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COMPETITION, LAND PRICE, AND CITY SIZE

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Competition, Land Price, and City Size

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Abstract

Larger cities typically give rise to two effects working in opposite directions: tougher competition among firms and higher production costs. Using an urban model with substitutability of production factors and pro-competitive effects, we study how market outcome responds to city population size, land-use regulation and commuting costs. For industries with small input of land, larger cities host more firms which set lower prices whereas larger cities accommodate more firms which charge higher prices in industries with intermediate land share in production. Furthermore, for industries with high input share of land, larger cities allocate fewer firms with higher product prices. We show that softer land-use regulation and/or lower commuting costs reinforce pro-competitive effects making larger cities more attractive for residents via lower product prices and broader variety for a larger number of industries.

Keywords: pro-competitive effects; production structure; land-use regulations; urban costs; pricing; city size.

JEL Classification: R13, R32, R52.

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1 Introduction

It is well documented that living in large cities is expensive (Glaeser et al., 2005a). Large metropolitan areas sustain substantially high housing prices (Glaeser et al., 2005b), demonstrate inconclusive evidence on product prices (Handbury and Weinstein, 2014), while variety is broader (Berry and Waldfogel, 2010; Schiff, 2015). In this paper, we argue that the cost side is crucial for understanding product prices formation and variation in variety among cities. Indeed, a larger city population corresponds to higher land prices (Combes et al., 2012). This, in turn, results in higher production costs since firms have to pay higher land rent. In what follows, we focus on the role of the production cost structure in shaping the market outcome. To this end, we study a spatial urban model that features pro-competitive effects, while factors - land and labor - are imperfect substitutes. We show that the production side plays a key role in explaining the differences in prices and variety across cities of different sizes.

Furthermore, our setting allows us to study an issue that attracts a lot of attention both in the media and academic journals, i.e., the impact of land-use regulation on welfare (Porter, 1995). While residential development regulation is widely studied (see survey in Gyourko and Mollon, 2015), here we focus on land regulation for commercial usage which takes different forms as discussed in Duranton and Puga (2015). The strict regulation of this type is shown to have negative consequences. Based on the data of US metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) between 1983 and 2009, Turner et al. (2014) find a highly negative impact of land-use regulations on the value of land and welfare. In the same vein, regulation policy related to office spaces (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008) and stores (Cheshire et al., 2014) has a negative impact on land rent, variety, and stores’ output. In addition, Hsieh and Moretti (2015) report that over-regulated cities such as New York, San Francisco and San Jose make a surprisingly small contribution to the nation’s economic growth compared to less regulated cities: lowering the intensity of regulations in these cities to the median US city level would lead to an increase in U.S. GDP by 9.5%. We provide micro-foundations for this evidence and show that relaxing land-use regulation increases welfare through lower product prices and broader variety.

This paper aims to shed light on the two following issues. Our first result depends on the relative share of land and labor in input. For labor-intensive industries, i.e. those with small input of land, larger cities host more firms which set lower prices. Whereas larger cities accommodate more firms which charge higher prices in industries with intermediate land share in production. While for land-intensive industries (with high input share of land), larger cities allocate fewer firms with higher product prices. This result provides a rationality for the inconclusive evidence about the behavior of product prices in cities of different sizes. The intuition is as follows. High land rent in larger cities increases the cost of production (henceforth, production cost effect). For land-intensive industries, the production cost effect is strong and suppresses the competition effect. The latter arises due to pro-competitive effects and the standard market size effect.
(tougher competition in larger markets) both working in the same direction. Note, however, that under the presence of pro-competitive effects, firms charge lower markups in larger markets independently of factor intensities. At the same time, firms in land-intensive industries set higher prices due to higher production costs in bigger cities. Thus, firms’ decisions are driven by the land market through the cost minimization problem.¹

The lower the land share in production, the stronger the tendency that larger cities sustain lower product prices and broader variety. This suggests a simple and intuitive reason for variation in market outcomes for diverse industries across cities of different sizes. On one hand, firms from relatively land-intensive industries, such as restaurants, theaters, and traditional retail, charge higher prices in the centers of big cities. On the other hand, such industries as banking, insurance, and printing adopted automatization in production process during the second half of last century, which led to a large social gain (Bresnahan, 1986). We naturally refer to them as relatively labor-intensive sectors. For instance, when computers replaced paper archives in banking and insurance industries, typesetting machines in printing, and panel boards in R&D and engineering industries, these industries likely experienced the shock of a decreasing relative share of land input.² Nowadays, these industries are large and prices for their production are low in big cities. On the empirical side, Bresnahan et al. (2002) show that firms which adopted information technology tend to use more skilled labor, while Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte (2009) show that the effect of job decentralization away from city centers has a larger impact on low-skilled jobs than on skill-intensive and managerial jobs. This evidence also confirms our findings that variation in land rent likely influences industries in different ways, depending on the industry’s cost structure. Furthermore, Glaeser and Kahn (2001) report a decreasing share of employment in central cities of US metropolitan areas during the second half of last century. Thus, the computerization process, i.e. a decrease in the relative share of land input, allowed those industries to become more competitive in densely populated cities while other industries were partially pushed out of the centers of large cities.

Our second purpose is to study how land-use regulation affects the results above where it is implicitly assumed that the land supply is perfectly inelastic. Needless to say, this corresponds to a very extreme case of strict land regulation. More realistically, we now assume that the amount of land available for firms increases with the city population size. We refer to this case as mild regulation which allows conversion of the surrounding areas of the central business district (CBD). We show that mild regulation leads to lower prices and broader variety with city growth for a larger number of industries than in the case of strict regulation. This is a consequence of a micro-founded effect of decreasing production costs via lower land rent induced by an increase in land supply. Thus, relaxing regulations is a potential source for social welfare improvement

¹Note that in the limiting case of a one-factor setting, the product cost effect disappears, whence the market outcome demonstrates an increase in mass of firms and a reduction in prices with city size.

²We acknowledge that advanced technology also reduces the share of labor input. Thus, we are talking about shares in relative terms.
which is in line with the above-mentioned empirical evidence.

To fix ideas, we choose relevant values of the main model parameters and provide a first approximation of the threshold values of labor shares in production. This gives us a rough idea for distinguishing across different market outcomes. We choose an appropriate level of mild regulation based on the empirical estimations of land price elasticity in city centers with respect to population size (Combes et al., 2012). For the case of mild land regulations, this analysis shows that prices are lower in larger cities for industries with labor share inputs above the threshold value which belongs to the interval (0.64, 0.81). In other words, firms of industries with labor share input above 0.81 set lower prices in larger cities. Furthermore, larger cities host more firms from industries with labor share above the threshold value not exceeding 0.61. Therefore, larger cities host more firms from industries where the share of land does not exceed 0.39.

