Ilya Naumov

THE FIRST-PERSON SINGULAR IMPERATIVE IN CHUKCHI

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In this paper, I consider the semantics and distribution of the first-person singular form in the Chukchi language. The main aim of the present study is to describe different contexts in which this form can be used and provide a formal analysis to its syntactic and semantic properties. I show that the distribution of this form is non-trivial and challenging for the current theories of the Imperative. In addition to standard uses in root (non-embedded) contexts, this form can appear dependent clauses with a desiderative predicate and in rationale clauses. Although the availability of embedded Imperative forms have been reported for a number of languages (for an overview see [Kaufmann 2014]), I am not aware of any studies that would state the possibility of using such forms in rationale clauses. Taking as a starting point the theory developed in [Stegovec 2018], I propose and examine a hypothesis that the productivity of the form in root contexts is due to the fact the imperative modal operator can have event antecedents.

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1 National Research University Higher School of Economics. School of Linguistics. MA Student; EMail: 6nlv@mail.ru
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1 Introduction

The present paper explores the syntax and semantics of the first-person singular Imperative form in the Chukchi language. Syntax and semantics of the imperative have been the subject of intense discussion in a number of typological [Xrakovskij & Volodin 1986; Birjulin & Xrakovskij 1992; Gusev 2013] and formal studies [Portner 2004, 2007; Kaufmann 2006/2012; Grosz 2009/2012; Oikonomou 2016]. Despite the significant theoretical and empirical progress that has been made in this area of linguistic research, little attention has been paid to first-person singular imperative forms, because of the fact that they are very rare in the languages of the world. In languages that have such forms, their distribution turns out to be rather constrained [Kuzmenkov 2001 for Mongolian; Malchukov 2001 for Even; Aikhenvald 2010: 73-74 for Manumbu; Oikonomou 2016: 167-168 for Greek; Stegovec 2018 for Slovenian; a.o.]. Things are different in Chukchi. The traditionally called “first-person singular Imperative” form is very productive and is freely used in root non-interrogative contexts, as V. P. Nedjalkov [Nedjalkov 1994] claims, it “is the principal means of expressing the speaker's future actions”. This state of affairs is unexpected from the typological point of view. The imperative consistently demonstrates a ban on coreference between the speaker and the subject of the imperative clause. While the availability of the first-person singular form in non-interrogative contexts in Chukchi seems to violate this constraint, I will try to show that in fact it does not. The initial empirical motivation for the proposed analysis comes from the properties of the Imperative when it is used in dependent contexts.

Imperative forms in Chukchi can embed in a number of environments. Among others, these are clauses embedded under desire predicates, and rationale clauses. Crucially, when the Imperative is used in clauses embedded under desire predicates, the subject of the Imperative cannot be coreferent with the matrix subject. This phenomenon is well-known from the literature on Romanian subjunctives and is usually called subject obviation — a ban on coreference between the matrix and the embedded subject of the subjunctive clause (see, e.g, [Picallo 1985; Quer 2006]). Following [Stegovec 2018], I will assume that the above-mentioned ban on coreference between the speaker and the subject of the imperative in matrix environments, as well as the ban on coreference between the matrix subject and the subject of the imperative in embedded environments are manifestations of the same constraint. This ban results from Condition B requirement. Imperatives and Subjunctives involve a special kind of modal operator that takes a type e element (a “perspectival” PRO) that refers to the attitude holder. Therefore, the subject of the Imperative cannot refer to the same entity as the individual argument of the Imperative (because they are in the same binding domain). This is the reason for why the subject of the imperative cannot be

3 In [Stegovec 2018] this entity is called the director. I chose the cover term attitude holder in order not to cause confusion in cases of desiderative predicates.
coreferent with the attitude holder. In [Stegovec 2018] this constraint is called “generalized subject obviation”. In contrast, when the Imperative is used in a rationale clause, there is no subject obviation — the subject of the imperative can be coreferent with the matrix subject. Based on [Heim 1992; von Fintel 1999; Nissenbaum 2005; Grosz 2014]. I will assume that these two types of contexts are fundamentally different in terms of the modality encoded. Adopting a modal approach to imperative semantics in the spirit of [Kaufamnn 2012], I will further assume that the imperative modal operator is responsible for establishing the modality of these sentences. The main claim of the paper that I will try to argue for is that the difference in modality finds its reflection in the properties of the imperative. Namely, I will propose that in Chukchi the modal operator of the imperative can take an event-type argument. The semantic type of the argument is determined by the kind of conversational backgrounds the modal operator takes. The kind of conversational backgrounds, in turn, is determined by the context in which the imperative occurs. When the imperative is used in a rationale clause, its modal operator takes a circumstantial modal base, a teleological ordering source, and an event-type argument. This is the reason why there is no subject obviation in this type of environments — PRO of the imperative modal and the matrix subject cannot be coreferent and thus cannot provoke Condition B violation. Finally, I will transmit the same explanation to matrix contexts. More specifically, I will claim that when the form of the first-person singular Imperative is used in root non-interrogative clauses, its modal operator also encodes teleological modality and takes an event-type argument. Contra standard views on the function of utterances with the first-person singular Imperative (see, e.g., [Xrakovskij & Volodin 1986: 139; Birjulin & Xrakovskij 1992: 28; Gusev 2013: 51-53]), I will argue that they do not constitute directive speech acts.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I introduce some background on the grammar of Chukchi and present the traditionally distinguished imperative paradigm. Section 3 is devoted to demonstrate the meaning of forms of different person-number combinations of the Imperative in matrix contexts. In Section 4, building on the fact that all these forms are used in a “cloud of context” where they are functionally homogeneous, I argue, in line with previous studies of Chukchi, that they constitute one morphological paradigm. In Section 5, I describe the semantics of the first-person singular in Chukchi and discuss previous approaches to the first-person Imperative in general. In Section 6, I introduce main theoretical concepts of the theory developed in [Stegovec 2018]. In Section 7, I show that this theory can be modified in way so that it accounts for the semantics of the first-person singular imperative. In Section 8, I summarize and discuss some theoretical implications of the proposed analysis.
2 The Imperative paradigm in Chukchi

