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The 1980 Olympiad in Moscow (the first Olympiad in Eastern Europe and the socialist state) is viewed through the prism of the successes and failures of the cultural and sports diplomacy of the Soviet state. Olympics-80 as a kind of mega-project "developed socialism" promoted (albeit temporarily) not only to strengthening the position of the Soviet Union in the international arena (especially in the background of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), but also unity of Soviet citizens in the face of "Western threat". The situation was somewhat more complicated with attempts to use the Olympic project to strengthen the socialist camp.

The source base of the research was the materials of the State archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian state archive of socio-political history and the Central archive of Moscow, as well as the published documents of the Russian state archive of modern history.

It is shown that, despite the boycott of the Olympics, its consequences did not have a particularly strong impact on the development of sports ties and international tourism in the USSR. For example, in 1980, at the suggestion of the delegation of the USSR, the participants of the world conference on tourism, when adopting the Manila Declaration on world tourism, included in the Declaration all the initiatives of the Soviet delegation. And since 1982, the process of restoring international sports contacts began.

Keywords: megaproject, soft power, cultural diplomacy, sports diplomacy, Olympics-80, international tourism

JEL Classification: Z

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Introduction

The XIX World Festival of Youth and Students, which Russia hosted in the autumn of 2017 under the slogan “For peace, solidarity and social justice, we are fighting against imperialism”, and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi demonstrated many common traits with the discourse and practices of Cold-War era foreign policy representations. A direct descendant of an event that took place 60 years prior (the 1957 World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow), the festival became an attempt to overcome Russia’s international isolation and to demonstrate its openness to the world without rejecting the possibility of actively promoting its interests on the global stage. In turn, the XXII Olympic Winter Games have a lot in common with the Moscow Olympics, up to and including the ordinal number.

Often perceived in the categories of “the new cold war”, the contemporary transformation of international relations has sparked an interest in the exploration of the 20th-century global competition, including that on the symbolic level. Over the last few decades, the fascination with the cultural aspects of the Cold War (or “the cold war of cultures”) has significantly increased. This interest was fuelled not only by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the USSR but also by the very logic of the research landscape development³.

Back in the early 2000s, foreign scholars set the objective of contextualising Soviet cultural diplomacy, considering that it was the USSR that dictated the modalities and pace of cultural relations development in a bipolar world⁴; at the same time, exploring the policy of relative openness employed by Stalin’s successors is a way to understanding causes and mechanisms of socialism stabilisation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe⁵. High-performance sports in general and the Olympic Games in particular served a range of political purposes even before World War II (in the USA in 1932 and in Nazi Germany in 1936). However, it was not until the latter half of the 20th century that sports became a battlefield for two social systems, with each trying to prove its supremacy through the level of world championships and Olympics organisation and achievements of athletic schools and athletes. The Olympic movement also became an instrument of political protest: thus, African nations

expressed their discontent with the South African policy by boycotting the Games, while Israeli-Palestinian tensions climaxed in a mass casualty attack at the 1972 Olympiad in Munich. In the context of the present study, it can be hypothesised that soft-power instruments played a crucial part in avoiding direct military confrontation between the superpowers, creating a cultural and symbolic balance of powers to match the military and strategic one.

On the one hand, cultural and sports diplomacy is country-specific\(^6\). In the post-WWII Soviet Union, for instance, sporting activities were overseen by the Physical Culture and Sports Sector of the Propaganda and Agitation Department within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As a result, the USSR Committee for Sports could not make a single important decision without the consent or approval of the higher party agencies\(^7\). On the other hand, the reality of the Cold War cancelled out the national features of the cultural and sports diplomacy in Western and socialist countries alike. In this respect, an analysis of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow presents an opportunity of discovering common and distinctive traits of the cultural, sports, and Olympic diplomacy of the last decade of the Cold War. To begin with, it is necessary to clarify the key terms used in the paper and to explain their relevance to the history of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.

The range of soft-power instruments: Operationalization of concepts

Even though soft-power studies have evolved into a rapidly developing area of research, the question of correlations between various instruments of the phenomenon remains open. The author believes that the scope of soft-power instruments may be specified by referring to the experience of preparation and implementation of mega-projects that necessitated an engagement of the full range of “diplomacies” — public, cultural, sports, Olympic, and so on.

Even academic sources, not to mention the media, often treat the categories of cultural and public diplomacy as synonyms. Thus, in France, the term “cultural diplomacy” is used on par with such terms as “foreign cultural policy” or “international cultural policy”. The debate about the equivalence of the terms “cultural diplomacy” and “foreign cultural policy” is ongoing in

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\(^7\) Prozumenschchikov, MYu 2004, Bolshoy sport i bolshaya politika [Elite sports and global politics], ROSSPEN, Moscow, p. 4-7.
Russia's modern diplomacy studies as well, whereas China maintains the tradition of using the term “people's diplomacy”\(^8\). Initially used primarily by the media for sporting events presentation, the term “sports diplomacy” remains no less controversial. The diplomatic potential of sports first attracted attention in the late 1970s\(^9\), followed by a number of in-depth studies in the 1980s and the 1990s\(^10\). However, even in the early 2000s, the term “sports diplomacy” was used primarily in English-language academic literature.

The present article offers the following hierarchy of the key concepts related to the sphere of soft power: “sports diplomacy” is the narrowest concept representing a part of a broader concept, “cultural diplomacy”, which, in turn, is a type of public diplomacy. All three types of diplomacy are manifestations of soft-power politics. That said, the interrelations among these elements are more complex. **Sports diplomacy** is similar to cultural diplomacy by nature because sports-related contacts are a part of cultural cooperation. A number of scholars treat sports diplomacy as an element of public diplomacy and, consequently, as representative and diplomatic “activities of individuals engaged in the field of sports” performed “on behalf of their government and in cooperation with it” with the purpose of conveying the state's positive image or brand to the foreign public\(^11\). Indeed, marketing studies carried out by Global Market Insite, USA, made it possible to conclude that athletic achievements have a comparable impact on shaping the positive image of a nation with that of national culture\(^12\).

Indeed, sports diplomacy reflects a state's ambition to prove its supremacy, and not only in athletics. Competitions and sports celebrities' private life are often used to attract attention to relevant issues of the modernity, such as human rights, environmental issues, violence and racism, drug abuse, gender inequality and so on. Sport serves a number of purely diplomatic purposes as well. For instance, the so-called “ping-pong diplomacy” ushered in the establishment

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of diplomatic relations between the USA and China. In 1970, the PRC invited American players to participate in a table tennis competition, which was followed by the Chinese team’s visit to America, the USA lifting its trade embargo in April 1971, and U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972\(^\text{13}\).

The history of Soviet sports diplomacy dates back to the time when the bolsheviks came to power. On the one hand, Soviet Russia was expelled from the International Olympic Committee and found itself in an economic and political blockade, so using sport connections was a way of overcoming its international isolation. On the other hand, the Communist regime viewed sports as a form of class warfare for the world’s working class and a means of uniting workers against capitalists of the world. A milestone in the development of Soviet sports diplomacy was the establishment of the Red Sport International in 1921. By 1926, the RSI had concluded agreements on the exchange of delegations with workers’ sports organisations in a few dozen countries. The tactics of a “unified workers' sport front” climaxed with the 1928 All-Union Spartakiad, held to counter the “bourgeois Olympiad in Amsterdam” of the same year\(^\text{14}\).

However, the politicisation of sports in the USSR reached its peak after WWII. The most effective measures of Soviet sports diplomacy included maintaining contacts with communist and workers’ sports organisations of Western-Bloc countries; hosting major international competitions (such as the Znamensky Brothers Memorial International Track and Field Tournament in Moscow); joint organisation of international tournaments with support of communist or socialist organisations of Western-Bloc countries (such as the annual Paris–Moscow International Cycling Race); international friendly matches; and World Festivals of Youth and Students, which included sporting competitions. The Soviet period also gave birth to such a form of sports diplomacy as goodwill ambassadors. In 1972 two Soviet gymnasts, Olympic champions Olga Korbut and Ludmilla Tourischeva, went on a tour around the USA; as a result, before the end of the year, the USSR and the USA concluded an agreement on contacts, exchanges and cooperation in a number of areas including sports\(^\text{15}\).


\(^{14}\) For more information on the first steps of Soviet sports diplomacy please refer to: Orlov, IB & Popov, AD 2018, Skvoz zhelezny zanaves. See USSR!: inostrannyie turisty i prizrak potyomkinskikh dereven [Through the Iron Curtain. See USSR!: foreign tourists and the ghost of Potemkin villages], The Higher School of Economics Publishing House, Moscow, pp. 89–91.

Present-day literature lists the following primary forms of sports diplomacy: international sports competitions, exchange of athletes, coaches, sports professionals, information, sports-related literature and other reference materials, agreements on affairs related to physical culture and sports, athletic congresses and festivals. Varied political protest forms occupy a special place\(^{16}\), including revolts at sporting events or their boycott, refusal to observe standards or rules of sporting event hosting or to participate in certain competitions or their opening, closing or award ceremonies; the use of certain emblems on clothes, symbolic gestures and other meaningful forms of behaviour; and terror attacks\(^{17}\).

