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# **POPULISM AND PROTEST INTENSITY: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS**

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## **POPULISM AND PROTEST INTENSITY: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS**

Populist studies are increasingly interested in the effects that populism has on political systems of contemporary democracies. This article analyzes the relationship between populist parties and politicians and the intensity of political protest. Arguing that populists generate feelings of anger and outrage at the establishment politicians, develop close relationships with social movements, and instigate further polarization and resistance from the opposition, the existence of populist actors in a political system is expected to generate more political protests. Empirical testing using cross-national figures considers the case of both the prevalence of populist parties in European countries and the existence of a populist politician as the head of government in European, Latin American, and North American countries. The results testify to strong positive correlations in both cases demonstrating the potential that populism has for socio-political destabilization. However, when tests are performed in order to observe whether this relationship holds within different geographical and temporal spaces, strong negative relationships are shown with populists prior to the year 2000 and positive ones afterwards. Finally, once the ideological disposition of the populist leaders is accounted for, the results testify to a diverging pattern; whereas the populist radical right and radical left are strongly associated with increasing protests after the year 2000, in the decade prior, centrist or neoliberal populism demonstrated a significantly negative correlation with protest intensity. This is especially true of the populist radical right that tends to rise alongside mobilizations for autocracy as well as provoke mass mobilizations for democracy among the opposition.

JEL Classification: **D72** Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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## **Introduction**

On April 13th, a rather fascinating event occurred. Four days prior, a general strike organized by Venezuela's National Federation of Trade Unions led to nearly one million Venezuelans to protest President Hugo Chavez's reforms in the streets (Hawkins, 2010). After violent clashes between supporters and opponents of Chavez occurred near the presidential palace, the military stepped in to request Chavez's resignation. By the 13th, however, word had reached his supporters that he had refused to resign from the office of the presidency. Supporters surrounded the presidential palace and seized television stations demanding his return and in a surprising turn of events, pro-Chavez members of the presidential guard removed the interim president and reinstalled Chavez as president. Like with Juan Perón before him, Chavez's polarizing political strategy had created a strong opposition force ready to protest his political reforms, though, at the same time, his strong connection to a segment of the Venezuelan citizenry had saved him from being ousted from power.

While the case of Chavez is more of an extreme case of mass mobilization, similar phenomena can be seen in many other cases of populists' ascendancy to power. Populism's close connection to the people, manifested by their exaggerated support for full popular sovereignty, the redirection of the anger of the populace towards establishment figures, and populists' close connection to social movements is expected to engender political protest on behalf of the masses whose grievances or issues have not been addressed by the political mainstream. Previous tests have demonstrated that populist attitudes are positively correlated with non-institutionalized forms of political participation, such as protest, and less with institutionalized forms (Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico, 2019). Moreover, populists in power are commonly very polarizing figures that can lead to further protests by the opposition, such as was the case with Hugo Chavez. This study intends to build upon this literature by testing this relationship with the use of cross-national panel data. If it is the case that populist attitudes incite citizens to protest, then one should expect to see this connection empirically when populists are present in the political arena.

This study is organized in the following way. It begins with a review of the literature between populism and political protest, followed by the theoretical argument to be empirically investigated. In brief, I argue that populist parties and politicians can lead to more political protests on behalf of the citizenry. For one, they can effectively mobilize those citizens who are angry with the political establishment for not hearing out their grievances. Secondly, populists often lead to a polarization of society that brings about further mobilization by the opposition. From there, the methods and materials are presented with a detailed description of the creation of the 'populist' variables as well as the dependent variables for 'political protest'. The study then moves towards empirical testing which is performed by way of regression analysis. Upon demonstrating that both the share of the vote for populist parties and populists in power demonstrate strong positive relationships with protest intensity when controlled for, I provide several concluding remarks, limitations, and promising directions for future research.

