RETHINKING THE EXPERIENCE OF BUILDING A SECURITY COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF ASEAN

BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

WORKING PAPERS

SERIES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
WP BRP 33/IR/2019

This Working Paper is an output of a research project implemented at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily reflect the views of HSE.
This article discusses the structural elements of the concept of a security community using the example of ASEAN. The relevance of studying this phenomenon has risen dramatically due to the official launch of the ASEAN Community in 2015, which consists of three key elements – the Economic Community, the Political and Security Community and the Socio-Cultural Community. The article argues that such generally accepted factors as economic interdependence, the political regimes, and the support of liberal ideas should be considered only as triggers which may facilitate the transition of security communities to a more advanced stage. In this regard, more significant variables are the “we feeling” among ruling elites and the population, the presence of common goals, the interests and values shared by all members of the community, adherence to key norms and principles of functioning of the union, the presence of strong channels of communication between states, the ability of collective response of states to internal and external challenges, and peaceful conflict resolution.

**Keywords:** security community, ASEAN, institutions, collective identity, values, norms and principles.

**JEL:** Z
0. Introduction

Problems of war and peace, ensuring international security, and preserving the balance of power in the international arena have traditionally played a leading role in the theory of international relations in analyzing interstate interactions.

The period after the end of the Cold War was accompanied by a decrease in the likelihood of a fully-fledged armed conflict between key global actors. Despite this, the current state of international relations is characterized by a revival of great-power rivalry, an expansion of non-military means for achieving foreign policy goals, such as sanctions and other restrictive measures.

In the context of “strategic uncertainty, a collective response to traditional and new threats to security has become a vital area of any association and community, while avoiding antagonizing larger regional powers.

The combination of these circumstances makes the discussion and rethinking of the security community concept, developed by Karl Deutsch in 1957, more topical.

The relevance of studying this phenomenon has risen dramatically due to the official launch of the ASEAN Community in 2015, which consists of three key elements – the Economic Community, the Political and Security Community and the Socio-Cultural Community.

This article consists of three parts. The first examines the existing approaches to the analysis of the concept of a security community. The main emphasis is on the works of Karl Deutsch, Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett and Amitav Acharya. The second part of the study introduces the criteria that a nascent security community should have, using ASEAN as a case study. Finally, the third part analyzes the extent to which the Association meets the specified criteria. In doing so, the paper identifies the main challenges ASEAN faces in building a security community.

The scientific novelty of the work lies, firstly, in the use of an updated approach to the analysis of a security community, and secondly, in rethinking the ASEAN experience and, in particular, problems in shaping the security community. The work argues that such generally accepted factors as economic interdependence, the political regimes, and the support of liberal ideas should be considered only as triggers which may facilitate the transition of security communities to a more advanced stage. In this regard, more significant variables are the “we feeling” among ruling elites and the population, the presence of common goals, the interests and values shared by all members of the community, adherence to key norms and the principles of the functioning of the union, the presence of strong channels of communication between states, the ability of collective responses to internal and external challenges, and peaceful conflict resolution.

It is concluded that at present, ASEAN is a nascent, pluralistic security community. However, while the existing problems identified in the study continue, the transition to a more mature stage is not possible. The key constraints of ASEAN include a periodic departure from the basic principles of the Association, and the failure to reach a consensus on a number of sensitive issues. As concrete examples we can identify the various positions of ASEAN member states on the South China Sea issue and the lack of a unified approach to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region”, an emerging geostrategic space.
1. The Theoretical Perspective on the concept of a Security Community

Karl Deutsch in “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience”, published in 1957, made a major contribution to the theoretical development and conceptualization of the term “security community”. He defined “a security community” as a group of people so strongly integrated that members of the community would not resort to the use of armed force, but would resolve disputes by “peaceful change”, that is, by using diplomatic tools and by the strengthening of institutional mechanisms [Deutsch 2015: 4].

Deutsch divides security communities into two groups – amalgam and pluralistic [Deutsch 2015: 15]. An amalgam security community means a formal union of two or more formerly independent subjects into a single large entity where there is a common government with unitary or federative form of the state. The clearest example is USA, which became a single state entity after 13 colonies united.

A pluralistic security community enshrines the political independence of sovereign entities, as the establishment of a single government does not occur. To Deutsch, relationships between USA and Canada are a typical example of a pluralistic security community.