Chukchi is a Paleosiberian language spoken in the North-East of Russia. According to the census of 2010, 5,095 people identified themselves as Chukchi speakers. The grammar of Chukchi is described in [Skorik 1961; Skorik 1977; Dunn 1999]. Chukchi is a highly agglutinative language with productive verbal and noun incorporation. It has a vowel harmony system largely based on height. One group of vowels contains i and u, another one — a and o. The schwa (ə) is neutral, and e vowel can appear in both high and low series. Chukchi has ergative case marking and complex verbal alignment, which combines an ergative-absolutive and a nominative-accusative strategy. The system of finite verbal forms has been recently described as consisting of “personal” and “adjectival” forms (see [Volkov et al. 2012]). These two groups of forms differ in agreement morphology they possess and an agreement strategy they demonstrate. Personal forms include the Aorist, the Presence-Progressive, the Future tense, the Imperative and the Conditional. Adjectival forms include the Perfect and the Stative. Personal forms are marked for aspect (perfective vs. imperfective). In the transitive conjugation, personal forms agree both with the subject and the object of the clause; adjective forms, in contrast, agree only with the absolutive participant. Personal forms distinguish perfective and imperfective aspect. The perfective-imperfective opposition is marked through suffixation: the perfective is marked either by phonological null or by the suffix -ɣʔe⁴; the imperfective is marked by the suffix -rkən.

The Imperative⁵ paradigm in Chukchi is traditionally taken to be fully homogeneous (see, however, [Daniel et al. ms.] for an alternative view) and include all person-number combinations. Prefixes are considered as cumulative morphemes combining mood with person (see [Skorik 1977; Nedjalkov 1994; Dunn 1999]).

Table 1. Chukchi Imperative paradigm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>PL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>m(ə)-...(k)</td>
<td>mən-...-(mək)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>q(ə)-...(ɣ)-(i)</td>
<td>q(ə)-...(ək)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>n(ə)-...(n)</td>
<td>n(ə)-...(net)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This state of affairs is unexpected from the typological point of view, and some researchers have claimed that this homogeneity is the very indication that these forms do not constitute an

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⁴ Here and after I present morphological markers in the version with high harmony.
⁵ Admittedly, Dunn (1999) calls this ‘Intentional’ rather than Imperative, assuming that intention is the only common component of the meaning of all person-number combinations. In the next Section it will be shown that this assumption is not justified.
Imperative paradigm [Kibrik 2001; Kibrik et al. 2004] on the sister Alutor language). Although, there have been proposed various definitions of what to count as a morphological “homogeneous” paradigm (see, e.g., [Birjulin & Xrakovskij 1992; van der Auwera et al. 2013; Gusev 2013]). I am not in a position to discuss relative merits and flaws of these approaches. I shall only say that the conclusions that we draw will vary depending on which definition we stick to.

Under functional considerations, these forms seem to be *prima facie* heterogeneous. If we do not take them to form a single imperative paradigm, we should state that they exemplify, at least, three distinct categories associated with three distinct functions: the Hortative (roughly functions to invite an addressee(s) to take part in a common action), the Imperative (roughly functions to command an addressee(s)), and the Jussive (roughly functions to direct a non-locutor(s)). This distinction would be based only on the difference in person, and this is not a desirable solution for identifying a grammatical category.

I will stick to the traditional view and take these forms to represent a single imperative paradigm. I will refer to the m(ə)- form as the *first-person singular Imperative*. My claim is based on the distribution of these forms. I will try to demonstrate that there is a “cloud” of contexts in which all these forms naturally appear and in which they are functionally homogeneous. Moreover, I will claim that clauses in which these forms occur share the same syntactic structure, while the observed difference in meaning and function is reduced to the difference in person and number of subjects of these clauses.

Although the subject of the present study is the first-person singular Imperative form, marked by the prefix m(ə)-, I will first say a few words about the meaning of forms of other person-number combinations.

### 3 A well-behaved Imperative

The goal of this section is to show that the meaning and function of forms of different person number-combinations of the Imperative is perfectly predictable with respect to what is known about these forms in other languages.

**The meaning of the second-person form**

The second-person Imperative form is used for requesting or ordering the addressee.

A typical request is presented in (1)^6. This is a line from a well-known Chukchi lullaby, in which the mother asks her son to help her with housework.

