity of the Tatar press, as its editors "seemed not to know much of the deeds and the religion of the Muslims"⁹³ (with all the secularization of the reformist- and politically-minded Muslim intelligentsia's language of self-description, professing Islam presupposed a kind of 'local knowledge' that needn't have been outspoken if not under shocking circumstances, and which Hadjetlaché lacked indeed).

Personal relations were, obviously, involved here too. But the broadest Muslim reaction expressed on the political scene was still about Muslim "ethno-national" cultural belonging: "Tell us finally the truth about the Muslim Azef", one of Hadjetlaché's former readers from the Northern Caucasus appealed to the *Musulmanskaia gazeta*⁹⁴.

Seemingly, nothing "orientalist" here, but "nationalist", with the exception of two issues. This was the *Muslim* culture taken as an *Oriental* one among other non-European "nations" resisting the European aggression (though seen as a part of the Russian State in whose frame,

⁹² Pago Tambiev: *K 110-letiju so dnja roždenija* [Pago Tambiev: To the 110th anniversary], ed. by R.X. Khashkhozheva, Nal'čik, Él'brus, 1984, p. 237. Italics added.

⁹³ Vakıt, № 839, 1911, in NART. F. 199. O. 1. D. 722, l. 237-238.

⁹⁴ *Musul'manskaja gazeta*, №20, 23.07. 1913.

with the State's oppression overcome, it should both develop its specificity and achieve the rapprochement with the things Russian, the former being the condition of the latter⁹⁵). And this culture's features were often perceived in inversion of the European/Russian negative Orientalist interpretations, its morality and spirituality countering both the European pragmatism and the Jewish corruption; the principal exception was its present-day characteristic, its backwardness, non-invertedly echoing those interpretations (with some essential differences, though, to be considered further on). In this way, Hadjetlaché's editions message, though exaggerated, coincided with the opinions of many Muslim modernizers.

But why did the Government accept Hadjetlaché? And why the *Moussoulmanine* and *V mire musulmanstva* were sponsored, while *Kavkaz i narody Vostoka* had not been allowed? The first reason for that refusal in 1898 was that "in spite of all good intentions of the editors", it "may only... strengthen [in those ethnics] their national consciousness, thus giving [them] material for the separatist aspirations recently observable".⁹⁶ By 1909-1910 the government was hardly less wary of the "separatist aspirations" among the Muslim peoples of the Empire than in 1898. Quite to the contrary, its paranoiac obsession with the perceived Pan-Islamism menace (presupposing the all-Muslim political union outside the country and separatism within it) reached its peak; and precisely in 1910 Hadjetlaché's patron in the Department of Foreign Confessions and Stolypin's consultant on the Muslim question, A.N. Kharuzin, presided the "Special meeting for the countermeasures against Tatar-Muslim influence in the Volga region" dealing abundantly with Pan-Islamism.⁹⁷ But the answer is perhaps exactly here. Besides

⁹⁵ The idea of rapprochement from the Muslim side was formulated already by I. Gasprinskii, in *Russkoe Musul'manstvo* (the Russian Muslimhood), Simferopol', 1881. To see fostering a "minority's" ethno-cultural awareness as *the* way to its better integration into the "pan-Russian state-framed community (*otečestvo*)" was not rare. As Tolz suggests, regarding such views of Russian academic orientologists, they were developed, in a broader context of romantic values, under the impact of the idea of "the small native homeland" (*malaja rodina*), e.g. Russia's national integration via fostering people's particular affinity to the region where they lived (V. Tolz, *Russia's Own Orient*, op.cit., p. 37-40, fl.). For the Muslim oppositionists, the appeal to the romantic values as those to be shared by their addressees in the Imperial core was obviously the case. On some Muslim activists' treatment of the ways to "rapprochement" with the things Russian, see O. Bessmertnaïa, « Le "panislamisme" existait-il? La controverse entre l'Etat et les réformistes musulmans de Russie (autour de la "Commission spéciale" de 1910) », *Le choc colonial et l'islam : Les politiques religieuses des puissances coloniales en terre d'islam*, s.l.d. P.-J. Luizard, Paris, La Découverte, 2006, p. 485-515.