As to commuting costs, we show that a city with higher commuting costs hosts fewer firms than a city of the same size but with lower commuting costs. Moreover, growth in population leads to opposite consequences for a number of industries in two cities. To be precise, variety shrinks in the city with higher commuting costs while it increases in the city with lower commuting costs. The reason is that urban costs, i.e. expenditure on housing and transportation, increase at a greater pace in the city with higher commuting costs than in the other city. Therefore, initial differences in welfare between residents of the two cities enhance in response to their population growth. This shows how an urban policy oriented toward public transport subsidies and investments in city traffic system would lead to an improvement in social welfare via an increase in variety. Furthermore, an increase in both commuting costs and city size might result in an inverse U-shaped behavior of the mass of firms for the industries with intermediate values of land share. At the first stage, the mass of firms increases with city size, while at the second stage, further city growth decreases variety. The reason is that an increase in commuting costs decreases spendings on commodities. This negative effect may overcome the positive effect of market size.

Last, we recognize that firms located in the CBD are involved in input-output (IO) and knowledge spillovers relationships and investigate their implications for our results. As pointed out by a number of empirical studies, agglomeration economies reduce production costs through intensive use of increasing returns to scale (IRS) in agglomerated industries (see reviews in Eberts and McMillan, 1999; and Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Following this idea, we extend our framework by introducing IO linkages and knowledge spillovers among firms. We show that stronger IO linkages increase the number of industries featuring lower prices in larger cities, and lead to broader variety for a larger number of industries in bigger cities. Furthermore, stronger knowledge spillovers also increase a number of industries featuring lower prices in larger cities; reinforce the effect of broader variety for labor-intensive industries and industries with intermediate labor input in larger cities, while the effect is opposite for land-intensive industries. Thus, technology with stronger IO linkages and knowledge spillovers allows industries to operate
more effectively in large cities with high land prices within the CBD.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 provides an analysis of industries with different cost structures in cities of different sizes. In Section 4 we extend our setting to deal with the case of intermediates. Section 5 concludes.

2 The model

Consider a linear city populated with a mass \( L \) of consumers uniformly distributed over \((0, L]\). The city has one CBD at \( x = 0 \) with an exogenously given size \( S \). Each consumer requires 1 unit of land for housing outside the CBD while firms are located in the CBD. Let \( x \in (0, L] \) denote the location of a consumer and her distance to the CBD.

We assume a one-sector economy which produces a horizontally differentiated good using two production factors, land and labor. We rely on the monopolistic competition framework without scope economies. Thus, the differentiated good market involves a mass of firms \( N \), each firm produces a single variety, and each variety is produced by a single firm.

We also assume that each consumer owns one unit of labor while land rent is equally distributed across consumers. As in Voith (1998) and Pfüger and Tabuchi (2010), in our framework only producers compete for land within the CBD while consumers commute to the CBD where the jobs are located.

2.1 Preferences and technology

We work with non-CES preferences since we are interested in the competition effect stemming from variable markups. In what follows, we assume that consumers share identical non-CES additive preferences (Zhelobodko et al., 2012) given by

\[
U = \int_0^N u(x_k) dk,
\]

where \( x_k \) is the per capita consumption of variety \( k \) and \( u(x_k) \) is a thrice differentiable, increasing, and concave function with \( u(0) = 0 \).

We rely on a standard assumption of urban literature by considering linear commuting costs. Hence, each consumer at location \( x \) seeks to maximize her utility (1) subject to the budget constraint

\[
\int_0^N p_k x_k dk = w + \frac{S}{L} \cdot R + \frac{1}{L} \cdot \int_0^L z(y) dy - \tau x - z(x),
\]

where \( w \) is the wage, \( R \) is the land price within the CBD, \( \tau \) is the unit commuting cost, and

\[3\]We discuss the consequences of variation in CBD size in Section 3.3.
$z(x)$ is the housing rent at location $x$. Consumers earn their salary $w$ while the return on land in the CBD (second term on the right-hand side of (2) and land rent from housing (third term) are equally distributed across consumers. The last two terms on the right-hand side stand for commuting costs and housing. Without loss of generality we set $z(L) = 0$, i.e. the land at the city border is costless.

The first order condition yields an inverse demand function given by

$$p_k = \frac{u'(x_k)}{\lambda},$$

(3)

where $\lambda$ is the Lagrange multiplier.

On the supply side, we assume that land and labor are imperfect substitutes in the production process. This assumption suggests that the density of workers in office spaces tends to be higher when the office rent increases. In what follows, we employ the cost specification from Bernard et al. (2007) and consider the Cobb-Douglas cost function over land and labor:

$$C(q) = (F + cq)w^\alpha R^{1-\alpha},$$

(4)

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ stands for labor intensity in production, and $q$ is firm output. Hence, firm $k$ maximizes profit given by

$$(p_k - cw^\alpha R^{1-\alpha})Lx_k - Fw^\alpha R^{1-\alpha}.$$ (5)

Since total cost functions are identical across firms, we suppress the firm index $k$. In what follows, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium.

### 2.2 Equilibrium

To obtain the equilibrium system of equations, we proceed as follows. First, the balances at land and labor markets

$$S = N \cdot \frac{\partial C(q)}{\partial R} = (1 - \alpha)N(F + cq)(R/w)^{-\alpha},$$ (6)

$$L = N \cdot \frac{\partial C(q)}{\partial w} = \alpha N(F + cq)(R/w)^{1-\alpha}$$ (7)

yield that the relative factor price is

$$\frac{R}{w} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{L}{S}.$$ (8)

In what follows, we are able to measure all equilibrium variables in terms of wage $w$. Equation (8) shows that the relative land price in the CBD is higher in a more populated city. Population growth implies a greater labor supply which makes land a relatively more scarce resource.
This, in turn, shifts the land price upwards. Furthermore, the land price increases faster if the production is more land-intensive, i.e. the smaller $\alpha$.

Second, the monopoly pricing rule yields

$$\frac{p}{w} = \frac{c}{1 - r_u(x)} \cdot \left( \frac{R}{w} \right)^{1-\alpha}. \quad (9)$$

Here $r_u(x)$ is the inverse demand elasticity given by

$$r_u(x) = -\frac{xu''(x)}{u'(x)}. \quad (9)$$

The function $r_u(x)$ also stands for the relative markup

$$m(x) \equiv \frac{p - cw^\alpha R^{1-\alpha}}{p} = r_u(x).$$

Under CES preferences $r_u = 1/\sigma$ is a constant, which implies that $r_u$ can be viewed as a measure of product differentiation. This interpretation also applies beyond the CES setting (see Zhelobodko et al. (2012) for details).