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^6 All the data presented in this paper was collected during two field trips to the village of Amguema (Iul’tin district, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug), jointly organized by the Moscow State University and School of Linguistics, Higher School of Economics (Moscow) in 2016–2017. I will be giving both corpus and elicited data as examples.
(1) \textit{tel'opkaqaj anə q-ajmə-γ-e}  
T.-DIM well 2.S/A.IMP-go.for.water-IRR-2/3SG.S  

\textit{tel'opkaqaj tel'opkaqaj anə qə-yəwəjek-w-i}  
T.-DIM T.-DIM well 2.S/A.IMP-wake.up-IRR-2/3SG.S

‘Telyopka, Telyopka, well, go for water, go for water! Telyopka, Telyopka, well, wake up!’.

There are also more categorical uses with a command-like or an order-like interpretation such as (2).

(2) \textit{ʔepte qə-qora-yərke ...}  
too 2.S/A.IMP-reindeer-gather  
... \textit{qə-qora-yərke-rkən əngən q-ine-winretə-rkən}  

‘You put the deer, too, help!’.

In contrast, one can utter an imperative clause without truly endorsing the prejacent (3). I refer to this kind of uses as “acquiescence”, following von Fintel & Iatridou 2015. They are taken to have weaker modal force than “canonical” directives.

(4) \textit{ewət ʔ-ra-ra-yə-η-κə qə-le-rkən}  
\textit{yəm qəʁəm reqən m-ik-wəe}  
1ABS NEG.FUT something 1SG.S/A.IMP-say-TH

‘If you want to go home, go! I will not say anything’.

In this example the speaker explicitly marks that she is not interested in the realization of the proposition. Acquiescence uses usually presuppose that it is the addressee who wants the proposition to be realized.

The meaning of the third-person form

The function of the third person form is to direct non-locutors. It is typically used when a potential performer of the action is absent. Often, the addressee is obliged to transfer the will of the speaker to the absent individual. The sentence in (5) illustrates this pragmatic component.

(5) \textit{ənkəm wedyaw-ŋaw wiin ənkə}  
and speak-FEM for.the.moment there  
\textit{opopə qeeqən n-re-simyʔa-n-ŋə-γ-e-n}  
better a.little.more 3.S/A.IMP-DES-think.over-DES-GET-TH-IRR.2/3SG.S

‘Let the chatterbox think a little bit more about it!’.
This form can also be used with weaker force. These are contexts when the speaker expresses her lack of interest in the actions of a third person, and the addressee does not have the obligation to transfer the speaker’s will to this person. In this case, the third-person imperative form is followed by the particle masənan ‘let’.

\(6\) masənan ŋutku nə-wakʔo-twa-rkən ewət ə-teqʔeŋə-rkən

\(\alpha\)ŋe ʔ-əŋew-ka ʔu-ək ɾən ə-tek
PROH NEG-call-NEG we-LOC with go-INF

‘Let him sit here, if he wants to. Do not call him to walk with us!’.

Such uses presuppose that the individual has already indicated his intention to perform an action, and the speaker is aware of his plans.

**The meaning of the first-person plural form**

The first-person plural form is used to express invitation to the addressee(s) to perform an action together with the speaker. Typical examples are \(7\) and \(8\).

\(7\) ənjiwŋewe ʔən-ʔuŋ-ŋata-mək
aunt.NOM 1PL.S/A.IMP-mushroom-search.for-1PL.S

‘Aunt, let’s go for mushrooms!’.

\(8\) etʔopeɬ ʔoon-re ʔajɣəpə ʔən-ləʔen-mək
better there-ADV.ALL.upwind 1PL.S/A.IMP-walk-1PL.S

‘Better there! Let’s go upwind!’.

What is of interest for the present discussion is that this form allows exclusive interpretation. That is, one can utter a clause containing this form not to invite the addressee but to inform him about the future action that will be performed jointly with some other individual(s).

\(9\) ʔən-ejwət
1PL.S/A.IMP-bring.presents

‘We’ll bring presents!’

The availability of such uses of this personal-number combination of the Imperative needs to be explained. The analysis developed in Section 5 will account for and predict the possibility of \(9\).

**4 A “cloud” of contexts and functional homogeneity**

In addition to the customary “declarative” uses, all forms of the Imperative can be naturally used interrogative utterances. Here, I call such utterances deliberative questions. More often, the first-person singular form appears in these environments. Depending on the modal force, there emerge two kinds of deliberative questions. With weak modal force, a deliberative question is used
to ask for permission. With strong modal force, a deliberative question is used to query the obligation.

For example, in (10) the speaker interests in whether or not, according to the addressee’s opinion, the former is required to chop the wood. This question has strong modal force and can be restated roughly as: ‘Do you want me to chop the wood?’.

(10)  
\[ m-\text{uswitk}u-y?e-k \]

1SG.IMP-chop-TH-1SG.S

‘Must I chop the wood?’.

In contrast, in (11) the speaker asks for addressee’s permission to perform the action, marking that the latter is in some privileged social position. This question has weak modal force and can be roughly paraphrased as: ‘Do you mind if I play the ball?’. Note that the \( iwke \)-particle does not change the quantificational force of the modal itself. I refer an interesting reader to Naumov & Kozlov (2017) for the analysis of its semantic contribution.

(11)  
\[ iwke \ m\-\text{qep}l-\text{uwiswet}\-k \]

PTCL 1SG.S/A.IMP-ball-play-1SG.S

‘May I play the ball?’.

