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SOME REMARKS ON RUSSIAN RECEPTION OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION OF “BLACK NOTEBOOKS”

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This article in the form of “reflections” is devoted mainly to the image-building of Heidegger in Russia as a thinker of Being, a conservative critic of late modernity and a “post” philosopher. On the one hand, due to French post-modernism influence on late Soviet and post-Soviet philosophy Russia has developed a special interest in Heidegger’s deconstruction theory. On the other hand, the reception of Heidegger’s criticism of European nihilism, totalitarianism and machine technology as the manifestations of modernity has shaped significantly the account of the “political”. The specifics of Russian reception of Heidegger can also be traced in the rejection of strict division between the “core” of Heidegger’s philosophy and “accidental” conditions related to social and political aspects of his work in 1930s. The current discussion about recently published “Black notebooks” shows not only the fact of existence of a separate language of description and analysis in Russian philosophical field but also an original tendency to holistic consideration of Heidegger’s thinking including not only his existential and historical reflections but also political passages and criticism of civilizational discourse. In addition to the reviews of “Black notebooks” by N.V. Motroshilova, V.V. Mironov and D. Mironova in the last year’s issues of the magazine “Voprosy filosofii” there are earlier works by N.V. Motroshilova, V.V. Bibikhin and A.V. Gulyga related to the debate on Heidegger’s political and ideological commitment which are in focus of attention.

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Introduction

In the spring of 2013 I participated in Jünger-Symposium which took place in a deep Württemberg province on the territory of a former Cistercian monastery surrounded by picturesque mountains of Swabian Jura. Among the guests of the conference there were Arnulf Heidegger, Hermann Heidegger’s son and an actual manager of his grandfather’s archive, Vittorio Klostermann, a son of the publisher of Heidegger’s works Vittorio Klostermann and his successor in Frankfurt, and Peter Trawny, Wuppertal philosopher and a current editor of Heideggeriana. It was then that I first found out about the intent of publishing of the first series of “Black notebooks” in the section IV of the Complete works (Gesamtausgabe), which only appeared at the moment in the plans of the publishing house Klostermann. In the mid-1970s these notes and reflections, which Heidegger had systematically put in notebooks with black oilskin covers for several decades (the first ones date back to 1930s), were handed over to the Archive of German literature in Marbach am Neckar for preservation. According to the author’s will, which we know about from his son Hermann and Heidegger’s personal assistant Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, the philosopher’s Complete works should have ended with the publishing of these notes though no one could have known their current size for sure at the moment. This can be regarded as part of Heidegger’s “hermeneutic policy” as well as his decision about posthumous publication of a big conversation about the fate of university, democracy, modern technology and mission of philosopher which took place in September 23 1966 and was published in the 30 issue of magazine “Spiegel” after his death [Heidegger 1976]. In 2003 there could be no question of the publishers’ desire to “rekindle the fading interest in Heidegger” especially when this interest never faded but only heated up. At the same time the publisher of the “Black notebooks” Peter Trawny declared solemnly during our meeting: “Heidegger will rise to notice again!”

The current state of international discussion on “Black notebooks”

And this is exactly what happened even before the first volume of “Black notebooks” (“Reflections II–VI”) was released [Heidegger 2014]. The publishing house Klostermann decided to introduce the publication by Peter Trawny’s small book with a self-explanatory title “Heidegger and the myth of Jewish world conspiracy.” [Trawny 2014]. At the same time some excerpts of the forthcoming publication were specifically entrusted to a French philosopher François Fedier, Jean Beaufret’s follower, who back in 1988 made an apologia for Heidegger

3 As of now four volumes (GA 94-97) have been published.
against charges of Heidegger’s commitment to Nazi ideas pressed by a leftist Chilean intellectual Victor Farias (“Heidegger: anatomie d’un scandale”). In January 2014 German weekly magazine “Die Zeit” arranged an interview with Fedier with the sole purpose of confirming Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, since Freiburg philosopher’s “shocking” statements about “Jews” and “Jewishness” (Judentum) had already been released. Fedier responded diplomatically: “Heidegger is a false suspect”, but clearly dismissed Trawny’s hypothesis that the Freiburg philosopher was influenced by “The Protocol of the Elders of Zion” [Blume 2014]. In the same year 2014 an Italian expert on Heidegger Donatella Di Cesare’s book “Heidegger and the Jews” [Di Ceare 2014] and a collection of articles “Metaphysics and anti-Semitism” edited by Fabris Adriano were released [Adriano (ed.) 2014]. In France the scandal surrounding “Black notebooks” could not go unnoticed by a leftist intellectual Emmanuel Faye who back in mid-2000s advanced an idea that Heidegger “introduced National-Socialism into philosophy” and now brought together critical voices of like-minded people in his book “Heidegger, the soil, the community, the race” [Faye 2005; Faye (éd.) 2014]. And a philosophy professor from University of Strasbourg Jean-Luc Nancy revealed Heidegger’s “banality” in the Jewish question [Nancy 2015]. The debates on anti-Semitism, National Socialism, cultural criticism and politics in Heidegger’s works were summarized in two German collections of articles with the participation of the leading experts on Heidegger from Europe, the USA and Canada (R. Volin, S. Vietta, J. Grondin, H. Zaborowski, T. Kisiel, R. Martin, D. Thomà, P. Trawny, E. Faye and others) [Heinz, Kellerer (Hg.) 2016; Homolka, Heidegger (Hg.) 2016].

