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NATIONALIZATION OF RUSSIA'S PARTY SYSTEM: LOCAL DIMENSION AND REGIONAL PATTERNS

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This research analyzes the nationalization of Russian party system and presidential candidates from 1996 till 2018 based on the index of nationalization, coefficient of variation, and Euclidean distance, proposing the new method of assessing the aforementioned measurements. The method includes using not the regional level data, but the lower unit of analyses – territorial electoral commissions, which improves the overall precision of the nationalization assessment. Furthermore, the regions themselves are compared to one another in the aspect of their "inner" nationalization.

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Introduction

The concept of nationalization is one of the most important when we speak about the evolution of party systems and its geographical implications. According to Golosov and Grigoryev, nationalization is "the unification of electoral support for political parties in different territorial entities of a state", so that, roughly speaking, the party system can be called "nationalized" when each party gets the same level of support from each region of the country [Golosov, Grigoryev, 2015, p. 128]. Two dimensions of nationalization can be also pointed out: static, which accounts for the "consistency of party support across a country at a particular period of time", and dynamic, which, in turn, measures the transformation or evolution of the party's voting results in the regions across time [Morgenstern et al., 2009, p. 1322].

The research on the topic of nationalization provides us with a variety of works on different factors which influence it in a certain way. For example, ethnic fragmentation and diversification of society in general, federalism, and majoritarian electoral system are supposed to cause lower nationalization, while the comparatively stable growth of democratic institutions and their thorough implementation are more likely to be correlated with its strengthening [Golosov, Grigoryev, 2015]. However, super-presidentialism can also be one of the factors positively influencing the level of nationalization, providing the state with strongly nationalized parties bound upon the leader's identity, as it can be noticed in the post-communistic world [Bochsler, 2010b]. Furthermore, proportional electoral system can put certain constraints on implementing territorial ethnic cleavages into party systems which themselves are territorialized [Miguel, 2017].

Nationalization can be assessed through different measures. For instance, Rose and Urwin created the "cumulative regional inequality index", which compares the dispersal of voters across regions with the dispersal of a party's national vote and shows the percentage of vote distribution in the regions [Rose, Urwin, 1975]. Ishiyama used the "regional party vote inequality index" (with the transformation from the previous index being the change of summing the final values by party to summing them by region) in order to measure the extent of nationalization of regional party vote [Ishiyama, 2002].

Caramani introduced the territorial coverage index, which equals the share of the regions where the party had their candidates from the total number of regions. So, for instance, if the certain party is presented only in a few regions, it means that it is more regionalized rather than nationalized [Caramani, 2004]. However, this index does not account for the real power that the party and/or its candidate holds in the regions, without which it would not be proper to speak

about nationalization, since the mere presence is not equal to the support and subsequent voting [Turovsky, 2016].

The researchers also used the variance (or variation) coefficient calculated as standard deviation of vote in the regions from the party mean vote share, which is counted for each actor and provides sensitive results, but, this coefficient has no upper limit [Rose, Urwin, 1975], and it can lower if the number of the regions is relatively small, so it is rather difficult for it to help making qualitative comparisons on the international scale [Turovsky, 2016]. We calculated this measure as well in our research; however, this is not the method we used to compare nationalization of Russia's party system with the other countries. Rather we used it to relate the results with the other means of measuring nationalization, since the coefficient of variation gives information on how exactly homogenous is the voting considering not the parties themselves, but rather the territorial electoral units of analysis.

To assess the parties' nationalization in our research, we also used Party Nationalization Score (PNS) by Jones and Mainwaring [Jones, Mainwaring, 2003], which can be calculated by subtracting the Gini index from 1 (the higher the score, the more homogenous is the country's voting). Since the score is limited by 0 on one end and 1 on the other, it is quite useful in the cross-national comparisons [Morgenstern et al., 2014]. Furthermore, the index can be also transformed to count Party System Nationalization Score (PSNS), for which one needs to multiply the shares of the vote and the PNS of all the parties that took part in the elections the same year and then sum up all the results. The same procedure can be done not only to the parties and party system, but to the presidential candidates as well.

There have already been a few articles written, where the authors conducted similar research on the nationalization. For example, Bochsler introduced a new Gini-based "standardized party nationalization score" which also controls for the sizes of electoral units in the country [Bochsler, 2010a], though, as Golosov and Grigoryev later mentioned, the score was too complicated for an empirical research [Golosov, Grigoryev, 2015].

However, the majority of nationalization calculation is based on the data from regional election commissions, which means, that in Russian case they focus on the data from the federal subjects' level. Though this method provides one with scientifically interesting results, it shows a more homogenous picture than if we look at the level of local communities. Also it does not consider the internal diversity of federation subjects which can be huge and really important while making simple comparisons among federation subjects senseless.