### **Populism and Political Protest**

Populism is closely linked with the democratic notion of popular sovereignty brought about by the great liberal revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. The fundamental belief at the core of democracy is that government should be, to quote Abraham Lincoln, "of the people, by the people,

and for the people”. The implication is that the “sovereign people” are the ultimate legitimate power in a democracy and that they are right to rebel against their government if they feel that they are not being properly represented by their politicians. Conceptually speaking, “populism”, can best be described as a “thin-centered ideology which considers society to be divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”, and believes that politics should be the expression of the *volonté générale*” (Mudde, 2004). It is important to note that while many democratic ideologies invoke the concept of popular sovereignty, populists are unique in that they view popular sovereignty as being the supreme value in modern democracies, which often leads to a crude belief in simple majority rule. While it can attach itself to other “host-ideologies” which provide for the larger worldview (Mudde, 2004), it is this core belief in popular sovereignty and the moralistic dimension to populism that are expected to act, albeit for different reasons, as significant motivators for political protest.

As populists believe fundamentally in the notion of popular sovereignty, that the people as a whole should determine the politics of their country, perceived violations of this notion can lead to citizens to develop grievances. Judges, bureaucrats, political parties and other intermediary institutions associated with liberal democracy, as well as other political “influencers” such as the media, interest groups, multinational corporations, and supranational governmental structures, are often the target of populist critiques. While populism often holds a rather antagonistic position to liberal democracy (Mudde, 2012; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Ruth-Lovell, Lührmann, and Grahn, 2019), this is not to say that populists are fundamentally anti-democratic per se. In their study on populist attitudes, Kaltwasser and Hauwaert (2019) conduct a cross-national survey involving countries in both Europe and Latin America and demonstrate that while populist citizens, on the whole, tend to be dissatisfied with the state of democracy in their country, fundamentally, they show strong support for democracy and democratic values. This implies that populists are not closet authoritarians by nature, but simply dissatisfied democrats (see Figure 1 below) (see also Zaslove, et al., 2020; Oesch, 2008; Ramiro, 2016; Van Hauwert and Van Kessel, 2018).




Figure 1: Populism Attitudes and Satisfaction with the State of Democracy  
*Source:* Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2020).

*Note:* The Populist scale takes the Ideological approach as its conceptual base (See Mudde, 2004). The wording of each survey question included can be found in Table A.6 in the Appendix. The data from Module 5 of the CSES dataset includes survey data from citizens in 19 countries around the world at the time of a national election. n=27,350.

Given their core belief in popular sovereignty, populists considered violations of the principle of ‘majority rule’ to go against this core notion of democracy. Using emotional appeals to feelings of injustice amongst a population, populism is capable of mobilizing citizens who have objective, relative, or constructed grievances concerning the governance of the establishment parties (Laclau, 1977; Laraña et al., 1994). Most often, these groups include those who have the impression of being ignored or excluded by the political establishment (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). In this respect, populist parties and movements can play a positive role for democracy insofar as they help to articulate the demands of these individuals who feel abandoned.

The moralistic dimension to populism which leads the populist to view the struggle between the two polar forces imagined by the populist, the people and the elite, to be viewed in Manichean terms (Mudde, 2004) generates feelings of anger and moral outrage (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza, 2020). While general distrust (Hooghe and Marien, 2012) and dissatisfaction (Miller, 1980; Torcal and Montero, 2006) are also negative attitudes that can be held about political phenomena, the anger arising from anti-elite sentiments is different insofar as it is of a moral character. While the former two can lead to political apathy, moral outrage is expected to lead to increased political participation. Moralized attitudes are associated with higher motivations to participate in politics (Skitka and Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Hanson, and Wisneski, 2017) and fewer inhibitions against acting (Effron and Miller, 2012; Ryan, 2017). In times when the political mainstream has become disenfranchised to the point of being hated by a large portion of the citizenry (Hay, 2007), the narratives constructed by populists can produce a justification for becoming more politically engaged. Feelings of injustice and moral outrage have been demonstrated to be strongly correlated

