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GENDER ATTITUDES AND ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION ACROSS EUROPE (THE EVIDENCE OF ESS DATA)

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Nowadays, in Europe, women do not have lower education as compared to men, but they are often less advantaged in their careers. The study aimed to reveal the association between gender attitudes, achievement motivation and realisation of this achievement motivation among the working women in Europe. According to multilevel regression modelling on European Social Survey (2010) data on employed individuals, women and men with more egalitarian gender attitudes in general have higher achievement motivation and are more likely to be able to influence policy decisions in their organisations. The impact of achievement motivation on the possibility to influence decisions was very strong in all the countries. The models with cross-level interaction showed that in most cases the association between the three aspects are more pronounced in countries with higher female participation in the labor market.

Keywords: Gender attitudes, gender differences, achievement motivation, cross-country analysis, labour market

JEL Classification: Z

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Introduction

Traditionally, men are considered to be the breadwinners, while a woman's main social role concerns child rearing and the household. However, today, the difference between gender roles is becoming less clear. The transition to more egalitarian gender equality attitudes is one of the key aspects of the modernisation process (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010; Welzel, 2013). Many policy measures have been taken to reach gender equality. Work-life balance is one of the key policies of the European Union (Crompton and Lyonette, 2006). In most European countries, childcare institutions and services make the household burden easier, and a traditional life pattern centred on marriage and having kids is more often regarded as only one of multiple possible alternatives. However, public policy regarding the support of working mothers differs across countries. It is very widespread in Nordic countries and other countries, such as France (Crompton and Lyonette, 2006). The specificity of Nordic countries is that state policy encourages not only female participation in the labor market but also male participation in domestic chores (Crompton and Lyonette, 2006). Social policy in general can structure the balance between work and family life. In countries where full-time employment is supported, the share of full-time employed women is higher (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Pettit and Hook, 2005; Ruppanner and Huffman, 2014).

At the same time, even in countries with the highest acceptance of gender equality, traditional gender norms still play an important role (Hakim, 2006). In the public sphere, women often take part-time jobs and have lower positions (Hakim, 2006). In the private sphere, women do most household duties (Batalova and Cohen, 2002; Bianchi et al., 2000; Fuwa, 2004; Hook, 2006; Ruppanner and Huffman, 2014; Tereškinas, 2010). When women enjoy more egalitarian gender role attitudes, they experience higher work–household conflict. It has been shown that work–household conflict is higher in Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands than it is in Hungary and the Czech Republic (Strandh and Nordenmark, 2006). For this reason, it is important to study the link between gender role attitudes and actual behaviour.

This study aimed to reveal the association of gender attitudes, achievement motivation and the realisation of this achievement motivation by employed women and men in Europe. I based my research question in distinguishing three levels of female achievement motivation, namely egalitarian gender attitudes, the importance of using initiative and the opportunity to influence policy decisions in organisations. The first level consists of egalitarian gender attitudes, since not all women strive for a gender-equal lifestyle. The question is whether women with egalitarian attitudes are more likely to strive for a professional career. On the second level, the importance of using initiative at work is highlighted as an indicator of the intention to build a professional career. Are women who consider initiative at work to be important more successful in their careers? The third level reflects actual career success – that is, as measured by the opportunity to influence policy decisions in the organisations where women work.

I also examined the association between these three levels for men, for comparative reasons. Men and women were analysed separately because, for them, gender equality attitudes mean two different things. When women answer questions about their gender attitudes, the situation refers to themselves. In contrast, male gender attitudes are an indicator of their general level of emancipation.

The contribution of this study is that it demonstrates the distinction between the acceptance of gender equality and the willingness to apply it in one's own situation. The link between attitudes towards gender equality and achievement motivation has not been investigated before.

Gender attitudes

Gender attitudes can be defined as 'normative beliefs about what gender relations in society should be like, or the extent to which a person supports the norm of gender equality' (Bergh, 2006: 6). Positive attitudes towards traditional gender roles consider men as a breadwinner and women as a homemaker, while positive attitudes towards non-traditional gender roles mean that men and women should equally participate in the labor market and in household duties (Voicu and Constantin, 2016).

Usually, women have more egalitarian gender attitudes compared to men (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Choe et al., 2014; Guiso et al., 2003; Mays, 2012). Higher level of education also positively contributes to egalitarian gender attitudes (Guiso et al., 2003; Rhodebeck, 1996; Van de Werfhorst and de Graaf, 2004). Countries vary considerably in terms of prevalent gender attitudes (Braun and Gloeckner-Rist, 2011; Fortin, 2005). Support for gender equality is highly correlated with the level of a country's economic development and GDP per capita as well as its percentage of women in parliament (Bergh, 2007; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2010). Furthermore, gender attitudes are more egalitarian in countries with a higher ratio of females to males in tertiary enrolment. For the female labor force, the participation rate is nearly the same, although it is not significant in all the models (Soboleva, 2014).

Gender attitudes have an impact on female labor market behaviour. The higher rate of labor market involvement of women is associated with more egalitarian gender attitudes (Alwin et al., 1992). It was demonstrated that women with egalitarian gender role attitudes earn more in a cross-cultural perspective; and for those who work longer hours, the effect is stronger – but for men, such a relation was not found (Stickney and Konrad, 2007). Early gender attitudes influence individual careers (work hours and earnings), although labor market outcomes can result in changes in gender attitudes because individuals tend to adjust to specific situations (Corrigal and Konrad, 2007).

At the same time, we should bear in mind that there could be different forms of female employment. In some countries (like the Netherlands), parttime employment is very widespread, although women still regard the work as a secondary activity.

According to preference theory, women choose their work-lifestyle balance (the balance between career and family life) in the developed world due to their preferences. Only a limited number of women (10-30%) are workcentred, and hence men are likely to be dominant in the labor market, not only because of discrimination but also because of self-discrimination. The largest group are adaptive women (40-80% per country) who prefer to combine work and family life and are interested in family-friendly public policy. Familycentred women (10-30%) also comprise the minority. Men are generally workcentred, although other types of men also exist (Hakim, 2006). I argue that this may only be partly true. Of course, women can choose their path to some extent, but their choice is limited because of social opinions, their partner's attitude and position, and their general position in the country and in their field. Furthermore, sometimes, women work because of economic necessity (Crompton and Lyonette, 2006). However, this theory could be partly applied to the social reality, especially in developed countries. Quite often, women do have an opportunity to choose their work-life balance. For example, they can work more or less, or focus on their career to a greater or lesser extent.

Consequently, I supposed that individual gender attitudes of women have an impact on individual achievement motivation and actual independence at the job. I did not expect this effect to be true for men. The first three hypotheses are as follows:

H1. Women with more egalitarian gender attitudes are more likely to perceive using initiative at one's job as an important work value.

H2. Women with more egalitarian gender attitudes tend to have jobs where they can influence the policy decisions of their organisations.

H3. I expect no relation between egalitarian gender attitudes, on the one hand, and perceiving using initiative at one's job as an important work

value and the opportunity of influencing policy decisions within the organisation for men, because still, for most men, career is rather important.