However, an interrogative clause with the first-person singular Imperative can be uttered without asking the opinion of a concrete person (12).

(12)  
\[ \text{emqel}t\wone \ n-iw-\text{i}\text{yam} \ et=\text{?}\text{am} \ m\-\text{qeplu}-y?e-n \]

inwardly ST-think-NP.1SG probably=EMPH 1SG.S/A.IMP-kick-TH-3SG.O

‘I think to myself: “Shall I kick him?”.

In this case, the speaker wonders about the expediency of taking the denoted action with respect to surrounding circumstances.

As I mentioned earlier, other forms of the Imperative also function in deliberative questions. For example, the third-person form is used with the meaning very reminiscent of the one observed in interrogative clauses containing the first-person form, with the exception that the denoted action is to be performed by a third person, not the speaker. An utterance with a strong interpretation is presented in (13a.), with weak — in (13b.).

(13)  
(a)  
\[ n-\text{ekwet}\-y?e-n? \]

3.S/A.IMP-leave-1SG.S

‘Should he go away?’.

(b)  
\[ iwke \ n\-\text{sajo}\-y?a-n \]


‘May he drink the tea?’.

The example with the first-person plural form is presented in (14). The speaker asks the addressee’s opinion about whether or not they (the speaker and the addressee) should perform the denoted action.
et=ʔəm məŋəɣənat məŋ-riwɬə-ne-t
probably=EMPH 1PL.S/A.IMP-go.for-3SG.O-PL 1PL.S/A.IMP-pull.over-3SG.O-PL
‘Shall we go and get them?’.

The second-person form has less clear semantics in deliberative questions. Without trying to provide an exhaustive description, I only say that it can be used when the speaker interests about the addressee's obligations.

qə-regə-y-i?
2.S/A.IMP-what.to.do-IRR-2/3SG.S
‘What should you do?’

Again, the analysis developed in Section 5 captures the possibility of (15).

4.1 Embedded environments

Imperative forms of all persons can embed in a large number of environments. The first type of environments is indirect speech reports. There, forms of the Imperative are used either to report directive speech acts (16), (17), and (18), or to report utterances containing the form of the first-person singular (19).

ənan yəm ən-ik-wʔ-i inqun
he.INS I 2/3.S/A-INV-say-TH-2/3SG.S COMP
mən-siit-ewə-n mimɬ
1SG.S/A.IMP-TR-heat-VB-3SG.O water.NOM
‘He told me that I should heat the water’.

ənan yəm ən-ik-wʔ-i inqun
he.INS I 2/3.S/A-INV-say-TH-2/3SG.S COMP
qə-n-siit-ewə-ɣə-n mimɬ
2SG.S/A.IMP-TR-heat-VB-IRR-3SG.O water.NOM
‘He told me that you should heat the water’.

ətlon t-iwə-n inqun
he.NOM 1SG.S/A-say-TH-2/3SG.S COMP
nə-n-siit-ew-ni-n mimɬ
3SG.S/A.IMP-TR-heat-3SG.A.3.O-3SG.O water.NOM
‘I told him that he should heat the water’.

ənan ən-ik-wʔ-i inqun nə-n-siit-ewə-ŋi-n mimɬ
‘He said that he would heat the water’.
The second type of environments is *clauses embedded under a desiderative predicate* teŋjeŋək ‘desire’ (20), (21), (22).

(20) ətɬon ∅-teŋjeŋə-rkən ɨŋqun
he.NOM 2/3.S/A-want-IPFV COMP
mə-tejkə-n orwoor
1SG.S/A.IMP-fix-th-3SG.O sledge.NOM
‘He wants that I should fix the sledge’.

(21) ətɬon ∅-teŋjeŋə-rkən ɨŋqun
he.NOM 2/3.S/A-want-IPFV COMP
qə-tejkə-ɣə-n orwoor
2.S/A.IMP-fix-IRR-3SG.O sledge.NOM
‘He wants that you should fix the sledge’.

(22) to-teŋjeŋə-rkən ɨŋqun
1SG.S/A-want-IPFV COMP
nə-tejkə-ni-n orwoor
‘I want that he should fix the sledge’.

The third type of environments is *rationale clauses* (23), (24), (25).

(24) nota-ytə to-ɬqətə-k ɨŋqun m-ətlʔa-re-rkən
land-DAT 1SG.S/A-leave-2/3SG.S COMP 1SG.S/A.IMP-mother-seek-IPFV
‘I went to the tundra in order to seek for the mother’.

(25) nota-ytə ɬ-qət-ɣʔ-i ɨŋqun q-ətlʔa-re-rkən
‘You went to the tundra in order to seek for the mother’.

(26) nota-ytə ɬ-qət-ɣʔ-i ɨŋqun n-ətlʔa-re-rkən
‘He went to the tundra in order to seek for the mother’.