The second order condition for the producer’s problem is given by

$$1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u) > 0, \quad (10)$$

where $\varepsilon_x(r_u)$ is the super-elasticity of the inverse demand (Nakamura and Zerom, 2010) given by

$$\varepsilon_x(r_u) = \frac{xr_u'(x)}{r_u(x)}. \quad (10)$$

The intuition behind (10) is that the inverse demand elasticity $r_u(x)$ should not decrease too fast. In other words, a higher consumption level $x$ should not boost product differentiation too much.

Third, using (9) and setting the profit function (5) equal to zero, we obtain the zero-profit condition

$$\frac{xr_u(x)}{1 - r_u(x)} = \frac{F}{cL}, \quad (11)$$

while the market clearing condition is given by

$$q = Lx. \quad (12)$$

Last, the equilibrium condition in the housing market requires consumer expenditure on housing and transportation, $(\tau x + z(x))/w$, to be the same across agents independent of their location and equal to $\tau L$. In the following discussion we will refer to the sum of spendings on
housing and transportation as urban costs which increase with both commuting costs $\tau$ and city size $L$. The per capita housing expense takes the form $\frac{1}{w_L} \cdot \int_0^L z(y)dy = \tau L/2$, after substituting in the budget constraint (2) we get $Npx/w = 1 + SR/wL = \tau L/2$. Finally, plugging (8) into the last equation after simplification we obtain

$$N \cdot \frac{cx}{1 - ru(x)} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{\alpha}{L} \cdot \frac{S}{L}\right)^{1-\alpha} = \frac{1}{\alpha} - \frac{\tau L}{2} \cdot (13)$$

Therefore, a symmetric free entry equilibrium is a bundle $(R/w, x, q, N)$ which solves the system containing (8), (11), (12), and (13).

3 Market outcome and city size

In this section we study the impact of an increase in the relative labor endowment on market outcome. We acknowledge that such an increase may arise for different reasons, for example, an inflow of migrants or a structural improvement in the production process. Structural changes of the production process, i.e. a decrease of the labor share in the input, produces the same effect as city population growth. For certainty, in the following discussion we focus on an increase in city population. Our analysis is applicable for the discussion on the impact of city population growth on industries with different land-labor intensities. Yet, taking into account technology properties, we show that industries with different land-labor shares demonstrate different market patterns within identical cities.

We also apply our analysis to a comparison of market outcomes across cities with different ratios of population to CBD size. Our presumption is that an industry could demonstrate different patterns depending on the city size. Indeed, the relative factor price (8) is higher in larger cities and/or in cities with a limited size of the CBD. The obvious reason preventing the CBD growth is strong land regulations which have been shown to cause negative welfare consequences via high CBD land prices (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Turner et al., 2014). Hence, the relative factor price with the corresponding city-CBD size ratio is a new force shaping the market outcome.

3.1 The role of city size

We first assume a given CBD size which might be the case of strict land-use regulation when converting the CBD surrounding areas is prohibited. We relax this assumption in Section 3.3 and study the case of mild land regulation. Thus, we investigate how product prices and the mass of firms respond to changes in city size $L$.

First, using (11), we compute the elasticity $\varepsilon_L(x)$ of per capita consumption with respect to $L$ (see Appendix A for computational details of this section):
\[ \varepsilon_L(x) = -\frac{1 - r_u(x)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)} < 0. \]  

(14)

Per capita consumption (14) decreases with \( L \) since \( r_u(x) \in (0, 1) \) and the denominator is positive due to the second order condition (10).

Plugging (8) into (9), and making use of (14), after simplifications, we obtain the behavior of the product price \( p \) with respect to the city size \( L \):

\[ \varepsilon_L(p) = 1 - \alpha - \frac{r_u(x)\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)}. \]  

(15)

We rely on the \( \varepsilon_x(r_u) > 0 \) case which is equivalent to \( r_u(x) \) being an increasing function. Zhelobodko et al. (2012) show that this assumption yields a necessary and sufficient condition for pro-competitive market behavior in response to population shocks, i.e. markups decrease with market size. Indeed, when \( \varepsilon_x(r_u) > 0 \), firms located in bigger cities charge lower markups \( m = r_u(x) \) because of the inverse relationship (14) between per capita consumption \( x \) and city size \( L \).

As implied by (15), a firm sets higher (lower) prices in a larger city when it belongs to the land (labor)-intensive sectors with \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \) (\( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \)), where \( \bar{\alpha} \) is given by

\[ \bar{\alpha} = 1 - \frac{r_u(x)\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)}, \]  

(16)

where the right-hand side is evaluated at equilibrium. This result is driven by the interplay between two opposite effects: (i) the production cost effect which is a result of higher land prices in larger cities captured by (8), and (ii) the standard competition effect. The latter is the sum of market size effect and pro-competitive effects which suppresses prices at larger markets. The first effect is missing in the non-spatial one-factor setting, \( \alpha = 1 \), where \( \varepsilon_L(p) < 0 \) and firms always set lower prices at larger markets.

However, in an urban setting with factor substitutability, a firm’s decision on pricing depends on its cost structure. When the industry’s production is land-intensive, i.e. \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \), the competition effect is dominated by the production cost effect. In this case, firms charge higher prices in larger cities, thus the equilibrium markup and price go in opposite directions. In other worlds, despite the fact that markups are lower in larger cities in the presence of pro-competitive effects, firms may set higher prices for the final good. This tendency is stronger for firms that belong to land-intensive industries since they are more sensitive to land price. Otherwise, for labor-intensive industries, the competition effect dominates the production cost effect and, as a result, firms set lower prices in larger cities.

The mass of firms \( N \) given by (13) depends on both city size \( L \) and its commuting costs \( \tau \). Using (13), after simplifications, the elasticity \( \varepsilon_L(N) \) of the mass of firms with respect to \( L \) takes
the following form:

\[
\varepsilon_L(N) = \alpha - \frac{\tau L}{\alpha - \tau L} - \frac{\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)} \cdot (1 - r_u(x)).
\]  

(17)

Let \( \alpha \) be a solution to \( \varepsilon_L(N) = 0 \), or, equivalently, \( \alpha \) is pinned down by

\[
\alpha - \frac{\tau L}{\alpha - \tau L} = \frac{\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)} \cdot (1 - r_u(x)).
\]  

(18)

Hence, a larger city hosts fewer (more) firms from a land (labor)-intensive industry, i.e. when \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \) (\( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \)).\(^4\) Further comments are in order. First, the intuition behind this result is in line with our discussion on firms’ pricing: larger cities attract fewer firms from land intensive industry because of the production cost effect dominating the competition effect.