Heidegger really “rose to notice”. However, he did so only to divide the participants of the fast-growing discussion of the contents of “Black notebooks” — not only “experts on Heidegger” and academic philosophers but also editors of feuilletons and just public intellectuals — into two camps as if having received an additional reason for confirming their high moral standings. That time some blatantly blamed Heidegger for if not “denying the holocaust” (R.Volin) then at least “domestic anti-Semitism” and the others were brave enough to demonstrate the loyalty to their idol even in such “challenging times” (J. Grondin) because “there could be no doubt as to the meaning of Heidegger’s thought.”[4] Those who were not ready to take an unequivocal moral stance and/or were not brave enough to chose either side noted Heidegger’s “ambivalence” on the matters of “race”, “people” and National Socialism throughout all the notes (M. Gabriel, H. Zaborowski) and cleared his anti-Semitism in a way by

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[4] On the psychological peculiarities of the confrontation between “adversaries” and “apologists” and on identity design based on the relevant agenda see article: [Bogatov 2016]. The “trial” is also mentioned by A. Ryasov in his review of the Russian translation of “Black notebooks”: “Well, we are in court. There are two mutually exclusive points of view — prosecution and defence. Each of these positions has its own ‘legitimacy’ perception of Heidegger’s message as a philosophical expression of Hitlerism or vice versa as criticism of Nazi reality (even more so coming from the author who knew this reality from the inside). It was thirty years ago that Jean-François Lyotard noted that this strong alternative ‘froze everyone on their respective positions’. In Heidegger’s case ‘Black notebooks’ offer a lot of material for consolidation of this confrontation.” [Ryasov 2016].
adding an adjective “being-historical” (seinsgeschichtlich) to it (P. Trawny). The last group of philosophers driven solely by good intentions and the desire to preserve Heidegger’s legacy for scientific research was the one that contributed the most to legitimizing Liberal-left representatives’ of the academic milieu request for “disposal” (Entsorgung) of Heidegger’s philosophy. The founder of American neo-conservatism Leo Strauss once wrote with understandable bitterness: “Here is the great trouble: the only great thinker in our time is Heidegger” [Strauss 1989, 29]. Now this thought can be rephrased as follows: “There are no more great thinkers in our time. The problem is solved.”

However, this opening brief overview of the European and American colleagues’ discussion surrounding “Black notebooks” should not be misleading concerning the interest in Heidegger or the desire to understand his thinking more thoroughly and better. On the contrary, it demonstrates an early completion and quick closing of Heidegger studies in the West. An intellectual historian Reinhard Mehring has entitled his article provocatively: “Posthumous suicide”. Assuming that the researcher’s hypothesis is correct and that the hermeneutic strategy of the author of the Gesamtausgabe has led to subsequent “self-demolition” [Mehring 2016], the only direction of Heidegger studies in the near future should be his self-destruction. In fact, what else if not the “self-demolition” does the indicative fact that mainly his so-called “anti-Semitist” passages became the subject of numerous statements and evaluations show? These phrases about “calculated aptitude” and “groundlessness of (international) Jewishness” occur approximately 15 times spread throughout more than 600 pages of the only 95th volume of the Complete works [2014b]. And even they occupy a marginal place in the context of Heidegger’s culture critical theory of integration of “American” and “bolshevist” origins with the “world Jewishness” which are the main carriers and conductors of Machenschaft and which are to blame for provoking the metaphysical crisis on the planet. As we look at the Western European debates it seems that “Black notebooks” consist solely of “problematic issues”.