In order to understand the new method suggested in this research better, the reader should get more details on the specifics of Russian electoral system. In Russia, there are two types of federal elections. Every four (or five – since the 2016 elections) years, the State Duma (the lower

house of the Federal Assembly) is elected. It consists of 450 deputies, with one half being elected by party lists and the other half – in single-member constituencies. Presidential elections were previously being held every four years as well, but since 2012 the term was lengthened to six years. The candidate that gains more than 50% of the vote wins in the first round; if no candidate has acquired that amount of electoral support, the second round is provided for the two candidates with the highest percentage. The federal elections are conducted by the Central Electoral Commission, which supervises the work of all the other election commissions, of which there are many, according to the territorial division of Russia. 85 regions, or federal subjects, have electoral commissions of their own. The regions are then divided into municipal districts (*rayons*), urban districts (*okrugs*), and intra-city areas in the biggest cities, with all of them having a territorial electoral commission (TEC). This is exactly the new and more diverse and fragmented level of territorial division that we used in our analysis of nationalization of Russia's party system. The number of TECs has not stayed the same, however, depending on the changes in regional administrative division. For instance, in 1999 there were 2735 of them, in 2004 - 2713, in 2011 – 2750, and in 2018 – 2777.

We calculated the index of the nationalization for every Russian federal election from 1995 to 2018. Being a methodical novelty, calculations of nationalization scores based on local (TEC) level data give us a far clearer image of the national vote's spatial distribution since this level is closer to the individuals than the regional one. That is also why, if we compare the results for, say, PSNS for Russia with the ones that were calculated by other researchers [Golosov, Grigoryev, 2015], the findings acquired while using the regional level data will be higher than the findings acquired while using the local level data. The graph presented below illustrates this difference.


Fig. 1. Comparison between region-assessed and TEC-assessed PSNS for parliamentary elections in Russia

Data for the region-assessed score from 1995 to 2011 was taken from the article by Golosov and Grigoryev [Golosov, Grigoryev, 2015] and the data for 2016 was calculated by the authors. It appeared to be logical to compare only the results that show the same time period; the complete results for PNS and PSNS calculated using the TEC-level data can be found in the next part of the article.

Not only can it be seen from the graph that the nationalization calculated according to the new method is significantly lower, but the heterogeneity of the growth of nationalization in the left part of the local level graph (1995-2003) is also quite visible, though not captured by the regional level kind of measurement. This proves that the new method offers a much more detailed and sensitive view on how the Russian party system experiences its nationalization. As one might have been expecting the local level measure of nationalization reveals much more diverse picture of a big country while staying quite correct in terms of computing procedure. This also makes us believe that the regional level data hides real spatial diversity of Russia. Furthermore, one might come up with quite different conclusions based on the new information. For instance, if we look at the regional level graph, it is rather clear that the Russian party system's nationalization was steadily growing until 2007, and then a slight falling happened in 2011. The literature routinely explains it by the rise of governmental and gubernatorial control of the vote. However, if we compare this steady growth with the more detailed, closed-up look at the nationalization, one might see that on the local level this tendency is not actually that powerful.

This difference can be explained if we understand different electoral reactions of diverse local communities of Russia, which may not give noticeable effect on the electoral patterns and voting results on the federal or even regional level where the trends are mutually "neutralized" by different communities, but are nevertheless important subjects of the analyses if we are aiming at trying to understand the reasons behind, for example, transformations in the party support or in the turnout.

The importance of the local communities is already vastly described in the literature on the topic. It is detrimental to mention, firstly, the works of Giddens, Agnew, and other researchers who "recovered" the idea of a community as a local political unit, which is able to affect the big picture greatly in spite of its rather small size since the whole body of the state consists of exactly those communities. That concerns not only the more traditionalistic societies, but the postindustrial ones as well. So the "place", or "locale" (the physical center of communal relationships), or "locality" (understood as a geographically close territory on which the highly intensive communication takes place) [Turovsky, 2015], is not a secondary projection of a bigger level of analyses but the primary one [Giddens, 2016].

Considering local communities specifically in Russia, with its multiple ethnicities and territorial diversity, not only sociological, cultural and economic but political as well, as it will be discussed later in the article, they combine a certain level of dependence on the regional governmental structures since the non-democratic regime prevents the local autonomy from blossoming [Turovsky, 2015]. This provokes the scientific interest to the discussion on the topic and the explanatory possibilities for the results in comparison of the local and regional level voting.

The Euclidean distance of the areas (from the national averages) was another method we used to assess the nationalization in this research. It differs, however, from the other methods, since it was calculated using regional-level data due to the specificity of this measure which requires the counting for each region, not for the parties competing. The Euclidean distance can show if the vote in the certain territory was typical for the country as a whole or if it deviated in either giving more votes to the pro-government party or in being more oppositional then the rest of the regions. So, for instance, if the Euclidean distance of a certain region is relatively low, it can be called typical, and on the contrary, if it is rather high, it can be called deviant [Turovsky, 2016].

The main goal of this article is thus to implement a new nationalization assessment method and try to apply it for the Russian case in order to prove its applicability and advantages, compared to the previous PSNS and PNS method (in Russian context, at least). Euclidean distance and coefficient of variance are to be used with the aim of supporting the general hypothesis of the major role of the territorial identities and differences in the electoral results that emerge because of that.