⁹⁶ RGIA. F. 776. O. 8. D. 1146, l. 7.

⁹⁷ E. Campbell, « The Muslim Question in Late Imperial Russia », in Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, Anatoly Remnev (Eds.), *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana UP, 2007, p. 320-347; Idem, *The Muslim Question and Russian Imperial Governance*, op.cit., p. 170-193; R. Geraci, *Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia*. Ithaca; L., Cornell UP, 2001, esp. p. 277-308; O. Bessmertnaïa, "Le panislamisme", *art.cit.* On

Hadjetlaché's biographical data better arranged for administrative eyes than those of Kazi-Bek, and personal differences among the Government officials (who might have been interested in the development of different kinds of "consciousness" in those "ethnics" within the frame of the state⁹⁸), and in the general political atmosphere so harshly changed after the Russo-Japanese war and the 1905 revolution, it was, perhaps, the idea of the *already given* all-Muslim unity dominating differences among the Muslim peoples, that led now the Government's Muslim politics. To be handled, it was to be handled as *unity* (together, surely, with handling and exploiting, often against that very *Muslimness*, regional and ethnic diversity). Hadjetlaché's editions addressed to that unity (instead of Kazi-Bek's *Kavkaz...* addressing ethnically defined peoples) thus appeared, on the Russian side too, in time to transmit the "spirit of the Government interests" and "help the Government in its struggle against pan-Islamism"⁹⁹ (characteristically, in 1916 Hadjetlaché would explicitly propose to the Government measures for *uniting* Russia's Muslims to better counter the German propaganda among them¹⁰⁰; *unity* thus appears both menacing and better posed for managing it).

The solution of the Muslim question Hadjetlaché suggested to the government in 1909–1913 was, here again, the Muslims' enlightenment. Two different trends of the imperial administration's attitude to the Muslims' enlightenment are relevant here. One of them saw the civilizing education as the way to the rapprochement of the Muslims with the things Russian. Thus, the Muslim intelligentsia's and the Government projects (both Orientalist in a way¹⁰¹) competed for the civilizing mission among the Muslim masses. Yet another trend doubted the feasibility of Muslims' civilizing and saw it even dangerous, as arming the Muslims (and their

the earlier stages of the paranoia developing in Russian Turkestan from where, particularly, it reached the Center (and where Kazi-Bek, according to V. Ian, spent some time just in those years), see A. Morrison, *art.cit.*

⁹⁸ For broadening the case of the orientologists discussed by Tolz (see fn. 95) as aspiring for "national consciousness" development among the minorities, see S. Glebov, « Postcolonial Empire? Russian Orientologists and the Politics of Knowledge in Late Imperial Russia », in *Ab Imperio*, 3, 2011, p. 385-392; N. Night, « Grigor'ev », *art.cit.*; A. Jersild, *Orientalism and Empire, op. cit.*

⁹⁹ GARF. DP, OO. 1913. D. 194, l. 89-93. In 1916 Hadjetlaché would explicitly propose to the Government measures for *uniting* Russia's Muslims to better counter the German propaganda among them (GARF. DP, OO. 1916. D. 74, l. 20-22); *unity* thus appears both menacing and better posed for managing it.

¹⁰⁰ GARF. DP, OO. 1916. D. 74, l. 20-22.

¹⁰¹ Cf. A. Etkind, *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience*. London, 2011. Proposing his concept of 'internal colonization' and 'Orientalism in reverse' and shifting the optics of discussion from the national to imperial one, the author points out (echoing, among others, P. Werth, "From resistance..", *art. cit.*) the Orientalist in its character attitude of the Russian elites to the Russian people as an object of "othering", exoticization and the civilizing mission. See also: A. Etkind, « Orientalism Reversed », *art. cit.* Parallels between Russian liberals' and Muslim reformers' attitude to their correspondent peoples are drawn in L.A. Jamaeva. *Musul'manskii liberalism nachala XX veka kak obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie* [Early XX century Muslim Liberalism as a Socio-Political Movement], Ufa, Gilem, 2002.