Despite the superficial contrast, all clauses containing the imperative forms share the common semantic feature: they describe situations that has not be settled at the moment of utterances. The crucial difference between these constructions lies in the possibility of the matrix subject to be coreferent with the embedded subject. In speech reports and purposive constructions, the matrix subject can be coreferent with the embedded subject, while in desire attitudes the coreference is prohibited. In later sections, I will take this fact as a starting point in developing an analysis of the first-person singular form of the Imperative in Chukchi.
4.2 The Imperative under negation

All forms of the Imperative serve to build negative declarative sentences. This fact is also gets out of the general idea of the contexts in which the imperative can occur and presents a serious problem for accounts that build performativity directly into the meaning of the imperative operator [Han 2000], as well as for accounts that associate the imperative operator with special performative presuppositions [Kaufmann 2012]. I do not provide a semantic analysis of these constructions here, as it deserves a separate thorough study (see [Pupynina 2012] for an overview of means of expressing negation in Chukchi). I am only intend to show that imperative forms, appearing under negation, become functionally homogeneous and do not differ more than ordinary indicative forms with different person features differ from each other.

In Chukchi, declarative negation is built through the construction consisting of an imperative form and a negative particle. There are three negative particles: *wan*, *etɬə* and *qəɾəm*. Depending on the particle with which the imperative form appears, the negated clause has reference either to non-future, or to future. *wan* + Imp has non-feature reference, *etɬə* and *qəɾəm* + Imp has future reference. Consider the relevant examples below.

(27) ɣəm qəɾəm reqən m-ik-wʔe
     I.ABS NEG.FUT something 1.S/A.IMP-say-TH
     ‘I will not say anything’.

(28) iʔam tаŋ-wane yəmə-kə qə-lqət-y-e
     ‘Why don’t you come to me?’

(29) tilme ʔeɬʔeɬ wane nə-n-wetyaw-an-nən
     ‘The eagle does not speak with shit’.

The possibility of the Chukchi Imperative to appear under negation and in embedded clauses has significant implications for our understanding of performativity of utterances containing imperative forms in general. Namely, the data presented above demonstrates that the performative character of the Imperative is absent when the modal is not anchored to the coordinates of interlocutors. In negative environments, this is because of the fact that the modal takes narrow scope with respect to the operator of negation, thus, it must be located relatively low in the tree. In embedded environments, this is because of the fact that it is anchored to the coordinates of the matrix arguments. That is, Chukchi provides evidence against the view that imperative clauses contain an operator with hardwired directive meaning [Han 2000], as well as against the view that this modal operator has hardwired performative presuppositions [Kaufmann 2012]. I leave the
problem of how exactly the relativity of the imperative modal influences performativity of utterances containing the imperative for future research.

5 The first-person singular Imperative

In this Section, I will discuss the meaning and distribution of the first-person singular Imperative. I will argue that existing approaches to forms of this person-number combination cannot account for the Chukchi data.

5.1 Root contexts

Apart from appearing in deliberative questions and embedded environments, the first-person singular form is very productive in root non-interrogative contexts. V. P. Nedjalkov [Nedjalkov 1994] claims that “it is the principal means of expressing the future action of the speaker”. In this function it competes with the Future form. Indeed, when there are no special temporal adverbs, like iyər(qej) ‘now’ and eryatak ‘tomorrow’, the utterance of the clause containing the first person-singular form of the Imperative, unlike the utterance of the clauses with the form of the Future, yields the inference that the denoted action will be performed immediately.

(30) a. tə-r-ajmə-yʔa
   1SG.S/A-FUT-go.for.water-TH
   ‘I will go for water’.

b. m-ajmə-yʔa-k
   1SG.S/A.IMP-go.for.water-TH-1SG.S
   ‘I will go for water (immediately)!’.

There are, however, clear differences between the first-person singular Future form and the m(ə)-form with respect to possible environments in which they can be used. Namely, the first-person Imperative is prohibited from appearing in factive clauses — under the matrix epistemic predicate layi ‘know’ (31), as well as in reason clauses (32).

(31) ənən layi, ɪŋqun eryatak *mə-lgat-yʔe-ŋ /
   he.INS know COMP tomorrow 1SG.S/A.IMP-go-TH-1SG.S
   OK t-re-lgat-yʔe nəmən-eto
   1SG.S/A-FUT-go-TH village-DAT
   ‘He knows that I will go to the village tomorrow’.

(32) eryatak qəɾəm mə-miysiretə-ŋ, qeluk
   tomorrow NEG.FUT 1SG.S/A.IMP-work-1SG.S because
   *m-ekwet-yʔe-ŋ /  OK t-r-ekwet-yʔe  ełɨə-qanjaw-eto
‘I will not be able to work tomorrow, because I will leave for the White Canyon’.

This restriction follows from the fact that imperative clauses require that the proposition is not settled. In this sense, the imperative operator can be analyzed as anti-veridical: \( \phi \) is anti-veridical if \( \phi(p) \) entails that \( p \) is false according to some relevant information state \( M \) (see [Giannakidou 2009; 2012; and elsewhere]).

The second difference between the first-person singular Imperative and the Future lies in the possibility of being used in “scheduled” contexts. Most of my informants mark this form as less natural when there is explicit indication that the denoted action will happen due to some established rules or as a consequence of some preparation procedure preceding the moment of speech. For example, in (33) the most stereotypical situation to happen based on the fact that the speaker has already bought the tickets is exactly that he goes on a trip.