Such analysis can provide useful information on how wide electoral homogenization is spread in democratic countries, but it is of utmost importance when one discusses electoral authoritarian regimes [Diamond, 2002]. Even though the elections which take part in these regimes are not usually pronounced fair, the closer look at the local vote might also help with identifying the regions where the voters are less unified in their electoral preferences than they were thought to be due to the power of the regime.

The local dimension of nationalization

The index of the nationalization for the 1993 parliamentary elections was not calculated in this paper since the TEC-level data was not found and only the regional voting results were available to us. We should, however, mention the features of this first parliamentary election in post-communist Russia. As such, the 1993's PSNS was rather high (0.74), while the next

election (1995) depicts a rather serious fall. The reason for that might be the rather "early" time for the Russian party system and its voters, since the 1993 elections were the first democratic ones in the post-communistic country, meaning that the majority of the competing parties did not have enough time to be properly presented in the regions and because of that did not have a physical possibility to achieve widespread recognition and, later, votes [Golosov, Grigoryev, 2015].

As was already mentioned above, our calculations of PNS were done based solely on the TEC-level data. To clarify the novelty of this method, it is useful to compare its results with the results acquired "traditionally" (that is, with the use of regional level data). The highest nationalization score was achieved in the most recent federal elections in 2018 (0.83), and the lowest – in 1995 (0.43). The graphs with the results for the whole time span between 1995 and 2018 elections with and without differentiation between the presidential and parliamentary elections can be found below.


Fig. 2. The index of nationalization (PSNS) for all federal elections from 1995 to 2018

Fig. 3. The index of nationalization (calculated as PSNS) for all Russian presidential elections from 1996 to 2018


Fig. 4. The index of nationalization (PSNS) for all Russian parliamentary elections from 1995 to 2016

Figure 2 demonstrates a quite unstable situation: the index increases and decreases, while the general trend is turned slightly upwards. The presidential and parliamentary elections, visualized in Figures 3 and 4 respectively, possess quite dissimilar characteristics. While for the presidential candidates the general trend is the stable growth, for the party lists it experienced a definite growth with slight downfall which has been happening for the last couple of elections. The lowest point for the presidential elections was reached in the 1990s as one might have been expecting - in 1996 (0.71), the highest – in 2012 (0.84), though the growth of the nationalization seems to be rather stable and the tendency looks promising from this point. However spatial

diversity of the 2004 voting which was very successful for incumbent reminds us of the fact that even very similar region level totals could conceal the real picture.

As for the party system itself, the lowest point was reached in the first elections presented in 1995 (0.43) and the highest – in the second and the most successful for "United Russia" elections in 2007 (0.77), with the general trend being not so stable. Evidently, the nationalization in the parliamentary elections is lower than the one in the presidential elections. In other words, Russian voters appear to vote more spatially unified for the presidential candidates than for the parties. To try to explain these tendencies, it might be useful to look closely at the respective parties and candidates themselves (and their indices of nationalization).

If we focus on the parties and candidates themselves and not on the party system as a whole, we would be able to find other rather important points of consideration. The parties and candidates were accounted for in case if they were present in the majority of the elections or are valuable in showing different ideological positions. Namely, the parties considered are the "incumbents" (or elite-based "parties of power" in Russian discourse), such as "United Russia" and its predecessors, CPRF, LDPR (participated in 1999 under the name of "Block Zhirinovskogo"), "A Just Russia", "Yabloko", and the "Right Liberals", or liberal-conservative parties, under which label we put "Democratic Choice of Russia" in 1995, while in 1999, 2003, and 2007 – "Union of Right Forces" (SPS), in 2011 – "Right Cause" (in 2016 renamed as "Party of Growth").

As for the presidential candidates – for "incumbents" we assessed the results of Yeltsin (1996), Putin (2000, 2004, 2012, 2018) and Medvedev (2008), for CPRF - Zyuganov (leader of CPRF; 1996, 2000, 2008, 2012), Kharitonov (2004), and Grudinin (2018), for LDPR - Zhirinovskiy (leader of LDPR; 1996, 2000, 2008, 2012, 2018), and Malyshkin (2004), and for "A Just Russia" – Mironov (leader of "A Just Russia") (2004, 2012). We also added a "liberal" candidate, under which label in 1996, 2000, and 2018 we counted Yavlinsky, in 2004 – Khakamada, in 2008 – Bogdanov, and in 2012 – Prokhorov. For 2018 we also included the score of Sobchak, who also played on the liberal field, thus presenting a competition to Yavlinsky.

Trying to capture the longitudinal trends the elite-based predecessors of the "United Russia", such as "Our Home is Russia" (1995) and "Unity" ("Yedinstvo"; 1999) – were also included in calculations of nationalization. We should also include the score for "Homeland – All Russia" (HAR) in 1999 as well, which is yet another clientelist predecessor of the incumbent party, although it is shown in the graph separately. It also should be taken into account that in the 2004 presidential elections Mironov was not yet the leader of "A Just Russia", since the party was created only in 2006. The results of the calculations can be seen on Figures 5 and 6.