new elites particularly) with modern weapons in their struggle against the ruling regime¹⁰². The issue of those disputes seems to be the choice between civilizational (i.e. allowing improvement via enlightenment) vs. “racial” approach to the Muslim culture’s otherness¹⁰³. Indeed, the doubts (to educate or not to) were based on the design, in the Imperial agents’ heads, of that same Muslim unity as a synonym for its *culture* patterned very much in the same way as the Muslim intelligentsia’s primordialist idea, but evaluated negatively. The perceived pan-Islamic menace represented, of course, the extension of the stereotype of the Muslim culture’s inborn fanatical spirit, while its capability of engendering political union equaled Muslims to a nation in itself, yet intrinsically hostile to the European civilization, and Russia first and foremost. In such a vision, the modernizing education culturally reinterpreted by the Muslims could but enhance the Muslim culture’s innate hostile potential, while the most educated, and thus the craftiest, Muslim leaders appeared as its bearers par excellence¹⁰⁴.

Hadjetlaché brought the ideas of both trends to their limits and combined them so as to propose an optimistic outcome of the impasse. It was a struggle for the Muslim masses *against* the Muslim leaders and the pan-Islamists of the whole world, concentrated around Turkey, waged by Hadjetlaché himself as *the* alternative to those leaders (and if, at the beginning, his reports described the pan-Islamist enemy generally, after his unmasking they included the names of his Muslim opponents¹⁰⁵). His step here was, in fact, to split the image of the overall Muslim unity (contrary to what he was mostly doing in the Muslim “camp”¹⁰⁶), exaggerating the older

¹⁰² E.Campbell, « The Muslim Question », *art.cit.*; R. Geraci, *op.cit.*; Idem, « Russian Orientalism at an Impasse : Tsarist Education Policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam », in *Russia’s Orient, op. cit.*, p. 138-161; O. Bessmertnaïa, « Le panislamisme », *art.cit.*

¹⁰³ Cf. A. Khalid’s often quoted argument that Orientalism was rather a civilizational, than racial approach (A. Khalid, *art.cit.*, p. 696). Yet “Muslimness” often seemed incorrigible; hence exploitation of ethnic differences against it, which led to various policies, e.g. that of “ignoring Islam” in Kaufman’s Turkestan (Daniel Brower, « Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan », in *Russia’s Orient, op. cit.*, p. 115-137). But Khalid’s message – with its accent on Orientalism invested heavily in the “Romantic categories of the organic nation” and “Romantic notions of authenticity” – is also about the similarities of effects of “racial” and the Orientalist “civilizational” approaches. Hence I use the two terms (the “racial” particularly) metaphorically, to signify the dichotomy of improvability / incorrigibility.

¹⁰⁴ W. Dowler’s study (*Classroom and Empire: The Politics of Schooling Russia’s Eastern Nationalities, 1860-1917*, Québec, McGill-Queens UP, 2001) complicates this picture, showing that educational measures were all the same attempted; he is not very attentive though to the “pan-Islamic threat”, albeit he touches upon “pan-Turkism” often confused, in fact, with pan-Islamism in those perceptions.

¹⁰⁵ Compare his reports in: RGIA. F. 821. O. 8. D. 1203, l. 10-17; GARF. DP, OO. 1913. D. 365, l. 13-25, 64-69retro, 7-8, 61-63; D. 194, l. 50-55.

¹⁰⁶ In the *Moussoulmanine* it was not so simple though: a sharp criticism of the Muslim “pseudo-intelligentsia” who forgot their duty to the people went there, along with the assertions of the more civilized character of the Russian Muslims in comparison

long-lasting imperial image of the genetic Muslims' loyalty to the State, and stressing the gap between them and their inventive leaders: it was still the enlightenment that the masses needed to resist those dangerous leaders' temptations, but carried by Hadjetlaché and his editions.