Russian Philosopher Mikhail Bogatov is right to state in the beginning of the article about “White noise of ‘Black notebooks’” the lack of any polemos, any debate on Heidegger’s philosophy. For this debate to happen one must have read at least all four of currently published volumes consisting of approximately 2000 pages of texts extremely difficult for comprehension. I myself read slowly and I admit that many people read philosophical texts faster than I do. But each sentence of Heidegger’s truly enormous cognitive laboratory requires just as much effort in interpreting as Heraclites’ fragments, even so that there is no connection between these “reflections” unlike those prepared by Heidegger himself. Therefore I could not have imagined that extensive studies on “Heidegger’s mishap” would be coming out and opinions on “lack of
philosophy in ‘Black notebooks’” would be exchanged less than a year after the publishing of these esoteric notes. Heidegger’s hermeneutic strategy turned out to be extremely precise exactly because it had not calculated anything. It can be said that Heidegger had expected high probability of Western Heidegger studies turning out to be inconsistent when faced with the greatness of the German thought. In “Notes III” (Anmerkungen III) Heidegger implies the danger of “the stream of gossip”(eine Flut von Geschwätz), because “lately it has become definitely clear that the talking will remain as pointless in the future as it has been all these years” [Heidegger 2015, 231–232]. It is obvious that the majority of Western European experts on Heidegger (not to mention journalists) could not respond to Heidegger’s silence with their own, i.e. could not regard his silence as a solitary “persistence in Being” (Inständigkeit im Seyn), observing not the external events of historical process but the arrival of Being as destiny (Geschick) [Homolka, Heidegger (Hg.) 2016, 109]. Heidegger left the commission for the publication of Nietzsche’s heritage in 1942, a little more than forty years after the philosopher’s death [ibid., 151]. Similarly to this philosophical demarche the most consistent and fair gesture towards the published volumes of Heidegger’s heritage would be radical stop to the debates on “Black notebooks” provided that the respect towards the philosopher exists. There was no process of reflection because even its beginning would require years of time. The show itself is over and the publishers promise nothing sensational anymore.

The current state of Russian discussion on “Black notebooks”

All mentioned above is the preliminary methodical procedure before the phenomenological reduction of the “atmospheric column of culture” (M.K. Mamardashvili), to be more precise, of the intellectual style that is as far from the spirit of “good silence” as it gets. Not in the sense of the lost “intellectual style”, it has been like this since the moment of its conception from the liberal European spirit. However, the current reign of pragmatism and positivism in science requires impossible even from the point of view of phenomenology and hermeneutics, to be more specific, for the amount of this or that thinker’s contribution to philosophy to be commensurate solely with the amount of data that can be rationally reconstructed according to

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5 See character evaluation by the young star of philosophy from Bonn M.Gabriel: [Gabriel 2015]. The evaluation of BN as “anti-philosophical” paper is based on the popular reference 1) to Heidegger’s sacrificium intellectus (i.e. the fact that the philosopher allegedly had given his thought to the National Socialist propaganda) and 2) to Heidegger’s lack of faith in reason and philosophy. These arguments are inconsistent and are easily refuted by 1) the fact that Heidegger consciously wrote an esoteric text and blatantly opposed himself to publicity, 2) the fact that he created anti-enlightenment project and constructed the “thinking of Being”, which included Plato and Heraclites, Hegel and Hoelderlin, as the opposite to one-dimensional rationalistic metaphysics.

6 In 1935 Heidegger joined the scientific committee on production of the Complete works by Nietzsche. However by autumn 1938 he, being disappointed in the course of work, wrote to his brother Fritz on November 2 1938: “Sessions in Nietzsche’s Archive were bitter – apparently even this attempt of publishing Nietzsche’s authentic works belonging to his heritage is doomed. Sometimes it seems that it takes more and more time to understand German thinkers.” [Homolka, Heidegger (Hg.) 2016, 47].
“today’s standards” from their texts. Today’s standards involve public discourse and transparency, i.e. for “political matters” to be a space for discussion, free exchange of opinions which is the most effective way of defense against the “tyranny of truth”.