to political engagement and political protest (Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, 2008; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2009; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2010). While other negative emotions have at times been associated with populists beliefs (Demertzis, 2006), the most common emotional association is anger (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza, 2020). This was the case with Euroscepticism in Britain (Vasilopoulou and Wagner, 2017), votes for Donald Trump (Abramowitz, 2018), votes for the populist radical right in France (Vasilopoulos, et al., 2018), and populist attitudes in Spain (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza, 2017). Anger is an emotion that arises from contexts where the individual understands personal harm or the threat of harm to be the result of negligent behavior of political actors. Previous studies have emphasized the extent that anger enhances political participation more than other emotions (Thompson, 2006; Valentino, et al., 2011; Weber, 2012). Considering that populist beliefs are ultimately related to feelings of anger, one should expect them to lead one to becoming more engaged in political protests than to become apathetic. Indeed, when tests were run using survey data from nine European countries, Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico (2019) demonstrated that those with populist attitudes were correlated with participation in non-institutional forms of political participation such as signing petitions, participating online, and in some cases participating in political demonstrations. Studies testing participation in institutional forms of political participation, however, have shown the showed the opposite relationship (Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico, 2019; Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015). This study shall build upon the results of the tests conducted by Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico (2019) by testing this relationship with cross-national data.




Figure 2: Moralism, Emotions, and the Populist Worldview

*Source:* Reproduced by the author from Meijers and Zaslove (2020a, 2020b).

*Note:* Each observation denotes a political party in continental Europe. The 2018 Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA) dataset measures positions and attitudes related to populism of 250 parties in 28 European countries. The expert survey was held from April to July 2018 and includes the input of 294 country-experts.

Given the populist's close connection to "the people", and the often un-mediated relationship they attempt to construct in order to bypass the mainstream institutions of society, populist politicians often have a close relationship with populist social movements, whether they be grassroots organizations or party affiliated (Aslanidis, 2007; Hutter and Kriesi, 2013). Many populist leaders, such as Evo Morales (Lehoucq, 2011, p. 352), have come to power on a wave of populist political protest against the incumbent or mainstream parties, while others, such as Hugo Chavez (Myers, 2011) and Juan Péron (Chen, 2011, p. 113, 117), have even been returned to power by popular demonstrations after having been ousted by the opposition. From their beginnings in the late 1990s, Morales' Movement for Socialism (MAS) built bridges between existing social movements that were increasingly resistant to the neoliberal politics of the era in order to form a broad opposition coalition (Lehoucq, 2011, p. 352; Madrid, 2011). Aslanidis (2007) outlines three typologies of populist movements in terms of their connection to electoral politics. First are those movements which eventually become institutionalized in the form of political parties such as PODEMOS in Spain and Italy's Five-Star Movement. Next are those movements that associate themselves with a certain party in an effort to have certain political candidates win political office. The Tea Party in the United States is a prime example as they provided support for right-leaning, small government Republican candidates such as Ted Cruz, Sarah Palin, and Michelle Bachmann. Finally, the third form are those movements that become "co-opted" by political parties. Considering that the discursive construction of such concepts as "the people" or the "99%", are what Laclau (2005) termed "floating signifiers", this renders them able to be co-opted and by political actors who can use them for their own opportunistic ends. One of the most infamous instances of this occurring happened in Ecuador when Rafael Correa appropriated the collective identities and discursive constructions of popular grassroots movements prior to initiating his first presidential campaign.

Once populist parties are established, however, or gain representation in government, this can spur the opposition to counter-protest. It was, for example, the controversial decision by Poland's Law and Justice party (PiS) controversial proposal to restrict the abortion law that sparked the mass mobilization of newly politicized Polish citizens who opposed the decision (Hall, 2019). In the United States, Donald Trump's campaign rhetoric and support for controversial policies such as the Muslim ban and the family separation policy, have instigated large protests in opposition (Berry and Chenowith, 2018; Zepeda-Millan and Wallace, 2018). The inauguration protests alone are estimated to have attracted around two million protesters and acted as a catalyst for the formation of a unified 'resistance' movement (Booth and Topping, 2017, Jan 22; Meyer and Tarrow, 2018). A number of populist heads of government have been removed from power after large scale anti-government protests such as was the case for Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador (Conaghan, 2011, pp. 372-3), Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (Myers, 2011, pp. 270, 281), and Fujimori in Peru (Palmer, 2011, p. 249).