Yet to stress the danger and his own necessity for the administration as an alternative enlightening figure, Hadjetlaché appealed exactly to the image of the innate and hostile Muslim unity, that is, pan-Islamism. His letters and reports to the officials were thus creating a rather strange hybrid of an overblown image of the Muslim enemy (sustained by the examples of other countries, including those of Europe, and Russia's enemies particularly, who had either already done, in their own struggle with the danger, what Hadjetlaché was proposing to Russia, or supported pan-Islamist emissaries) on the one hand, and, on the other, the Muslim loyal, though backward, subject just needing proper enlightenment to know his friends and foes and become a *citizen*¹⁰⁷. Against the background of the common enemies around (and inside) Russia and Hadjetlaché himself, he suggested to the government a kind of *disarmed* Muslim modernization.

And that worked. For those who were interested in his editions, like A. Kharuzin and P. Stolypin too, civilizing Muslims (with the idea of strengthening the integrity of the Empire or building a national state of it in mind¹⁰⁸), was, all doubts notwithstanding, still the *ideal*. At least, the editions seemed to be capable to civilize them as much as to counter the harmful pan-Islamic propaganda, as well as to give (in an inverted accordance with the Muslim activists' desires) some information on the current situation to the government. For those who, like the Police department, were more interested in information, Hadjetlaché looked appropriate for intelligence missions in Russia's Muslim regions (in 1913 he was sent to Turkestan and Bukhara, and to the Volga-Urals region¹⁰⁹, but it was not all he did in that capacity). And nearly everyone here saw in him a bearer of the expert knowledge on that obscure culture, the Muslim world, whose impenetrability for alien understanding Hadjetlaché never forgot to stress, opposing himself as a genuine good judge to the whole of the "connoisseurs of the Orient" (*znatoki Vostoka*), the

with those of other countries, and better conditions for progress they had living in Russia; hence their traditional loyalty to the State was here also in place.

¹⁰⁷ On the ideals of citizenship as means of integration in the late Russian Empire: A. L. Jersild, « From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire », in *Russia's Orient, op. cit.*, p. 101-114; E. Lohr, « The Ideal Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia », in *Kritika*, 7 (2), 2006, p. 173-194; Idem, *Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union*, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2012.

¹⁰⁸ On the compatibility of nation- and empire-building in the period, see V. Tolz, *op. cit.*, p. 23-24, fl.; on the destructive effects of the former for the latter: R.G. Suni, « The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, "National" Identity, and Theories of Empire », in Ronald Grigor Suny, Terry Dean Martin (eds.), *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, Oxford UP, 2001, p. 23-66 (1st Russian translation, in *Ab Imperio*, 1-2, 2001, p. 9-72).

¹⁰⁹ GARF. DP OO. 1913. D. 194, l. 50-55; D. 365, l. 7-8, 13-25, 61-69retro.

Orientalists-“outsiders”¹¹⁰. That didn’t prevent, though, the appearance, in 1912 (with earlier preparations), of another “special organ on the Muslimhood”, sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior, the *Mir islama* (the *Islamic World*), authored by those very Orientalists, often the best in Russia¹¹¹; it was later (1914) assessed by the then director of the Department of Foreign Confessions, E.V. Menkin, as an “edition of *the same type*” as the *Moussoulmanine* whose support was thus “no longer necessary”¹¹² (Menkin seems to have disliked Hadjetlaché generally, and sent him back to the Police department with his proposals). As it appears, the Government did feel the need for an expert knowledge on the Muslim world, but not always knew what it should be and whom to consider its real bearer, and, actually, how to use it¹¹³.

For Menkin’s predecessors and many workmates and successors, the genuine cultural belonging (a born Muslim!) was (as it is, at times, now) a pledge of the genuine cultural knowledge and understanding. Not the only condition, naturally. Among other Muslims, Hadjetlaché looked distinguished by his civilized character (supported by his living in Europe) and erudition (proved by his writing talents and “outstanding position” in the Muslim world), conscious patriotism and geopolitical concerns, where common enemies (and the inner Muslim opposition particularly) was, perhaps, the main persuading argument; as well as by the benefits (here too, analogically to what we’ve seen in the Muslim milieu) of his being an outsider to the established Russian Muslims’ political camps – all that made him himself a manifestation of the “disarmingly modernized” Muslim citizen, supporting the sinking belief in the civilizing mission. His being an *outsider* to the Government, with his Muslim cultural distance manipulated so as to underscore both their common interests and his self-sufficiency (quite in the way of Allaev’s letters to Syromiatnikov) thus brought him trust.