In order to conduct a thorough review of security communities, it is necessary to distinguish major operating conditions. According to Deutsch, the most significant fundamental condition for the genesis and further development of a security community is the ability of the participating political entities and governments to respect each other’s interests and to manage disputes without the use of force achieve foreign policy goals [Deutsch 2015: 23-28].

In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that the essence of a security community, as coined by Karl Deutsch, does not exclude the likelihood of a conflict within a group, but merely posits the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Secondly, a significant aspect of the theory is the compatibility of key values related to the formulation of political decisions. According to most researchers, the presence of shared values by all members within the association is decisive when building a constructive dialogue within an association. Deutsch also points out that values become an effective tool only if they are incorporated into political institutions and political behavior, which help strengthen the ruling elites’ sense of belonging to the security community [Deutsch 2015: 133-134].

Thirdly, in order to achieve success, a security community needs on-going communication between social groups and political institutes.

According to Deutsch, through communication, members of a group think as a whole, see as a whole and act as a whole, thereby enhancing the level of mutual trust [Deutsch 2015: 23]. It is a high level of mutual trust, sensitivity and commitment to the norms of social communication that contribute to the establishment of a “we-feeling” or, in other words, “a sense of community” [Deutsch 2015: 24].

Finally, he notes how economic relations between members of a community and their further interdependence are important along with other primary elements of a security community.

Deutsch does not make an explicit connection between interdependence and liberal values and their role in resolving conflict. However, it makes sense to link economic interdependence and liberal democracy with methods for conflict prevention, based on Deutsch’s ideas using the Euro-Atlantic Region as the main research object.
The further development of the concept of a security community was made by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett [1998: 31-36]. They underline three key components of a community. Firstly, members of a community share common identities and values. Secondly, there is an inclusive and direct dialogue between the members of a community. Thirdly, they have a high level of mutual trust, and an awareness of each other’s strategic interests and altruistic motives.

This last one illustrates a conceptual difference between “an association” and “a community”. Ferdinand Tönnies noted that unlike “an association”, where a major component is egoistic interests, “a community” implies the sum of common interests [Tönnies 1955: 19].

One of the distinctive features of the Adler and Barnett’s work is that they emphasize the role of liberal democracy in establishing a security community. Political scientists contend that the advancement of liberal values contributes to the advent of a single multinational civil culture, demonstrating a commitment to principles such as respect for international law, the recognition of the leading role of UN, and political and cultural pluralism.

All these principles logically fall within democratic peace theory, whose representatives claim that liberal democracies tend to participate in armed hostilities with each other less [Owen 1994: 92; Farnham 2003: 403; Risse-Kappen 1995: 502]. They also assert that democracies develop institutions of a civil society more often, fostering a process of social communication and the involvement of the public in political decision-making.

It is important to emphasize that, according to researchers, maintaining a high level of trust within a group of states requires an awareness of each other’s activities or, according to Oran Young, the development of “social practices” rather than by active coordination between international organizations [Young 1982: 284].

Adler and Barnett give the cooperation between democracies possessing nuclear weapons as an example of the active use of social practices as a tool to strengthen dialogue between members of a security community. When France withdrew from NATO in 1965 and insisted on preserving an independent nuclear arsenal, other members did not consider this as a threat to their national security [Adler and Barnett 1998: 46].

The possession of nuclear weapons by undemocratic states, however, causes concerns among members of security communities. In this case the researchers agree with Deutsch’s interpretation, according to which a common threat is a necessary condition for adopting a collective approach within a security community.

By dividing security communities into three types (nascent, ascendant and mature) Adler and Barnett made a valuable contribution to the conceptualization of the term [Adler and Barnett 1998: 17, 48]. At the first stage, governments do not intend to establish a security community, they simply consider the coordination of joint initiatives to provide collective security. In order to strengthen interactions between states, one of the necessary conditions is a common threat. Moreover, unlike Deutsch’s concept, where an external threat de-facto leads to the establishment of a military alliance, the nascent stage also implies the development of institutional and multinational relations and the dissemination of ideas of collective security. Besides, states become aware that coordinated actions can be supported by achieving material progress in economics, ecology and other spheres.