In other words, sports diplomacy is at the confluence of diplomacy and sports. On the one hand, governments purposefully use sports as a diplomatic instrument; on the other hand, sports can be a sort of diplomacy in itself, if we are speaking about interaction among non-state actors involved in the organisation of a sporting event with an influence on international relations\(^{18}\). At the same time, sports diplomacy is capable of unlocking the potential of public and cultural diplomacy. A country’s ability to host a major international sporting event (primarily, the Olympic Games and world championships) contributes to its more positive perception worldwide, in particular by enhancing its status and image\(^{19}\).

Treating sports diplomacy as an independent type of diplomatic activity was predetermined by a number of circumstances including, most importantly, an increased motivation of

\(^{16}\) Winter Games have never fallen prey to politically-motivated boycotts, with the exception of isolated diplomatic debates, such as the expulsion of Taiwan in 1980. As to Summer Olympics, the first incidents occurred during the Games in Antwerp (1920) and Paris (1924), when the judges punished athletes from Germany and its former WWI allies. Due to political controversy, the RSFSR / USSR was not admitted to these games either. The boycott policy reached its peak at the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne, where some of the boycotting countries (including the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland) were protesting against the Soviet forces crushing the Hungarian Revolution, whereas Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon expressed their outrage at the Suez Crisis. The Chinese delegation also refrained from participating since the Taiwan team was invited. In 1976, 29 African states boycotted the Montreal Games (see Chappelet, JL 2009, “Zimniye olimpiyskiye igry: kratky ocherk. Universitetskaya lektiika po olimpiyskim disiplinam [Winter Olympics: a brief overview. A university lecture on Olympic sports]”, Logos: Filosofsko-Literaturny Zhurnal, vol. 73, no. 6, p. 10).


\(^{19}\) Bogolyubova, NM & Nikolayeva, YuV, Geopolitika sporta i osnovy sportivnoy diplomatii [Geopolitics of sports and the basics of sports diplomacy], available at <https://studme.org/119973/turizm/osobennosti_realizatsii_sportivnoy_diplomatii_deyatelnosti_sovremennych_gosudarstv>.
governments to strengthen the role of non-state actors in international relations and the emergence of a new public diplomacy — one characterised by a higher diversity of diplomatic channels and methods and society-to-society interaction. At least three channels of sports diplomacy application as a soft-power instrument can be determined: for enhancement of the nation’s image and status and for pressure on other countries (public diplomacy); as a means of rallying the people around international sporting events (people's diplomacy); and as a means of uniting people around humanitarian, social and cultural projects (cultural diplomacy).

Let us examine these approaches in more detail. Political scientist and Harvard University professor Joseph Nye introduced the category of “soft power” into academic discourse as a new principle and mechanism of building relationships between nations. As opposed to traditional international relations mechanisms (including economic and military coercion) defined as “hard power”, the new form of foreign policy strategy uses cultural, educational and similar resources and suggests achieving progress through voluntary participation in attractive forms of interaction. Nye's followers believe that a state's ability to pursue its goals without coercing its opponents or with minimal possible coercion determines the state's true power.

However, the existing juxtaposition could be challenged not only from the perspective of general criticism of the concept but also considering the specifics of soft power as a mechanism of pursuing foreign policy objectives. First, the number of actors in typical soft-power areas considerably exceeds that of countries. In our case, the actors of traditional soft-power areas include Olympic and sports organisations and tourism companies. Second, the regulatory aspect of soft power does not prevent the state from executing its political will for purposes of humanitarian cooperation. Third, from experience, the most active soft power users are the states

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that are unable to build their relations with the global community on their economic or military might.\textsuperscript{25}

In other words, treating this policy as a strategy of complete abstinence from coercion in favour of humanitarian cooperation is one-sided. To correct this approach, Nye suggested the category of “reasonable power” as a balance between “soft” and “hard” components. A similar concept is the Chinese “comprehensive power of the state”, which includes humanitarian and cultural influence, economic model attractiveness, scientific and technological progress, environmental and demographic situation and matters of defence capabilities and energy security.\textsuperscript{26} The 1980 Olympic Games, especially considering its boycott, is a vivid example of the use of soft-power instruments, on the part of both the Soviet Union and its opponents.

In turn, we will be treating public diplomacy as purposeful international activities aimed at building long-term relations among states and promotion of national interests through the establishment of cultural, educational and other international contacts.\textsuperscript{27} At the same time, public diplomacy is based on an assumption that public opinion may have a considerable influence on the government's decisions and the country's political regime and systems.\textsuperscript{28} British political scientist Mark Leonard has singled out the primary goals of public diplomacy, which are intrinsically linked with cultural policy development: raising awareness about the country; developing a positive perception of the country and its values; attracting foreign tourists and students; promotion of exported goods; and attraction of foreign investment and political allies.\textsuperscript{29} Notably, the history of the 1980 Olympics is well-aligned with such an understanding of public diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{27} Bogolyubova, NM & Nikolayeva, YuV, Geopolitika sporta i osnovy sportivnoy diplomatiyi [Geopolitics of sports and the basics of sports diplomacy], available at <https://studme.org/119973/turizm/osobennosti_realizatsii_sportivnoy_diplomatiyi_deyatelnosti_sovremennyh_gosudarstv>.
\textsuperscript{28} For further information please refer to: Bakhriyev, BKh 2017, “Publichnaya diplomatiya v sovremennom issledovatel'skom diskurse [Public diplomacy in contemporary research discourse]”, Vestnik TGUPBP, Social Sciences series, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 131–147.
\textsuperscript{29} Leonard, M 2002, “Diplomacy by Other Means”, Foreign Policy, no. 132, pp. 48–56.
Finally, **cultural diplomacy**\(^{30}\) will be treated as an exchange of various cultural components between states and nations for the purpose of deepening their relations and at the same time promoting each own interests. Cultural diplomacy aims to use elements of culture to create a positive perception of the country's population, culture and politics in the eyes of foreigners. Its purpose is to stimulate the expansion of cooperation between countries, to defend national interests, and to prevent, manage and mitigate the consequences of international conflicts\(^{31}\). Therefore, cultural diplomacy may employ every aspect of the national culture: arts (including cinema, music, and fine arts), exhibitions, educational programmes, exchange of scientific, educational and other achievements, literature (translations of popular books), broadcasts of news and culture-related television programmes, religion, including an interreligious dialogue, propaganda of social policy achievements and so on\(^{32}\). Cultural diplomacy may be analysed in three dimensions: **institutional** (including channels and mechanisms of international contacts); **subjective** (biographies of cultural diplomacy ambassadors, their professional strategies, generational, age- and gender-oriented portraits); and **media** (representation of events, personae and symbols for an external audience).

Adjacent to cultural and public diplomacy is the concept of **people's diplomacy**, which was actively used during the Cold War and included, among other things, a variety of principles and modalities of cooperation in sports\(^{33}\). People's diplomacy emerged as a means of overcoming a lack of official ties to foreign countries in a situation when international recognition of Soviet Russia at an early stage of its existence was problematic. Later on, this phenomenon transformed into a system of influencing foreign public opinion through government-created pseudo-grassroots organisations that were fully controlled by the governing party\(^{34}\). A form of international cooperation exceptionally popular in the 1980s and 1990s was the Goodwill

\(^{30}\) Emerging in the 1930s, the term initially had propaganda connotations, being used to characterise the Soviet foreign policy. American scholar Frederick Barghoorn defined this term as “the manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes” (Barghoorn, FC 1960, The Soviet Cultural Offensive. The role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy, Princeton). Once cultural diplomacy gained popularity among Western countries, the term received a positive interpretation. Milton C. Cummings Jr., American political scientist and John Hopkins University professor, defined cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding” (Cummings Jr., MC 2003, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government, Center for Arts and Culture, Washington DC, p. 1).


\(^{32}\) Ibid., pp. 82–87.

\(^{33}\) Medvedeva, TI 2007, “Osnovye metody i formy grazhdanskoy diplomatii v sovremennom politicheskom protsesse [Primary methods and forms of civil diplomacy in the contemporary political process]”, Vlast, no. 4, p. 71.

\(^{34}\) Savelyev, NS 2013, “'Narodnaya diplomatiya' kak element 'ottepeli' na primere severo-zapadnykh oblastey Sovetskogo Soyuzu ['People's diplomacy' as part of the Khrushchev Thaw on the example of the Soviet northwest]”, Vestnik Novgorodskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, vol. 1, no. 73, p. 100.
Games — an international sports competition comparable to the Olympics by its scope and ambition. The motto of the Games, “From Friendship in Sport to Peace on Earth”, accurately reflected the principles of people's diplomacy.