Phenomenological “bracketing” of the debates on BN in the sense of avoiding supposed objectivity of believing in Heidegger’s “politicization” and approaching the very subject or case of philosophy allow us to clearly establish the true “godmother” of the whole discussion about philosophy and politics. — Heidegger’s follower in Marburg Hannah Arendt. The title of previously mentioned book by J.-L. Nancy unambiguously refers to H. Arendt’s essay “The banality of evil” with her philosophical classification of Eichmann’s actions as “self-delusion brewed on atrocious stupidity”. In the previously mentioned interview of “Die Zeit” with François Fedier the journalist also asked this question: “What could Hannah Arendt have said about ‘Black notebooks’?” Fedier evaded the question then. However, the most commonly recurring image in the debates is that of Syracuse temptation of great philosophy which can not resist the temptation to become the mentor to the tyrant. This Arendt’s issue is also raised in the two most significant statements about “Black notebooks” made in Russian language – the articles by N.V. Motroshilova [Motroshilova 2015, Motroshilova 2016] and V.V. Mironov in co-authorship with D. Mironova [Mironov, Mironova 2016]. Both of these articles refer to Arendt’s speech, which she made on German radio in honour of Heidegger’s 80th anniversary. The political philosopher, who did not like the term “philosophy of politics”, here, takes a moral position, the position of superiority that is based on the theory of “totalitarianism” developed by her earlier. At present moment this theory of totalitarianism has become a part of philosophical consensus as well as the belief that some deadly dangerous prejudices contaminate people’s minds including the minds of “theorists” which contributes to the consolidation of totalitarian power. “Now we all know, — says Arendt, — that Heidegger once yielded to temptation to change his residence and ‘to connect’, as they put it back then, to the world of human matters. As for this world, Heidegger had it even worse than Plato, because the tyrant and his victims were in the same country and not overseas” [Arendt, Khaidegger 2015, 203]. Philosophers, regardless of the time circumstances or their character, allegedly suffer from a kind of “professional disease” — the inclination towards the tyrannical which “can theoretically be found in every thinker”: they can not see the difference between their own, free and solitary thinking and reality; or rather they tailor reality to their thinking. As a result, “Plato and Heidegger seek shelter at tyrants’ and fuehrers’ when getting involved in human matters” [ibid., 204]. Thus Arendt’s vision turns out to

7 In the letter dated May, 8 1954 Hannah Arendt, replying to Heidegger’s question about the subject she was working on, mentioned the topic that she had been interested in lately: “philosophy and politics in your interpretation”. “Philosophy and politics” is the precise title of the final part of the lecture series that Arendt was giving at University of Notre-Dame in 1954.

8 The speech was published in: Merkur. Heft 10. 1969.
be the most optimal way to preserve the greatness of Heidegger’s thought while pointing out one inexcusable “flaw” belonging not only to him but to the whole centuries-old philosophical tradition. According to this reasoning it would be better for a philosopher to accept the fact that the world in his head differs drastically from that filled, to the “wise men’s” great disappointment, with living people and not ideas.

An assumption about the “involvement” of the thought into human matters suggests separate existence of the thought and socio-political sphere (“the freedom of the thought” and “the freedom of choice”) and the conviction that the thought represents the detachment from the world. It is important for understanding of Arendt’s political philosophy (or philosophical anthropology) which she developed in her final work “The life of mind”. However, it is irrelevant for Heidegger’s philosophy, moreover, it immediately makes it inaccessible as well as its consideration in the “totalitarian” perspective.

A few of the participants of the discussion could focus our optics as clearly for the reading of “Black notebooks” in the context of Heidegger’s philosophy, which does not put “the freedom of thought” and “the freedom of choice” in separate spheres, as A.V. Akhutin did. “If Heidegger’s participation in the Nazi ‘revolution’, — says Moscow-Kiev based philosopher, — could have been taken out of the thinking world of his philosophy without destroying this world, Heidegger’s philosophy would have been discredited as a whole. The fascination, obsession, if you will, with one of the “spirits of time” is exactly the sign of consistency and existential responsibility of Heidegger’s philosophical thought, his “heroism of consequences”. Or, if ‘Heidegger’s case’ is only about him than it is just a special case (an incident) in his biography or it is a mishap of the “case of being”, an experience of being-presence which is inherent in human, an experiment sort of carried out by the philosopher on himself, — then this dangerous possibility constitutes the essence of our common — human — matter. Then Heidegger’s special case is not only philosophically valid but also imperative: the thought is philosophical when it is participatory, when it runs the risk of failure, probably dismal. In any case there is the focus of the matter. Either together with Heidegger, the Nazi, we reject all his philosophy — his Greeks, his Germans, his Hoelderlin, his ‘Being and time’, or we must read ‘Black notebooks’ as yet another chapter, as a variation of this philosophy. Stroking one’s moral ego by exposing of a Nazi anti-Semitic is as secure as it is pointless” [Naranovich 2016].

I have cited this extensive (published by the journalists of online-portal “Gorky”) A.V. Akhutin’s statement as an example of free from “Arendt’s” perspective point of view and at the same time uncompromising though reserved stance on the attitude towards “the literature about Heidegger” for a reason. I would suggest that the presence of “Arendt’s” perspective in very valuable for Russian reception of Heidegger reviews by N.V. Motroshilova, V.V. Mironov, D.
Mironova is, on the contrary, connected to the predominance of studies in German language in the bibliography which tends to focus on the issue of “Heidegger’s guilt” and on the German “question of guilt” (*Schuldfrage*) in general.