(34)  
\[
\text{ely\textsuperscript{a}g\textsubscript{a}n\textsuperscript{a}wet\textemdash} \text{awtobus-}\text{a} \quad \tilde{\text{m}}-\text{ekwet-}\text{y}\text{e} \text{ /} \\
\text{white-canyon-DAT} \quad \text{bus-INS} \quad \text{1SG.S/A}\text{.IMP-leave-TH} \\
\text{Ok} \quad \text{t-r-ekwet-}\text{y}\text{e} \text{ /} \text{bilet\textemdash} \text{enmes} \quad \text{to-piri-net} \\
\text{1SG.S/A-FUT-leave-TH} \quad \text{tickets} \quad \text{already} \quad \text{1SG.S/A-buy-3SG.O-PL} \\
\]

‘I am going to the White Canyon by bus. I have already bought the tickets’.

In contrast, the first-person singular form of the Imperative is used as an answer to a directive speech act with the second-person form of the Imperative, while the corresponding form of the Future is worse in such context.

(35)  
A:  
\[
\text{q\textsuperscript{o}-qametwa-}\text{y}\text{e} \\
\text{2SG.S/A}\text{.IMP-eat-IRR-2/3SG} \\
\]

‘Eat!’.

B:  
\[
\text{ii} \quad \text{Ok} \quad \text{m\textsuperscript{o}-qametwa-}\text{y}\text{a-k} \text{ /} \quad \tilde{\text{i}}-\text{ra-qametwa-}\text{y}\text{a} \\
\text{yes} \quad \text{1SG.S/A}\text{.IMP-eat-TH-1SG.S} \quad \text{1SG.S/A-FUT-eat-TH} \\
\]

‘Yes, I will eat!’.

First-person singular imperative/subjunctive forms are found very rarely across languages. In languages that have such forms they often happen to be relatively weak being used predominantly questions [Kuzmenkov 2001 for Mongolian; Malchukov 2001 for Even; Aikhenvald 2010: 73-74 for Manumbu; Oikonomou 2016: 167-168 for Greek; Stegovec 2017 for Slovenian; a.o.]. It turns out that the data from Chukchi contradicts this pattern. But why is this form available in root non-interrogatives? I will claim that there the answer to this question lies in the properties of the Imperative when it is used in rationale clauses. Namely, bulding on the insights of [Nissenbaum
I will argue that in this environment the modal operator of the imperative takes an event-type argument that refers to the matrix event.

Before developing my own analysis, I will turn my attention to one existing proposal on the semantics of first-person singular imperative forms presented in [Gusev 2013].

5.2 Previous approaches to the semantics of the first-person singular Imperative

The rarity of the first-person imperative forms is reflected in the fact that, to the best of my knowledge, there have not been any separate studies on the syntax or semantics of these forms — neither in the cognitive, nor in the generative tradition. Nevertheless, a few words have been said. In what follows, I will present the recent V. Ju. Gusev’s [Gusev 2013] discussion of the meaning of the first-person singular imperative.

In one of the sections of his typological survey of imperative constructions [Gusev 2013] V. Ju. Gusev discusses the semantics of different person number combinations of the imperative. Criticizing the earlier proposal made in [Xrakovskij & Volodin 1986: 139; Birjulin & Xrakovskij 1992: 28], who argue that the first-person singular Imperative has the meaning of “self-causation”, V. Ju. Gusev [Gusev 2013: 51-53] claims that forms of this person-number combination express “indirect causation”.

“If there is a causal relationship between two actions $P_1$ and $P_2$, such that $P_1$ causes $P_2$ (such a connection can be established by the speaker himself), then the speaker can order the listener to perform $P_1$, thereby indirectly causing himself to perform $P_2$. $P_1$ may or may not be named.”

[Gusev 2013: 52]

The basis for both approaches presented above is the common assumption that imperative clauses are canonically associated with directive speech acts. Some uses of the first-person singular Imperative in Chukchi seems to be speaking in favor of Gusev’s view (36). Clearly, a child cannot suckle a mother’s chest until she gives him it. That is, this utterance implies that the child is expecting the mother to perform a certain action so that he can perform the action denoted by the imperative on his part.

(36) $\text{memej and m-ɒmmem-ɣʔa-k}$

mother.NOM let 1SG.S/A.IMP-suckle-TH-1SG.S

‘Mommy, let me suckle!’

Although in cases when two actions are seems to be causally related and $P_1$ is overtly expressed, the Future form can be used instead of the Imperative with no visible difference in meaning (37). That is, we cannot state that in this construction the first-person singular Imperative is used because the construction itself requires it.
In this type of constructions, the first clause containing the form of the second-person singular Imperative functions as a restrictor: the speaker will do $P_2$ only in those worlds where the addressee does $P_1$. In this respect, they are reminiscent of the so-called “conditional imperatives”, and, I suppose, can be analyzed using the same machinery. I leave it for future research.

There are two problems with Gusev’s analysis that force me to abandon it. The first one is theoretical. While imperative clauses indeed tend to be tied to directive uses, this is not always the case. Imperatives are functionally inhomogeneous and have a variety of forces: advices, curses, wishes etc. That is, they are not necessarily associated with the semantics of causation. The second problem is empirical and emerges when we carefully look at contexts where the $m(ə)$-form can appear. Namely, it can be used when there is no addressee present (either actual or imaginable).

The conclusion that I made from the above discussion is that we need an analysis that will not appeal to the notion of causation and that will not tie the meaning of the first-person singular Imperative to interaction with an addressee.