As previously noted, a particular use case of public, cultural and sports diplomacy instruments is a mega-event. As applied to the sphere of international sports, along with association football world cups, the most prominent mega-event of the latter half of the 20th century was the Olympic Games. It is believed that investing in the organisation of mega-events can considerably improve the country's international standing and influence its global positioning through a demonstration of its leadership's organisational efficiency, management capability and competence. The connection with public diplomacy is evident. At the same time, mega-events are large-scale cultural events of international significance. That is, in addition to inherent mega-event properties (its duration, number of participants and spectators and the level of organisational complexity), external factors, too, play an important part (such as appeal for journalists and tourists and the impact on the host city urban space and infrastructure development). By these criteria, the Olympic Games in general and the 1980 Olympics in particular are among the seminal mega-events of the latter half of the 20th century.

Research design: theoretical framework and source base

The research design for the present paper is based on a number of theoretical constructs:

First, the notion that the functioning of elite sports is a combination of organisational, economic, mass-media and political factors. In particular, the Success Resources Model divides the core resources of an elite sports organisation into three levels: the social level (religion, gender relations, distribution of poverty and wealth, population growth dynamics, political and economic situation in the country and quality and nature of education and mass media), the level of national elite sports organisation (management and governance structures, human resources potential, scope and structure of financing, frequency and quality of training sessions and a consistent system of competitions that ensures realisation of a full-fledged national athletic programme) and the entire combination of circumstances that are material for elite sports (the

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coordination of elite sports with the legal system, mass media, science, education, armed forces, healthcare and mass sports)\(^{37}\);

Second, recognition of sports as a type of contemporary culture and a space for dialogue between nations, and sports culture (including the Olympic culture) as a specific language\(^{38}\);

Third, the soft power theory, which offers an alternative to a black-and-white perception of the post-WWII international relations history. Analysis of the Moscow Olympics in a broader foreign political context is a way toward redefining the role of sports in the shaping of the global political agenda (\textit{Olympic and sports diplomacy}) and exploring the 1980 Olympics as one of the last attempts of maintaining the socialist community.

The factual density of the present research framework necessitates a reference to archive documents. Considering that the preparation and staging of the Moscow Olympics was entrusted primarily to the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee, the documents of the Organising Committee fund form the core empirical basis of the present study. However, since the most relevant archive documents (those available at the State Archive of the Russian Federation and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History) have already been used in academic research\(^{39}\), the scope of documents for analysis has been extended to include previously unused materials of the Olympiad-80 Moscow Organising Committee stored at the Central State Archive of the City of Moscow for a deeper immersion in the daily life of the Olympic Games\(^{40}\).

International relations in physical culture and sports have also been analysed through unpublished documents of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sports (Gossport of the

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\(^{39}\) Tomilina, NG (ed.) 2011, Pyat kolets pod kremlyovskimi zvyozdami: Dokumentalnaya khronika Olimpiady-80 v Moskve [Five rings beneath the Kremlin stars: A documentary chronicle of the 1980 Olympiad in Moscow], TYu Konova, MYu Prozumenschikov (comp.), MFD, Moscow. The collection of 303 documents covers the period from 1976 to 1981 and features materials of the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the CPSU, documents of ministries, government agencies and social organisations, certificates and reports of the Sports Committee and the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee, reports from Soviet diplomatic organisations abroad, transcripts of interviews with foreign representatives, letters and telegrams.

\(^{40}\) Central State Archive (TsGA) of the City of Moscow, Fund 2376, Series 1, Glavmosolimpiada Mosgorispolkoma [Main Directorate of the Moscow City Executive Committee for Preparation of the City of Moscow to Hosting the XXII Olympic Games].
Olympic mega-project as confrontation and dialogue

To expose the complex configuration of soft-power channels and instruments, it is suggested that the Olympic mega-project be studied in dynamics, by dividing the historic event into several principal stages. As applied to the Olympic Games in general and the Moscow Olympics in particular, relevant sources traditionally single out three stages: the pre-Olympic stage, the Games themselves, and the post-Olympic stage. The pre-Olympic stage, in turn, is divided into two sub-stages: a struggle for the right to host the Olympics and the very preparation for staging the Games. That said, from the perspective of soft-power politics analysis, it seems appropriate to single out four stages, and not three.

Stage one: the struggle for the right to host the Olympics (from the beginning of the bidding process to the decision of the International Olympic Committee). The Soviet Union became a full-fledged member of the Olympic movement in the spring of 1951; starting from 1952, Soviet athletes were regular participants of summer and winter Olympic Games.

Consequently, the Soviet leadership was seriously considering hosting the Olympics in Moscow even in the 1950s. As early as in April 1956, the leaders of the Sports Committee of the USSR requested permission from the CPSU Central Committee to start negotiations with the IOC on the subject of hosting the 1964 Olympics in Moscow. The Central Committee approved the initiative in the person of Leonid Brezhnev, a Central Committee secretary at the time. However, it turned out that the USSR had to meet a number of requirements, which it could not guarantee. The requirements concerned not only customer services but also free access of foreign media representatives to Soviet citizens. Most importantly, the host country was obliged to invite all states to the Olympics, regardless of whether it maintained diplomatic relations with them. The matter was postponed for two years, until December 1958, when the Secretariat of the CPSU

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41 State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), Fund R-7576. The Committee for Physical Culture and Sports of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
42 State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), Fund R-9610. The Organising Committee for Preparation and Staging of the 1980 Twenty-Second Summer Olympic Games in Moscow (the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee).
43 State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), Fund R-10029. The Sovintersport All-Union Foreign Trade Association.
Central Committee ruled that it was “inexpedient to apply” to the IOC for the right to host the 1964 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The Soviet leadership decided to support Tokyo’s bid, expecting a positive reaction from athletes and sports officials of Asian and African countries, which were yet to host the Games. Moscow also hoped to use Tokyo's selection as a launchpad for its own bid for 1968. Moscow secured the right to host the 1962 IOC Session, which was to elect the 1968 Olympics host city, snatching the honour from Nairobi, Kenya. However, the IOC Executive Board postponed the matter of the 1968 Olympics location until 1963, forcing Moscow to suggest that Nairobi host the 1962 IOC Session on the condition that the 1963 Session takes place in the USSR. The IOC refused to make any changes, eventually holding the 1962 Session in Moscow and the 1963 Session, in Baden-Baden. Subsequently, Nikita Khrushchev forewent the idea of Moscow hosting the Olympics altogether45.

The situation changed when Leonid Brezhnev came to power. Late in 1965, the Sports Committee of the USSR put forward an initiative of bidding for the 1972 Games. The issue was submitted to the Central Committee for further deliberation, and the USSR failed to apply before January 1, 1966. The next time hosting the Games in Moscow was suggested in April 1969 by Sergei Pavlov, chairman of the Sports Committee of the USSR. Since Brezhnev favoured the idea, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a directive to that effect as early as in September of the same year. Approved two months later at a Politbureau session, the directive officially nominated Moscow as the host city of the 1976 Olympics. A powerful propaganda campaign through Moscow-controlled Western media ensued. Multiple delegations set out for a number of countries to persuade their representatives to support Moscow’s bid. For the 69th IOC Session in Amsterdam, which was focused on host city election, the USSR prepared a film, an exhibition stand, mock-ups of sports facilities, a book and an album titled “Moscow 1976”. It appears that the Kremlin believed the Olympiad in Moscow was practically a done deal, so it was not until March 1970 (two months prior to the session in Amsterdam) that the Secretariat of the Central Committee adopted the Plan of Information and Propaganda Activities to support Moscow’s bid for hosting the XXI Summer Olympic Games. Naturally, they did not have enough time to implement the plan. In addition, the IOC Session was preceded by a Western media campaign drawing attention to the fact of censorship in the USSR, criticising its foreign tourist service, pointing out significant weaknesses in the technical

equipment of Soviet sports facilities and so on. Indeed, during the European Figure Skating Championship in February 1970 in Leningrad, foreign journalists had to wait for five hours to connect to their news agencies, and television broadcasts often had sound issues. Moscow defeated Montreal and Los Angeles in the first round but lost to Montreal in the second, once the Canadian city had got Los Angeles' votes.46

Most likely, the Olympic Committee did not want to take sides in the circumstances of the Cold War and opted for a compromise. Nevertheless, the USSR came forward with a suggestion of reorganising the IOC, which included 22 persons of title, toward a more democratic body. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership countered the IOC by showing more support to the general assemblies of national Olympic committees (NOCs) and international sports federations (IFs).

Yet Moscow was nominated again just a few years later. The Politbureau decided to bid for hosting the 1980 Olympics back in 1971; that is, the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus had a considerable amount of time for preparation. The previous campaign provided some practical experience. Besides, Lord Killanin (Michael Morris), the new president of the IOC, owed his appointment to Moscow to a great extent, which furthered regular consultations and negotiations with the IOC leadership. Lord Killanin, Duke of Edinburgh (president of FEI, the International Equestrian Federation), Franz Joseph II (IOC member and the reigning Prince of Liechtenstein) and other persons of title received an invitation to come to Moscow. The Soviet capital's readiness to host the Games was proved by Moscow staging the Universiade in the summer of 1973, which was a major success. Moreover, the X Olympic Congress, which had not convened for 43 years, took place in Varna in the same year at the Soviet initiative and supported the idea of strengthening IOC's cooperation with national governments and government sports organisations. Congress members also condemned the so-called “gigantism” of the Games — a suggestion of several IOC members that the Olympics be held simultaneously in multiple cities or even countries. The Soviet delegation, in turn, secured a permit to install an exposition titled “Moscow Invites the 1980 Olympics” next to the expositions of the upcoming 1976 Games in Montreal and Innsbruck, which earned the USSR more points in support of its bid for the Summer Olympics.47

At this stage, one of the Soviet foreign policy objectives was shaping a pro-Soviet space in the Muslim world. The USSR focused its efforts on Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, using such modalities of cooperation as bilateral sporting events, weeks of sports or friendship weeks featuring an athletic programme. For instance, in 1970 Egypt hosted a Soviet week of sports, and a year later Egyptian athletes paid a reciprocal visit to the USSR. In 1972–1973, similar weeks of sports were held in Syria, Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon. As a result, by the mid-1970s, the USSR had established close sports relations with 37 Asian, African and Middle Eastern nations\textsuperscript{48}.