Second, a comparison between (18) and (16) shows that \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \), at least for empirically plausible levels of urban costs \( \tau L \).\(^5\) Based on this comparison, three different patterns may arise: (i) for a labor intensive sector, i.e. when \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \), the production cost effect is weak, therefore, larger cities host more firms which set lower prices; (ii) for an industry with intermediate factor intensities, \( \bar{\alpha} < \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \), the production cost effect is stronger, hence, this sector features more firms but higher prices in larger cities; and (iii) for land-intensive sectors, i.e. when \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \), the production cost effect dominates the competition effect. Therefore, larger cities host fewer firms from this industry while product prices are higher compared to smaller cities. This discussion provides micro-foundations for the negative consequences of land scarcity (meaning high production costs) within large dense cities at least for industries with a substantial land input. As pointed out by a number of empirical studies for the UK (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et al., 2014) and US cities (Turner et al., 2014; Hsieh and Moretti, 2015), land regulations have negative welfare consequences. We contribute to the literature by showing a mechanism which may lead to welfare losses through an increase in product prices and a decrease in product variety within over-regulated cities. The simple and intuitive reason is an increase in production costs in response to city growth under strict land regulations. We provide a more detailed discussion on the mild land regulation in Section 3.3.

The following proposition summarizes our findings.

**Proposition 1.** Assume preferences with pro-competitive effects, i.e. \( \varepsilon_x(r_u) > 0 \). Then, a larger city is characterized by (i) more firms and lower prices in labor-intensive industries, \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \); (ii) more firms and higher prices in sectors with intermediate intensities of factors, \( \bar{\alpha} < \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \); (iii) fewer firms and higher prices in land-intensive industries, \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \).

**Proof.** In the text.

\(^4\)Note that in the one-factor world without space, where \( \alpha = 1 \) and \( \tau = 0 \), the mass of firms is always bigger at larger markets.

\(^5\)We will provide a quantitative discussion on our results in the section 3.4.
Proposition 1 says that market behavior depends on both demand and supply side properties. The economic intuition for this result is straightforward. Firms in land-intensive industries are more sensitive to land prices which are higher in larger cities. Hence, these firms have to set higher product prices in larger cities to compensate for higher production costs. Note that this result has nothing to do with anti-competitive practices or tacit collusion of firms. Instead, it is a consequence of the firms’ cost minimization problem driven by the land market.

Next, we look at the firm size. The elasticity $\varepsilon_L(q)$ of firm size (12) with respect to $L$ is given by

$$
\varepsilon_L(q) = 1 + \varepsilon_L(x) = \frac{\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)}.
$$

Under the presence of pro-competitive effects, $\varepsilon_x(r_u) > 0$, we obtain $0 < \varepsilon_L(q) < 1$. Therefore, larger cities host bigger firms, which is in line with the empirical evidence (Levinsohn, 1999). We note that the behavior of firm size in response to market expansion is the same as in the standard monopolistic competition model (Zhelobodko et al., 2012). However, as shown above, this is not the case for the mass of entrants and product prices.

### 3.2 Commuting costs

In addition to the interaction between competition and production costs effects, the mass of firms is affected by commuting costs $\tau$ as shown by the second term on the left hand side of (18). In equilibrium, commuting costs are proportionate to urban costs $\tau L$. In other words, an increase in commuting costs results in higher expenditure on housing as well. It is readily verified from (18), that larger commuting costs $\tau$ lead to a higher threshold value $\alpha$. Thus, an increase in commuting costs may cause variety changes under city size growth. To be precise, assume that for an industry with $\alpha^*$ variety increases with city growth, i.e. $\alpha^* > \underline{\alpha}$. Assume in addition that commuting costs also increase which makes $\alpha$ larger. This might lead to an increase in the threshold value $\alpha$ above $\alpha^*$, i.e. $\alpha^* < \underline{\alpha}$. Therefore, increases in both commuting costs and city size results in inverse $U$-shaped behavior of the mass of firms. At the first stage, the mass of firms increases with city size, while at the second stage further city growth decreases variety.

Furthermore, the differences in the mass of entrants could be the consequences of different commuting costs among cities. Consider a simple example of two cities equal in size with higher commuting costs in one of them, i.e. $\tau_1 > \tau_2$. Note that commuting costs have an impact only on the mass of firms (13) but do not affect product price (9) and firm size (12). Therefore, in a low commuting cost city the variety is broader while consumption levels and production prices are equal. This has a direct implication on the welfare of residents in the two cities. Indeed, once consumers are endowed with preferences exhibiting love for variety, residents in this city are better off. Therefore, we show how a public transportation subsidy, i.e. a decrease in $\tau$, would
lead to an improvement in social welfare.

Moreover, as discussed above, the threshold value $\alpha$ is higher in the city with higher commuting costs $\tau$, i.e. $\alpha_1 > \alpha_2$. Assume now that these two cities experience a shock of population growth. An increase in the cities’ sizes has a different impact on the industry with $\alpha \in (\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ in these cities only because of the differences in urban costs. To be precise, in the city with higher urban costs the variety shrinks but the opposite holds in the city with lower urban costs while product prices in both cities increase. However, an increase in prices is higher for the high commuting cost city. Therefore, an increase in city size may have the opposite welfare consequence for the residents of these cities. Consumers in the city with high urban costs are worse-off because of an increase in product prices while the product variety shrinks. Residents of the low commuting cost city might be better-off due to a broader variety which could compensate for the losses associated with an increase in prices. Initial differences in welfare between residents of two cities enhance in response to city population growth. Hence, this discussion contributes to the debates on the development of city transportation systems and public transportation subsidies by showing the source which leads to welfare improvement through the product markets.

3.3 The CBD size and land regulations

In this section we discuss the role of land-use regulation. In our previous analysis we assumed a fixed amount of land $S$ within the CBD and examined the consequences of changes in the city population size $L$. We may refer to the above discussion as strict land-use regulation when converting the surrounding areas of the CBD is prohibited. Now let us assume a mild regulation policy which allows such conversion and address the question of its impact on the market outcome and city residents. We again follow the empirical acquirement that usually an increase in the CBD size is less than proportional to the population size growth. This assumption is supported by the empirical evidence suggesting that (i) the elasticity of unit land prices in the city center with respect to city population is 0.72 (Combes et al., 2012), and (ii) the city size growth usually exceeds the growth in the land area (Pagano and Bowman, 2000).