Gender inequality in the private sphere

Today, the types of families are changing. The general opinion is that together with changing gender roles, there is a shift from traditional to egalitarian families. In traditional families, men are responsible for making money, and women do household duties and child rearing. In egalitarian families, there is an equal division of labor between spouses. However, in reality, the picture is more complex. Women are more in charge of housework than men and experience more work–life conflict (Batalova and Cohen, 2002; Bianchi et al., 2000, Fuwa, 2004; Hook, 2006; Ruppanner and Huffman, 2014).

According to some research, the egalitarian family (with equal roles) is more an ideal type than a real family practice (Thornton and Young-DeMarco, 2001). Many families are neotraditional, where both partners work but women work less and do most part of the household duties (Tereškinas, 2010).

The difference between supporting gender equality in theory and pursuing the strategy of gender equality in real life was shown for different countries. For instance, in Romania, although women express egalitarian gender attitudes, parenthood impedes the careers of women stronger than it does for men (Sănduleasa and Matei, 2016). Housework is still unequally shared between genders, with women accomplishing the major part. Hence, in case of work– family conflict, the family is the first priority for women, whereas work is the first priority for men. What is also important is that although state social policy is able to promote gender equality outside the family, it cannot control the division of labor between spouses inside the family (Sănduleasa and Matei, 2016). Tereškinas (2010) came to the conclusion that, in Lithuania, individuals possess egalitarian gender beliefs, but real gender roles do not conform to their beliefs. This situation could be caused by cultural norms in work organisations and in society on the whole. In developed countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, men and women also do an uneven share of housework labor, even though gender role attitudes are more egalitarian. Even Scandinavian, 'family-friendly' policies do not help here. In developed countries, women face stronger work–life conflict, because they do not accept the current situation (Strandh and Nordenmark, 2006).

Public policy can neither control the private sphere nor fully control the public sphere. In this paper, I focus on the public sphere, which should be largely dependent upon the private sphere.

Gender inequality in the public sphere

In the public sphere, women gain wider access to education and the labor market. In Europe, women do not have lower education as compared to men and even achieve better results (Warrington et al., 2000; Duckworth and Seligman, 2006; Vantieghem and Van Houtte, 2015). However, despite this, they are often less advantaged in realising their careers (Figueiredo et al., 2015). In other words, although women manage to have a rather high level of human capital, they are unable to make full use of it in their professional activity. Insufficient usage of female human capital hinders economic development. The cause of the insufficient usage of women's human capital largely lies in the structure of their work values and their job preferences, because they must consider other spheres of life.

There are several possible explanations for the fewer advantages women have in making their careers. First, women often face discrimination. The following forms of discrimination can be distinguished:

• the glass-ceiling effect (Johnston and Lee, 2012; Yap and Konrad, 2009): Women are less likely to receive more than a certain, specified salary;

• the sticky floors effect: Women tend to be promoted out of the lowest positions to the next level slower than men (Yap and Konrad, 2009).

The second reason is that women still have different motivations. Although they share egalitarian gender attitudes, they still attach more attention to their families and make less effort to achieve something in their professional life. In other words, female self-discrimination takes place. Women more often ask for shorter work hours than they do for promotions or a higher salary (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). Some studies have shown that women report more job satisfaction than men do. 'This "female advantage" in job satisfaction has been labelled a "gender paradox" (Clark et al., 1996) because it is inconsistent with the material and status disadvantages that women still experience in the workplace'. Women tend to report more intrinsic motivation, whereas men report more extrinsic motivation (Magee, 2015). Intrinsic motivation is less dependent upon promotions and wages.

The prestige of female positions is still lower. The representation of women in male professions is greater than the representation of men in female professions. Additionally, negative attitudes are still widespread towards men who do female work. Furthermore, 'stay-at-home fathers' perceive more losses in their careers and incomes than do 'stay-at-home mothers' (Croft et al., 2015).

In sum, despite the fact that an increasing number of women are making careers and aiming to succeed in professional life, men are still not eager to occupy female roles for a number of reasons. Sometimes, it is difficult to draw a distinction between gender discrimination and individual characteristics, since it is not quite clear whether women have lower positions because of discrimination or because of their aspirations or self-discrimination (Budig and England, 2001).

However, as achievement motivation is likely to depend upon the general value systems of individuals, a higher achievement motivation should lead to a higher probability of having a job with the possibility of applying this achievement motivation. Hence, the hypotheses are as follows.

H4. Women with higher achievement motivation are more likely to have jobs where they can influence the policy decisions of their organisations. **H5.** Men with higher achievement motivation are more likely to have jobs where they can influence the policy decisions of their organisations; and for them, the effect will be stronger than it is for women because they face fewer obstacles in this respect.

Cross-country differences

The association between gender attitudes, achievement motivation and the realisation of achievement motivation should vary across countries. The interrelation between country characteristics is more complex than one could imagine. Economic and social development is not always associated with lower pay gaps and occupational segregation. A higher level of female employment does not necessary lead to a higher pay gap and occupational segregation, because more women enter the labor market (Hakim, 2006).

Macrolevel arrangements of organisational gender equality can influence time allocation between work and non-work spheres of life. Policies supporting full-time employment increase the number of full-time employed women (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Pettit and Hook, 2005; Ruppanner and Huffman, 2013). At the same time, it was shown that despite family-friendly policies aimed at helping to combine work and family responsibilities, gender equality in the workplace is not always reduced. The glass-ceiling effect is stronger in Sweden than it is in the US (Hakim, 2006).

Taking all this into account, I suppose that the best indicator of the female role in the labor market is still their involvement. If a large number of women are economically active, then this means that they would at least partly like to realise the strategies of gender equality. A high employment rate, in turn, reflects the success of the realisation of such strategies.

I suppose that for women, the interrelation between these three steps of achieving gender egalitarian strategies will be stronger in countries with higher female involvement in the labor market. In countries where women are more involved in the labor market, women who are more egalitarian will have more opportunities to realise their motivations and will be more advantaged in their careers. In such countries, women's rights are respected more. Women who would like to achieve something in their professional careers will have better opportunities and resources to do so. In countries where women's rights are less valued and respected, women with a high level of gender equality attitudes and achievement motivation may not have the opportunity to satisfy their ambitions in real life.

The last two hypotheses are:

H6. For women, the three effects pronounced in the hypotheses above will be stronger in countries with a high female labor force participation rate and lower female unemployment.

H7. For men, these three effects will not depend upon female involvement in the labor market.

Data and methods

The dataset was from the fifth wave of the European Social Survey (2010) and comprised a battery of questions about work values. The sample was limited to the employed. The fifth wave contains 27 countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine. A cross-cultural dataset allows us to disclose both individual- and country-level predictors of female and male achievement motivation and its realisation.

First, I performed a correlation analysis to determine whether there were strong correlations between the three levels of gender equality. Second, I applied multilevel regression modelling to reveal the effect of gender role attitudes and achievement motivation.