Furthermore, in the early 1970s, Soviet diplomats had to show “tolerance in politics and sports”, lifting the ban on receiving teams from South Korea, Taiwan and Israel to stage the 1973 Summer Universiade. The Taiwan Issue exacerbated for the USSR in the early 1974, shortly before the Biathlon World Championship in the Byelorussian SSR\textsuperscript{49}. Just a few months prior to the election of the 1980 Olympics host city, a refusal to host the championship would have had catastrophic consequences. So the Taiwan national team competed in the 1974 Biathlon World Championship in Raubichi, Belarus, but the delegation was not allowed to travel around the country or contact Soviet citizens outside the event venues. In addition, Taiwanese athletes and coaches were issued entry visas on separate forms that were confiscated at the time of their departure\textsuperscript{50}.

Shortly before the Olympic host city election, Moscow welcomed a large delegation of foreign journalists, including Israeli representatives. “Three weeks ago I expressed doubts in this newspaper that Moscow would be the venue for the 1980 Olympic Games. Having returned from a ten-day trip to Moscow, Leningrad and Baku, I must say that Russians have much better sports facilities than Los Angeles,” British correspondent James Coote of Daily Telegraph changed his point of view in just 10 days\textsuperscript{51}.

A thawing political climate also contributed to the election of the Soviet capital, including the signing of the Treaty of Moscow with the FRG in 1970 on the inviolability of West German


\textsuperscript{49} When the decision about the championship was discussed in 1971, no one expected the International Modern Pentathlon and Biathlon Union (UIPMB) to grant membership to Taiwan just one year later.

\textsuperscript{50} Prozumenshchikov, op. cit., pp. 123–124.

\textsuperscript{51} Avdokhin, A, Olimpiada-80: chto ostalos za kadrom [1980 Olympics: Behind the scenes], available at:
frontiers with Poland and the GDR, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin (1971), which finalised the international status of West Berlin, American president Richard Nixon's visit to the USSR in 1972 and Leonid Brezhnev's reciprocal visit a year later.

However, the decisive factor was subjective. Thanks to Sergei Pavlov's credibility in global sports, an increased interest in the Soviet Union and its athletes, friendly contacts with IOC members (especially Baron Eduard von Falz-Fein, a known Liechtensteiner public figure\textsuperscript{52}, and Willi Daum, president of the West German NOC) and support from Lord Killanin, IOC President, whom Ignaty Novikov, Leonid Brezhnev's childhood friend, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ad future chairman of the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee, successfully turned into a great friend of the Soviet Union, Moscow cemented its victory. On October 23, 1974, IOC members at the 75th Session in Vienna favoured Moscow over Los Angeles by 39 votes to 20.

Stage two (organisation and preparation) starts with a positive IOC decision and concludes on the eve of the Olympics opening ceremony. In February 1975, the CPSU Central Committee passed a directive “On the preparation for the XXII Summer Olympics of 1980 in Moscow”, appointing the composition of the Olympiad '80 Organising Committee with Ignaty Novikov as its head\textsuperscript{53} and launching an ambitious preparation project. The responsibilities of the Organising Committee included coordinating the activities of ministries, government agencies, Soviet social and sports organisations, maintaining contact with the IOC, international sports federations, NOCs and other foreign associations and organisations. One of the Organising Committee's primary objectives was to realise the Olympic economic programme, which was supposed to cover the organising expenses in full and to compensate, at least partially, for the capital expenditures associated with hosting the Games\textsuperscript{54}.

The Soviet leadership was not trying to conceal its ideological agenda behind the Moscow Olympics. In 1975, the structure of the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee was extended to include the Propaganda Directorate in order to offer foreign tourists the “right” outlook on Soviet society. The directorate was headed by a seasoned expert in propaganda and information

\textsuperscript{52} Russian emigrant and President of the Liechtenstein NOC, who was friends with prominent European businessmen and officials and a personal acquaintance of several heads of state, approached each IOC member before the voting with a personal request to give Moscow a chance.

\textsuperscript{53} The Committee ceased to exist in 1981.

\textsuperscript{54} Koval, VI 1978, Olimpiada-80 (Ekonomichesky aspekt) [The 1980 Olympics (Economic aspect)], Moscow, p. 12.
policies, Vladislav Shevchenko, who had occupied high-ranking posts in the Committee of Youth Organisations of the USSR, the State Committee of the USSR for Foreign Cultural Relations, and the Novosti Press Agency since the mid-1950s. The responsibilities of Propaganda Directorate employees included, among other things, monitoring foreign media coverage of Moscow's preparation for the Olympics. A special resolution of December 26, 1978, set an objective of “enhancing the collection of information on the nature of public speeches dealing with the Olympic Games in Moscow, including the position of adversarial Maoist propaganda concerning the 1980 Olympics”. In June 1977, the Fifth Directorate of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR was extended to include the 11th Department, tasked with “operative and counter-intelligence activities aimed at thwarting subversions by the enemy and rogue elements in the period of preparation and staging of the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow”.

The organisers wanted the Moscow Olympics to surpass all its predecessors, demonstrating the benefits of the socialist system to the entire world. In turn, foreign visitors were to promote a positive outlook on the Soviet reality abroad. This is why foreign coverage of Moscow's preparation for the Olympics included a wide range of public and cultural diplomacy instruments, such as regular events for journalists (press conferences, briefings and meetings) and the general public (photo and themed exhibitions and a variety of creative industry events), distribution of printed press in foreign languages (the Olympiad-80 and Olympic Panorama magazines, books, leaflets, booklets and other materials), screenings of documentaries, television and radio broadcasts on the role of sports in the USSR and its preparation for staging of the Olympics, non-commercial and commercial distribution of souvenirs with Olympic symbols. Shortly before the Olympics, Moscow saw the release of the Olympic Encyclopaedia, which included over 1250 entries and covered the achievements of all Soviet Olympic champions except for Ludmila Belousova and Oleg Protopopov, who had chosen to stay abroad and were only mentioned twice in the “Games Results” section.

55 1981, Igry XXII Olympiady [the Games of the XXII Olympiad], in 3 vols., vol. 2. Podgotovka i provedeniye [Preparation and staging], Moscow, p. 7.
58 Pavlov, SP (ed.) 1980, Olimpiyskaya entsiklopediya [The Olympic Encyclopaedia], Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Moscow.
While Soviet authorities intended to engage foreign journalists for adaptation and distribution of materials from Moscow at the early stages of the pre-Olympic marathon, later on, they prioritised the development of their own information network abroad. The total number of copies of Soviet Olympics-related publications exceeded 50 million; 110 countries ran documentaries on the preparation for the Olympics over 6500 times, and the Olympic Moscow exhibition toured 162 cities in 71 countries. The international department of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) jointly with the TASS news agency prepared 14 major Olympic Moscow photo exhibitions for foreign audiences, with the first one opening its doors in Berlin early in November 1979. The UNESCO headquarters in Paris also displayed the exhibition, which included over 120 large-sized photographs and colour slides, postage stamps, coins, posters and souvenirs with Olympics symbols. The Sputnik magazine's field office distributed over 20,000 posters, leaflets, booklets, and themed photo exhibitions on the development of sports in the USSR and preparation for the Olympics among foreign youth organisations.

Countering Western media became an important aspect of information support of the preparation for the Moscow Olympics. Judging by media overviews, Western journalists mostly criticised human rights violations (with a special focus on dissidents and Jews), rigid passport regulations, underdevelopment and low efficiency of consumer services, censorship and the unspoken presence of KGB officers in the Sports Committee of the USSR, the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee and even among athletes. In response, representatives of “slanderous” Western media (such as Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty) encountered major obstacles trying to gain accreditation for their journalists at the Moscow Olympics.