However, if V.V. Mironov and D. Mironova’s article is devoted solely to the discussion of the “philosopher’s alliance with power”, N.V. Motroshilova’s article reconstructs broad philosophical grounds and key concepts of “Black notebooks”. The author underlines four “major categorical words” indicating the nature and profound destructive tendencies of the New time in Heidegger’s notes – *Machenschaft* (“machination”, “scheming”, “narrow-mindedness”, “disposal of all things existent”), *das Rechnerische* (“calculating activity”), *Bodenlosigkeit* (groundlessness), *das Riesige* (“violation of measure”). All of them refer to the critics of technology as the end of new European metaphysics and are related to Being-historical measurement of different “national” identities (English, Jewish, German, Russian). To illustrate this point N.V. Motroshilova cites an extract from “Reflections VII”: “The New Time (*die neue Zeit*) is an era that the more consolidates its essence, the more exclusively it reflects only on what it does. What it does (*es tut*) is solely the thing that the completeness of subjectivity must do — maintaining the state of unconsciousness (*Besinnungslosigkeit*) and, maybe, until self-destruction. And this unconsciousness is not blindness, on the contrary, there is the gigantic (*das Riesenfähfe*) in the calculation and this gigantic leads to the release (*Losgelassenheit*) of streaks of force and destruction” [Heidegger 2014b, 36]. “Broad philosophical” profile of “Black notebooks” summary made by N.V. Motroshilova sounds as follows: on the one hand there is “Heidegger’s drastic change of direction towards new being philosophy” in them, and on the other hand “there is concentration of everything negative related to the New time” which is never found in all known text by Heidegger up till this moment.”

**On peculiar features of Russian reception of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy in connection with his criticism of National Socialism and modern technology**

The history of the debate on “Heidegger’s case” in Russia began in the autumn of 1989 when the First international conference on Heidegger took place in Moscow and publicly showed for the first time not only the fact of existence of independent Russian reception of Heidegger, but also its inclusion in European context. As the follow-up to the conference a famous book “Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and modernity” was published [Motroshilova (ed.) 1991]. This book starts with an article by N.V. Motroshilova where we can see the same duality of Heidegger — a philosopher who criticizes “rapid expansion of the power of science and
technology” and preaches “an ideology of love and going back to the ‘good things’” [Motroshilova (ed.) 1991, 46] and a philosopher who is led to the “depth of totalitarianism and misanthropy” [ibid., 50] by some external force (a fuehrer, a leader).

In the same book there was also V.V. Bibikhin’s article “Heidegger’s case” which was later published more than once in amended form [Bibikhin 1993, Bibikhin 2002]. The main Russian translator and interpreter of Heidegger’s works questions the fact that “Heidegger’s case” is “our business” (in the sense of participating in the investigation: is Heidegger a reactionary romantic? a crypto-Thomist? an anti-fascist? a Nazi?) if only because “to make a case” is completely different from continuing the legacy of Heidegger himself [Bibikhin 1991, 168]. It is significant that Bibikhin, unlike Motroshilova, based his work not on German literature (at the moment there were such names as O. Poeeggeler, H. Ott, J. Habermas) but on the French one and particularly not on F. Fedier, who was his friend, but on J. Derrida. Referring to Derrida’s book dated 1987 “On the spirit: Heidegger and the question” Bibikhin defines Heidegger’s “personal case” as an “act of acceptance of the world” or participation in the simplest event of the world. In the lecture course “Early Heidegger” (1989/1990, 1990/1991, 1991/1992) Bibikhin phrased the same thought as follows: Heidegger chose the work of thought, he “had given himself to the thought” [Bibikhin 2009, 16], and any attempt of discussing him should not be a discussion of his personality, job, fate, but should be an attempt to see what Heidegger pointed out: “One might think what could be easier: we take Heidegger’s texts, we have them; we read them, we have already learnt how to read them; we compare them to the existing translations, there are already a lot of them. We carry out a legitimate academic research, we study an important philosophical author…and we completely miss Heidegger among loads of his texts…” [ibid., 7]. The thesis mentioned above defines the specifics of Bibikhin’s approach: it is not so much the discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy, but the discussion of philosophy in general which is caused by Heidegger’s development as a philosopher.

Bibikhin’s optics is — more than Russian researchers say or write — a look on Heidegger through the lens of Derrida’s deconstructivism which Bibikhin interprets as the task of “analysis” (razbor) of thought constructions to be able to trace it back to its origin [Bibikhin 1991, 170]. Deconstruction of European metaphysics as the oblivion of Being and nihilism becomes no less than Heidegger’s “trademark” in Russian area due to Bibikhin’s translations and personal interpretations, and his works “European nihilism”, “Time of the picture of the world”, “Question of technology”, “Science and comprehension” from the collection of articles “Time and Being” (1993) become the very part of the philosophical legacy of the German thinker which
Russian reader got acquainted with a few years before the first complete translation of “Being and time” was released (1997).