The second stage is an ascendant community, which means a substantial increase in the institutional links between states, closer military cooperation, mutual trust, and the building of a collective identity which enshrines the commitment of members to resolve potential disputes by peaceful change.
Finally, the third stage is a mature community, where the key elements include a well-formed collective identity, a focus on multilateral actions, a common attitude to a particular actor as a threat and a coordinated policy on its elimination [Adler and Barnett 1998: 55].

The typology of Amitav Acharya provides a detailed analysis of security communities and the differences between them and other forms of cooperation [Acharya 1995: 180-181]. Acharya conducts a comparative survey of 4 categories including a security regime, a security community, a defense community and collective security.

In his view, the absence of an arms race is typical of a security community. Bilateral or multilateral political and military alliances can be established within a security community, however, this has not been the case in practice. A security community does not mean the development of an integrated armed force or a common defense budget, which is regarded as the prerogative of a defense community [Acharya 1991: 170].

In order to identify the features of a security regime, Acharya refers to Barry Buzan’s concept, where actors’ interests are neither completely compatible nor completely competitive. In this case, the ideological basis of the concept meets the term “non-war community” of Ole Wæver [Wæver 1998: 71].

A security regime can arise between states, competing on the international scene, and the use of force by a state will be limited by the threat of retaliation by another state [Buzan 2003: 45-48]. Thus, under a security regime the likelihood of armed conflict is not excluded.

Finally, it is necessary to make a conceptual differentiation between collective security and a security community. Collective security is based on the principle of the predominance of military power and does not include a high level of economic interdependence or close functional cooperation. As Acharya notes, a collective security system is increasingly directed to punishing aggressors rather than searching for methods to manage conflict by peaceful means, whereas a security community aims to solve all disputes using formal and informal mechanisms but without use of force [Acharya 2014: 22].

On the basis of these typologies, I suggest a modern approach to the analysis of security communities, and determine whether ASEAN meets key components of that concept.
Table 1. An outline of the basic conditions for the formation of a security community and its applicability to ASEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collectives identity</th>
<th>Collectives actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The &quot;we-feeling&quot; among the ruling elites and the population;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adherence to key norms and principles of the functioning of the association;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shared values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The perception of a Union as a security community by population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to develop a coordinated policy;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The effectiveness of formal and informal communication institutes;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The ability to maintain unity with external and internal calls;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to resolve conflicts peacefully</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: made by the author*

2. Main criteria

When selecting the criteria for forming a security community and their applicability to ASEAN, Adler and Barnett’s the three phases were taken as the basis. However, for a more complex consideration, the fundamental variables of Deutsch’s concept were taken into account, in particular, the presence or absence of large-scale hostilities between members of the community.

The analysis of the concept and its main provisions made it possible to identify the following patterns.

Firstly, liberal democracy and economic interdependence are not basic conditions for a security community. Based on Deutsch and his followers, the use of these variables largely narrows down the research field, confining it to the North Atlantic and Euro-Atlantic regions.

Secondly, a theory of complex interdependence itself has been criticized repeatedly for its limitations in practice. As Nye and Keohane claimed, interdependence between states, primarily economic, essentially minimizes the potential for conflict or armed confrontation [Keohane and Nye 1977: 48].

An exploration of the correlation between economic interdependence and the establishment of a security community identified two basic problems. Firstly, history shows that as a rule economic interdependence is reached at the bilateral level between major economies, or at the level of the integration of organizations with a high rate of interregional trade and the
leading states. Therefore, small and medium-sized countries that are non-members of advanced regional integration groupings with a high volume of trade within a community remain beyond the research field.

Secondly, the post-cold-war period has been characterized by a decrease in the potential for the transformation of competition between major powers and regional powers into armed conflict, despite confrontation and the reduced role of global security institutions. Instead of this, non-military approaches to achieving foreign policy goals, in particular the imposition of sanctions and other restrictive measures, are growing in popularity. In practice economic interdependence would not necessarily result in a reduction of the potential for conflict, as evidenced by relations between Germany and Great Britain on the eve of the First World War, and USA and China today.

Based on the foregoing, economic interdependence, political regimes and support for liberal ideas should be considered only as additional factors which may contribute to the transition of security communities to a more advanced stage.