Fig. 5. Index of nationalization for parties in the Russian elections from 1995 to 2016


Fig. 6. Index of nationalization for the presidential candidates in the Russian elections from 1996 to 2018

As one can see from the graphs, there has been a downturn for both the presidential candidates and parties in the recent years. The 1999 elections showcase significant growth for all the major parties and a period of stability follows then except for the "Union of Right Forces", which experienced a fall from 0.62 in its successful 1999 election to 0.48 in 2007. Another liberal party such as "Yabloko" also suffered from the downturn in its nationalization as its support became even more concentrated in a mere handful of areas.

Most of the parties experienced nationalization's growth in 2011, - that is, except for the "party of power", that went down from 0.81 in 2007 to 0.69 in 2011 and continued to become more regionalized even in its more successful 2016 election with the score at 0.65, though the process of its spatial diversification seems to have slowed down. It should be mentioned that the support for "United Russia" becomes much weaker in the last years, then the support for the incumbent president [FOM, 2019a; FOM, 2019b]. This demonstrates that Putin's electorate is

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not only much bigger but also more spatially homogenous than the one of "United Russia"; even more, the index of the nationalization showcases that the voters' support for the Putin's candidacy is getting more "evenly spread" across the regions than the support of the dominant party, the trend for which even goes in the opposite direction. It is also interesting to note the much more drastic fall of the nationalization of another elite-based party such as "A Just Russia" in 2016 along with the loss of its public support.

As for the individual presidential candidates the general tendency goes upwards. The CPRF and LDPR candidates' scores seem to go almost parallel, while for the incumbent after a period of stability there occurred a growth in 2012 from 0.83 to 0.9 (the first Putin's elections after Medvedev's presidency) and a slight drop later in 2018 to 0.86, although his support is still far more nationalized than for any other candidate. The "liberal" candidates stand apart from the rest, with a sharp decline of nationalization from 0.71 in 2008 (Bogdanov) to 0.53 in 2018 (Yavlinsky). This corresponds to the trend for "Yabloko".

If the difference between Putin's and "United Russia"'s nationalization is quite noticeable, the tendencies for LDPR and CPRF in presidential elections are synchronized. The both started quite low on the graph, then their support became substantially more homogenized, and in the recent elections they showed a slight drop. This might have been an evidence of more significant correlation in the popular support of CPRF and LDPR and their respective presidential candidates, with the nationalization score of LDPR and its candidates being in the recent elections slightly lower than the one of CPRF and its candidates due to even less support of LDPR in most ethnic areas.

The trend exposed in the Figure 3 thus can be explained with the help of the later graphs. The general line for the presidential candidates' nationalization goes upwards, showing the unification of the voters' preferences, which is supported with the individual graphs. There is, however, a downfall in the recent 2018 elections. The whole picture thus correlates with the incumbent, who has the biggest share of votes, and thus influences the formula in the way that when in 2018 the individual graph for Incumbent falls, the PSNS falls as well, although not as drastically due to the more or less stable results of CPRF and LDPR candidates, who in the most cases have second and third highest results. As for the three other candidates shown on the graph, their contribution to the PSNS is minimal.

Looking at the parliamentary elections it can be seen that the graph grows up until 2011 elections and only from there the PSNS goes down. This can be explained with the generally stronger "uniting" capacity of the incumbent presidential candidate, as compared with the "party of power". Since the incumbent retains the biggest votes' share, it influences the PSNS the most, from the rapid growth in 1999 with the rest of the "leaders" mentioned above, saving the

nationalization in 2003 (the system graph here grows, however, due to LDPR's contribution), hitting the peak in 2007, to the decrease of the unified support in 2011 and further in 2016 (which is a little bit softened by the indices of CPRF and LDPR). Other actors, saying that once again, do not influence the PSNS that much.

Euclidean distance: an elusive snapshot of deviant areas

Euclidean distance is a statistical method which is used to determine areas of the state that are distinctive or as close as possible to the national average. Just like any other statistical method, Euclidean distance has its pros and cons. The downsides are the elusive results obtained from a mathematical process, which, in turn, is "the square root of the sum of the squares of the differences between the vote for each party in a particular region and its nationwide result" [Turovsky, 2016, p. 173]. The final figures can be very different from election to election for the same area due to changes in party systems and voting preferences and are not easy for interpretation. With the use of Euclidean distance, the analyzed regions are divided into two categories: "typical" and "deviant". The latest, in turn, usually split into two more specific categories: the first group shows low and/or incoherent support for the main parties, and the second one, on the contrary, provides maximum support for the leading party, in contrast to the almost non-existent support of others [Turovsky, 2016, p. 173].

This study examined each of the 85 regions of Russia from 1991 to 2018 (for presidential elections) and from 1993 to 2016 (for parliamentary elections). Each of the regions belongs to one of the two categories: deviant and "typical" areas. For simplicity we give only the 5 most significant cases for each.

It is worth noting that the values obtained by calculating the Euclidean distance are not regulated by a single measurement scale. Euclidean distance is not regulated by fixed values, for example, from 0 to 1, as is the case when measuring nationalization via the PSNS. Thus, the results will be interpreted separately in each election's study and depend on each case studied.