I can now say what the Muslims revealed when they finally unmasked Hadjetlaché. These were his articles stressing the pan-Islamic menace in the conservative Russian press.

¹¹⁰ On the low level of his Orientalist knowledge, see: *Mir islama* (The World of Islam, SPb.), 1912, p.118-123. This criticism caused Hadjetlaché’s irate letter to V. Bartold (ARAN SPb. F. 68. O. 1. D. 430, l. 162), editor of the *Mir Islama* in that year, and outstanding in the Islamic studies, also respected by the Russian Muslim intellectuals.

¹¹¹ On *Mir islama*: R. Khairutdinov, « “Mir islama”: iz istorii sozdanija zhuranala » [“Mir islama”: from the history of the journal’s foundation], in *Mir islama* (Kazan’), 1, 1999, p. 3-20; É. Ybert, « La première revue russe d’islamologie : *Mir Islama* (1912-1913), La religion de l’Autre à travers différents prismes », in *Slavica Occitania*, 29, 2009, p. 391-420.

¹¹² RGIA. F. 821. O.133. D. 449, l. 138-139 (December 1914); italics added. The tasks of the organ were “avoiding political partiality (*partijnost*’), to wholly illustrate the contemporary religious needs of the professors of Islam, their everyday life condition in Russia, as well as their economic situation and cultural-enlightening (*kulturno-prosvetitel’nye*) and charitable requirements and necessities”.

¹¹³ The incapability of the Russian state to *apply* the Orientalist knowledge, sometimes extended to lack of interest, is stated, in different frameworks, by: N. Knight, « Grigor’ev », *art.cit.*; V. Tolz, « Orientalism », *art. cit.*; A. Morrison, *art.cit.*

Moreover, he didn't hesitate to reproduce in his Muslim editions his article from the right-wing *Ofiterskaia zhizn'* (the Officers' Life). To do that, he changed the original title: "*Pan-Islamism, a Menacing Movement in the Muslim World*", for the one appealing to the Muslims: "*Reformers of Islam: an attempt of historical investigation*"¹¹⁴, and eliminated the odious assessments. Yet his main trick here was the change of code in describing the Muslim unity: its "racial" (that of genetic incorrigibility) and political (that of political uniting) dimension became civilizational (improvable) and cultural¹¹⁵. It was that same difference that pushed the Muslim intellectuals in Russia to publically (and fiercely) renounce the Russian conservatives' idea of pan-Islamism as a myth used by the government to justify repressions, and to deny the Muslims their 'national' rights on their way to enlightenment. Their discovery was published in the press, including the Russian newspaper with a large audience, the Cadets' *Rech'* (the *Speech*), and used in the political debates with the Government, pointing out its immoral agents and methods¹¹⁶. As for the government, not everybody there knew (especially, later on) about that unmasking; among those who did, a few denied Hadjetlaché, the others believed those were pan-Islamist intrigues¹¹⁷.

With all the deep difference (to see *backwardness* as an obstacle to overcome on one's way to progress *or* as a particular and everlasting innate cultural feature extending to hostility, implies opposite visions of the past and the future, i.e. the history itself), the idea of the Muslim union – and unity, and *culture* itself – formed another imperial mirror discovered by Hadjetlaché. As it appears, within the system of those mirrors, almost one and the same text could be read by different audiences, according to their expectations, in different and even opposing perspectives – at least before its author was unmasked. His method was, obviously, *divide et impera*, and he played on counterposing the two camps that were opposed to each other without his efforts. But it was the mirrors of reciprocal discourses (those of modernity, Empire and Orientalism), which

¹¹⁴ *Ofiterskaia zhizn'*, 1908, № 118, p. 261-263; No. 122, p. 317-318; No. 123, p.333-335; *Moussoulmanine*, 14–17, 1911, p. 685-696; *V mire musul'manstva*, Nos. 1-3, 1911.