These translations were made for reference collected works of Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION) back in the late 1970s–early 1980s. Back then Bibikhin had already shaped an image of Heidegger as a philosopher of “ideological poverty” and as a critic of late modernity who saw the final word of ontological nihilism in the ideology of National Socialism with its claim for world domination. According to Heidegger “a new man of the era of ideologies has nothing else to do on the Earth but consolidate and perpetuate his absolute dominance on it or question his metaphysical nihilistic essence”. When in the summer of 1940 Heidegger first shared the prospect of the “decline of the truth of all things existent”, “the desolation of Earth” and the reign of the new “humanity of metaphysics”, “a working animal” on it with the scarce audience, German troops were entering France and getting ready for the landing on the British Isles.” [Bibikhin 1981a]9. In this case it does not matter that Bibikhin neither knew nor could have known at the moment about Heidegger’s esoteric notes of 1931–1934 which show the amount of enthusiasm that Heidegger greeted National Socialism and “German revolution” in general with as the return of the Greeks in order to save the European humanity from a moral danger of groundlessness, individualism, subjectivism and activism. On the contrary, it can be concluded, based on the esoteric work “Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)” published exactly in 1989, that from 1935/36 Heidegger consistently interpreted the technical modernity as the era of total nihilism, the main feature of which was total objectification and disposal of all things existent (Machenschaft). Eventually this interpretation became Heidegger’s main component of self-deconstruction in post-rector period and the means of philosophical disengagement from National Socialism, the alliance of which with technology dispelled all his “agroromantic” illusions and was the extreme form of the “abandonment by Being.”10 Nevertheless Bibikhin did not have to wait for “Black notebooks” to be released to revise his attitude towards the issue of Heidegger and National Socialism already in the 1990s taking into account all volumes of the Complete works published by then (and above all volumes 36/37 with the course of lectures on “the essence of truth” of 1933–34 and volume 16 with all Heidegger’s speeches of his rector period). The final revised position of Bibikhin sounds as follows: “Heidegger was able to see the revolution of the whole German being behind what was called National Socialist revolution of 1933. In a similar way all-Russian revolutionary movement of 1904–1918 was at its national core a shift promising changes in

9 This thought can also be traced in the introduction to the compilation of Heidegger’s texts under the title “Being and time”. “In the year when Hitler starts and loses the war for control on the planet, Heidegger thinks and talks about nihilism as the last oblivion of being.” [Bibikhin 1993, 8].
10 For details see: [Mikhailovsky 2016].
Russia and maybe in the whole world. Both in Russia in 1917, 1991 and in Germany 1933, 1948 activists rushed onto political stage taking matters into their own hands. They averted the slowly emerging event without allowing it to unfold in its whole truth. Having early, by the end of the same year 1933, felt the inevitability of a breakdown, Heidegger opted for deliberate silence. Unlike Jaspers who turned his back both on politics and its inevitable depth, Heidegger made a commitment to put the historical being into words. Due first of all to him and the likes of him Germany stayed the land of thinkers and poets in the terrible twelve years of its madness.” [Bibikhin 2002, 10–11]. We shall notice that “to put the shift of historical Being into words” is the very act of thought, act of acceptance of the world that Bibikhin mentioned back in 1989 in connection to Derrida’s deconstructivism.

Bibikhin’s Heidegger is also a thinker captivated by the essence of Being, by the mystery of Aletheia-unconcealment. “Heidegger’s silence” can be explained as the expression of this captivation. Helpless silence, to which “the moment of history of the world when nihilism comes to its planetary end” leads, becomes for Heidegger a unique “hint” on the fact that language is not limited solely to the rapidly losing its value “expression” or “communication” and some other speech that has come through the dead zone of silence is able to coincide with the being in a way that it can not be pulled into the nihilistic whirlwind.” [Bibikhin 1981b]. Similarly to Bibikhin’s inability to understand that the investigation of “Heidegger’s case” stays essentially the investigation which is far from “questioning as the piety of the thought” we can not see now that the debates surrounding “Black notebooks” en gros bypass — due to the objective demands of publicly arranged discourse — the main event of Heidegger’s philosophy “after the Kehre”, bypass the very core of his thought, namely, “the silence”. However at the same time it is correct that Russian reception of Heidegger enriched by Bibikhin’s optics includes the chance of productive understanding of Heidegger’s esoteric philosophy.12

The reception of philosophy of Heidegger as the critic of culture, an anti-modernist and a “post”-thinker is yet another important feature of Russian reception of Heidegger which we can — at least in a fragmented manner — reconstruct on the example of some representatives of the Orthodox-patriotic movement of the 1970s-early 1980s involving historians, philologists, philosophers, writers and people gathered around self-published magazines or such thick literary magazines as “Moskva”, “Molodaya Gvardiya” or “Nash Sovremennik”. Let’s look at just two examples. The first example is Vladimir Nikolaevich Osipov, a historian, publicist and social

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11 This scientific and analytical review with the elements of commentary (together with the reviews entitled “European nihilism” and “From New European subject to ‘superman’”) was devoted to Heidegger’s work “European nihilism” and published in the reference book “M. Heidegger’s works on cultural studies and the theory of ideologies”. The reviews were republished in the book: [Bibikhin 2006].