"Typical" regions would be characterized by the smallest level of deviation of regional values from the federal ones, and as a result, the values of "typical" regions should be close to zero. The "deviant" regions illustrate the opposite situation: the larger the Euclidean distance the bigger is the difference between the results of voting in the region and the country. The fixation of the regions in these two categories will demonstrate the established structure of the Russia's electoral space.

The evolving situation in Russia can be tracked according to the Euclidean distance indicators presented in tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix). They present regions for each electoral

cycle and for each type of election (presidential or parliamentary), with table 1 containing the 5 most "typical" regions, and table 2 containing the 5 most "deviant" subjects of the federation.

According to table 1, "typical" regions in Russia are usually not the same for every presidential election. Sometimes certain regions can be found as "typical" in the different elections but quite inconsistently. For example, this is the case of Yaroslavl Region, appeared as "typical" for the presidential elections in 1991 with the value of 3.62 and in 2004 with 1.8. Volgograd Region did the same three times: in 1991, 2012, and 2018. The values were at 3 both in 1991 and 2012 and 1 in 2018.

The "typical" regions identified in the parliamentary elections are usually characterized by higher minimum values due to more volatile voting as compared with the presidential elections, such as at 3-4 with a minimum of 2.25. In addition, the list of such regions is not identical to those "typical" in the presidential election. For example, Yaroslavl and Volgograd regions never appear on the list. However, some regions can be "typical" in the presidential and parliamentary elections within the same electoral cycle. For example, Kaluga Region demonstrated this in the 2003 parliamentary and 2004 presidential elections. Also, Stavropol Territory did it in the 2011-2012 electoral cycle. Thus, our study shows very high volatility of the "typical" regions in Russia and it even makes no sense to look for any area which could constantly deliver electoral returns similar to the federal ones. However, the list of "deviant" regions is more consistent because of many national republics being regularly present. But apart from republics again we cannot find any returning deviations.

Other results of the Euclidean distance measurements are similar for the "typical" and "deviant" regions. Firstly, there is a decrease in the Euclidean distance values in the recent election campaigns, as compared with the 1990s. Secondly, the Euclidean distance values in the presidential election are smaller than in the parliamentary elections. Thirdly, the number of "oppositional" deviant regions is usually much smaller and less stable than the number of "loyalist" deviant regions, which proves the inconsistency of oppositional voting in Russia.

So, we conclude that the electoral behavior of the Russia's regions is ever-changing, and therefore it is almost impossible to identify a group of entities of the federation that would constantly demonstrate any single feature. Besides some national republics being more deviant actually changed the reason of deviation starting with the mass pro-communist voting in the 1990s and turning to "United Russia" then. The study of regional electoral deviations shows once again that average nationalization scores oversimplify not only the real scale of Russia's spatial diversity but also the volatility of individual regional voting patterns which look very changeable over the time.

Measuring nationalization within the regions

Measurement of nationalization is possible in several ways depending on the spatial level (federal, regional, local) or the actors in the analysis (the whole party system, or a certain candidate or party). The coefficient of variance presented in this part of the paper allows us to consider the rates and dynamics of nationalization within each region under study. It will be examined with the study of the nationalization at the level of territorial election commissions (TEC) within each region. The idea is to check the degree of internal spatial diversity and (probably) find out if it is higher than being measured all across the state or if its evolution differs from that of Russia as a whole.

In order to get the most valid results, was decided to analyze the regions with the number of TECs more than 30. Similar restrictions on the number of TECs within a region are necessary to build high-quality models, since in regions with insufficient number of territorial electoral commissions the number of random indicators increases. The larger the number of TECs, the more accurately the support of each candidate in a certain territory will be presented. Moreover, a large amount of data is necessary for the most correct calculation of the values included in the coefficient of variation (standard deviation, mean). That is why 38 entities of the Russian Federation were selected to explore their "internal" nationalization scores: Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Dagestan, Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Altai Territory, Krasnodar Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Primorye Territory, Stavropol Territory, Arkhangelsk Region, Volgograd Region, Bryansk Region, Voronezh Region, Ivanovo Region, Irkutsk Region, Kemerovo Region, Kirov Region, Kostroma Region, Kursk Region, Moscow Region (*oblast*), Nizhny Novgorod Region, Novosibirsk Region, Omsk Region, Orenburg Region, Penza Region, Rostov Region, Ryazan Region, Samara Region, Saratov Region, Sverdlovsk Region, Tambov Region, Tver Region, Chelyabinsk Region, Chita Region (later renamed for Zabaykalye Territory), Moscow City, St. Petersburg. This selection allows us to study the magnitude of internal electoral heterogeneity of each region and make comparisons across the regions and over time.

Regions have different levels of diversity, with varying degrees of variability when voting in favor of a party. First of all, the main focus here will be on parliamentary parties ("United Russia", CPRF, LDPR, "A Just Russia", and some others in the past), because these parties receive the biggest support from the electorate. Secondly, only selected regions will be visualized in the graphs since the trends and degrees of internal diversity can be similar.

The degrees of the national coefficient of variation are shown in figure 7 (parliamentary elections) and figure 8 (presidential elections). They demonstrate the changing spatial diversity of voting at the level of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and not for TECs.