¹¹⁵ For the comparison of the article's opposite versions, see O. Bessmertnaia, « Kul'turnyi bilingvizm? Igra smyslov v odnoi skandal'noi stat'e (Iz istorii otnoshenii musul'manskikh oppozitsionerov i russkikh "gosudarstvennikov" v pozdneimperskoi Rossii) » [Cultural bilingualism? The play of meanings in one scandalous article (From the history of relationship of Muslim oppositionists and Russian conservatives in late-imperial Russia)], in *Rossii i musul'manskii mir, op.cit.*, p. 197-383.

¹¹⁶ *Rech'*, № 353, 24.12. 1911/ 6.01.1912; Sadri Maksudov's speech at the State Duma session, March 13, 1912, in *Musul'manskie deputaty Gosudarstvennoi dumy Rossii, 1906-1917: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Muslim deputies of the Russian State Duma, 1906-1917: Collection of documents and materials], ed. by L.A. Iamaeva, Ufa, Kitap, 1998, p. 178-194.

¹¹⁷ The director of the Police department in 1914-1915, V.A. Brune de Sent-Ippolite, thought Hadjetlaché was acting out of "personal interests" (GARF, F. 102. O. 316. 1909. D. 234, l. 57); yet the assessments of 1916 (e.g.: GARF. DP, OO. 1913. D. 194, l. 89-93) still presented the story as Hadjetlaché's struggle against pan-Islamism.

made Hadjetlaché's swinging between the camps and playing the Other easy, and his speeches trustworthy.

We can now picture some traits of his image built to make up a really bold figure. His identity of a Writer, the bearer of a high social mission in Russia, adds to that boldness in both camps. Among the State officials, it formed another aspect of his difference from an ordinary police agent, that made him recognizable and thus understandable (“She spreads far and wide, our great Rus’. Over the mountains, valleys and rivers my train is speeding forth...” – that was the beginning of one of his reports to the... police, introducing the contrast between inner and Eastern, Muslim Russia¹¹⁸). For the Muslim oppositional intellectuals where nearly everyone *wrote* (and wrote oppositionally), his being an oppositionist writer with many connections underscored his “outstanding belonging” to the milieu. Yet the pivot of the image was, expectedly, his “national character”. Its construction was based on the stereotypes of that same wave of mass literature on the Caucasian/Oriental topics that he himself participated in as Kazi-Bek.

His works, with their manifest exoticism, were then already appreciated as some *truth*, while his authentic origins, here too, played the crucial role: the works were valued for the “*lively and truthful* description of Caucasian and Oriental life”, “the exactitude of an eye-witness locally born”¹¹⁹, and depicting those “passionate characters” who were “the southerners, the Chechens or Tatars”¹²⁰ (and the shock of the hero’s first exposure proceeded from the same logics of origins: his being a liar not “locally born” made him not an “eye-witness” either, and all his writings turned into “a fruit of fantasy and compilation”¹²¹). As in his biographies, so in his “live” image he reproduced that “Southern”, or “Asiatic”, character (not to forget, though, that, combined with Hadjetlaché’s modernized quality, that literarily produced character was shifting to *this* side of the border between the North-Caucasian past and present). And he appealed to the icon of Muslim resoluteness (thus inverting that of fanaticism), resorting to that same “ethno-cultural” logic which brought the Muslim activists to cast him out of the Muslims’ ranks: “Could they have really likened me to Azef? What an outrageous error! *A Muslim will rather die than turn traitor*”¹²². Ironically, for all the sides involved in Hadjetlaché’s political double-dealing – the Russian officials and journalists, the Volga-Ural and North-Caucasian Muslim intellectuals –

¹¹⁸ GARF. DP, OO. 1913. D. 365, l. 13.

¹¹⁹ *Vokrug sveta*, 26, 1897, p. 415; cf.: *Russkaia mysl'* (The Russian Thought), October, 1896, Bibliographic section, p. 453-454.

¹²⁰ *Kavkazskii vestnik* (The Caucasian herald), 26 (2), 1902, p. 99.

¹²¹ The *Samarskaia gazeta* quoted above.