For my research, multilevel regression modelling was a relevant method because I had to distinguish two levels of analysis (Hox, 2010; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Multilevel analysis allows us to consider variances on the individual and country levels. In our case, individuals were nested in countries. Hence, I pointed out level 1 (individual level) and level 2 (country level).

The main variables were as follows. I used two dependent variables.

• Using initiative as work value: 'Important in choosing job: Job enabled you to use own initiative', 5-item scale.

• Opportunity to use initiative at job: 'How much the management at your work allows you to influence policy decisions about the activities of the organisation?' (10-item scale). This variable measured the subjective assessment of the person to influence the policy decisions of the organisation. However, the advantage of these variables is that they included 10 gradations and, consequently, an individual could choose his or her position in the scale.

The two dependent variables served different purposes. Using initiative as a work value reflects the achievement motivation. Those individuals who find important using initiative at work also find important achieving something in their professional lives. Opportunity to influence policy decisions within the organisation shows the actual realisation of the achievement motivation. It is the indicator of achievement.

The following independent variables were included in the analysis.

Individual level:

On the individual level, the main independent variable was the index of gender attitudes, which consisted of two statements available at the ESS: 'When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women' and 'A woman should be prepared to cut down on the paid work for the sake of her family' (5-point scale). Also, in the second set of models for the opportunity to

use initiative at a job, I added using initiative as a work value ('Important in choosing job: Job enabled you to use own initiative') as a predictor.

I also controlled on the individual level the following variables. First, I included employment type, which consists of three categories: employed (base category), self-employed or working for family business. Then, I controlled for educational level, which also included three groups: low (base category), medium and high. In addition, I took into account marital status (married is a base category) and whether there were children in the household (has children is a base category). Then, I looked at the degree of religiosity measured by an 11-item scale, where 0 was not religious at all and 10 was very religious. Religious people are likely to share more traditional values and, consequently, religious women should have lower achievement motivation and less opportunity to influence the decisions of the organisation. Finally, I controlled for age and age squared.

Country level:

On the country level, I used two measures of female involvement in the labor market, namely the female labor force participation rate and the female unemployment rate. Both measures were taken from 2010 via the World Bank website (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator). I chose the female labor force participation rate (LFPR) and female unemployment rate (UR) because these two indicators sufficiently characterise the labor market situation of women. LFPR shows the share of women who would like to work, and UR indicates how many women were not successful in finding a job. In contrast to measures reflecting labor market policy (such as paternal leave, etc.), LFPR and UR exactly reflect female participation in the labor market, but not what is done to achieve it. Female employment 'is not only a reflection of the availability of state-provided extra family supports for caring, but also of wider economic and labor market policies that will include tax systems, employment protections and

regulation, etc' (Crompton and Lyonette, 2006). I did not use educational attainment because inequalities in education for men and women are very low.

Men and women were analysed separately because, for them, gender equality attitudes mean two different things. When women answer questions about their gender attitudes, the situation refers to themselves. Male gender attitudes, on the other hand, are an indicator of their general level of emancipation.

I had to exclude Finland from multilevel analysis because, for Finland, the data on marital status were absent. For women, the final dataset contained 2016 observations for correlation analysis. The regression analysis for the importance of using initiative contained 11274 observations, and the regression analysis for the opportunity to influence policy decisions within organisation included 11108 observations. For men, the final dataset comprised 12233 observations for correlation analysis, 11369 observations for the importance of using initiative and 11269 observations for the opportunity to influence policy to influence policy decisions.

The number of missing variables was rather small, so they were excluded from the analysis.

Results

Correlation analysis

First, I compared the correlations between the three levels of egalitarian strategies across European countries. These correlations showed whether there was a strong association between the three levels of gender egalitarian strategy. I calculated the Spearmen correlations between the variables measuring gender attitudes, achievement motivation and actual opportunities at jobs in 26 countries.

Tables 1 and 2 here

Table 1 demonstrates that there is a positive and significant correlation between the importance of using initiative and the actual opportunity to influence policy decisions in organisations in all countries except Greece. It ranges from 0.110 in Spain to 0.388 in Bulgaria. The positive correlation between the index of gender attitudes and the importance of using initiative was present in most of the countries, except for some countries in southern and eastern Europe, namely Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Estonia, Croatia, Slovakia, Russia and Ukraine. Finally, the correlation between gender attitudes and actual opportunity to influence policy decisions within the organisation was not significant for most of the countries. There was a significant and positive relationship only in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Lithuania, Russia, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland. This could be explained by the fact that there were other factors mediating the relationship between gender attitudes and the opportunity to influence policy decisions for working women.

As far as men are concerned, the tendencies were the same as for the women. In all the countries, there was a significant and positive correlation between the importance of using initiative and influencing policy decisions within the organisations. Additionally, this correlation was stronger among men than among women in most countries. The positive association between male egalitarian gender attitudes and the importance of using initiative was present everywhere except for in some countries but usually it is weaker than for women. In Greece and Russia, male egalitarian attitudes and importance were negatively associated with using one's initiative at a job. In countries such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia and Ukraine, there was no correlation between these two aspects. In most countries, there was no correlation between male egalitarian gender attitudes and the opportunity to influence policy decisions. Only in Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Israel and Slovakia was there a positive correlation, while in Spain, Greece and Denmark the correlation was negative (see Table 2).

After the correlation analysis, I performed multilevel regression modelling to reveal (1) the effect of gender role attitudes on achievement motivation, and (2) the effect of gender role attitudes and achievement motivation upon the realisation of achievement motivation.

Multilevel regression modelling: ability to use initiative

In Table 3, multilevel regression models for the importance of using initiative are displayed.

Tables 3 and 4 here

In model 1.1, individual characteristics were included. In line with my hypothesis, for women who share egalitarian gender attitudes, the opportunity to use initiative was more important. In models 1.2 and 1.4, I added the female labor force participation rate and female unemployment rate, respectively. Both these indicators did not have significant impacts upon female achievement motivation. In model 1.3, the interaction effect between individual gender attitudes and female LFPR was included. The marginal effect of gender attitudes on the importance of using initiative is illustrated in Figure 1. In countries with higher female LFPR, the opportunity to use initiative at a job was more important for women with egalitarian gender attitudes. However, in countries with lower female LFPR, this association became weaker or even insignificant. In model 1.5, the interaction effect between individual gender attitudes and female unemployment rate is shown. Here, the same tendency is evident. In countries with a lower female unemployment rate, the effect of egalitarian gender attitudes on the importance of using initiative was stronger. In countries with a higher female unemployment rate, this association was insignificant (see Figure 2 for marginal effects). So, the result for the interaction effect supports my initial hypothesis.