6 A. Stegovec’s [Stegovec 2018] proposal

A. Stegovec [Stegovec 2018] aims to explain the subject obviation effect that arises both with root and embedded directive clauses in Slovenian. In Slovenian directive clauses include the Imperative and Subjunctive, which are mainly used for directive speech acts. Both imperative and subjunctive forms can appear embedded in a number of environments and be used in questions. He starts from the observation that, cross-linguistically, both imperative and subjunctive non-interrogative clauses show ban on the coreference between the subject of IMP/SUBJ and the director — the matrix subject in embedded contexts or the actual speaker in root contexts. He calls this phenomenon the “generalized subject obviation” (SOb) effect.
Following M. Kaufmann [Kaufmann 2012], he assumes that imperatives involve a covert performative modal operator. The main claim of his work is that the effect of disjoint reference between the subject of the matrix and the embedded clause well-noticed for embedded subjunctives, and the obligatory absence of coreference between the director and the subject of the imperative (or root subjunctive) clause are two manifestations of the very same restriction. This restriction is a type of Condition B effect. Imperatives and Subjunctives involve a special kind of modal operator that, due to its complex semantics, requires a type $e$ element (the “perspectival” $\textit{PRO}$) that is bound by the matrix subject or the speaker in non-interrogatives, and the addressee in interrogatives. This operator combines with “centered” conversational backgrounds $f_x$ and $g_x$.

\begin{equation}
\|\text{OP}\|^e = \lambda f. \lambda g. \lambda p. \lambda x. \lambda w. (\forall w' \in O(f_x, g_x, w))[p(w')]
\end{equation}

\begin{enumerate}
    \item $f_x$ is the body of information available to $x$ in $w$.
    \item $g_x$ are criteria to decide between worlds compliant with $f_x$ endorsed by $x$.
\end{enumerate}

The reference of $\textit{PRO}$ in root environments is determined by special attitudinal operators dominating the clause in the spirit of Pearson (2012). Namely, non-interrogative clauses are dominated by the operator referred to as COMMIT. Its function is to establish identity between $\textit{PRO}$ of the modal and the matrix subject/speaker and to restrict the set of worlds the modal quantifies over to those compatible with the matrix subject/speaker’s beliefs. As $\textit{PRO}$ of the modal in this context is coreferent with the matrix subject/speaker, it induces a Condition B violation if the subject of the imperative/subjunctive is 1p exclusive. Interrogative clauses, in contrast, are dominated by the ASK operator. Its function is to establish identity between $\textit{PRO}$ of the modal and the addressee and to restrict the set of worlds the modal quantifies over to those compatible with the speaker’s beliefs that $p$ is true at each of the addressee’s doxastic alternatives. As $\textit{PRO}$ of the modal in this context is coreferent with the addressee it induces a Condition B violation if the subject of the imperative/subjunctive is 2p. All these configurations are demonstrated below.

**Embedded clauses** ($\textit{PRO}$ is bound by the matrix subject):

(40) *He$_i$ said [that [$\textit{PRO}_i \text{OP}_f^{i, g(i)} f^{i, g(i)} \text{pro}_i \text{go.imp/subj}]]$.

$\approx$ Intend.: He said that he must go.

**Unembedded non-interrogative clauses** ($\textit{PRO}$ is bound by the speaker):

(41) *[[SPEAKER$_i$ COMMIT[$\textit{PRO}_i \text{OP}_f^{i, g(i)} f^{i, g(i)} \text{pro}_i \text{go.imp/subj}!]]]$.

$\approx$ Intend.: I must go!

**Unembedded interrogative clauses** ($\textit{PRO}$ is bound by the addressee):

(42) *[[ADDRESSEE$_i$ ASK[$\textit{PRO}_i \text{OP}_f^{i, g(i)} f^{i, g(i)} [[\text{pro}_i \text{go.imp/subj?]}}]]$]

$\approx$ Intend.: Must you go?!
A. Stegovec’s analysis accounts for the “speaker distancing ban” (43) (see [Kaufmann 2012; Condoravdi & Lauer 2012; Stegovec & Kaufmann 2015]) and predicts a ban on exclusive first-person imperatives in non-interrogatives.

(43) Go away! #But I don’t want you to.

In Slovenian, the first-person singular form of the Subjunctive can be used only in interrogative environments. A. Stegovec’s proposal explains this fact successfully. However, as we saw in the previous Section the first-singular Imperative in Chukchi can be used in non-interrogatives as well. In the next Section, I will claim that once we slightly modify A. Stegovec’s, it will perfectly capture the distribution of the first-person singular Imperative in Chukchi.

7 Proposal

I adopt a kind of a modal approach to imperative semantics [Kaufmann 2012]. To be more specific, I assume that imperative clauses contain a covert modal operator located in the functional domain of a clause. However, I depart from the view that this modal has special performative presuppositions that are responsible for the fact that imperative clauses are used non-descriptively. In Chukchi, imperative clause can be used descriptively (see, e.g., subsection 4.2).

I further assume, following [Kratzer 2006; 2013] and [Moulton 2009], that the modal meaning of an attitude predicate comes from covert modal operators located in the left periphery of the embedded clause. The imperative modal is a suitable candidate for this role. That is, when an imperative clause is embedded under a desiderative predicate, the imperative modal imperative operator is responsible for encoding the modality of the whole attitude ascription.