More important primary criteria are: a “we feeling” among the ruling elites and the population, the existence of common goals, interests and values, adherence to norms and principles of the union, and the presence of strong channels of communication between states. The ability to collectively respond to internal and external challenges and preserve internal unity, and the ability to resolve emerging conflicts by peaceful means, are also among the relevant parameters.

It is necessary to emphasize that the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action 2012 explicitly notes the interconnection of the political, economic, and social spheres. The document reflects that ASEAN should be based on the principle of comprehensive security. This implies ensuring not only military, but also political and social stability, and reducing the gap in economic development between countries.

Given the high degree of interconnectedness between security and socio-economic prosperity in ASEAN, it seems reasonable to analyze the building of collective identity from the perspective of the political elites and of the citizens of member states.

A common historical heritage is not a separate criterion, but acts as an additional factor that contributes to the formation of a “we feeling” within the community.

Finally, public confidence in the security community was not a criteria due to the lack of statistical data to identify patterns. In ASEAN, this criterion is partially replaced by the perception of the Association as a political institution. A significant role in the study was played by public opinion polls prepared by ISEAS and ERIA.

3. Collective identity

The formation and further development of a security community is not possible without a collective identity of all members, common interests, mutual trust and collective actions vis-à-vis internal and external threats.

Studying the formation of ASEAN as a security community, we can distinguish 4 key factors that contribute to enhancing the sense of a collective whole.

---

First, the Association’s operation is based on “the ASEAN Way” which includes such basic principles as the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, renouncing the use force or its threat, peaceful dispute resolution, the consideration of individual features of member countries. These principles formed the basis of the first regional security document of the Association – the Declaration on the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), signed by the foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries in 1971^4^.

Secondly, since the mid 1970s the idea of building “One Southeast Asia” occurred in the official discourse of the member states of the Association [Acharya and Layug 2012: 2; Wah 1997: 5]. In practice, this idea was embodied in the attempts to unite countries based on their Southeast Asian geography.

Thirdly, all member states of the Association promote the so called ASEAN centrality as a basic principle both within the association, when interacting with dialogue partners in a bilateral format and within ASEAN-led multilateral institutions.

Finally, the question of the formation of an ASEAN collective identity should be directly linked to the presence of common values among the community members. The Association leaders have repeatedly expressed their commitment to Asian values, noting their universal nature. The importance of ensuring social harmony, concern for social and economic prosperity and well-being of society, a strong work ethic, loyalty to political leaders and the ruling regime, and a focus on informal relations have been traditionally emphasized [Barr 2000: 313-316, Harper 1997: 509].

Separately, the primacy of collectivism and communitarianism played a key role in the launch of multilateral dialogue platforms and the creation of the ASEAN Community in 2015.

One of the main ideologues of Asian values was the Singapore leader, Lee Kuan Yew, and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad. In December 1990, the Malaysian leader initiated the creation of the East Asian Economic Grouping, later renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus, as a counterweight to Western projects of economic regionalism [Khalifah 1992: 19].

In addition, Mahathir opposed the accession of Australia to the East Asian Summit, since, in his opinion, the country is part of the “collective West” and does not share the basic Asian values^5^.

Nevertheless, throughout its entire existence, ASEAN has faced a number of problems that hinder the development of a “we feeling”.

In this regard, all the states of ASEAN, with the exception of Thailand, were colonized. The period that followed independence was characterized by active attempts to form stable political regimes and national economies. As a result, the need to overcome colonial heritages and build independent economic systems prompted countries to cooperate economically.

More importantly, the process of decolonization was accompanied by increased nationalism in the member states, while maintaining close relations with the former colonizers, which led to the exacerbation of a number of territorial conflicts in the region [Acharya 2017: 27]. Therefore, the common historical heritage of a colonial past to a greater extent had a

---


^5^ Mahathir does not want Australia at the East Asia Summit. Taipei Times, December 8, 2005. URL: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/08/2003283497
destructive influence on the development of relations between the member states of the Association.

In general, there is a high degree of heterogeneity among the ASEAN member countries – cultural, linguistic, religious, and political. There is still a low level of trust between the members, disagreements are observed on a number of issues regarding the long-term development of the Association, foreign policy priorities primarily in relation to China and the United States.