Figures 1 and 2 here

Turning to the models for men, most tendencies were the same as for women. In Figure 2.1, I checked only for individual characteristic. Contrary to my initial hypothesis, men with more egalitarian gender attitudes usually have higher achievement motivation, although the effect was much weaker for them than for women. Both female LFPR and the female unemployment rate were insignificant as country predictors (models 2.2 and 2.4, respectively). Concerning the interaction effects, contrary to my expectations, the tendencies were also the same as for women. In countries with higher female LFPR and a lower female unemployment rate, there was a positive association between male egalitarian gender attitudes and the importance of using initiative at a job. In countries with lower female LFPR and higher female unemployment rate, there was no link between these two variables (see models 2.3 and 2.5 and Figures 3 and 4 for marginal effects).

Figures 3 and 4 here

Regarding the control variables, their effect was almost the same in all the models. Medium and higher education result in attaching more importance to using initiative at one's job. The effect of higher education was more than two times stronger. For those who are self-employed or work for their own family business, using initiative at the job was more important than for those who were employed. The effects of age, age squared, marital status and living with children were insignificant. The degree of religiosity positively affected the importance of using initiative for men and did not have any impact on women.

Multilevel regression modelling: opportunity to influence decisions about the activities of the organisation

In Table 5, multilevel regression models for the actual opportunity to influence decisions about the activities of the organisation are displayed.

Tables 5 and 6 here

In model 3.1, individual-level variables are taken as predictors. In line with the hypothesis, women with egalitarian gender attitudes evaluate the actual opportunity to influence decisions about the activities of the organisation more positively compared to women with more traditional gender attitudes. In model 3.2, I checked the effect of the importance of using initiative on the opportunity to influence the decisions in organisations and determined that the effect was very strong and positive, which also confirmed my initial hypothesis. In model 3.3, I checked both effects simultaneously and determined that both effects remained significant, although the effect of egalitarian gender attitudes became weaker.

In models 3.4 and 3.7, I added country-level variables. Again, neither female LFPR nor female UR were significant. The interaction effects were also not very strong, but they were opposite to the hypotheses. The effect of egalitarian gender attitudes was stronger in countries with lower female LFPR (see model 3.5 and Figure 5) and a higher female unemployment rate (see model 3.8 and Figure 7).

The association between the importance of using initiative at one's job and the actual opportunity to influence policy decisions was very strong and significant for all the countries. At the same time, in the countries with a lower female unemployment rate, this effect was stronger (see model 3.9 and Figure 8). For female LFPR, the interaction effect was not significant, although the tendency was the same (see model 3.8 and Figure 6). So, here, my initial hypothesis was partly confirmed.

Figures 5, 6, 7, 8 here

When we consider the model of the actual opportunity to influence the policy decisions within organisations, some results are the same for men, whereas others are different (see Table 6). Men with egalitarian gender attitudes evaluate the actual opportunity to influence decisions about the activities of the organisation more positively compared to women with more traditional gender attitudes, but this effect was weaker for them than it was for women (model 4.1). This result contradicts the initial hypothesis, as I did not expect any effect. The effect of the importance of using initiative strongly and positively influenced the actual opportunity to influence policy decisions, and this effect was stronger than it was for women (model 4.2). Here, the hypothesis was confirmed. In model 4.3, I checked both effects simultaneously and determined that both effects remained significant, although the effect of egalitarian gender attitudes became weaker (but less weak than for women).

Interestingly, both country-level variables had a significant impact on male actual opportunities to influence policy decisions within organisations. In countries with higher female LFPR, men assessed their opportunities for influencing policy decisions within organisations more positively (model 4.4), whereas in countries with higher female UR, men assessed these opportunities more negatively (model 4.7).

For men, there was no interaction effect of gender attitudes on the assessment of influencing policy decisions within organisations in countries with different female LFPR (see model 4.5 and Figure 9). For female UR, there was the opposite effect compared to women. In countries with higher female UR, men's gender role attitudes were not connected with their opportunity to

influence policy decisions. On the contrary, in countries with a lower female unemployment rate, men's egalitarian gender attitudes were positively associated with their opportunity to influence policy decisions with organisations in which they worked (model 4.8 and Figure 11).

The effect of using initiative was stronger in countries with higher female LFPR (model 4.6 and Figure 10) and lower female UR (model 4.9 and Figure 12). In other words, the tendency was the same as for women, but stronger.

The interaction effects for men are contrary to the hypotheses because no interaction effects for men were expected.

Figures 9-12 here

The impact of control variables again stayed almost the same in all the models. Those who had medium and, especially, higher education evaluated their opportunity to influence decisions more positively. Being self-employed or working for one's own family business quite expectedly led to a more positive assessment of opportunities to influence decisions. In contrast, those who were not married tended to evaluate job freedom more negatively. The presence of children in the household did not have a significant effect for women or a positive effect for men. Age was positively associated with opportunities to influence decisions was negative. Higher religiosity led to a more positive assessment of opportunities to influence decisions was negative. Higher religiosity led to a more positive assessment of opportunities to influence decisions within organisations.

Conclusion and discussion

In the current study, I revealed the interrelation of gender attitudes, the importance of achievement motivation and the opportunity to influence

decisions within an organisation of employed women and men separately. Using the ESS of 2010, I tested this association across 26 countries.

The study contributes to previous research by demonstrating the effect of gender role attitudes on real motivations and behaviour in the labor market. It demonstrates that egalitarian gender role attitudes *do* play a role in shaping labor market behaviour, but at the same time, labor market behaviour is formed by other factors as well.

Working women at least to some extent pursue the strategies of gender equality. The research revealed that women with more egalitarian gender attitudes attach more importance to using initiative at their jobs. However, this effect was stronger in countries with higher female participation in the labor market, which supports the initial hypothesis. For men, the tendency was the same, although the effect of egalitarian gender attitudes was weaker.

Egalitarian gender attitudes also influence the opportunity to influence policy decisions in the organisation, but this effect was less stable. This effect was stronger for women than it was for men. For women, this association was stronger in countries with lower female involvement in the labor market, whereas for men, it was stronger in countries with higher female involvement. Maybe, for women, this can be explained by the fact that in countries with higher female involvement, more women have jobs where they are able to influence policy decisions, disregarding their attitudes towards gender equality.

Concerning the effect of the importance of using initiative at the job on the actual opportunity to influence policy decisions, it was very strong and significant in all the countries. At the same time, it was even stronger in countries with higher female involvement (especially for men). This could be explained by the fact that passive men in such countries must face more competition with women. When women are not engaged in the labor market, it is enough for men to have any job at all for their self-esteem. Overall, the research demonstrates that, on the one hand, egalitarian gender attitudes have an impact on female achievement motivation and its realisation in their careers. On the other hand, this relation was not very strong and did not exist across all European countries. This means that not all women with egalitarian gender attitudes were willing and able to pursue them in their professional life. The reason for this may lie in the fact that women still carry the double burden of doing the majority of housework and contributing to family income at the same time. Interestingly, men with more egalitarian gender attitudes tended to attach more importance to using their own initiative on their jobs, although this effect was weaker than it was for women. This could possibly be explained by the fact that people who have modernisation values in one area (for instance, attitudes towards gender equality) tend to have modernisation values in other areas (for example, work values).