Hence, we focus on the case of a disproportionately smaller increase in the CBD size in response to population growth, more formally, we assume that $dL/L > dS/S$. To keep things tractable we assume that an elasticity of CBD growth with respect to city population is positive constant $\delta < 1$. The profit-maximizing markup $m = r_u(x)$ and the firm size $q = Lx$ are not affected by changes in the CBD size $S$, while changes in the product price $p$ are given by

$$
\varepsilon_{L/S}(p) = \delta(1 - \alpha) - \frac{r_u(x)\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)},
$$

while the threshold value $\bar{\alpha}$ is
\[ \bar{\alpha} = 1 - \frac{1}{\delta} \cdot \frac{r_u(x)\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)}. \]  

(19)

The same exercise for the equilibrium mass of firms allows us to determine the threshold value \( \alpha \) as a solution to

\[ \alpha - \frac{1}{\delta} \cdot \frac{\tau_L}{\bar{\alpha} - \tau_L} = \frac{1}{\delta} \cdot \frac{\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)} \cdot (1 - r_u(x)) - \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta}. \]  

(20)

It is readily verified from (19) and (20) that both thresholds \( \bar{\alpha} \) and \( \alpha \) increase with \( \delta \) for the empirically relevant values of urban costs \( \tau_L \). Softening land regulation means a decrease in \( \delta \) and, therefore, lower threshold values. As a result, a land-intensive industry attracts more firms which set lower prices in larger city under mild regulations \((\delta < 1)\) whereas for strict regulations \((\delta = 1)\) the outcome would be the opposite. Thus, as mentioned in the introduction, softening land regulations is a source for social welfare improvement (Turner et al., 2014; Hsieh and Moretti, 2015). Thus, we end up with the following Proposition.

**Proposition 2.** Mild land-use regulation leads to lower thresholds \( \bar{\alpha} \) and \( \alpha \), thus, in larger cities variety is broader and product prices are lower for a larger number of industries compared to strict land regulation.

**Proof.** In the text.

### 3.4 Quantitative examples

What are the quantitative boundaries \( \alpha \) and \( \bar{\alpha} \) for the labor-land ratio \( \alpha \) in Proposition 1? When those boundaries are of extreme values, for example, close to 0, our analysis is restrictive because only very land-intensive industries demonstrate behavior different from the one obtained in a baseline monopolistic competition model with pro-competitive effects. To evaluate quantitative values for the thresholds at the first approximation, we rely on empirically plausible values of urban costs and demand side variables.

First, empirical studies show that the share of expenditure on housing is on average between 23% and 25% while even in large cities it does not exceed 30% with the lowest share close to 20% (Davis and Ortalo-Magné, 2011; Combes et al., 2012). As to commuting costs, individuals spend around 4 weeks of work per year commuting in large European MSAs such as Paris (Proost and Thisse, 2017). Thus, the budget share of transportation usually does not exceed 8%. The same number in terms of labor hours is reported by Redding and Turner (2014) and Schafer (2000) based on household surveys from different countries with the lower bound close to 4%. Hence, empirical evidence suggests that the upper bound for urban costs \( \tau_L \) is around 0.35 of the individual’s total income \( 1 + \frac{S}{L} \cdot \frac{R}{w} + \frac{1}{wL} \cdot \int_0^L z(x)dx \).

Second, according to different empirical studies, price elasticity usually takes values between 7 and 10 while the super-elasticity of demand lies between 1 and 2 (Head and Ries, 2001; Head
and Mayer, 2004; Dossche et al., 2010; Beck and Lein-Rupprecht, 2016). In this model, price elasticity coincides with $1/r_u(x)$ while the super-elasticity of demand is $\varepsilon_x(r_u)$.

Based on these estimation ranges of parameters, we compute intervals for the possible threshold values of labor share $\alpha$ in production. For the upper-bound of urban costs, the threshold $\bar{\alpha}$ for different pricing behavior belongs to the interval $(0.90, 0.95)$ while the minimum and maximum value of $\alpha$ are $\alpha_{\text{min}} = 0.73$ and $\alpha_{\text{max}} = 0.89$, respectively. For the lowest values of urban costs, $\alpha$ falls to the interval $(0.66, 0.82)$. Thus, the possible range of the threshold $\alpha$ for increasing/decreasing variety with city size is between 0.63 and 0.89. These values show that the competition effect dominates the production cost effect for industries which are relatively labor intensive.

Note that this is a rough approximation which does not take into account any variation in the CBD size with respect to city population, i.e. these numbers are related to the case of strict land regulations. As the next step, we turn to the case of mild land regulations. We first seek the appropriate value of land regulation strength $\delta$. To this end, we depart from the relationship (8) showing a proportionate change in the relative land price $R/w$ with respect to city population size $L$. However, Combes et al. (2012) report that the estimate of land price elasticity in the city center is 0.72. Thus, by choosing $\delta = 0.28$, we reflect this evidence and are able to estimate the intervals for threshold values of $\bar{\alpha}$ and $\alpha$ in the case of mild regulations. Plugging the above-mentioned values for model parameters and $\delta = 0.28$ into (19) and (20), we conclude that $\bar{\alpha}$ belongs to the interval $(0.64, 0.81)$ while the threshold value of $\alpha$ does not exceed 0.61. In other words, bigger cities host more firms setting lower prices in industries with a share of land input smaller than 0.19 while firms with a share of land input exceeding 0.36 charge higher prices in larger cities.

How does population growth affect industry size measured as firms’ total revenue? On one hand, an increase in population size leads to higher urban costs, $\tau L$, and, therefore, less spendings on products. On the other hand, it results in an increase in the total city income $L(L/\alpha + \tau L/2)$. The overall effect on the industry size $M = LNp_x$ is given by

$$\varepsilon_L(M) = 1 - \frac{\tau L}{\frac{2}{\alpha} - \tau L}.$$ 

Using our approximation for urban costs, we show that value of $\varepsilon_L(M)$ does not exceed 0.73 – the value computed for the upper-bound of urban costs $\tau L$ (0.35 of a total income). In other words, with urban costs working in the same direction as the production cost effect, industry size increases less than proportionally to city size. It might be viewed as an alternative interpretation of the different behavior of firms in industries with different production structures.

---

6We acknowledge that these empirical estimations were conducted for different demand systems, however, elasticity of substitution coincides with demand elasticity in a monopolistic competition framework independently of the demand system.
in response to city growth. To be precise, firms from land-intensive industries suffer from increased production costs which may have a negative impact on product prices and even on the mass of firms. Moreover, higher urban costs reinforce this effect. Hence, we have to be careful in discussing the causes of price levels and industry sizes in cities of different populations and commuting costs.

Finally, the results of Proposition 1 are driven by two opposite effects, i.e. the production cost effect and the competition effect. To illustrate the opposite nature of these effects, first, let us exclude the production cost effect by assuming the limiting case of the one-factor model $\alpha = 1$. In this case, both the mass of firms and prices increase with city size. Second, under the absence of the competition effect, i.e. $\varepsilon_x(r_u) = 0$, the elasticity (15) of the commodity price boils down to $\varepsilon_L(p) = 1 - \alpha > 0$. Hence, firms always set higher prices in larger cities. Here, only the production cost effect is at work because prices are not affected by market size.