Fig. 7. The national coefficient of variation, parliamentary elections

Fig. 8. The national coefficient of variation, presidential elections

If we compare the degree of internal diversity (the value of the coefficient of variation) of the regions and the country as a whole, then the following regions are characterized by approximately the same level of internal variability: Arkhangelsk (fig. 9 and fig. 10), Novosibirsk, Kirov Regions, and Krasnoyarsk Territory. Only three regions demonstrate an increased variability of voting, especially for opposition parties, as compared with the national

level of variation, according to the results of the presidential elections: Dagestan (fig. 11), Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan. Omsk Region (fig. 12) and Rostov Region also demonstrate high level of variation for the parliamentary elections. The rest shows lower values of variation as compared to the national one.


Fig. 9. Coefficient of variation of Arkhangelsk Region, parliamentary elections

Fig. 10. Coefficient of variation of Arkhangelsk Region, presidential elections

Fig. 11. Coefficient of variation of Dagestan, presidential elections

Fig. 12. Coefficient of variation of Omsk Region, parliamentary elections

The degree of internal diversity of 14 regions is similar to that of Russia, according to the results of the presidential elections: Krasnodar Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Zabaykalye Territory, Stavropol Territory, Moscow Region, Arkhangelsk Region, Saratov Region, Novosibirsk Region, Sverdlovsk Region, Kirov Region, Rostov Region, Chelyabinsk Region, Sakha (Yakutia), Buryatia. Although only four of them belong to the same group in the parliamentary campaigns. Regions with variation staying at the nationwide level in the parliamentary campaigns are as follows: St. Petersburg, Ivanovo Region, Kursk Region,

Arkhangelsk Region, Novosibirsk Region, Kirov Region, Irkutsk Region, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Primorye Territory.

The level of variability of voting in the regions of Russia is vast and diverse, and for this reason only few regions correspond to the national degree of variability. The remaining regions are similar to the national level only for one type of election (parliamentary or presidential) or do not have any similarities regardless of the type of election. The graphs usually show that the biggest fluctuations of values are associated with LDPR, CPRF and, in some cases, "A Just Russia". At the same time, the scores of "Yabloko" are always very high due to the concentration of its electorate in bigger cities. The values of incumbents and "parties of power" are usually characterized by smaller changes.

The values of the coefficient of variation in the regions and at the national level were used to study the very level of spatial diversity. Now comparative analysis of the trends in the development of regional and national diversity will be made to clarify the direction of the trend lines.

There are two categories of variability trends at the level of Russian regions, with some exceptions, none of which exactly repeat nationwide trends.

When comparing the degrees of internal diversity of the regions with the national ones we noted only few regions with similar scores, such as Kursk, Penza, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Arkhangelsk, Kostroma, and Ivanovo regions. In addition, there are a number of regions characterized by a similar trend, but with some deviations: Yakutia, Zabaykalye Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Voronezh Region, and Kirov Region.

A feature of the national trend in the parliamentary elections (figure 7) is as follows:

1. The fall in the variability for "United Russia" in the period from 1995 to 2007, when the minimum was reached, after which a fluctuated increase in the coefficient of variation began.

2. A decrease in the level of diversity for LDPR from 1995 to 2003 and an increase in variability from 2007.

3. Fluctuated increase in the variability of CPRF in the period from 1995 to 2003 and the decrease in the diversity of voting from 2007.

Selected regions from the analyzed sample are described by similar trends with possible minor inconsistencies.

Fig. 13. Coefficient of variation of Kursk Region, parliamentary elections

For example, the case of Kursk region (fig. 13) demonstrates the presence of trends similar to national ones, with "A Just Russia" trend as an exception (the trend for this party in the last election in 2016 rises in contrast to the national trend).

Fig. 14. Coefficient of variation of Chita Region (Zabaykalye Territory), parliamentary elections

Zabaykalye Territory (fig. 14) demonstrates the presence of general trends which are poorly compared with the national graph for parliamentary elections (fig. 7). Trends do not have unidirectional lines that are immediately relevant to all parties. Although Zabaykalye Territory trends of "United Russia" and CPRF are very similar to trends presented on the national graph. However, there are also differences associated, firstly, with "Yabloko" trend towards a decrease

in the variability. Secondly, LDPR is located on the graph near "United Russia", while on the national graph its position is close to CPRF.

The regions were divided into two categories then. Firstly, according to the degree of diversity, and secondly, due to similarity of trends. The first category includes the regions with similar degrees and trends, another – the regions with different values of variation and trends.

Fluctuating and dynamic trends are detected even in several studied regions (fig. 15). Udmurtia, Altai Territory, Krasnodar Territory, Stavropol Territory, Bryansk Region, Ryazan Region, Omsk Region, Tver Region, Nizhny Novgorod Region, Orenburg Region, Sverdlovsk Region, Volgograd Region, Chelyabinsk Region, Rostov Region, and Samara Region demonstrate a constant change of trend direction from 1995 to 2007 according to the results of the parliamentary elections.