The current research brings us to the question of whether reaching full gender equality is a realistic and right (rational) goal. From my point of view, it would be better to strive not for equal male and female participation in the labor market but for the situation when both men and women feel comfortable. Male and female values and aspirations should be taken into account while elaborating social policy. Increasing female participation in the labor market can also generate more egalitarian gender role attitudes.

The research has certain limitations. Using a cross-country dataset, on the one hand, permits international comparisons and simultaneous evaluation of individual and country effects. On the other hand, it is limited to certain indicators of the concepts presented herein and to a certain period of time. Qualitative research on the link between gender attitudes, achievement motivation and its realisation for men and women may represent the next step of research.

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Tables and figures

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Lithuania 0.156^{***} 0.084^* 0.264^{***} Netherlands 0.218^{***} 0.090^{**} 0.197^{***} Norway 0.161^{***} 0.134^{***} 0.186^{***} Poland 0.115^{**} 0.138^{***} 0.149^{***} Portugal 0.009 -0.079 0.127^{**} Russia -0.005 0.068^{**} 0.242^{***} Sweden 0.162^{***} -0.045 0.307^{***} Slovenia 0.109^{**} 0.062 0.132^{**} Slovakia -0.025 0.008 0.300^{***}	Ireland	0.172***	0.060	0.267***					
Netherlands 0.218^{***} 0.090^{**} 0.197^{***} Norway 0.161^{***} 0.134^{***} 0.186^{***} Poland 0.115^{**} 0.138^{***} 0.149^{***} Portugal 0.009 -0.079 0.127^{**} Russia -0.005 0.068^{**} 0.242^{***} Sweden 0.162^{***} -0.045 0.307^{***} Slovenia 0.109^{**} 0.062 0.132^{**} Slovakia -0.025 0.008 0.300^{***}	Israel	0.249***	0.089**	0.197***					
Norway0.161***0.134***0.186***Poland0.115**0.138***0.149***Portugal0.009-0.0790.127**Russia-0.0050.068*0.242***Sweden0.162***-0.0450.307***Slovenia0.109*0.0620.132**Slovakia-0.0250.0080.300***	Lithuania	0.156***	0.084*	0.264***					
Poland0.115**0.138***0.149***Portugal0.009-0.0790.127**Russia-0.0050.068*0.242***Sweden0.162***-0.0450.307***Slovenia0.109*0.0620.132**Slovakia-0.0250.0080.300***	Netherlands	0.218***	0.090**	0.197***					
Portugal0.009-0.0790.127**Russia-0.0050.068*0.242***Sweden0.162***-0.0450.307***Slovenia0.109*0.0620.132**Slovakia-0.0250.0080.300***	Norway	0.161***	0.134***	0.186***					
Russia-0.0050.068*0.242***Sweden0.162***-0.0450.307***Slovenia0.109*0.0620.132**Slovakia-0.0250.0080.300***	Poland	0.115**	0.138***	0.149***					
Russia-0.0050.068*0.242***Sweden0.162***-0.0450.307***Slovenia0.109*0.0620.132**Slovakia-0.0250.0080.300***	Portugal	0.009	-0.079	0.127**					
Slovenia0.109*0.0620.132**Slovakia-0.0250.0080.300***	-	-0.005	0.068*	0.242***					
Slovenia0.109*0.0620.132**Slovakia-0.0250.0080.300***	Sweden	0.162***	-0.045	0.307***					
Slovakia -0.025 0.008 0.300***									
Ukraine -0.059 -0.025 0.181***									

Note: ***p <.01, **p <.05, *p <.1 (2-tailed tests). Design weights are applied.