¹²² “Allaev”’s letter to Syromiatnikov, March, 1913. IRLI. F. 655. D. 15, l. 37-38.

these “Muslim” and “Circassian” characters appeared trustworthy (at least, before his exposure). Thus literature, and the popular Russian Orientalist literature particularly, interfered through all the story: it meddled in the actors’ perceptions of truth, the North-Caucasians’ self-representations included. Finally, all of them appear to be, to this or that extent, nourished by that “popular” (or “mass”) space of images.

That shows the story at another angle. A merchant from an imperial province, Grigorii Ettinger, might have stayed there, at a distance from the imperial core (a *cultural* distance of the Orientalist type again, if the object of the *internal* Russian Orientalism, might include the merchants too¹²³). Yet he chose another way, resembling those of the creators and publishers of that popular literature (e.g. newspapers and magazines created *for the people*, just as the *Moussoulmanine* was described by “Allaev” to Syromiatnikov), who were the self-made men coming themselves from below, – like renowned N.I. Pastukhov of a senior generation, the creator of *Moskovskii Listok* (*The Moscow sheet*) and the famous novel *Bandit Churkin*, – by the way, another friend of “Moscow censor S.I.S.”¹²⁴. But Kazi-Bek–Hadjetlaché added *Orientalism* there – or, rather, Orientalisms: those in reverse, in inverse, and the direct one first and foremost. His choice of the domains where to play his tricks, the literature, the revolution, the Muslims, the intelligence, the war, and the Bolsheviks – all permeated by these Orientalisms, – shows, as it seems, the whole picture of the era, and the importance of the Orientalist element there.

It was only when losing success, that Hadjetlaché would lose the symbolic capital of his otherness in relations with the Russian side, and his ambivalent Oriental/civilized distance/closeness would be turned into just a distance: “a barbarian, a savage Asiatic”, the Bolshevik representative in Stockholm, V. Vorovskii, wrote about him in 1919¹²⁵, during the Swedish investigation, possibly, masking Hadjetlaché’s connections with the Bolsheviks’ Legation (so, quite tactically, yet bringing to force the same premises as Okhranka proceeded

¹²³ Cf. A. Etkind, *Internal Colonization*, op.cit.

¹²⁴ J. Brooks, *When Russia*, op.cit (on Pastukhov: p. 118-125, passim); on S.I. Sokolov and Pastukhov friendship: V. Giliarovskii, *Moskva*, op.cit.

¹²⁵ V.V. Vorovskii, « Zhertvy stogol’mskikh banditov » [The victims of Stockholm bandits]; « V mire merzosti zapusteniia » [In the world of abominable desolation], in Idem, *Works*, M.–L., Partizdat, 1933, vol. 3, p. 388-419. R. Khashkhozheva tried to deconstruct Vorovskii’s argument in: « Odisseia Kazi-Beka Akhmetukova [Kazi-Bek Akhmetukov’s Odyssey] », in *Literaturnaia Kabardino-Balkariia* (Nal’chik), 1, 2001, p. 161-176. On some of Hadjetlaché’s connections with the Bolsheviks (which doesn’t mean, to my mind, he was their *real* agent), see V.N. Frolov, « “Liga ubiits i ee rukovoditel’ M.-B. Hadjetlaché: Novye materialy » [The “league of murderers” and their leader M.-B. Hadjetlaché: New materials], in *Iz glubiny vremen* (SPb.), 13, 2005, p.391-399. At the same time, Hadjetlaché was connected with the British, French, *and*, probably, the German intelligences, but this is another story.

from previously), and Aleksei Tolstói later produced a novel about those events, *The Black Gold* (1931, later renamed *The Emigrants*), based on the same image.

Conclusion

There is hardly a Russian specificity present in how the cultural distance regarding the Muslims was put and the *applied Orientalism* functioned along the way of the story placed in its time and space, no matter how critical the attitude of the State officials (and the hero himself) to Europe might be, – except for the feebleness of the State, both hesitant in its Muslim politics and aggressive in its rhetoric¹²⁶, which other scholars have already pointed out. Hadjetlaché’s ability to turn his Oriental otherness into advantage with the State officials was due, to a great extent, to that feebleness, and very much to his own talents. In the ambivalent complex of his closeness/distance to/from that circle, his “closeness” was established via *maintaining* his Oriental otherness, and not diminishing it; it was hardly because the officials themselves felt any proximity to the Orient. Yet there’re other aspects which the story reveals.