There are problems in shaping the “we feeling” among the population of ASEAN member countries. According to social polls, only 58% of ASEAN citizens believe that people born in Southeast Asia have much in common with each other. Only 43% of respondents identify themselves as Southeast Asians, while 51% of respondents consider themselves Asians. For comparison, according to 2018, in the European Union, 70% of the population of the EU countries identify themselves as EU citizens. More than 75% of respondents to a survey conducted by ERIA in 2017 felt ‘moderately’ as ASEAN citizens, and 50% of those polled indicated they felt ‘very much’ as ASEAN citizens.

Despite these statistics, the majority of respondents confirmed that the sense of belonging to ASEAN is formed mainly due to geographical proximity and is not directly related to the activities of the Association.

Separately, no surveys have been conducted demonstrating the commitment to a security community among the population of ASEAN countries or the perception of themselves as members of this community. However, indirectly, this is evidenced by the results of a sociological survey at the ASEAN 50th anniversary. Answering the question “What do you associate ASEAN with?”, 65% respondents noted economic growth in Southeast Asia. 38% of respondents associate ASEAN with security and 25% with culture and heritage, which fits into the framework of the ASEAN Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Community.

In addition, despite the strong feeling that ASEAN provides security in the region, only 20% of respondents describe ASEAN as a political association, 13% as a social organization, and another 9% as a cultural organization.

These results allow us to conclude the following.

First, despite the attempts of ASEAN ruling elites to promote the concept of "a people-oriented ASEAN", citizens of the member states see themselves as residents of Southeast Asia or Asia as a whole rather than part of the Association.

Secondly, the overwhelming majority of citizens of ASEAN member states view the Association as an economic unity, rather than political or security community.

One of the reasons for, and a factor aggravating the current situation, is the low level of awareness among the population about the achievements, problem areas, and mechanisms of

---

8 Voices of ASEAN. What Does ASEAN Mean to ASEAN Peoples? Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, November 2017. URL: http://www.eria.org/ASEAN_at_50_2_1_Integrative_final.pdf
10 Ibid.
ASEAN. The ERIA study showed that only 17% of citizens of ASEAN member countries under the age of 30 are familiar with the activities of the Association. These factors significantly impede the building of a socio-cultural community, which, along with the economic, political and security community, is a key pillar of the Association.

A systemic constraint on the development of ASEAN as a collective unit is the periodic departure from its fundamental principles. For example, use of force in the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in 2011, which led to casualties. In addition to directly violating one of the basic principles of the Association, the parties failed to use the conflict resolution mechanisms set forth in Article 15 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Article 22 of the ASEAN Charter. These say that Member States shall endeavor to peacefully resolve all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation [Koldunova 2011: 109].

Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 shortly after its independence from Portugal violated the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and of renouncing of the use force or the threat of force.

4. Collective actions

Formal and informal institutes of communication

At certain stages of its development, ASEAN attempted to strengthen the institutional security mechanisms by formalizing them, an example of which is the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, signed in 1976. Of particular importance is Article 14, which fixes the creation of the High Council as a permanent body for resolving conflicts between ASEAN member states.

In evaluating the effectiveness of the Treaty, it should first be pointed out that that mechanism has never been used in practice. The wording of the document contains structural restrictions. It states that the Treaty does not include coercive measures and the imposition of sanctions against a state that has breached the obligations it has undertaken. According to Article 15, if the conflict remains unresolved, the High Council only has the right to encourage actors to resort to dispute resolution methods like good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation procedures.

The Treaty enshrines that parties to a conflict use the dispute resolution methods contained in Article 33 of the UN Charter, voluntarily, which questions the need to abide by conditions of the Treaty.

The ASEAN Charter holds as legally binding that all conflicts between Member States should be resolved peacefully in accordance to the Articles of the 1976 Treaty.

Throughout the more than half-century of its history, the Association has never managed to resolve territorial disputes between ASEAN Member States completely. Nevertheless, taking into account the incomplete nation-building and the many interstate disagreements, the prevention of armed confrontation is a credit to ASEAN [Caballero-Anthony 2002: 537].

---

11 Voices of ASEAN. What Does ASEAN Mean to ASEAN Peoples? Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, November 2017. URL: http://www.eria.org/ASEAN_at_50_2.1_Integrative_final.pdf

A key step in building constructive dialogue was a rise of bilateral and multilateral consultations on security issues, for instance, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), the annual ASEAN Summits, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit (EAS).