In addition, the 1980 Olympics was presented as a joint project of the entire socialist community. Informational cooperation with socialist countries included regular meetings of news agency and press agency representatives to discuss matters of Olympic propaganda and, consequently, the propaganda of socialist lifestyle. However, when the heads of Eastern Bloc

59 Milovanova, op. cit., p. 52.
60 2011, Pyat kolets pod kremlyovskimi zvyozdami: Dokumentalnaya khornika Olimpiady-80 v Moskve [Five rings beneath the Kremlin stars: A documentary chronicle of the 1980 Olympiad in Moscow], MFD, Moscow, p. 799.
63 Pyat kolets pod kremlyovskimi zvyozdami... [Five rings beneath the Kremlin stars...], pp. 195–196, 799.
sports organisations convened in Berlin (September 26 – October 4, 1975), a number of significant controversies became apparent. Contrary to preliminary arrangements, Bulgaria, Romania and the GDR were trying to delegate their representatives to the governing bodies of international athletic associations. Czechoslovakia faulted the Soviet Union for opposing Czechoslovakian representatives in the International Ice Hockey Federation. For its part, the DPRK was delaying the signing of the final outcome document of the Meeting, pushing for redaction of the paragraph about the historic role of the CPSU and the Soviet Union in defeating Nazism and promoting détente in Europe. The tensions were exacerbated at the mixed commission meeting in Moscow on March 16–17, 1976. Representatives of athletic organisations from socialist countries gathered to discuss matters of preparation for the Olympics and staging the Games, with the list of participating states including the People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), the GDR, the DPRK, Cuba, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), the Polish People's Republic (PPR), the Socialist Republic of Romania (SRR), the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) and the USSR. Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian and Cuban delegations suggested creating national working groups to address specific cooperation aspects, thus divesting Moscow of its “central and guiding” role. The North Korean delegation once again proposed to remove “politically biased content” from the text of the document (about the significance of the XXV Congress of the CPSU and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and to address matters of sports without politics. In spite of support from the Romanian delegation, the North Korean delegation was only allowed by a majority of votes to specify their position in the communique without the right to publish the document. At various levels of diplomatic and inter-party relations, the Soviet leadership underscored the significance of the Moscow Olympics as a “materialisation factor of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe”64.

The socialist community continued working on a consistent position in the following year. Thus, on June 10, 1977, the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a highly classified directive, assigning four members of the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee headed by Ignaty Novikov for participation in the 79th IOC Session in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leadership intended to kill two birds with one stone: apart from an opportunity to contribute to the IOC Session, “the visit of the Organising Committee delegation to Prague will further the

64 Ibid., pp. 105–107, 261.
establishment and strengthening of ties with sports delegations of the CSSR and other socialist countries”. Indeed, on June 17, Ignaty Novikov was received by Lubomír Štrougal, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; the focus of their meeting was the possibility of Czechoslovakia hosting the 1984 Winter Olympics in the Tatra Mountains\(^\text{65}\). The Soviet delegation in Prague also met with heads of party, governmental and social organisations, who “expressed their willingness to show every support for the preparation to the 1980 Olympics in Moscow”\(^\text{66}\). Most importantly, the 79th IOC Session approved the Soviet Union's programme of Olympic competitions in Moscow.

In September 1977, the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee decided to inform the North Korean leadership that it was desirable to see the North Korea team participate in the Games and the USSR had not changed their principal position of non-recognition of the South Korean regime. Meanwhile, the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee and the Sports Committee of the USSR were put in charge of negotiating with East German sports officials to finalise a proposal to the IOC to rename the Germany team to the FRG team and to prohibit the athletes of West Berlin from showing their appurtenance to the FRG at the Olympics\(^\text{67}\). The USSR also suggested that the IOC should refuse to recognise the NOC of the Republic of China (Taiwan) unless it was renamed as well. In case the PRC protested against Taiwan's participation in the Games, the decision was made to use the latter's IOC membership as a pretext. However, should the PRC demand that its NOC be recognised by the IOC simultaneously with Taiwan's expulsion, the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee and the Sports Committee of the USSR undertook to support such a claim\(^\text{68}\).

However, IOC President Lord Killanin, who came to Moscow with an official visit as early as in December 1976, raised the subject of Taiwan in a meeting with Nikolai Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, pushing for guarantees from the Soviet leadership regarding the presence of Taiwanese athletes at the Games in Moscow. The Kremlin

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\(^{65}\) The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had reached out to its Soviet counterpart with a request to support their bid for hosting the 1980 Summer Olympics as early as in September 1967. The Soviet authorities approved of the initiative and promised to help but went back on their promise after the Prague Spring in 1968. (Ibid., p. 266).

\(^{66}\) Ibid., p. 151, 153, 155.

\(^{67}\) After protracted negotiations, the USSR agreed to play the FRG national anthem during the award ceremony of a West Berlin athlete. That said, Soviet officials were well aware of the fact that West Berlin athletes were yet to win any medals at any Games. In exchange for such lenience, the USSR won a concession for the GDR, as FRG representatives agreed to present their team as “the FRG team” instead of “the Germany team” at the Moscow Olympics. Prozumenshchikov, op. cit., pp. 118–119.

\(^{68}\) Pyat kolets pod kremlyovskimi zvyozdami... [Five rings beneath the Kremlin stars...]. p. 158.
confirmed their earlier promise but pointed out the PRC's rigid position on the issue. Only a year before the Moscow Olympics, thanks to the pragmatic policy of the new Chinese government after Mao's death, the NOC of Taiwan was renamed at the 81st IOC Session in Montevideo to the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, as the IOC recognised the National Olympic Committee of the PRC.  

Marked by the presence of Bulgaria, Hungary, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the GDR, the DPRK, the MPR, Cuba, Poland, Romania, the CSSR and the USSR, a meeting of Eastern-Bloc sports organisations officials in Budapest on October 3–8, 1977, demonstrated that many of the disputes had been resolved. In particular, all the delegations acknowledged “a successful realisation of exchange plans, long-term Agreements and protocols of Permanent Joint Commissions” and supported “comprehensive development and strengthening of cooperation in preparation for and staging of the Olympic Games”. The delegations also reached agreement on backing the nomination of Vitaly Smirnov, IOC Olympic Programme Commission member, deputy chairman of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sports of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and first deputy chairman of the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee, for the position of the IOC Vice President and the proposal to the IOC about renaming the NOC of the FRG. It was also deemed practical, in view of Moscow's preparation for the Olympics, to switch to two-year planning of sports exchange activities in 1979–1980. The meeting participants also voted in favour of admitting representatives of the People's Republic of Angola to the meeting — an issue raised by the Cuban delegation. Another arrangement was made with the GDR delegation regarding a special meeting in Moscow in November 1977 “to discuss all matters of bilateral ties in the field of sports and problems arising in international sports associations”. At the same time, the Soviet side showed little enthusiasm about the proposal of the State Administration for Physical Culture and Sports of the Council of Ministers of the HPR to nominate Arpad Csanadi, deputy chairman of said Administration and IOC Executive Committee member, for the position of IOC President. Soviet sports officials approved of the North Korean delegation's proposal to boycott world championships in shooting (1978) and basketball (1979) in South Korea but ignored the delegation's call to remove the statement about the success of the 1977 Universiade in Sofia in view of South Korea team's participation.

70 The NOC of Angola was established in 1979 and recognised by the IOC in 1980.
71 Pyat kolets pod kremlyovskimi zvyozdami... [Five rings beneath the Kremlin stars...], pp. 158–160.
In the 1970s, the USSR found it increasingly more difficult to refuse South Korean athletes the right to participate in competitions hosted by Moscow. Moscow turned a deaf ear to the DPRK's demands of boycotting the 1977 Universiade in Sofia because of the planned participation of South Korean students. The USSR also ignored Pyongyang's official statement about developing a joint strategy of non-admission of South Korea to the Moscow Olympics. Notably, while North Korean officials stubbornly boycotted every competition in socialist countries if South Korea was participating, they had no objections against competing with the neighbour in capitalist countries. In 1975 South Korea teams took part in the wrestling and weightlifting world championships hosted by the USSR, as the North Korean leadership learned about it as a fait accompli. A problem arose shortly before the 1978 Volleyball Women's World Championship, which was to be hosted by four Soviet cities and to include both North Korea and South Korea national teams. According to the rules of the International Volleyball Federation (FIVB), the South Korea team intended to compete under the name “Korea”, which was unacceptable for Pyongyang. However, the Soviet side found a way out of this predicament: during a parade in Leningrad, where the South Korea team competed, the participants carried only Olympic flags instead of signs with country names. Whereas official FIVB documents in French featured the name “Korea”, Russian-language documents referred to the country as “South Korea”. During the competitions, the scoreboard read “Korea (South Korea)”. In 1979 Moscow hosted a junior championship of the International Rowing Federation (FISA), marked by the participation of South Korean rowers. Half a year later, the USSR welcomed athletic gymnastics judges from 25 countries including South Korea for an Olympic preparation training course. At the same time, the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a directive in November 1968 prohibiting the participation of Soviet athletes in any sporting events staged in South Korea. In 1978 Soviet judokas competed in an international tournament in Japan, side by side with South Korean athletes. This was how the USSR abandoned its policy of “not recommending” Soviet athletes to participate in international events (except for world championships and Olympic Games) alongside South Koreans.72

The third meeting of the mixed commission of Eastern-Bloc sports organisations for cooperation in the field of preparation for and staging of the 1980 Olympics (including the PRB, the HPR, the GDR, Cuba, the PPR, the SRR, the CSSR, the MPR and the SRV) took place in

Moscow on February 14–15, 1978. The delegates expressed their willingness to take the necessary steps for “further isolation of racist sports organisations of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia within the international sports movement” and “joining the efforts of socialist countries' representatives in the IOC and IFs so as to thwart the attempts of certain NOCs to represent countries and territories where they have no jurisdiction”73. They also reaffirmed the necessity of regular consultative meetings of IOC members and socialist countries' representatives in governing bodies of IFs. The Romanian delegation, however, decided to emphasise its special position once again. At Romania's proposal, the adopted Protocol featured the term “socialist countries” instead of the more specific “community of socialist countries”. As we can see, the concerted practical steps demonstrated the success of Eastern Bloc sports diplomacy. For instance, the 80th IOC Session in Athens (May 1978) awarded the right of hosting the 1984 Winter Olympics to Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. Not only did the session result in Vitaly Smirnov's appointment to the position of IOC Vice President, but it was also marked by inclusion of a DPRK representative in the Committee74.