gender attitudes and opportunity to influence policy influence policy decisionsusing initiative and opportunity to influence policy decisionsBelgium 0.129^{***} 0.127^{***} 0.296^{***} Bulgaria 0.015 0.075 0.303^{***} Switzerland 0.108^{**} 0.073 0.264^{***} Cyprus 0.091 0.206^{***} 0.270^{***} Czech -0.072 0.016 0.168^{***} Germany 0.077^{**} -0.040 0.367^{***} Denmark 0.087^{*} -0.082^{*} 0.346^{***} Estonia 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} Finland 0.163^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.020 0.342^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^{*} 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Portugal 0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Survaia -0.17^{***} 0.023 0.444^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 <th></th> <th colspan="9">Spearman correlation between</th>		Spearman correlation between								
gender attitudes and using initiativeinfluence policy decisionsinfluence policy decisionsBelgum 0.129^{***} 0.127^{***} 0.296^{***} Bulgaria 0.015 0.075 0.303^{***} Switzerland 0.108^{**} 0.073 0.264^{***} Cyprus 0.091 0.206^{***} 0.270^{***} Czech 0.072 0.016 0.168^{***} Germany 0.071^{***} -0.040 0.367^{***} Denmark 0.087^* -0.082^* 0.346^{***} Estonia 0.054 0.089^* 0.293^{***} Spain 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} United V V V Kingdom 0.107^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} 0.020 0.342^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} 0.0071 $0.158^$			gender attitudes and	using initiative and						
Countryusing initiativedecisionsdecisionsBelgium 0.129^{**} 0.127^{***} 0.296^{***} Bulgaria 0.015 0.075 0.303^{***} Switzerland 0.108^{**} 0.073 0.264^{***} Cyprus 0.091 0.206^{***} 0.270^{***} Czech 0.072 0.016 0.168^{***} Germany 0.077^{**} -0.040 0.367^{***} Denmark 0.087^* -0.082^* 0.346^{***} Spain 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} Finland 0.163^{***} 0.005 0.220^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} United V V V Kingdom 0.107^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} 0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.020 0.342^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} 0.020^*** 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^* 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.117^{**} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^* 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}										
Belgium 0.129^{***} 0.127^{***} 0.296^{***} Bulgaria 0.015 0.075 0.303^{***} Switzerland 0.108^{**} 0.073 0.264^{***} Cyprus 0.091 0.206^{***} 0.270^{***} Czech 0.072 0.016 0.168^{***} Germany 0.077^{**} -0.040 0.367^{***} Denmark 0.087^{*} -0.082^{*} 0.346^{***} Estonia 0.054 0.089^{*} 0.293^{***} Spain 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} United 0.163^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} Kingdom 0.107^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^{*} 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^{*} 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Susia -0.17^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Susia 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}		-								
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Switzerland 0.108^{**} 0.073 0.264^{***} Cyprus 0.091 0.206^{***} 0.270^{***} Czech 0.016 0.168^{***} Republick -0.072 0.016 0.168^{***} Germany 0.077^{**} -0.040 0.367^{***} Denmark 0.087^* -0.082^* 0.346^{***} Estonia 0.054 0.089^* 0.293^{***} Spain 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} Finland 0.163^{***} 0.005 0.220^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} United 0.107^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^* 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^* 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lihuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} -0.023 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^* 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Belgium	0.129***	0.127***							
Cyprus 0.091 0.206*** 0.270*** Republick -0.072 0.016 0.168*** Germany 0.077** -0.040 0.367*** Denmark 0.087* -0.082* 0.346*** Estonia 0.054 0.089* 0.293** Spain 0.071 -0.100** 0.166*** Finland 0.163*** 0.005 0.220*** France 0.125*** 0.020 0.246*** United - 0.132*** 0.132*** Croatia 0.135** 0.181*** 0.253*** Greece -0.115*** -0.127*** 0.132*** Croatia 0.165** -0.020 0.342*** Israel 0.086* 0.139*** 0.184*** Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262*** Norway 0.144*** -0.027 0.246*** Poland 0.110** 0.071 0.158*** Portugal 0.113** -0.028 0.414***	Bulgaria	0.015	0.075	0.303***						
CzechRepublick -0.072 0.016 0.168^{***} Germany 0.077^{**} -0.040 0.367^{***} Denmark 0.087^* -0.082^* 0.346^{***} Estonia 0.054 0.089^* 0.293^{***} Spain 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} Finland 0.163^{***} 0.005 0.220^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} United -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Croatia 0.107^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^* 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^* 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^* 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Switzerland	0.108**	0.073							
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$Germany$ 0.077^{**} -0.040 0.367^{***} Denmark 0.087^* -0.082^* 0.346^{***} Estonia 0.054 0.089^* 0.293^{***} Spain 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} Finland 0.163^{***} 0.005 0.220^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} United -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^* 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^* 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Czech									
Denmark 0.087^* -0.082^* 0.346^{***} Estonia 0.054 0.089^* 0.293^{***} Spain 0.071 -0.100^{**} 0.166^{***} Finland 0.163^{***} 0.005 0.220^{***} France 0.125^{***} 0.020 0.246^{***} United 0.005 0.292^{***} Greece -0.15^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^* 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^* 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.0711 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.17^{***} 0.028 0.414^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Republick	-0.072	0.016							
Estonia0.0540.089*0.293***Spain0.071-0.100**0.166***Finland0.163***0.0050.220***France0.125***0.0200.246***UnitedKingdom0.107***-0.0550.292***Greece-0.115***-0.127***0.132***Croatia0.135**0.181***0.253***Hungary-0.0500.085*0.280***Ireland0.165**-0.0200.342***Israel0.086*0.139***0.184***Lithuania-0.0760.0470.262***Netherlands0.106**0.0310.252***Poland0.110**0.0710.158***Portugal0.113**-0.0330.164***Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***	Germany	0.077**	-0.040							
Spain0.071-0.100**0.166***Finland0.163***0.0050.220***France0.125***0.0200.246***UnitedKingdom0.107***-0.0550.292***Greece-0.115***-0.127***0.132***Croatia0.135**0.181***0.253***Hungary-0.0500.085*0.280***Ireland0.165**-0.0200.342***Israel0.086*0.139***0.184***Lithuania-0.0760.0470.262***Netherlands0.106**0.0310.252***Norway0.144***-0.0270.246***Poland0.113**-0.0330.164***Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	Denmark	0.087*	-0.082*	0.346***						
Finland0.163***0.0050.220***France0.125***0.0200.246***UnitedKingdom0.107***-0.0550.292***Greece-0.115***-0.127***0.132***Croatia0.135**0.181***0.253***Hungary-0.0500.085*0.280***Ireland0.165**-0.0200.342***Israel0.086*0.139***0.184***Lithuania-0.0760.0470.262***Netherlands0.106**0.0310.252***Norway0.144***-0.0270.246***Poland0.110**0.0710.158***Portugal0.113**-0.0330.164***Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	Estonia	0.054	0.089*	0.293***						
France United0.125***0.0200.246***Kingdom0.107***-0.0550.292***Greece-0.115***-0.127***0.132***Croatia0.135**0.181***0.253***Hungary-0.0500.085*0.280***Ireland0.165**-0.0200.342***Israel0.086*0.139***0.184***Lithuania-0.0760.0470.262***Netherlands0.106**0.0310.252***Norway0.144***-0.0270.246***Poland0.113**-0.0330.164***Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	Spain	0.071	-0.100**	0.166***						
UnitedKingdom 0.107^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^{*} 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^{*} 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovakia -0.046 0.015^{**} 0.392^{***}	Finland	0.163***	0.005	0.220***						
Kingdom 0.107^{***} -0.055 0.292^{***} Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^{*} 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^{*} 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovakia -0.046 0.015^{**} 0.392^{***}	France	0.125***	0.020	0.246***						
Greece -0.115^{***} -0.127^{***} 0.132^{***} Croatia 0.135^{**} 0.181^{***} 0.253^{***} Hungary -0.050 0.085^{*} 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^{*} 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	United									
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Hungary -0.050 0.085^* 0.280^{***} Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^* 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^* 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Greece	-0.115***	-0.127***	0.132***						
Ireland 0.165^{**} -0.020 0.342^{***} Israel 0.086^{*} 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Croatia	0.135**	0.181***	0.253***						
Israel 0.086^* 0.139^{***} 0.184^{***} Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^* 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Hungary	-0.050	0.085*	0.280***						
Lithuania -0.076 0.047 0.262^{***} Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Ireland	0.165**	-0.020	0.342***						
Netherlands 0.106^{**} 0.031 0.252^{***} Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***}	Israel	0.086*	0.139***	0.184***						
Norway 0.144^{***} -0.027 0.246^{***} Poland 0.110^{**} 0.071 0.158^{***} Portugal 0.113^{**} -0.033 0.164^{***} Russia -0.117^{***} -0.028 0.414^{***} Sweden 0.090^{*} 0.016 0.236^{***} Slovenia 0.204^{***} 0.043 0.241^{***} Slovakia -0.046 0.015^{**} 0.392^{***}	Lithuania	-0.076	0.047	0.262***						
Poland0.110**0.0710.158***Portugal0.113**-0.0330.164***Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	Netherlands	0.106**	0.031	0.252***						
Poland0.110**0.0710.158***Portugal0.113**-0.0330.164***Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	Norway	0.144***	-0.027	0.246***						
Portugal0.113**-0.0330.164***Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	-	0.110**	0.071	0.158***						
Russia-0.117***-0.0280.414***Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	Portugal	0.113**	-0.033	0.164***						
Sweden0.090*0.0160.236***Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***	-									
Slovenia0.204***0.0430.241***Slovakia-0.0460.015**0.392***				0.236***						
Slovakia -0.046 0.015** 0.392***										
Ukraine -0.059 0.009 0.403***	Ukraine	-0.059	0.009	0.403***						

 Table 2. Spearman correlation between three levels of gender equality, men

Note: ***p <.01, **p <.05, *p <.1 (2-tailed tests). Design weights are applied.