In linguistic literature, desiderative predicates are standardly analyzed as quantifiers over possible worlds which domain of quantification is restricted by a doxastic modal base and a bouletic ordering source (see [Heim 1992; von Fintel 1999; a.o.]). Under the view I adhere in my analysis, these conversational backgrounds are introduced as arguments of the modal in the embedded clause. Namely, I assume that modals in clauses embedded under desire predicates have a doxastic modal base and a bouletic ordering source. As it was shown in the previous section, in Chukchi, the Imperative can appear under the desire predicate teɣʔjeŋək ‘want’ (I repeat the relevant example as (45)).

(45) ætlon ̣-teɣʔjeŋə-ʁkən ıŋqun
   he.NOM 2/3.S/A-want-IPFV COMP
   mə-tejkə-n  ̣orwoor
He wants to fix the sledge.

When the subject of the matrix clause is coreferent with the subject of the embedded imperative clause, the infinitive must be used.

He wants to go to the tundra in order to seek for the mother.

Here, the subject of the matrix clause can be coreferent with the subject of the embedded clause containing the Imperative form.

These facts lead to the conclusion that the modal operator of the Imperative can take different conversational backgrounds. When it takes a doxastic modal base and a bouletic ordering source, there is subject obviation. When it takes a circumstantial modal base and a teleological ordering source, there is no subject obviation. To explain these patterns, I claim that the null argument of the modal operator in imperative clauses can have either a nominal antecedent or an event antecedent. This variation depends on the type of conversational background the modal takes:

\[ \left[ \text{‘desire’ } \varnothing_{\text{imp}} \varphi \right] \rightarrow \text{the modal base of } \varnothing_{\text{imp}} \text{ is doxastic;} \]

the ordering source of \( \varnothing_{\text{imp}} \) is bouletic.

\[ \left[ \text{‘(in order) to’ } \varnothing_{\text{imp}} \varphi \right] \rightarrow \text{the modal base of } \varnothing_{\text{imp}} \text{ is circumstantial;} \]

the ordering source \( \varnothing_{\text{imp}} \) is teleological.
In complement clauses of desire predicates its null argument refers to the matrix subject, while in dependent clauses of purposive construction it refers to the whole event. The data from Chukchi has important two important theoretical consequence. First, it suggests that, unlike what A. Stegovec [Stegovec 2018] proposes, the relativity of modals is not restricted to only one type of entity. Second, it suggests that the modal operator is not obligatorily takes only one type of conversational backgrounds, as some authors (see [Condoravdi & Lauer 2012; Oikonomou 2016]) proposed.

Turning back to the first-person singular Imperative, I argue that its availability in non-interrogative contexts is due to the fact that in Chukchi the null pronoun of the imperative modal can refer to the whole event and, what is more important, it always does so in the case of the m(ə)-form being used in root non-interrogative contexts.

I have said that if the modal imperative operator takes a circumstantial modal base and a teleological ordering source its pronominal argument refers to the whole event —either the speech act event, or the matrix event. In this case, there is no subject obviation effect, and the speaker/the matrix subject can be coreferent with the subject of the imperative clause. When the subject of the imperative non-interrogative clause is the first-person singular, PRO of the modal must refer to the event in order to not provoke Condition B violation. In particular, when the first-person singular Imperative is used in root contexts, the null argument of the modal refers to the speech act event. Therefore, in root contexts, the first-person singular Imperative denotes an action that is best to perform for the speaker according to the circumstances of speech act event and the goals the speaker pursues in this event. The circumstances of the speech act event can be thought of as all relevant facts surrounding the speech act participants.

In the case of the second-person Imperative, the modal operator takes a doxastic modal base and a bouletic ordering source, and its null argument refers to speaker. The domain of the quantification of the modal operator is then restricted by the speaker’s most desirable doxastic alternatives. Utterances containing the second-person forms canonically constitute directive speech acts, because of the fact that the director does not equal to the subject of the imperative clause. The director is the speaker, while the subject of the imperative clause is the addressee. That is, conditions for an utterance of a clause containing an imperative form to constitute a directive speech act are the following: the modal operator takes a doxastic modal base and a bouletic ordering source, its null argument refers to the speaker, the subject of the imperative clause is not coreferent with the speaker. It is obvious, that the non-embedded non-interrogative clauses containing the first-person singular Imperative form do not satisfy these conditions and, therefore, do not constitute directive speech acts.
8 Conclusion

I have shown that imperative clauses in Chukchi do not demonstrate the well-established subject obviation effect. Therefore, the form of the first-person Imperative is licensed in root non-interrogative environments. I have argued that the absence of subject obviation is due to the fact that the null argument of the modal operator in imperative clauses can have an event antecedent.

The relativity of the modal depends on the type of conversational backgrounds it takes. In non-embedded non-interrogative clauses containing the first-person singular Imperative the modal operator takes a circumstantial modal base and a teleological ordering source.

I hypothesize that for a given language the availability of the first-person singular imperative/subjunctive forms in non-interrogative contexts will be directly related to the possibility of imperative/subjunctive to be used in dependent clauses of purposive constructions.

References


Contact details:

Ilya V. Naumov
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). First-year MA student of the program “Linguistic Theory and Language Description”. E-mail: 6nlv@mail.ru.

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