As to countering the policy of apartheid, in 1977 the Tennis Federation of the USSR refused to compete in a tennis tournament due to participation of South African players. Although the International Tennis Federation (ITF) admitted South Africa for participation only in individual tournaments, Moscow was displeased even with such a compromise. It was not until tennis became an Olympic event in 1982 that the Soviet side reluctantly made peace with the ITF's position regarding South African tennis players75.

Realising that the participation of certain countries (including Israel) was becoming an increasingly relevant issue as the Games were drawing nearer, the CPSU Central Committee developed a foreign policy programme with a focus on the Games organisation. In particular, it was decided that any contacts with the NOCs of Taiwan, Chile and South Korea prior to and during the Olympics should be IOC-mediated. As to Haiti, Israel, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and other countries the USSR had no diplomatic relations with, Moscow was still forced to host their athletes, judges, officials and journalists. By contrast, the UN General Assembly resolution on South Africa and South Rhodesia gave Moscow the right to refuse admission not only to athletes

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73 Shortly before the Moscow Olympics, the CPSU Central Committee settled on a compromise, consenting to establish contacts with the NOCs of Taiwan, Chile and South Korea, but only through the IOC.
74 Pyat kolets pod kremlyovskimi zvyozdami... [Five rings beneath the Kremlin stars...], pp. 168–169.174.
75 Prozumenshchikov, op. cit., p. 134.
but even to tourists from these countries. However, almost all of the above-mentioned countries eventually joined the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.\(^\text{76}\)

However, the problem arose where no one had expected, as the Soviet-German relations in the field of sports soured just before the Olympics. The GDR viewed the Games in Moscow as an opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of German socialist sport. In particular, the leadership of the German Gymnastics and Sports Union (DTSB) started concealing the particulars of their preparation for the Olympics from their Soviet colleagues. In November 1979, Sergei Pavlov reported to the CPSU Central Committee that the leaders of the DTSB were cancelling previous arrangements “of organising joint training camps and competitions and were limiting access to their coaches and athletes”. Thus, a meeting in the GDR in May 1979 had yielded a collective preparation plan for swimming teams with joint training camps and Olympics trials, but the DTSB leadership “found numerous pretexts to reject proposals of joint training events; if Soviet athletes arrived to the training venue several minutes before the scheduled time, East German athletes would cease their training immediately”. Another stumbling block was the matter of doping, which, as Pavlov believed, was “a nearly ubiquitous practice in East German sports”. After the East German suggestion of including their experts in the anti-doping laboratory team for the Moscow Olympics was rejected, the GDR proposed to conclude a bilateral “secret agreement” to protect the interests of Soviet and East German athletes. The proposal was rejected as well. However, East Germany was pushing for the rights to perform doping control at their laboratory in Kreischa for as many international competitions as possible. Sergei Pavlov was wary of the fact that, whenever the DTSB lab performed tests, “the presence of banned drugs is revealed exclusively in athletes from socialist countries and their data is immediately submitted to international federations”. For instance, the experts believed that the submission of compromising materials on Bulgarian and Romanian female runners to the International Amateur Athletic Federation allowed the GDR to eliminate strong competition for East German track-and-field athletes at the 1980 Olympics. The situation with doping control became even more challenging after the weightlifting world championship in Greece in November 1979, where athletes from socialist countries including the USSR won in all categories. Initially, doping control was entrusted to the Hungarian laboratory, but after GDR representatives came forward with a proposal to do the tests for free, the administration of the

\(^{76}\) Ibid., pp. 149–150.
International Weightlifting Federation transferred half of the samples to East Germany. Fearing that the German comrades may harm Soviet weightlifters, Sergei Pavlov asked the CPSU Central Committee to reach out to the East German leadership. Apart from the GDR, the Soviet Union saw a deterioration of relations with many of its other “friends” on the eve of the Olympics. Thus, the heads of multiple communist parties insisted on Moscow inviting their extensive delegations at its own expense. For instance, the Italian communists expected to send a delegation of 60–80 members on such conditions, while the communist party of Réunion wished to arrive to Moscow almost in its entirety.

Prior to the Olympics, the Soviet Union placed an emphasis on its experience of organising national Spartakiads, which were viewed as Olympics-grade events. Staging such large-scale competitions with a strong international presence was indeed a successful and relevant experience. Thus, the finals of the VII Summer Spartakiad of 1979 welcomed 2306 foreign athletes from 84 countries, with media coverage provided by 907 foreign journalists from 46 countries. Television broadcasts covered not only Intervision and Eurovision networks but also America and Japan. Undertaking to engage foreign mass media (including Western ones) in the coverage of preparation and staging of the 1979 Ice Hockey World and European Championships in Moscow, the Soviet authorities were trying to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist economic model and Soviet sports to the world on the eve of the 1980 Olympics. For the same reason, young Soviet athletes were participating in international friendship festivals and events. For instance, the participation of a female basketball team (Spartak from Leningrad) in a cruise across the Baltic states in 1979 was a major success. Soviet female gymnasts regularly visited Japan and the USA under youth tourism programmes.

In addition, in the latter half of the 1970s, the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee cooperated with a wide range of Soviet governmental and social organisations on a programme of activities to support the XXII Olympic Games in third-world countries, including the strengthening of bilateral sports contacts (for instance, by sending Soviet experts and non-commercial transfer of sports equipment), organising themed film festivals featuring Soviet films about sports, tours of performance groups and distribution of Olympics-related printed materials.

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77 Zhirnov, Ye 2010, “Nikakaya drugaya Olimpiada ne prinosila takikh bolshikh ubytkov [No other Olympiad had resulted in such losses]”, Kommersant Vlast, no. 21, p. 56.
78 Kvartalnov, VA 2003, Turizm: istoriya i sovremennost [Tourism: History and modernity], vol. 1, Moscow, p. 208.
The Organising Committee developed a specific working plan for Asian, African and Latin American countries in support of the Moscow Olympics. As previously mentioned, these countries were offered a range of benefits, including professional training for national team coaches and assistance with creation of NOCs and transportation of national delegations to Moscow for participation in the Olympics. However, in spite of all the efforts, Muslim African nations boycotted the Games of the XXII Olympiad. The Moscow Olympics received active support only from the countries suffering from South African aggression since the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee secured permission from the IOC to ban South African athletes and tourists from the Olympics. At the same time, the decisive factor of participation in the Olympics for a number of developing countries was a full compensation of their athletes' travelling expenses, which confirms the use of the Olympic Games in the format of public diplomacy.

However, starting from late 1979, the diplomatic and informational tension around the Olympics was defined by the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. On December 29, 1979, U. S. President James Carter sent a letter to Leonid Brezhnev condemning the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan's domestic policy and threatened with negative ramifications. In response, Brezhnev clarified that the Soviet Union was simply assisting Afghanistan with countering external aggression, and the limited contingent of Soviet troops would be withdrawn as soon as the reasons that had predetermined Afghanistan's call for help were eliminated. Without waiting for the UN to pass a resolution, James Carter gave a speech on January 4, 1980, outlining discriminatory steps to counter Soviet invasion in Afghanistan — namely, to postpone the consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), to limit the economic and cultural exchange and trade with the Soviet Union and lending to the USSR by the USA and its allies, to cut Soviet fishing privileges in U. S. waters and to cancel the deal of selling 17 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union. The sanctions also included revoking licenses for the sale of high technologies to the USSR. Not a month had passed since the Soviet Union deployed its troops in Afghanistan when its actions in Kabul were condemned by the UN Security Council; on January 14, 1980, an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution with a demand to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan (104 countries voted in support of the resolution, with 18 votes against and an equal number of

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blank votes). Yet the only country to fully support the American anti-Soviet sanctions was the United Kingdom, whereas Western European states consented only to the grain embargo. By contrast, the Muslim world was not an idle bystander. On January 25–28, 1980, participants of the emergency meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference in Islamabad joined Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in condemning “the Soviet military aggression against the Afghan nation”. In protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, diplomats from 15 countries boycotted the 1980 Labour Day parade in Moscow.