The parties are actively trying to coordinate joint actions in the field of security and to combat new challenges and threats. In particular, in 2012, the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation was launched. This is a think tank designed to develop a common position on global issues. The 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, the ASEAN Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change and many other strategic documents have also been adopted.

In addition to these, the decrease in interstate tensions was facilitated by the establishment of ad hoc joint committees and commissions on the resolution of territorial disputes. These include Committees for Malaysia-Thailand, Malaysia-Indonesia, Malaysia-Philippines, and Philippines-Indonesia [Caballero-Anthony 1998: 47-48].

An important condition for strengthening dialogue on security issues is a positive psychological climate and the avoidance of direct criticism of Association members. According to the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Subandrio, “only those agreements are productive where actors regard each other as not enemies, but as close friends and brothers” [Irvine 1982: 17].

To summarize, when ASEAN’s leaders build a dialogue on a security issue they rely on consultations mainly with informal agendas and ad hoc negotiating formats, which serve as tools to construct a collective identity and inculcating “the habit of preventing war”.

Against this backdrop, the statement of Carlos Romulo, the former Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs is noteworthy. He says that behind-the-scenes agreements are more important for the Association than official negotiations at ASEAN summits and other platforms [Acharya 2014: 80]. As shown in the 2004 ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (later renamed the ASEAN Political-Security Community), key goals include strengthening political dialogue between countries, solidarity within ASEAN and the “we feeling”, and trust-building within Association.

The final version of the Plan of Action did not include a number of sensitive wordings, which indicates the reluctance of the ruling elite develop into a more mature society. A statement about “democracy and the protection of human rights as basic values shared by all the ASEAN Member states” was deleted from the initial draft.

Beyond the document, a suggestion from Jakarta to establish ASEAN peacemaking contingents has met with resistance from a number of countries, in particular Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand [Acharya 2014: 175].

Indonesia, as the initiator of the “ASEAN Political-Security Community” emphasizes that it is not a defense community or a military alliance, but it focuses on fostering inclusive dialogue on regional security issues. To sum up, the analysis of the statements and the declarations made by officials leads to the conclusion that the key imperative for ASEAN is not complete conflict resolution, but creating a context of trust, where the risk of armed confrontation is minimized. In other words, as Acharya notes, ASEAN multilateral diplomacy has been traditionally aimed not at creating

---

formal mechanisms, but at accelerating the socialization of the political elites of member states [Acharya 1998: 208]. This point logically fits into Deutsch’s security community theory, where the ability of members to resolve conflicts peacefully is much more important than the absence of conflict as such.

We should also note the progress achieved in recent years in military-technical cooperation between ASEAN member states which, according to the concept of Adler and Barnett, is an integral element of the second phase – ascendant security communities.

In particular, the holding of the first ASEAN Naval Exercises, AMNEX 2017, was a milestone. Another significant event occurred in October 2018, when ASEAN and China conducted their first joint military maneuvers. US-ASEAN bilateral exercises are planned for 2019. On a regular basis, the ASEAN countries conduct multilateral maneuvers in the format of the ADMM + 8. Along with this, ASEAN member states are increasing the interaction between their militaries, in particular, through the exchange of intelligence information.

The combination of these factors allows us to state that the political elites give priority to the development of institutional and transnational relations and the dissemination of ideas about collective security. The formation of the ASEAN Community in the form of three pillars reflects the focus of ASEAN member states on conducting coordinated actions in defense and security with a parallel increase in cooperation in the sphere economy, the social sphere, and culture.

The current regulatory and institutional framework and the current dynamics of interaction within the Association clearly illustrate that ASEAN is currently in the first phase, a nascent security community.

5. Existing challenges

Despite the progress in creating institutional mechanisms and deepening military cooperation, ASEAN faces a number of structural constraints that impede the formation of a fully-fledged security community. The fundamental problem for the long-term development of the Association is the failure to reach a consensus on the most sensitive issues. It makes sense to highlight a few examples that largely determined the further development of ASEAN:

1) An increase in disagreements between ASEAN Member States in the 1990s as a result of ecological catastrophes in Southeast Asia. The crisis was largely caused by the artificial burning of forest for agriculture on the Indonesian island Sumatra, resulting in smoke from fire spreading to other countries, primarily Malaysia and Singapore [Jong and Ping 2011: 964]. To eliminate the consequences, Member States of the Association signed an Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002, and then put pressure on Jakarta in order to ratify the document. Until 2014, Indonesia refused to ratify it.