4 Agglomeration economies

Generally, agglomeration economies are beneficial for both consumers and producers (Fujita and Thisse, 2013, ch. 4; Picard and Tabuchi, 2013). Consumers benefit from a broader variety within cities where industries on average are more agglomerated. Firms experience higher demand for their products when market interactions among firms become more intensive due to IO linkages and produce at lower costs because of knowledge spillovers. Hence, firms benefit due to heavy exploitation of the IRS technology. This could result in tougher competition in the presence of pro-competitive effects and, therefore, lower product prices. Thus, reciprocal causality leads to benefits for both producers and consumers. In this section we show positive consequences of agglomeration economies through decreasing product prices and increasing variety in a city and discuss the impact of intermediate sector size and the strength of knowledge spillovers on the market outcome.

4.1 IO linkages

We assume a technology à la Krugman and Venables (1995) when the whole range of varieties is used both in final consumption and production of the differentiated good. To be precise, we rely on the total cost function given by

$$C(q) = (F + cq)w^{\alpha \beta} R^{(1-\alpha)\beta} P^{1-\beta}$$

where $1 - \beta \in (0, 1)$ is the share of intermediates in production, while $P$ is the CES price index,

$$P = \left( \int_0^N p_k^{1-\sigma} dk \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},$$
\( \sigma > 1 \) is the elasticity of technological substitution across intermediate varieties. We assume a single market for the final and intermediate goods, therefore, both types of buyers, consumers and firms, pay the same equilibrium price for each variety. The demand \( D_i \) for variety \( i \) is given by

\[
D_i(p_i) = D_i^F + D_i^I, \tag{22}
\]

where \( D_i^F = L(u')^{-1}(\lambda p_i) \) is the demand for final consumption obtained from (3), and \( D_i^I \) is the demand for variety \( i \) as the intermediate good. The firms’ total spending on intermediates is given by \( (1 - \beta)C(q) \) due to the Cobb-Douglas technology (21), therefore, \( D_i^I \) takes the form

\[
D_i^I = (1 - \beta)(F + cq)N \cdot \frac{p_i^{\sigma}}{\bar{p}_{\beta-\sigma}} \cdot w^{\alpha \beta} R^{(1-\alpha)\beta}. \tag{23}
\]

At the symmetric equilibrium, the price elasticity \( \varepsilon_p(D) \) of demand for each variety is

\[
\varepsilon_p(D) = \frac{D_i^F r_{u(x)} + \sigma D_i^I}{D_i^F + D_i^I}. \tag{24}
\]

Furthermore, using the zero-profit condition \( pq = C(q) \) and the firm budget constraint \( (1 - \beta)C(q) = p \cdot D_i^I \), we obtain the result that in equilibrium the shares of total output used for final and intermediate consumption are constant and equal, respectively, \( \beta \) and \( 1 - \beta \). Using (24), the markup \( m = 1/\varepsilon_p(D) \) takes the form

\[
m = \frac{q}{\frac{\beta q}{r_{u(x)}} + \sigma(1 - \beta)q} = \frac{1}{\frac{\beta q}{r_{u(x)}} + \sigma(1 - \beta)}. \tag{25}
\]

Equation (25) shows that the equilibrium markup is still a function of per capita consumption \( x \) only. This representation holds despite the fact that the complexity of the supply side stems from substitutability of factors and IO linkages, and the complexity of the demand side is due to variable markups and the endogenous weights of consumption groups in the elasticity (24).

The factor-market clearing conditions yield

\[
L = N \cdot \frac{\partial C(q)}{\partial w} = \alpha \beta N(F + cq)w^{\alpha \beta - 1} R^{(1-\alpha)\beta} P^{1-\beta},
\]

\[
S = N \cdot \frac{\partial C(q)}{\partial \pi} = (1 - \alpha) \beta N(F + cq)w^{\alpha \beta} R^{(1-\alpha)\beta - 1} P^{1-\beta}.
\]

Therefore, the relative factor price is still given by

\[
\frac{R}{w} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{L}{S}. \tag{26}
\]

Plugging (26) and the equilibrium price index
$$P = N^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} p$$

into the expression for markup \( m = \left( p - cw^{\alpha \beta} R^{(1-\alpha)\beta} P^{1-\beta} \right)/p \), we get the equilibrium relative price

$$\frac{p}{w} = \left( \frac{c}{(1-m) \cdot N^{\frac{1-\beta}{\sigma-1}}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \cdot \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{L}{S} \right)^{1-\alpha}. \tag{27}$$

Plugging (27) into the zero profit condition \( pq = C(q) \) we obtain

$$\frac{qm}{1-m} = F/c.$$  

Using \( Lx = \beta q \), we get

$$\frac{xm}{1-m} = \beta \cdot \frac{F}{cL}. \tag{28}$$

Finally, (26) implies that the budget constraint (2) may be restated as

$$N px = \frac{1}{\alpha} - \tau L/2. \tag{29}$$

Before discussing the impact of agglomeration economies on the market outcome, we show that, with a sufficiently large intermediate good sector, some standard properties do not hold. Indeed, using the duality principle, (21) may be represented with a production function given by

$$q = \frac{1}{c} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{L^{\alpha \beta} S^{(1-\alpha)\beta} Y^{1-\beta}}{C} - F \right), \tag{30}$$

where \( Y = \left( \int_0^N y_k^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \, dk \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \) is the CES aggregator over varieties, \( y_k \) is the output for intermediate consumption, and \( C = (1-\alpha)\beta (1-\beta) \) is a constant. In a symmetric equilibrium \( Y = y N^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \) which leads to the following form of production function

$$q = \frac{1}{c} \cdot \left( \frac{S^{(1-\alpha)\beta} Y^{1-\beta}}{CN^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}} - F \right).$$

Hence, when the intermediate good sector is large, i.e. \( \beta < 1/\sigma \), each firm output \( q \) increases with entry. In other words, the business stealing effect, which is typically present when varieties and their markets are interdependent, is missing. In what follows, we focus on the case when the intermediate sector size is bounded, i.e. \( \beta > 1/\sigma \), and study how IO linkages shape the market outcome under city population growth.