Fig. 15. Coefficient of variation of Ryazan Region, parliamentary elections

As elsewhere in this category there are exceptions. Firstly, St. Petersburg, Moscow City, Kemerovo Region demonstrate similar fluctuations between 1995 and 2007 (fig. 16 and fig. 17).

Fig. 16. Coefficient of variation of St. Petersburg, parliamentary elections

Fig. 17. Coefficient of variation of Kemerovo Region, parliamentary elections

In most of the regions mentioned, the trend lines of LDPR, CPRF, and "United Russia" were located next to each other, and they were also close to each other. In the cases of St. Petersburg and Moscow City, the situation differs since all the parties keep values of variance close to each other. In addition, the trend continues to fluctuate, while in the regions mentioned earlier it is either in decline or increase. The situation in Kemerovo region is slightly different both from a larger number of regions and from the trends of Moscow and St. Petersburg. If in the first case only 3 parties have the same values, in the second case all parties showed similar indicators.

There are regions which trends cannot even be assigned to any of the previously analyzed categories: Dagestan, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Primorye Territory, Saratov Region, Tambov Region (fig. 18 and fig. 19).


Fig. 18. Coefficient of variation of Tatarstan, parliamentary elections

Fig. 19. Coefficient of variation of Saratov Region, parliamentary elections

Trends in the following regions are similar to national ones only for the presidential elections: Ivanovo, Arkhangelsk, Kursk, Kirov regions, Krasnodar and Stavropol territories. Thus only 6 out of 38 regions show trends related to the national ones for the presidential elections. However, on the graph of Krasnodar Territory (fig. 20) some differences are still found. Firstly, the initial position of incumbent is higher than of the opposition, while on the

national graph (figure 8) it is different. Secondly, there was a large increase in the variability of the vote for the liberals in 2008.

Fig. 20. Coefficient of variation of Krasnodar Territory, presidential elections

Bryansk, Penza, Novosibirsk, Kostroma, Omsk, Volgograd, Tambov, Rostov, Chelyabinsk, Kemerovo, Sverdlovsk regions, and Krasnoyarsk Territory are those regions where LDPR and CPRF trends are showing the same pace and direction. The increase in the variation (reaching a peak value) was recorded in all regions in this category in 2004 - 2008 as it can be seen on the example of Penza region (fig. 21). There are fewer regions with a reverse trend (a decrease in variation according to the results of the 2018 presidential election): Voronezh, Tver, Irkutsk regions, Udmurtia, and Tatarstan.

Fig. 21. Coefficient of variation of Penza Region, presidential elections

The graph for Voronezh region (fig. 22) shows differences with the previous group. If in the latter case a peak value was recorded in 2004-2008, then in the former case a smooth growth was recorded until 2008 followed by decline.

Fig. 22. Coefficient of variation of Voronezh Region, presidential elections

Some regions do not have a single line that would allow them to be assigned to a certain category. These are Zabaykalye Territory, St. Petersburg, Moscow City, Buryatia, Yakutia, Dagestan, and Bashkortostan.

Fig. 23. Coefficient of variation of Moscow City, presidential elections

The Russian regions are so diverse that only Arkhangelsk and Kirov regions out of 38 territories in our sample replicate national trends in terms of variation degrees and evolution in the presidential elections. In addition, all these regions have varying degrees of inner diversity sometimes exceeding the national average.

Conclusion

In this study we have measured the nationalization scores for Russian parties, party system as a whole and presidential candidates using new method based not on the regional voting data, but on the local level data. The new method showed that the nationalization of Russian party system is in fact lower than it was thought to be. Moreover local electoral diversity sometimes demonstrates evolution that is slightly different from that explored previously with the use of regional data. The complexity of the Russian electoral space was demonstrated, which the general index (calculating the level of nationalization across the entities of the federation) does not allow to understand. For this reason, the internal electoral diversity of the federation entities, along with the individual regional paths were also distinguished. Internal regional diversity, in turn, also varies sometimes reaching the magnitude across the federation subjects. Besides "internal nationalization" in some regions can follow its own regional trends being different from the national one. In this regard it is revealed through the use of Euclidean distance that even most deviant regions in Russia are not the same over time, while typical regions are always different. Consequently, nationalization as a phenomenon and as a process requires more detailed and diverse measurements, which would make it possible to understand the real complexity and diversity of the electoral space of Russia.

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Appendix

Table 1. The most "typical" regions according to results of parliamentary and presidential elections in 1991-2018

Typical regions					
Presidential elections			Parliamentary elections		
Year	Region	Value	Year	Region	Value
1991	Murmansk Region	3,369	1993	Kaluga Region	4,759
1991	Novosibirsk Region	3,450	1993	Omsk Region	5,451
1991	Yaroslavl Region	3,624	1993	Vladimir Region	5,631
1991	Saratov Region	3,680	1993	Krasnodar Region	5,994
1991	Volgograd Region	3,723	1993	Ivanovo Region	6,025
1996	Nizhny Novgorod Region	0,829	1995	Samara Region	4,142
1996	Udmurtia	4,321	1995	Krasnoyarsk Region	4,186
1996	Tver Region	4,430	1995	Kaluga Region	4,370
1996	Samara Region	4,508	1995	Kaliningrad Region	4,437
1996	Jewish Autonomous Oblast	5,752	1995	Nizhny Novgorod Region	5,766
2000	Yakutia	1,694	1999	Vladimir Region	4,689
2000	Vladimir Region	1,826	1999	Buryatia	5,909
2000	Ivanovo Region	2,032	1999	Kaluga Region	5,916
2000	Tyumen Region	3,015	1999	Yakutia	6,141
2000	Rostov Region	4,083	1999	Chelyabinsk Region	6,308
2004	Novgorod Region	0,909	2003	Rostov Region	3,109
2004	Chelyabinsk Region	1,619	2003	Novgorod Region	3,127
2004	Kaluga Region	1,633	2003	Kaluga Region	3,929
2004	Yaroslavl Region	1,881	2003	Smolensk Region	4,008