The idea of boycotting the Moscow Games was voiced at a high-level NATO meeting early in January 1980 by its initiators, representatives of the UK, the USA and Canada. After Moscow retained its right to host the 1980 Summer Olympics by a unanimous decision at the 82nd IOC Session, the U. S. administration declared a withdrawal of their national team from participation in the Games. Jimmy Carter made his statement on the eve of the Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, USA, leaving the Soviet leadership no time for a symmetrical response. As a result, the Soviet delegation had to proceed to the USA as scheduled and to pretend nothing was happening.

The boycott was later joined by a range of other countries (a total of 65). Here is how Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary of the UK, explained the logic behind the boycott: “few things would hurt Soviet prestige more than the absence of a number of Western countries from the Olympic Games”. Meanwhile, Baron Heseltine, the British Secretary of State for the Environment, wrote to Andrei Gromyko that the British government would “have to embrace the use of sport for the first time as a political weapon”, but “the end would justify the means”. The absence of sports delegations from major Western powers and China at the Moscow Olympics was supposed to turn the Games into a second-grade event.

However, the Soviet leadership managed to secure the support of Juan Antonio Samaranch, Spanish ambassador to the USSR and IOC Vice President who would be elected IOC President immediately after the conclusion of the Moscow Olympics. It was Don Samaranch who

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81 Besides, the matter of boycotting the Olympics in protest over the USSR persecuting its dissidents had been seriously considered by the West even before the Soviet Union's decision to deploy troops in Afghanistan.

persuaded the NOCs of Spain, Italy, the UK and a number of other Western powers to allow their athletes to come to Moscow by their own volition. At the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympic Games, 14 teams (Australia, Andorra, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Puerto Rico, San Marino, France and Switzerland) carried the IOC flag, the New Zealand team carried the flag of the New Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association and the Spaniards carried a flag with the NOC of Spain logo in the middle (the Olympic rings and the Spanish flag below). Italy prohibited participation in the Olympics only to those athletes who were military servicemen. Due to this restriction, Ezio Gamba, future coach of the judo Russia national team who won his only Olympic gold in Moscow, had had to resign from the Carabinieri. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, San Marino and Switzerland ignored the Parade of Nations at the opening ceremony, while Ireland sent a single flag-bearer. Athletes from these countries received their awards to the sounds of the Olympic Hymn; finally, the closing ceremony featured the flag of Los Angeles instead of the U.S. national flag. In addition, the IOC decided to forgo the tradition of transferring the flag to the host country of the next Olympics — the USA — at the closing ceremony. The U.S. national anthem was not played either. As a result, the Moscow Olympics were marked by many a curious incident. Thus, during the individual road race award ceremony three Olympic banners soared to the ceiling of the Velodrome as cyclists from Switzerland, France and Denmark climbed the pedestal. And yet, all things considered, the event can be regarded as a major success of Soviet public and sports diplomacy.

The start of the Olympic year was marked by a reduction in cultural exchanges with the USA. On the cusp of the Olympics (June 10, 1980), the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a directive, signed by Mikhail Suslov, “On measures of enhancing security of Soviet organisations and citizens abroad”. In view of a “challenging political situation”, the directive contained a set of measures aimed at enhancing security, “increasing political vigilance and discipline and ensuring strict compliance with the standards and rules of behaviour”. Even before the Moscow Olympics, the Soviet leadership announced a more rigid approach to Soviet athletes' participation in international competitions marked by a pronounced engagement of

84 Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fund 89, Declassified Documents Collection, Series 31, Case 7, Sheet 31; Series 32, Case 32, Sheet 2.
American sports organisations and a more differentiated approach to international competitions organised by capitalist countries, considering these countries' role in the anti-Soviet campaign surrounding the 1980 Olympics. In 1980 Moscow refused to compete in a match encounter with American swimmers and to play in the Canada Cup international ice hockey tournament. The Czechoslovakia team did not come to Canada either.

In the meantime, as the Olympics drew nearer, the USSR announced a partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. Later, during the games, yet another Soviet manned space mission with an international crew was launched. Nevertheless, on July 16, 1980 (three days prior to the Olympics opening ceremony), Philadelphia welcomed the participants of Liberty Bell Classic, an event organised as part of the Olympic Boycott Games. A multinational track-and-field tournament was marked by the participation of 29 teams from countries boycotting the Moscow Olympics, including the USA, China, Canada, Egypt, Thailand, the FRG, Kenya and Sudan.

The third stage (the shortest but the most eventful) covers the staging of the Olympic Games. Aimed at demonstrating the country's ethnic diversity and presenting the traditional elements of its peoples' material and spiritual culture, Soviet cultural diplomacy had a number of specific features and included public catering at the Olympics, performances of folk art groups and the use of folk motifs in the interior design of hotels and restaurants.

The IOC administration highly appreciated the opening multinational concert at the Olympics and was particularly impressed by the massive scale, accessibility and visual appeal of the Olympic cultural programme, which contributed to a festive atmosphere and fuelled the public interest in the Moscow Olympics. Considering that the cultural programme was being broadcast on a daily basis across the entire USSR and abroad, the Olympic festival reached out to hundreds of millions of spectators and listeners

There is little room for doubt that the USSR successfully constructed an image of a considerate, accommodating host. The cultural diplomacy included a broad and diverse cultural programme (with specially developed repertoires for 170 sub-programmes) that employed 32 Moscow theatres and concert halls, 2 circuses, 30 museums and exhibition halls, and 15 urban parks. The guests of the Olympics watched over 400 theatre performances (a variety of 120 titles) and more than 360 concerts. The aggregate cultural programme outreach exceeded 8 million people. Thirty-nine cinemas offered over 6000 sessions to an audience exceeding 2.5 million spectators including 63,500 visitors from 30 countries.

It is self-evident that the Moscow Olympics cultural programme was generally in line with the traditions of Soviet “hospitality techniques”, which dated back to the pre-war era and included selective demonstration of model socialist construction samples and ranging of cultural services offered to foreign guests in accordance with the guests' importance (“public diplomacy”). According to the official report of the Propaganda Directorate of the Olympiad-80 Organising Committee on cultural services offered to members of the Olympic family, dated October 16, 1980, several categories of guests were entitled to free services: the IOC President, Vice Presidents and Executive Committee members, the IOC Director General, honorary and regular members, members of IOC commissions, presidents and secretary generals of NOCs and IFs and IF technical delegates; honorary guests, delegations from future host cities and observers; persons accompanying members of the IOC, IFs or NOCs and honorary guests; members of the jury of appeal; accredited journalists; and athletes participating in the Games. The Soviet Union had envisaged a specific cultural programme for each category of the Olympic family members to match their importance and schedule. For instance, high-ranking officials of the IOC, NOCs and IFs and their accompanying persons had an opportunity of meeting famous Soviet composers, taking a boat tour of Moscow, visiting the Andrei Rublev Museum of Ancient Russian Culture and Art and so on. Jury members and judges were treated to a meeting with Soviet circus stars, while journalists were offered a visit to the Mosfilm studio. The athletes could enjoy their cultural programme right at the Olympic Village Culture Centre. Guests of the Olympics also requested a number of additional tours around Moscow, to museums and memorial estates, exhibitions (particularly the Exhibition of the Achievements of National Economy, or VDNKh of the USSR), to Moscow's industrial facilities, suburban collective farms.

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88 TsGA of Moscow, Fund 2376, Series 1, Case 95, Sheets 41–42; Case 138, Sheet 258.
and pioneer camps. Most of all, the athletes’ delegations favoured Lenin’s Mausoleum, the Moscow Kremlin, Vladimir Lenin’s Memorial Flat, the Museum of the Russian Revolution, the State Historical Museum, the Central Armed Forces Museum, the Leo Tolstoy Museum, the Polenovo Museum Estate and so on. Around 500 foreign guests and journalists visited the ZiL and the AZLK automobile plants, the Rot Front confectionery factory, the Khromatron Plant, the 2nd Moscow Watch Factory, Leninsky Luch and Zavety Ilyicha collective farms and the Moskovsky state farm. During the Moscow Olympics, the city organised a six-kilometre running race for American tourists along the Moskva River embankment, which was perceived as a friendship race (an element of “people's diplomacy”).

As previously mentioned, one of the Soviet public diplomacy tools was the Novosti Press Agency — the one responsible for media coverage of the 1980 Olympics and forming a positive image of the USSR abroad. That said, the impact of staging the Summer Games of the XXII Olympiad on the image of the Soviet Union was visible mostly in the audiences that had already been loyal, such as the socialist community and a number of third-world countries. Meanwhile, in most developed capitalist countries and Arab states, this impact was neutralised by an increasing political confrontation with the USSR due to the situation in Afghanistan.