A number of “Orientalisms”, differently authored and addressed, have intersected here. To name them roughly (as they do intersect): the Orientalism of the State regarding the Muslims, and that of the participants of the “literary process” – writers, journalists and reviewers regarding the Orient, and that regarding the Jews (the “direct” one, with many different positions within it); the “Orientalism” of the Muslim intellectuals (regarding the Muslim culture as a whole and the Muslim masses, the culture’s very impersonation, specifically) or that of the Circassian ethnographers (regarding Circassians), mainly, inversed; and that of the North-Caucasian adventurers – participants in Ashinov’s expedition, regarding themselves and opposing the others, the self-imposed one; and the *internal* Orientalism of the elites regarding Russia’s own *people*, – those “in reverse”. That intersection formed for the hero both a space of identity choice (resulting in his own self-imposed, reversed “Orientalism”), and a space of trading *on* that identity: that of *otherness* for the Imperial core, and of “outstanding *belonging*” for the opposite side. The Orientalist images adjoin here the ideas of national characters, while Orientalism(s) as such conjoins the “ethno-national” vision of cultural belonging (up to its genetic, “racial”, interpretation), applied even to “Muslim culture”. The authentic “cultural” origins thus became a criterion of political and even aesthetical truthfulness (or “truthful otherness”, when addressed to the State officials), though *per se* were defined politically and ethically. That relates, in fact, to the chauvinistic atmosphere on the eve of World War I (not to forget all other wars of the nearest past and present), and we see how those “Orientalisms” divided the Imperial space and

¹²⁶ A. Morrison notes “the curious mixture of bluster and timidity” in the officials’ attitudes towards Islam in Turkestan (*art.cit.*, p. 645).

engendered the image of the enemy, the genetic and mass enemy. On that background, Hadjetlaché appears as a figure of the *crisis* of modernity. Simultaneously, he shows the reciprocal and often shared character of those space-dividing discourses turning into Imperial mirrors, an aspect of the “self-nationalizing” Empire as it is from within, as a live (and rather frightening) experience of the Other¹²⁷. That reciprocity, and the reciprocal constructions of ‘Muslim culture’ particularly, allowed Hadjetlaché, playing the Other, to turn his invented Circassian and Muslim identity into symbolic capital easily bought by each side involved.

Word and deed more often than not don’t coincide, and deeds of the past, sometimes, disappear easier. It was the noble message of Hadjetlaché’s romantic writings (and the family legend of him as a fighter against the Bolsheviks, and for the Muslims’ and the State mutual understanding in Russia) by which the memory of his descendants was formed, and many readers, some scholars included, influenced. Among her many other activities, Leila Hadjetlaché tried to introduce the heritage of her father to L. Massignon, A. Bennigsen and other well-known specialists; a short-story of his appeared in the *Central Asian Survey*, as a sample of national resistance¹²⁸.

When I encouraged Celia de Barros to transmit Hadjetlaché’s family archives to BDIC, I aspired to a possibility for everybody to acquire his/her own Hadjetlaché. Yet professional historians now mostly agree it’s time to get out of the barely national(ist) agendas. As I hope, *my* Hadjetlaché makes his small step in that direction.

Abbreviations

ARAN SPb – Russian Academy of Sciences Archives, SPb. section, St. Petersburg

BDIC - Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine, Nanterre

GARF – State Archives of the Russian Federation, Moscow

IRLI – Institute of Russian Literature, St. Petersburg

NART – National Archives of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kazan’

RGIA – Russian State Historical Archives, St. Petersburg

TsGIA – Central State Historical Archives, St. Petersburg

¹²⁷ Cf.: I. Gerasimov, S. Glebov, J. Kusber, M. Mogilner, A. Semenov, « Novaia imperskaia istorija i vyzovy imperii » [New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire], in *Ab Imperio*, 1, 2010, p. 19-52.

¹²⁸ Mohammed Beg Hadjetlache, « Aul Yulan: An Episode of the Caucasian War », *Central Asian Survey*, 4/4, 1985, p. 47-49.

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