12 The fact that this chance is not remote can be traced in the reflective essay by V. Karpets “Around ‘Black notebooks’” [Karpets 2016].
activist who spent 15 years in prison on political charges in 1960s, 70s and 80s for publishing Orthodox-patriotic magazines “Veche” and “Zemlya”. In an interview with a correspondent for Associated Press on April 25, 1972 V.N. Osipov as the editor of the magazine “Veche” answered the questions about “national cultural independency” of Russian people and the source of inspiration for discussions, namely, Russian and Western philosophers and writers. Among Russian philosophers Osipov names P.A. Florenskiy, who “was able to merge the active comprehension of scientific and technological mission of the XX century with fervent Orthodoxy”, mentions the “paramount importance for the modern Russian mentality” of N. Berdyaev’s, S. Bulgakov’s, S. Frank’s, A. Losev’s works and, finally, acknowledges his “great sympathy towards Martin Heidegger’s work as a great philosopher of our time and not only ours” without “taking a risk of presenting judgment or approval for Western philosophy which it does not need”. Why does Osipov value Heidegger? “Because of his spiritual heat and pathos in searching of the authentic being, his comprehension of the infinity of human nature, his great persistence in the search, his high aesthetics and inclination towards the patriarchal” [Osipov 2012, 39]. This, as it may seem, somewhat naïve acknowledgement illustrates vividly the fact of reception of Heidegger in the 1960s–1970s not only in the academic institutions of USSR (P.P. Gaidenko, V.V. Bibikhin, U.N. Davydov, N.V. Motroshilova and others), but also in the self-publishing field (except for V. Osipov, T. Goryacheva, who translated Heidegger and corresponded with him around 1970 when she was a student of the philosophical department of Leningrad State University is also worth mentioning).

The other example is late publicist works of a famous Soviet expert on Kant and German classicists A.V. Gulyga, another man and scientist with a complicated life. In 1988 Gulyga’s article “Heidegger’s case”, his answer to previously mentioned V. Farias’s investigation, was published in “Literaturnaya gazeta” [Gulyga 1988a, 15]. “Heidegger’s case” is the work of journalists desperate for sensations; philosophers have nothing to do with it. According to Gulyga, this journalistic publication, like the whole current debate on Heidegger, is “characteristic of modern state of philosophy”: people argue not about the problems of teachings but about the degree of the philosopher’s involvement with the fascist movement and the fact whether or not he was an anti-Semite. For Gulyga Martin Heidegger is “the last representative of the great philosophy brought up in the German land”, “a great theorist of culture” facing a catastrophe. The “post”-philosopher’s image is based on the strong metaphor of a clock that struck midnight: “The arrow on the clock of history reached twelve, how can we move it back? The image of executed time owns now the minds of scientists and politicians. The philosopher reflected on it a long time ago. And he said that it was time to go back to the start, to the original simple grounds of human life, to break the deadlock that was created by technically rational
thought.” Gulyga as though wants to say that midnight of history has come; the clock has struck twelve and Heidegger is the one who peers into the darkness where the contours of things to come can be seen.

Like Bibikhin, Gulyga approaches Heidegger not through the German criticism but through the French one, through Derrida, Lyotard, Lacan, Foucault and others. A very nontrivial hypothesis about post-historical element in Heidegger’s thinking is advanced in the articles “What is post-modernity?” and “On the postmodernism” [Gulyga 1988b, 1990]. The author names this tendency “post-modernity”. If “modernity” means some kind of opposition to the unmodern, old-fashioned, gone and past is regarded as the lowest stage withdrawn by the following development, post-modernity sees the past not only as the prerequisite for the present but also its integral part: it is the convergence of what was, what is and what will be. Thus post-modernity stands for some kind of escalation of historicism or the most illustrative example of “superhistoricism”. Starting with “Being and time”, Heidegger expresses intuition of “executed time”, of a unity in which future, present and past come together. Gulyga correctly observes not only “mutual affiliation” and “equivalence” of the three modes of time in early Heidegger’s works, but also the priority of the “future” over the other two modes. Heidegger is not a passiste, his vision is focused on the future, not the past, and without this vision there would be neither historicism, nor the very concept of an “Other Inception”.