2) In the 2000s there were failed attempts to reach consensus on the violations of human rights in Myanmar. A number of states including Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand advocated Myanmar’s suspension from ASEAN and urged other members to consider this issue. However, the outcome on Myanmar’s suspension from ASEAN was not adopted.

The most telling example of a lack of consensus within ASEAN was voting in the General Assembly on human right issues in Myanmar on December 2017. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei voted for, whereas other 5 members were against the adoption of resolution, which urged Naypyidaw to cease hostilities against the Muslim population of

---

14 All ASEAN member countries took part in the exercise, with the exception of Laos, which is landlocked.
Rakhine State and allow access to international organizations to deliver humanitarian assistance.

3) Finally, another example of how requiring consensus can lead to contradictions within the Association was the blocking in 2012 by Cambodia of the adoption of a joint statement on the South China Sea, which was an unprecedented event in the history of the Association. A similar situation arose in 2016 immediately after the publication of the results of the Hague Tribunal for the SCS. The decision ruled that China has no historical rights to the disputed territories in the South China Sea.

Phnom Penh, seeking to maintain strategic cooperation with China’s key foreign economic partners, took advantage of the “veto power” and excluded paragraphs on the results of the Hague Tribunal for the SCS from the final communiqué adopted at the 49 ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting. In addition, the document lacks the standard for ASEAN references to the need to respect international law and the peaceful settlement of territorial conflicts.

In general, the South China Sea is one of the most significant examples of the lack of unity within the Association. For Vietnam and the Philippines, the question of the territorial possession of the islands in the SCS is a key problem in ensuring regional security and is directly linked to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a result, these countries are pursuing a more hawkish policy towards China.

Malaysia and Brunei, despite their direct involvement in the conflict over the SCS with China, historically adhere to a more restrained position, do not seek to openly criticize Beijing or promote an anti-Chinese agenda within Asian-centered dialogue platforms.

A number of other countries, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, not being parties to the dispute, emphasize the need for a peaceful settlement based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2002 Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea, while maintaining a limited US military presence in the region [Lokshin, Kobelev, Mazyrin 2019: 146].

The lack of collective action and the lack of unity within the Association can be illustrated with a number of other examples, for example the inability of Association to contain the spread of radical Islam in Southeast Asia, most notably ISIS. According to the “Global Terrorism Index”, in 2017 South and Southeast Asia made up one third of all terrorist attacks in the world. Two countries of SEA – Philippines (10th) and Thailand (17th) – were among the highest rating countries for terrorist activity and demonstrated the largest increase since 2002. In 2017 both countries and Myanmar made up 94% of all terrorist attacks in Asian-Pacific region. To compare, in 2002, the three countries made up 55% attacks in region.

This circumstance is caused by factors such as gaps in the legislation at the state level and ASEAN as whole, particularly Conventions for the Suppression of Terrorism, the perception by the ruling elite of terrorism as threat to the security of individual countries, the long process of policy harmonization and others [Borelli 2017: 15-18].

---

19 Ibid.
In countering radical Islam, ASEAN Member States bet on the development of cooperation with dialogue partners, most notably China and Australia, which largely undermines the credibility of Association as an independent actor.

In the foreseeable future an additional factor undermining the consolidated position of ASEAN will be the promotion of the concept of the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) and the activation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which includes India, USA, Australia, and Japan. That concept has strong anti-Chinese connotations and, after Donald Trump’s rise to power in the United States, pressure on China has become more open and systemic.

Currently, there is no consensus among the ruling elites of ASEAN countries on what the concept of IPR means, its potential benefits or the possible negative impact on the long-term development of the Association. In particular, some ASEAN countries, first of all Indonesia, are showing an active interest in participating in this concept, as evidenced by high-level speeches.

During the official visit of the Indonesian President Joko Widodo to India in May 2018, he and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi not only reaffirmed the importance of achieving a “peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region”, but also welcomed the adoption of the “Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region between India and Indonesia”20.