The Moscow Olympics welcomed athletes from a total of 80 countries, losing to five preceding Summer Games by the number of participants. Before that, the latest Summer Olympics with fewer participating countries (a total of 67) was in Melbourne in 1956. Therefore, the image of the USSR suffered a considerable blow, since the number of participating countries was viewed by the organisers of the 1980 Olympics as a criterion of success. In addition, thousands of tourists gave up the idea of visiting Moscow. The Intourist state travel agency reported a return of hundreds of thousands of tickets to all competitions almost in every country: instead of the 1.7 million tickets to Olympic events intended for sale abroad, national general agents purchased 1.3 million, ultimately failing to distribute even this amount in full. However, some made it to the Moscow Olympics despite all the obstacles. Thus, disregarding the Canadian

90 Milovanova, op. cit., pp. 55–56;
91 The 81st nation, Liberia, participated in the opening ceremony, but its athletes did not compete in any events.
92 Zhirnov, Ye, “Nikakaya drugaya Olimpiada ne prinosila takikh bolshikh ubytkov [No other Olympiad had resulted in such losses]”... p. 56.
government's boycott of the Olympics, about 150 Canadian tourists entered the territory of the Soviet Union with the help of Swiss Youth Tourism Bureaus\textsuperscript{93}. Another tangible blow was the loss of sponsors and partner companies; out of dozens of foreign private-sector partners, only the West German Adidas met its obligations in full and throughout the entire event. In the meantime, the British government offered support to entrepreneurs and organisations that refused to cooperate with the organisers of the Moscow Olympics. Two such examples are the annulment of sponsorship support agreement with Land Rover and the termination of an agreement with Hoover on the supply of the Olympic Village with laundry equipment. Furthermore, British Airways cancelled its flights to Moscow, while Aeroflot, the Soviet national airline, requested permission for charter service during the Olympics but never got it from the British government\textsuperscript{94}. Nevertheless, according to the official statistics, the Soviet Union was handling three-quarters of the Olympic matters using its own technical capabilities, 20 per cent with the help other socialist countries, and only five per cent through Western purchases\textsuperscript{95}.

If we were to consider the Games of the XXII Olympiad in the context of interconnected and complementary mechanisms of public, cultural and sports diplomacy, the impact from its hosting by far exceeded an image boost. Thus, the media confrontation focused on qualitative, not quantitative indicators. A smaller number of represented countries in comparison with the Montreal Olympics was partly compensated by new IOC members' delegations. For the first time, the Olympics welcomed Angola, Botswana, Jordan, Laos, Mozambique and the Seychelles. The 1980 Summer Olympics was also marked by the début of Cyprus, which had only participated in the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid by then. A number of nations made their first appearance at the Olympics under a new name: Sri Lanka (previously, Ceylon), Benin (Dahomey) and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). It can be stated that the principles of the Olympism took over the attempts to undermine the image of the Soviet Olympics. Despite the absence of American and many other athletes, the 1980 Olympics was marked by 74 Olympic records (of which 32 were set by the USSR team), 36 world records (14 by the USSR), 40 European ones

\textsuperscript{93} Kuznetsova, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{95} GA RF, Fund 9610, Series 1, Case 286, Sheet 5.
(17 by the USSR) and 34 Soviet records. To compare, the XVII Olympics was marked by 76 Olympic and 30 world records; the XVIII Olympics, 81 and 32; the XIX Olympics, 84 and 27; the XX Olympics, 94 and 46, and the XXI Olympics, 82 and 34, respectively. The Moscow Games never became the “Olympiad of Records”, but the Soviet team did set a record, winning 195 medals, 80 of which were gold medals. According to informal team award records, the Soviet team won 80 first prizes, 69 second prizes, 46 third prizes, ended up fourth 26 times, fifth 20 times, and sixth 17 times. The four teams that won the most medals were from socialist countries: the USSR, the GDR, Bulgaria and Cuba. They were unexpectedly followed by the Italy team.

In all, the Moscow Olympics boycott did not yield the expected results for its ideologists. The absence of a number of leading athletes did nothing to harm the athletic or visual appeal of the Olympic tournaments. In the first days of the 1980 Olympics, American media published the UPI press agency's item about an incident at the Luzhniki Stadium, where American tourists unfolded a sign above the stands saying: “Let the Soviet nation know that only some of the Americans agree with Carter, who stripped American athletes of their legitimate right to come to Moscow and to participate in this global sporting forum!” An analysis of media in capitalists and developing countries demonstrates that at least three key messages of the Moscow Olympics (the Soviet nation's yearning for peace, the Soviet leadership's desire to develop sports and the Soviet Union's ability to ensure a high organisational and technical level of a mega-event) were perceived by representatives of the target audiences.

Finally, the fourth, post-Olympic, stage, which begins immediately after the conclusion of the games, has no definite upper time limit in view of its delayed effect. It deals with attempts to cement the achieved results and retaining (and potentially, expanding) international ties, including those in sports.

Not only did the Soviet Union fall short of its target revenue due to an unexpectedly lower influx of foreign tourists, but the repercussions of the Olympic boycott initially had a negative impact on the Soviet Union's sports ties. Thus, in 1981, in spite of a previous agreement with

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96 TsGA of Moscow, Fund 2376, Series 1, Case 138, Sheets 257,264–267,281; Prozumenshchikov, op. cit., p. 229.
Australia regarding a joint field hockey training camp, the Australian national federation of the sport decided against inviting the Soviet team to the tournament. To the Soviet representative's question about the reasons for not admitting the Soviet national team to this competition, an Australian field hockey federation member said in confidence that the directive to refrain from inviting the Soviet Union had been sent from above. Another example would be the collective policy of Scandinavian countries, which they started developing in 1981 to counter the Soviet Bandy Federation and, therefore, to prevent a powerful global influence of the USSR in this sport.

With time, though, the sports ties were restored. In 1982, Canada reached out to the Soviet Ice Hockey Federation with an initiative of discussing interaction with the NHL. The Canadians suggested holding eight matches a year between the best NHL teams and the champion of the Soviet Union and delegating Soviet hockey players to the USA and Canada for professional contracts with local hockey clubs. The Soviet side was also proposed to consider the possibility of junior teams exchange among the USA, Canada and the USSR. In 1983, the Denmark national track-and-field team participated in a training camp led by Russian coaches. Apart from that, the Soviet Union received youth volleyball teams including the All-American high school volleyball team, which held a training camp in the USSR and competed with Soviet teams. In 1981, when the IOC decided to stage the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, the Politbureau adopted two directives specifying the level of sports-related contacts with South Korea. The directives regulated South Korean athletes' participation in USSR-hosted competitions and Soviet athletes' participation in South Korean events. It also allowed for displaying of the South Korean flag at official competitions hosted by the Soviet Union. The second directive essentially permitted Soviet athletes to participate in competitions organised by international sports federations in South Korea, thus leaving the question about Soviet presence at the 1988 Olympics open.

Yet some of the sanctions caused significant damage to the image of the Soviet Union. For instance, in protest against the events in Afghanistan, the U. S. National Academy of Sciences declared a cessation of contacts with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Admittedly, the academicians' protest lasted only half a year, but the relations between the scientists of the two

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98 GA RF, Fund 7576, Series 31, Case 7240, Sheet 51–52.
100 Ibid., Case 9429, Sheet 9; Fund 10029, Series 2, Case 237, Sheet 7; Case 243, Sheet 3.
countries remained sour for a long time. Neither did the Moscow Olympics become a unifying project for the Eastern Bloc countries. Moreover, Romania positioned its presence at the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles as a challenge to the Soviet Union.

Even Western scholars admit, however, that the boycott did not result in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan or any improvement of the human rights situation\textsuperscript{102}. The loser was Jimmy Carter himself. Many of his supporters were anxious to see a face-to-face duel between the USSR and the USA at the Moscow Olympics; for want of such a confrontation, the nation preferred Ronald Reagan, a Republican, at the presidential election in November 1980. The Moscow Olympics boycott did little to impede the development of Soviet foreign tourism. As the Olympics bid goodbye to its guests, no one could doubt that the USSR was a mass tourism destination capable of receiving visitors at the highest level. As early as in August 1981, the USSR welcomed five specialised working groups of American trade union activists, economists, sociologists and healthcare workers, who visited Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Ulyanovsk, Tolyatti and other cities. Prior to the departure, they met with Soviet radio, television and press correspondents and made a statement that all doors had been open to them in the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{103}.

In 1981, a group of 1200 young people from the Soviet Union set out on a cruise across eight countries of North and West Africa, followed by a Latin American cruise that featured a visit to Nicaragua, Costa Rica and other countries of the region. According to a member of the Politbureau of the Costa-Rican communist party, the presence of Soviet youth had a “considerable impact on the national election campaign”\textsuperscript{104}. In other words, it was public diplomacy in action.

In 1982, the USSR welcomed over 5 million foreign tourists. Furthermore, when adopting the Manila Declaration, the participants of the 1980 World Tourism Conference made sure to include the initiatives of the Soviet delegation, who proposed, among other things, to proclaim September 27 World Tourism Day. At its third session, the General Assembly of the World Tourism Organisation adopted resolutions approving the theme of the 1981 World Tourism Day:

\textsuperscript{103} 1981, “Dlya nas vse dveri byli otkryty. Govoryat amerikanskiye turisty ['All doors were open to us': American tourists' testimonials], Turist, no. 11, p. 29.
“Tourism and the quality of life”105. A popular form of international cooperation in the 1980s and the 1990s were the Goodwill Games. Their motto, “From Friendship in Sports to Peace on Earth”, accurately reflected the principles of people's and cultural diplomacy of the last decades of the 20th century.

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