To sum this research up preliminary (expecting final results would be presumptuous), it must be said that both perspectives “Heidegger as a deconstructionist”, “as a thinker questioning the Being” and “Heidegger as a critic of culture, an anti-modernist and a “post”-philosopher” are the topics that are represented the most vividly in the French reception of Heidegger which, — as it can be seen on the examples of V.V. Bibikhin and A.V. Gulyga and as it could have been shown on the examples of such different philosophers as V.A. Podoroga [Podoroga 1991, Podoroga 1993] and A.G. Dugin [Dugin 2010, Dugin 2011, Dugin 2014], — have to a large extent determined the specifics of the Russian reception of Heidegger in late Soviet and post-Soviet times.

**Conclusion**

Peter Trawny was right: Heidegger did rise to notice again. But Western European Heidegger studies bypassed the solitary silence of “Black notebooks” in loud droves and in doing so rendered themselves irrelevant. Two volumes of the Russian translation of “Black notebooks” were published in 2016 and 2018 [Khaidegger 2016, Khaidegger 2018]: it is remarkable that the editor, the publisher and the sponsor of the Russian translation have refused
to express their position limiting themselves to translating of P. Trawny’s German afterword. The latest issue of the Russian philosophical journal “Logos” (vol. 28, no. 3, 2018, in print), which has recently been announced, is about to refuse of the spirit of “good silence” too and import the current international debate on Heidegger’s National Socialism and anti-Semitism into the Russian intellectual field. The result of it would be the same: reducing Heidegger to the political issues and missing an opportunity of the understanding Heidegger’s transition to an Other Inception (der Andere Anfang) of thinking.

Nevertheless, “Black notebooks” can have a future in Russia. This assumption is based on Heidegger’s own words about the “new shift of Being” and the possibility of an “Other Inception” in Russia. In his interview to “Spiegel” Heidegger unexpectedly mentions Russia as a possible place where a free attitude towards the world of technology would be achieved and the shift to the experience of Being, to the non-metaphysical thinking about Being, the origins of which are unknown to us, would occur.13 That mention correlates with the reflections of 1941 about “boundless simplicity” of the “Russian origin” which is ready to accept the giving away of the Being (Seyn) and to overcome (getting over it) the European metaphysics: “There is a treasure of waiting for a hidden God which surpass [the meaning of] all the raw materials in the essence of the Russian origin.” [Heidegger 2014c, 128].

In his lecture about the essence of language of 1957 [Heidegger 1965, 173] Heidegger said that thinking ploughed the field of Being. The ground for comprehension and learning of Heidegger’s esoteric thinking as the solitary guarding of the Being has been prepared in Russia, inside the Russian language. Firstly, there is a historically formed duality and simultaneity of the public and non-public discussion/consideration of philosophical problems and philosophical essays with the characteristic predominance of the second type over the first one: what usually is depicted by the critical intellectuals as a disadvantage turns out to be an advantage in the case of Heidegger’s thought. This duality allows to give serious consideration to the “communicative strategies” (V.A. Podoroga), to describe “the clash of the pre-communicative and communication”, “the undisclosed and disclosed” (A. Ryasov) in Heidegger’s philosophy as compared to the European literature and philosophy of the 20th century and by doing so acquire a valuable hermeneutic tool. Secondly, in Russia Heidegger has been read as a philosopher of the future, not the past, as a “precursor of the dawn of a completely different era of the world”: thus, the key concepts of “Black notebooks” of “Machenschaft(en)”, “das Rechnerische”, “das Riesige” not only help to give an unfavorable diagnosis to the late modernity (N.V. Motroshilova) but also to look ahead in “the year 2300 when the history may reappear.” Thirdly,

13 The Russian translation of the conversation of the employees of the magazine “Spiegel” R. Augstein and H. Wolf with M. Heidegger on September, 23 1966 was published in: [Motroshilova (ed.) 1991, 247].
Russian literature on Heidegger shows not only the existence of its own independent language of description and analysis but also a tendency towards holistic approach to the consideration of the philosopher’s work involving, in addition to the analysis of *Dasein* and Being-historical thinking, political ontology and critics of civilizational discourse in the spirit of conservative revolution. Such reputable readers and interpreters of Heidegger’s works as V.V. Bibikhin, A.V. Akhutin renounce the strict division between the very “core” of Heidegger’s philosophy and “accidental” circumstances and are responsive to the issue of the philosopher’s responsibility which matches with the reflection of the historical situation of philosophy in USSR. Fourthly, the learning of Heidegger’s thought through discussion and the separation with French poststructuralism and postmodernism in the late Soviet and post-Soviet philosophy have become an integral factor of development of national philosophical thought which has grown stronger while exercising in deconstruction of ideological and thinking surpluses and in the very Heidegger’s case.
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