To this end, in Appendix B we provide an analysis of the impact of city size on the market outcome. Under the presence of IO linkages, equilibrium markup (25) is still a function of per
capita consumption $x$ only. Therefore, preferences with $\varepsilon_x(r_u) > 0$ still generate pro-competitive behavior, i.e. additional entry leads to a drop in markups. However, we show in Appendix B that the thresholds $\alpha = \alpha(\beta)$ and $\bar{\alpha} = \bar{\alpha}(\beta)$ now depend on the size of the intermediate good sector, $1 - \beta$, and are the solutions to the following equations, respectively:

\begin{align}
\alpha - \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta(\sigma - 1)} \cdot \frac{\tau L}{2\alpha - \tau L} &= \frac{(\beta - m)m\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{(1 - m)r_u(x) + \beta m\varepsilon_x(r_u)} + \frac{\beta\sigma - 1}{\beta(\sigma - 1)} \cdot \frac{(1 - m)r_u(x)}{(1 - m)r_u(x) + \beta m\varepsilon_x(r_u)}, \quad (31) \\
\alpha - \frac{\tau L}{2\alpha - \tau L} &= \frac{(\beta - m)m\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{(1 - m)r_u(x) + \beta m\varepsilon_x(r_u)}. \quad (32)
\end{align}

What do agglomeration economies bring to our analysis? First, it is readily verified that the right hand sides of the (31) and (32) increase with $\beta$. Hence, a larger intermediate good sector (lower $\beta$) leads to a decrease in both the threshold values of $\alpha(\beta)$ and $\bar{\alpha}(\beta)$. In addition, one can show that both functions on the right hand sides of the (31) and (32) are concave and $\alpha(\beta) > \bar{\alpha}(\beta)$ when urban costs $\tau L$ are not extremely high. Moreover, whether the elasticity of substitution for final consumption is larger (smaller) than in production, i.e. $\sigma > 1/r_u(x)$ ($\sigma < 1/r_u(x)$), two slightly different patterns of the market outcome arise. To be precise, the pattern for $\sigma > 1/r_u(x)$ is presented on the left hand panel of Figure 1, otherwise the market patterns rely on the right hand panel.

We summarize our findings in the following Proposition.

**Proposition 3.** Stronger IO linkages (i) increase the number of industries featuring lower prices in larger cities, and (ii) lead to broader variety for the larger number of industries in bigger cities.
Proof. In the text.

To discuss the impact of IO linkages, consider two industries where the first industry has stronger IO linkages, i.e. $\beta_1 < \beta_2$. Therefore, other things equal, a larger city is likely to host more firms from the first industry while prices for the first industry’s good tend to be lower in a larger city. This result stems directly from the fact that the intervals for positive effects are higher for the first industry, i.e. $\pi_1(\beta) < \pi_2(\beta)$ and $\underline{\alpha}_1(\beta) < \underline{\alpha}_2(\beta)$.

In the same vein, city population growth is more likely to result in a drop in product prices and an increase in product variety for industries that exploit IO linkages more intensively. Hence, agglomeration economies are one more source of positive welfare in addition to the improvement of the production process via automatization. Proposition 2 shows that stronger IO linkages allow industries to compete more effectively in larger cities with high land prices within the CBD.

IO linkages build an additional connection between urban costs and firms’ pricing. Indeed, when IO linkages are negligible, urban costs do not affect the threshold value $\underline{\alpha}$ given by (16). However, (31) implies that this is not the case when $\beta < 1$. Commuting costs matter for both product prices and the mass of firms. Let us come back to our example with two cities of the same size but with different commuting costs. It is readily verified from (31)-(32) that both thresholds $\pi(\beta)$ and $\underline{\alpha}(\beta)$ are higher for the city with high commuting costs. Hence, for the industry with stronger IO linkages, prices are lower and the variety is broader in the city with low commuting costs.

In addition, population growth in each of these two cities may have different consequences for the industry. In particular, an increase in city size is more likely to result in higher product prices and lower variety in the city with higher commuting costs. The reason is that high commuting costs have a negative impact on the industry which is enforced by city size. In other words, consumers have to spend more on housing and transportation with city growth, hence, an increase in product variety is smaller in the city with higher commuting costs. Therefore, an urban policy oriented toward public transport subsidies and investments in the road system would lead to an improvement in social welfare via both broader variety and lower prices.

4.2 Knowledge spillovers

Now we investigate how knowledge spillovers shape the market outcome. To this end, we modify the production cost function (4) in the following way:

$$C(q) = N^{-\gamma}(F + cq)w^{\alpha}R^{1-\alpha},$$

where the new term $N^{-\gamma}$ stands for the knowledge spillovers while $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ measures their strength.
One can show that the relative factor price and zero-profit condition are still given by (8) and (11), respectively. However, the equilibrium product price takes the form

\[ p = \frac{cN^{-\gamma}}{1 - r_u(x)} \left( \frac{R}{w} \right)^{1-\alpha}. \]  

(34)

Plugging (33)-(34) into the budget constraint (2), we obtain

\[ N^{1-\gamma} \cdot \frac{c x}{1 - r_u(x)} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{L}{S} \right)^{1-\alpha} = \frac{1}{\alpha} - \frac{\tau L}{2}. \]  

(35)

Making use of (14), the elasticity of (35) with respect to \( L \) takes the form

\[ \varepsilon_L(N) = \frac{1}{1 - \gamma} \left[ \alpha - \frac{\tau L}{\alpha - \tau L} - \frac{\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x)} + \varepsilon_x(r_u) \cdot (1 - r_u(x)) \right]. \]  

(36)

Thus, the threshold value \( \alpha \) is still given by (18). Therefore, knowledge spillovers magnify the effect of city population size discussed in Section 3.1 while the threshold value \( \alpha \) is not affected.

To be precise, for industries with a high share of labor, \( \alpha > \alpha \), stronger knowledge spillovers make elasticity (36) larger while the opposite holds for land-intensive industries with \( \alpha < \alpha \).

Taking the elasticity of price (34), we get

\[ \varepsilon_L(p) = 1 - \alpha - \frac{r_u(x)\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - r_u(x)} + \varepsilon_x(r_u) - \gamma \varepsilon_L(N). \]  

(37)

Comparison between (15) and (37) shows, that the last term in (37) stands for the impact of knowledge spillovers on price behavior. For land-intensive industries, \( \alpha < \alpha \), \( \varepsilon_L(N) < 0 \), therefore, knowledge spillovers lead to a stronger increase in their product prices with population size growth. However, for industries with \( \alpha > \alpha \), \( \varepsilon_L(N) > 0 \) which (i) makes elasticity of product price (37) higher, and (ii) increases the threshold value \( \bar{\alpha} \) for different pattern of pricing. The intuition is as follows. An increase in city population size leads to an increase in the mass of firms for industries with \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \) at a greater pace than in the absence of knowledge spillovers. This makes the competition effect stronger which, in turn, leads to a greater drop in product prices for labor-intensive industries, \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \), and suppresses a price increase for industries with intermediate values of labor share input, \( \alpha < \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \) (see bullet (ii) of Proposition 1). Furthermore, for the upper-tale of these industries, the effect is strong enough to revert the pricing pattern. Thus, under the presence of knowledge spillovers, an increase in city population leads to lower prices for a larger number of industries with intermediate values of labor share input than in the case of the absence of knowledge spillovers. For land-intensive industries, \( \alpha < \alpha \), the effects work in opposite directions.

Last, an increase in the strength of knowledge spillovers, i.e. larger \( \gamma \), results in a larger number of industries featuring lower prices in larger cities. Furthermore, an increase in \( \gamma \) produces a
scale effect on variety. For industries with $\alpha > \alpha$, an increase in city population leads to a greater increase in variety while the effect is opposite for land-intensive industries. We summarize our findings in the following Proposition.