2004	Ryazan Region	2,393	**2003**	Buryatia	4,011
2008	Leningrad Region	0,242	**2007**	Ulyanovsk Region	2,252
2008	Moscow Region	0,920	**2007**	Novgorod Region	2,305
2008	Buryatia	1,434	**2007**	Saratov Region	2,681
2008	Udmurtia	2,132	**2007**	Lipetsk Region	3,089
2008	Moscow City	2,613	**2007**	Kaluga Region	3,344
2012	Krasnodar Region	1,887	**2011**	Rostov Region	2,506
2012	Stavropol Territory	2,302	**2011**	Stavropol Territory	4,202
2012	Nizhny Novgorod Region	2,317	**2011**	Voronezh Region	4,248
2012	Ivanovo Region	2,539	**2011**	Mariy-El	4,439
2012	Volgograd Region	3,053	**2011**	Kursk Region	4,612
2018	Orel Region	0,854	**2016**	Belgorod Region	2,559
2018	Samara Region	1,006	**2016**	Tula Region	2,783
2018	Volgograd Region	1,039	**2016**	Ryazan Region	2,907
2018	Chuvashia	1,079	**2016**	Stavropol Territory	3,381
2018	Bashkortostan	1,326	**2016**	Lipetsk Region	3,802

Data source: CEC of the Russian Federation, calculated by the authors

Table 2. The most "deviant" regions according to the results of parliamentary and presidential elections in 1991-2018

Deviant regions					
Presidential elections			**Parliamentary elections**		
Year	**Region**	**Value**	**Year**	**Region**	**Value**
1991	Altai Republic	42,061	**1993**	Dagestan	46,796
1991	North Ossetia	39,456	**1993**	Ingushetia	62,683
1991	Tuva	62,031	**1993**	Tuva	38,568
1991	Kemerovo Region	43,722	**1993**	Kurgan Region	156,080
1991	Sverdlovsk Region	31,103	**1993**	Novosibirsk Region	66,576
1996	Adygeya	37,509	**1995**	Ingushetia	31,092
1996	Ingushetia	41,240	**1995**	North Ossetia	30,331
1996	North Ossetia	39,017	**1995**	Chechnya	41,107
1996	Chechnya	45,211	**1995**	Kursk Region	30,877
1996	Chuvashia	41,732	**1995**	Kemerovo Region	27,051
2000	Dagestan	27,197	**1999**	Ingushetia	81,857
2000	Ingushetia	41,797	**1999**	Tatarstan	27,915
2000	Kabardino-Balkaria	25,243	**1999**	Tuva	52,037
2000	Kemerovo Region	30,758	**1999**	Moscow City	34,948
2000	Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug	35,006	**1999**	Chukotka	29,661
2004	Bashkortostan	23,241	**2003**	Dagestan	32,973
2004	Dagestan	26,095	**2003**	Ingushetia	33,926
2004	Ingushetia	30,663	**2003**	Kabardino-Balkaria	39,449
2004	Kabardino-Balkaria	28,395	**2003**	Mordovia	40,658
2004	Chuvashia	24,371	**2003**	Chechnya	47,286
2008	Dagestan	25,650	**2007**	Ingushetia	37,964
2008	Ingushetia	27,012	**2007**	Kabardino-Balkaria	34,938
2008	Karachayevo-Cherkessia	23,774	**2007**	Karachayevo-Cherkessia	31,365
2008	Mordovia	23,965	**2007**	Mordovia	31,920
2008	Chechnya	24,127	**2007**	Chechnya	38,658
2012	Dagestan	32,985	**2011**	Ingushetia	47,526
2012	Ingushetia	32,300	**2011**	Karachayevo-Cherkessia	45,294
2012	Karachayevo-Cherkessia	31,419	**2011**	Mordovia	47,555
2012	Tuva	30,407	**2011**	Tuva	40,902
2012	Chechnya	41,450	**2011**	Chechnya	56,579
2018	Kabardino-Balkaria	19,007	**2016**	Dagestan	38,149
2018	Yakutia	19,863	**2016**	Mordovia	32,632
2018	Tuva	17,864	**2016**	Tatarstan	34,537
2018	Chechnya	17,312	**2016**	Tuva	31,643
2018	Crimea	18,610	**2016**	Chechnya	46,463

Data source: CEC of the Russian Federation, calculated by the authors

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