	Model 1.1	Model 2.1	Model $3.\overline{1}$	Model 4.1	Model 5.1
Gender attitudes	0.302***	0.302***	-1.036***	0.302***	0.704***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.380)	(0.037)	(0.097)
Degree of religiosity	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age squared	0.00001	0.00001	0.00002	0.00001	0.00001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Not married	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.018
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
No children in household	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Medium education	0.240^{***}	0.240***	0.240***	0.240***	0.242***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
High education	0.536***	0.536***	0.536***	0.535***	0.537***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Self-employed	0.364***	0.364***	0.362***	0.364***	0.362***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Working for own family business	0.216***	0.217***	0.217***	0.216***	0.222***
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Gender attitudes: FLPR2010			0.025***		
			(0.007)		
FLPR2010		0.013	-0.003		
		(0.012)	(0.013)		
Gender attitudes:femaleUR					-0.043***
					(0.010)

Table 3. Results of multilevel	regressions for	or opportunity	to use	initiative	as an	important
characteristic of job for women,	ESS 2010					

Female UR				-0.015 (0.015)	0.011 (0.016)				
Constant	3.615***	2.915***	3.747***	3.759***	3.498***				
	(0.132)	(0.650)	(0.688)	(0.194)	(0.203)				
Observations	11,218	11,218	11,218	11,218	11,218				
Countries	26	26	26	26	26				
Log Likelihood	-14,254.970	-14,254.380	-14,248.140	-14,254.480	-14,244.550				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	28,535.940	28,536.760	28,526.280	28,536.950	28,519.100				
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	28,631.170	28,639.310	28,636.150	28,639.510	28,628.980				
ICC	0.112	0.107	0.107	0.108	0.108				
Note: $***n < 01$ $**n < 05$ $*n < 1$ (2-tailed tests)									

Note: ***p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 (2-tailed tests). Unstandardized coefficients are presented.

	Mode 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 2.4	Model 2.5
Gender attitudes	0.115***	0.114***	-1.024***	0.115***	0.355***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.377)	(0.037)	(0.093)
Degree of religiosity	0.008^{***}	0.008^{***}	0.008^{***}	0.008^{***}	0.008^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age squared	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Not married	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.009
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
No children in household	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Medium education	0.203***	0.203***	0.204***	0.202^{***}	0.205***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
High education	0.486***	0.486^{***}	0.488^{***}	0.486^{***}	0.490^{***}
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Self-employed	0.416***	0.416^{***}	0.416***	0.416***	0.415***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Working for own family	0.332***	0.332***	0.330***	0.332***	0.333***
business	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
	(0.00.1)	(0.01.)		(0.0.1)	()
Gender attitudes: FLPR2010			0.022***		
			(0.007)		
FLPR2010		0.014	0.003		
		(0.010)	(0.010)		
					de de de

Table 4. Results of multilevel regressions for opportunity to use initiative as an important characteristic of job, men, ESS 2010

Gender attitudes:femaleUR

Female UR				-0.009 (0.012)	0.005 (0.013)
Constant	3.566 ^{***} (0.120)	2.802 ^{***} (0.520)	3.422 ^{***} (0.554)	3.652 ^{***} (0.167)	3.514 ^{***} (0.174)
Observations	11,363	11,363	11,363	11,363	11,363
Countries	26	26	26	26	26
Log Likelihood	- 14,333.330	- 14,332.240	- 14,327.640	- 14,333.060	- 14,329.150
Akaike Inf. Crit.	28,692.660	28,692.470	28,685.270	28,694.130	28,688.290
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	28,788.060	28,795.210	28,795.340	28,796.860	28,798.370
ICC	0.077	0.071	0.070	0.076	0.075

Note: ***p <.01, ** p <.05, * p <.1 (2-tailed tests). Unstandardized coefficients are presented.

	Model 3.1	Model 3.2		Model 3.4	Model 3.5	Model 3.6	Model 3.7	Model 3.8	Model 3.9
Gender attitudes	0.551***		0.391***	0.397***	1.676	0.391***	0.391***	0.084	0.380^{***}
	(0.127)		(0.126)	(0.126)	(1.292)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.332)	(0.126)
Importance to use initiative		0.510***	0.497***	0.498***	0.499***	-0.009	0.497***	0.498***	0.651***
		(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.349)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.084)
Degree of religiosity	0.033***	0.026***	0.031***	0.031***	0.030***	0.030***	0.031***	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.082 ^{****} (0.016)	0.098 ^{***} (0.018)	0.097 ^{***} (0.018)	0.098 ^{***} (0.018)	0.098 ^{***} (0.018)	0.097 ^{***} (0.018)	0.098 ^{***} (0.018)	0.097 ^{***} (0.018)	0.097 ^{***} (0.018)
Age squared	-0.001 ^{***} (0.0002)								
Not married	-0.216 ^{***} (0.062)	-0.201 ^{****} (0.061)	-0.217 ^{****} (0.062)	-0.218 ^{****} (0.062)	-0.217 ^{***} (0.062)	-0.218 ^{****} (0.062)	-0.217 ^{****} (0.062)	-0.218 ^{****} (0.062)	-0.217 ^{***} (0.062)
No children in household	-0.086 (0.064)	-0.069 (0.064)	-0.080 (0.065)	-0.081 (0.065)	-0.081 (0.065)	-0.079 (0.065)	-0.079 (0.065)	-0.081 (0.065)	-0.077 (0.065)
Medium education	0.797^{***} (0.089)	0.685 ^{****} (0.089)	0.669 ^{****} (0.089)	0.664 ^{***} (0.089)	0.665 ^{***} (0.089)	0.663 ^{***} (0.089)	0.667 ^{***} (0.089)	0.665 ^{****} (0.089)	0.665 ^{****} (0.089)

Table 5. Results of multilevel regressions for opportunity to influence decisions about the activities of the organisation, women, ESS 2010

High education	1.915 ^{***} (0.094)	1.678 ^{***} (0.094)	1.640 ^{***} (0.096)	1.636 ^{***} (0.095)	1.636 ^{***} (0.095)	1.632 ^{***} (0.095)	1.638 ^{***} (0.096)	1.636 ^{***} (0.096)	1.634 ^{***} (0.096)
Self-employed	5.253 ^{***} (0.096)	5.042 ^{***} (0.096)	5.061 ^{***} (0.096)	5.063 ^{***} (0.096)	5.064 ^{***} (0.096)	5.063 ^{***} (0.096)	5.062 ^{***} (0.096)	5.063 ^{***} (0.096)	5.065 ^{***} (0.096)
Working for own family business	4.345 ^{***} (0.242)	4.272 ^{***} (0.243)	4.294 ^{***} (0.243)	4.297 ^{***} (0.243)	4.297 ^{***} (0.243)	4.301 ^{***} (0.243)	4.293 ^{***} (0.243)	4.289 ^{***} (0.243)	4.289 ^{***} (0.243)
Gender attitudes: female LFPR					-0.024 (0.024)				
Using initiative: female LFPR						0.010 (0.007)			
Female LFPR				0.124 ^{***} (0.025)	0.139 ^{***} (0.030)	0.086 ^{**} (0.036)			
Gender attitudes: female UR								0.033 (0.033)	
Using initiative: femaleUR									-0.016 ^{**} (0.008)
femaleUR							-0.065 (0.042)	-0.085 [*] (0.047)	-0.002 (0.053)