**Proposition 4.** Stronger knowledge spillovers (i) increase a number of industries featuring lower prices in larger cities; (ii) reinforce the effect of broader variety for labor-intensive industries and industries with intermediate labor input ($\alpha > \alpha$) in larger cities, while the effect is opposite for land-intensive industries ($\alpha < \alpha$).

**Proof.** In the text.

Thus, in this section we discussed the role of agglomeration economies and showed the mechanism of positive impact of IO linkages and knowledge spillovers on industries’ outcomes.

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper we shed additional light on the role of land prices and land regulation within large cities. We contribute to the literature by showing how strict land regulation could affect the market outcome of industries and, therefore, the well-being of citizens. Moreover, we provide a comprehensive analysis based on micro-founded grounds showing why and how industries with different cost structures may demonstrate different pricing patterns in cities of different sizes. In particular, we show that firms from land-intensive sectors set higher prices in large cities with high CBD land prices. In other words, high prices for the products of these industries could be a consequence of the variation in land price and urban costs in cities rather than any type of collusion among local producers.

We also show that a high concentration of some service industries in large cities could be the result of successfully adopting technology such as intensive use of computers, which replaces traditional technologies requiring higher inputs of land. We have witnessed a number of industries experience such shocks leading to drastic decreases in their share of land in the production process. We believe that the estimation of production costs and, in particular, the share of land input, in various industries among cities could highlight additional factors which shape pricing rules and variety in cities.

## References


Appendices

Appendix A

Taking the elasticities of (11) with respect to $L$, we obtain:

$$
\frac{(xr'_u(x) + r_u(x))(1 - r_u(x)) + xr'_u(x)r_u(x)}{(1 - r_u(x))^2} \cdot \frac{1 - r_u(x)}{xr_u(x)} \cdot x\varepsilon_L(x) = -1,
$$
or, after simplifications, we get (14):

$$
\varepsilon_L(x) = -\frac{1 - r_u(x)}{1 - r_u(x) + \varepsilon(x)r_u}.
$$

Plugging (8) into (9), we get

$$
\frac{p}{w} = \frac{c}{1 - r_u(x)} \cdot \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \cdot \frac{L}{S}\right)^{1-\alpha}.
$$

Then, the elasticity of price with respect to $L$ takes the form

$$
\varepsilon_L(p) = \frac{(1 - r_u(x))xr'_u(x)}{(1 - r_u(x))^2} \cdot \varepsilon_L(x) + 1 - \alpha.
$$
Plugging (14) into last equation, we get

\[ \varepsilon_L(p) = 1 - \alpha - \frac{xr'(x)}{1 - ru(x)} \cdot \frac{1 - ru(x)}{1 - ru(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)} = \]

\[ = 1 - \alpha - \frac{ru(x)\varepsilon_x(r_u)}{1 - ru(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)}. \]

Using (13), we obtain

\[ \varepsilon_L(N) + \varepsilon_L \left( \frac{cL}{1 - ru(x)} \right) + 1 - \alpha = -\frac{\tau L}{2} \]

or,

\[ \varepsilon_L(N) + \frac{1 - ru(x) + xr'(x)}{(1 - ru(x))^2} \cdot \frac{1 - ru(x)}{x} \cdot x\varepsilon_L(x) + 1 - \alpha = -\frac{\tau L}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha - \tau L}. \]

Making use of (14)

\[ \varepsilon_L(N) - \frac{1 - ru(x) + xr'(x)}{(1 - ru(x))^2} \cdot (1 - ru(x)) \cdot \frac{1 - ru(x)}{1 - ru(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)} + 1 - \alpha = -\frac{\tau L}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha - \tau L}, \]

we finally obtain (17):

\[ \varepsilon_L(N) = \alpha - \frac{\tau L}{2} - \frac{\varepsilon_x(r_u)(1 - ru(x))}{1 - ru(x) + \varepsilon_x(r_u)}. \]

**Appendix B**

Per capita consumption is pinned down by the zero-profit condition (28) which is very similar to zero-profit condition (11) under the absence of intermediates described in Section 3. Note that (11) may be obtained from (28) as a limiting case when \( \beta \to 1 \). Moreover, the relative change in per capita consumption \( x \) in response to exogenous shocks in city population size qualitatively the same to the case without intermediates. To be precise, using (28) and (25) we obtain that the elasticity \( \varepsilon_L(x) \) of per capita consumption with respect to \( L \) is negative and given by

\[ \varepsilon_L(x) = -1 + \frac{\beta m \varepsilon_x(r_u)}{(1 - m)r_u(x) + \beta m \varepsilon_x(r_u)} > -1. \]

Using (25) we obtain the markup behavior

\[ \varepsilon_L(m) = \beta m \cdot \frac{\varepsilon_x(r_u)\varepsilon_L(x)}{r_u(x)} \]

which is similar to the case when \( \beta = 1 \). Indeed, increasing elasticity of final good demand \( \varepsilon_x(r_u) > 0 \) leads to pro-competitive effects and markup decreases with market size \( L \).

Using (27) and (29), we derive the elasticities \( \varepsilon_L(N) \) and \( \varepsilon_L(p) \) of the mass of firms and prices
with respect to $L$:

$$\varepsilon_L(p) + \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta(\sigma - 1)}\varepsilon_L(N) = 1 - \alpha - \frac{1}{\beta}\varepsilon_L(1 - m),$$

$$\varepsilon_L(p) + \varepsilon_L(N) + \varepsilon_L(x) = -\frac{\tau L}{\alpha - \tau L}.$$

After simplifications we obtain

$$\varepsilon_L(p) = \frac{\beta(\sigma - 1)}{\beta\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{\beta(\sigma - 1)(\beta - m)m\varepsilon_x(r_u) + (\beta\sigma - 1)(1 - m)r_u(x)}{\beta(\sigma - 1)((1 - m)r_u(x) + \beta m\varepsilon_x(r_u))} - \alpha + \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta(\sigma - 1)} \cdot \frac{\tau L}{\alpha - \tau L} \right).$$

(38)

and

$$\varepsilon_L(N) = \frac{\beta(\sigma - 1)}{\beta\sigma - 1} \left( \alpha - \frac{\beta - m}{(1 - m)r_u(x) + \beta m\varepsilon_x(r_u)}m\varepsilon_x(r_u) - \frac{\tau L}{\alpha - \tau L} \right)$$

(39)

Note the elasticities (38)-(39) have opposite signs for the cases when $\beta > 1/\sigma$ or $\beta < 1/\sigma$. However, as pointed out in the Section 4.1, we focus on the former case, i.e. $\beta > 1/\sigma$. Hence, the thresholds values of $\alpha(\beta)$ and $\beta(\beta)$ are the solutions to (31) and (32), respectively.
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