However, the Indonesian understanding of IPR is different from that of the United States, Australia, Japan or India. According to Jakarta, ASEAN should play a key role in building this new geopolitical space. It is characteristic that it is Indonesia, which, through the development of cooperation with IPR members, is striving to become a “global maritime fulcrum”, the first of the ASEAN countries to introduce the IPR concept on the sidelines of Asian-led dialogue platform.

Participating in EAS, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi encouraged ASEAN member states to contribute to creating IPR as open, transparent, inclusive, respectful of international law and cooperative by using the EAS mechanism as the main platform21.

Nevertheless, some ASEAN countries, most notably Malaysia, Cambodia and Laos treat that concept cautiously and refrain from official statements, seeking not to jeopardize the strategic benefits from cooperation with China.

Further development of the U.S.-led concept threatens to deepen the division within the Association, undermining its fundamental principles and devaluing ASEAN’s central role in the regional security architecture [Lee 2018: 28].

In the short term, as relations between the United States and China deteriorate, the issue of supporting IPR is most acutely faced by Thailand and the Philippines, which are allied to Washington. Despite the fundamental revision of Manila’s foreign policy towards greater rapprochement with China with the coming to power of Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines still maintain close military-technical ties with the United States. This is evidenced by the rejection of the acquisition of Russian Mi-171 helicopters in favor of the American S-70 Black Hawk and the fact that the Philippines is the second largest recipient of American assistance after Singapore in the subregion. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),

from 2010 to 2018, the Philippines received about $2.5 billion in aid, 50% of which came in the form of military-technical support\textsuperscript{22}.

It is likely that the U.S. and QUAD partners will make attempts to more actively involve Vietnam in IPR. In particular, this is evidenced by the fact that Vietnam is first in Washington’s list of priority partners among the ASEAN states according to the Department of Defense report published on June 1, 2019\textsuperscript{23}.

It is no coincidence that it was in Da Nang, Vietnam during the APEC summit in 2017 that US President Trump for the first time presented the vision of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region”.

It is also important to note the interest of Vietnam itself in strengthening strategic cooperation with the countries of the region. The commitment to the idea of promoting IPR was notably manifested when the President of Vietnam Trân Đại Quang visited India in March 2018\textsuperscript{24}. 

Finally, according to the Australian Institute of Strategic Policy survey, conducted in October 2018, Vietnam has the most positive attitude towards IPR among all ASEAN member countries. 69% of respondents speak positively of this initiative\textsuperscript{25}. 88% of Vietnamese noted the need to institutionalize QUAD to strengthen the regional security architecture, based on rules and respect for international law\textsuperscript{26}.

6. Conclusion

The analysis of ASEAN has made it possible to adjust the typology of Deutsch, Adler and Barnett. In particular, it is more expedient to form a collective identity as a key element in the first phase – building a nascent security community.

Given the interconnectedness between “high” (defense and security) and “low” politics (economics, social sphere, culture) in ASEAN, which is confirmed by the launch of three communities at the same time, it seems reasonable to say that the collective identity bearer within the security community are not only the political elites, but also the citizens of the member states.

The key achievements of the Association in ensuring regional security in the Asia-Pacific region are the prevention of the escalation of existing conflicts within the Association, the socialization of the political elites of member states, and the “institutional binding” of large regional players using ASEAN-led dialogue platforms.

Despite the presence of formal and informal institutions of communication, ASEAN has not managed to form an ascendant or mature security community and at the moment they represent an emerging pluralistic community – the first phase, according to Adler and Barnett’s classification.

\textsuperscript{24} India-Vietnam Joint Statement during State visit of President of Vietnam to India (March 03, 2018). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 03. 2018. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29535/IndiaVietnam+Joint+Statement+during+State+visit+of+President+of+Vietnam+to+India+March+03+2018
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
The lack of unity on strategic issues, which is currently most clearly illustrated by the South China Sea issue and the concept of IPR, the “we-feeling” among the ruling elites and the population, coupled with the Association’s periodic departure from fundamental principles, greatly hinders the formation of a full-fledged security community.

As a result, while the existing problems identified in the study continue, the transition to a more mature stage of the security community is not possible.
7. References

Alexander S. Korolev
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies. Junior Research Fellow;
E-mail: askorolev@hse.ru

Yulia A. Belous
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia). Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies. Research Assistant;
E-mail: ybelous@hse.ru

Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily reflect the views of HSE.

© Korolev, Belous, 2019