Constant	1.203^{***}	-0.648	-0.805*	-7.404***	-8.204***	-5.375***	-0.190	0.003	-0.783
	(0.408)	(0.446)	(0.450)	(1.402)	(1.627)	(1.977)	(0.600)	(0.631)	(0.671)
	11 200	11.000	11 100	11 100	11 100	11 100	11 100	11 100	11 100
Observations	11,299	11,232	11,108	11,108	11,108	11,108	11,108	11,108	11,108
Log Likelihood	-28,295.380	-27,989.660	-27,675.510	-27,666.870	-27,666.380	-27,665.810	-27,674.380	-27,673.880	-27,672.400
Akaike Inf. Crit.	56,616.750	56,005.320	55,379.010	55,363.740	55,364.760	55,363.610	55,378.750	55,379.760	55,376.810
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	56,712.080	56,100.560	55,481.430	55,473.470	55,481.800	55,480.660	55,488.480	55,496.800	55,493.850
ICC	0.091	0.086	0.081	0.042	0.043	0.043	0.075	0.076	0.076

Note: ***p <.01, ** p <.05, * p <.1 (2-tailed tests). Unstandardized coefficients are presented.

	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	Model 4.3	Model 4.4	Model 4.5	Model 4.6	Model 4.7	Model 4.8	Model 4.9
Gender attitudes	0.451 ^{***} (0.125)		0.378 ^{***} (0.123)	0.383 ^{***} (0.123)	0.244 (1.261)	0.377 ^{***} (0.123)	0.378 ^{***} (0.123)	0.938 ^{***} (0.313)	0.369 ^{***} (0.123)
Importance to use initiative		0.587 ^{***} (0.031)	0.583 ^{***} (0.032)	0.584 ^{***} (0.032)	0.584 ^{***} (0.032)	-0.326 (0.335)	0.584 ^{***} (0.032)	0.582 ^{***} (0.032)	0.932 ^{***} (0.081)
Degree of religiosity	0.055 ^{***}	0.047 ^{***}	0.052 ^{***}	0.051 ^{***}	0.051 ^{***}	0.052 ^{***}	0.052 ^{***}	0.052 ^{***}	0.052 ^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.056 ^{***}	0.066 ^{***}	0.065 ^{***}	0.066 ^{***}	0.066 ^{***}	0.066 ^{***}	0.065 ^{***}	0.065 ^{***}	0.066 ^{***}
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Age squared	-0.001 ^{****}	-0.001 ^{***}							
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Not married	-0.197 ^{***}	-0.220 ^{***}	-0.207 ^{***}	-0.206 ^{***}	-0.206 ^{***}	-0.208 ^{****}	-0.207 ^{***}	-0.205 ^{***}	-0.207 ^{***}
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
No children in household	-0.148 ^{**}	-0.131 ^{**}	-0.129 [*]	-0.129 [*]	-0.129 [*]	-0.126 [*]	-0.129 [*]	-0.129 [*]	-0.125 [*]
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Medium education	0.600^{***}	0.505 ^{****}	0.483 ^{***}	0.478 ^{***}	0.479 ^{***}	0.474 ^{***}	0.479 ^{***}	0.487 ^{***}	0.480 ^{***}
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)

Table 6. Results of multilevel regressions for opportunity to influence decisions about the activities of the organisation, men, ESS 2010

High education	1.870 ^{***} (0.089)	1.620 ^{***} (0.088)	1.575 ^{***} (0.090)	1.571 ^{***} (0.090)	1.571 ^{***} (0.090)	1.563 ^{***} (0.090)	1.571 ^{***} (0.090)	1.582 ^{***} (0.090)	1.560 ^{***} (0.090)
Self-employed	5.410 ^{***} (0.074)	5.199 ^{***} (0.074)	5.190 ^{***} (0.075)	5.191 ^{***} (0.075)	5.191 ^{***} (0.075)	5.195 ^{***} (0.075)	5.191 ^{***} (0.075)	5.190 ^{***} (0.075)	5.204 ^{***} (0.075)
Working for own family business	4.139 ^{***} (0.247)	4.019 ^{***} (0.247)	4.019 ^{***} (0.249)	4.016 ^{***} (0.249)	4.016 ^{***} (0.249)	4.017 ^{***} (0.249)	4.018 ^{***} (0.249)	4.022 ^{****} (0.249)	4.012 ^{***} (0.249)
Gender attitudes: female LFPR					0.003 (0.024)				
Using initiative: female LFPR						0.017 ^{***} (0.006)			
Female LFPR				0.111 ^{****} (0.022)	0.109 ^{***} (0.025)	0.042 (0.034)			
Gender attitudes: female UR								-0.060 [*] (0.031)	
Using initiative: femaleUR									-0.037 ^{***} (0.008)
femaleUR							-0.066 [*] (0.037)	-0.033 (0.040)	0.083 [*] (0.049)

Constant	2.151 ^{***} (0.379)	0.018 (0.410)	-0.143 (0.414)	-6.054 ^{***} (1.221)	-5.977 ^{***} (1.400)	-2.389 (1.820)	0.478 (0.538)	0.162 (0.559)	-0.935 (0.620)
Observations	11,473	11,436	11,269	11,269	11,269	11,269	11,269	11,269	11,269
Countries	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
Log Likelihood	-28,563.970	-28,257.660	-27,846.830	-27,837.810	-27,837.800	-27,834.090	-27,845.310	-27,843.410	-27,834.520
Akaike Inf. Crit.	57,153.940	56,541.310	55,721.660	55,705.620	55,707.610	55,700.190	55,720.610	55,718.830	55,701.050
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	57,249.460	56,636.790	55,824.280	55,815.570	55,824.880	55,817.460	55,830.560	55,836.100	55,818.320
ICC	0.076	0.072	0.067	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.059	0.058	0.061

Note: ***p <.01, ** p <.05, * p <.1 (2-tailed tests). Unstandardized coefficients are presented.




Figure 1. Effect of gender attitudes upon using initiative in countries with different female LFPR, women




Figure 2. Effect of gender attitudes upon using initiative in countries with different female unemployment rate, women




Figure 3. Effect of gender attitudes upon using initiative in countries with different female LFPR, men




Figure 4. Effect of gender attitudes upon using initiative in countries with different female unemployment rate, men




Figure 5. Effect of gender attitudes upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female LFPR, women




Figure 6. Effect of using initiative upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female LFPR, women




Figure 7. Effect of gender attitudes upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female unemployment rate, women




Figure 8. Effect of using initiative upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female unemployment rate, women





Figure 9. Effect of gender attitudes upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female LFPR, men



Influencing policy decisions in countries with different female LFP

Figure 10. Effect of using initiative upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female LFPR, men




Figure 11. Effect of gender attitudes upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female unemployment rate, men




Figure 12. Effect of using initiative upon opportunity to influence policy decisions within organization in countries with different female unemployment rate, men

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