Polarization is a common side effect of having populists in power due to their often divisive rhetoric, Manichean perspective on politics, their support for controversial issues and policies backed by their 'people', and the rather complicated relationship they have towards the institutions of liberal democracy (Enyedi, 2016; Handlin, 2018; Kaltwasser, 2017). In political systems where "populist polarization" exists, party rivalries are ultimately not confined to elite-conflicts as the dominant electoral strategy is one where elites appeal to the "opposition between the righteous people and the corrupt elites, and to the public's distrust of the institutions of compromise" (Enyedi, 2016). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) note that populism can lead to a "moralization of politics" which makes reaching agreements with other parties and the formation of stable political coalitions

more difficult. In lieu of elite-conflicts, populist polarization is based in genuine ideological differences within the electorate and a change in government instead does not simply bring to power an opposition party, but also a party that is anti-systemic in nature (Enyedi, 2016). Elections, thus, are transformed into a contest between competing political regime types. Anti-populism, or “fighting fire with fire”, is a common response by many establishment parties which employs the opposite moral categories used by the populists, and has the effect of feeding this conflict which can lead to a more permanent populist versus anti-populist political cleavage (Kaltwasser, 2017). The resulting backlash from the mainstream, therefore, should expect to produce intensified protests once populists enter into government. Anecdotally, this relationship would seem to hold in a number of modern democracies (see Table 3 below).




Figure 3: Percentage Increase in Protest Events from Predecessor

Source: Author; Banks and Wilson (2019)

Note: “Protest Events” are operationalized as being both violent and non-violent in nature. \*For those populist chief executives whose predecessors only held the office for a year or less, the average of the two previous chief executives were used.

## Materials and Methods

### *Empirical Strategy*

In order to test the main hypothesis on the relationship between populism and protest intensity (of various sorts), I take panel data from 1989 to 2018. The method used to analyze this relationship involves the use of a negative binomial regression, which allows one to avoid the biases associated with a non-normalized Poisson distribution of a dependent variable containing a large number of zeroes, which is the case for the dependent variables utilized in this study. This being the case, a standard parametric OLS-regression is not applicable for the purposes of this study, as it cannot account for a poisson-distributed dependent variable (see Hilbe, 2011). Moreover, considering that



the data involves observations for both country and year, organized as panel data, I introduce fixed effects for both in order to account for this.

This study is divided into three sets of tests. The first involves tests for the effect that the presence of a populist party or a populist politician in the position of the chief executive have on the intensity of political protest in a given country. From this, it will be possible to gauge the effect of simply having a prominent populist party as the opposition as well as the effect of a populist coming to power. The second set of tests involves a breakdown of these figures by geographic, temporal, and ideational considerations. Finally, the third set of tests incorporates variables for specific kinds of mobilizations (for democracy and for autocracy) so as to parse out which social actors are actually doing the protesting.

### *Dependent Variables*

In order to test for a relationship between the populism and political protest intensity, I make use of the data from the Cross-National Time-Series Database (Banks & Wilson, 2019), which contains variables for both “anti-government demonstrations” and “riots” which will be used as dependent variables. The definition that Banks and Wilson provide “for anti-government demonstrations” is “any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature” (Banks & Wilson, 2019, p. 13). “Riots”, on the other hand, are defined as “any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force” (Banks & Wilson, 2019). Finally, for a more robust testing of political protest in general, I combine both variables for “anti-government demonstrations”, which are peaceful in nature, and “riots”, which are violent in nature, into a single variable denoting “political protest”.

To compliment the protest event data from CNTS, variables denoting various forms of “mass mobilization” were also taken from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge, et al., 2020). The reasons for doing so are as follows: (1) While the figures from CNTS are better suited to measuring the quantity of protest events, V-Dem’s variables for mass mobilization are better measure for the size and intensity of said events. While events of one million or more protesters could theoretically occur, this would not necessarily be reflected in the CNTS data which codes for protest events in the same way no matter if they have a hundred or a million participants. Thus, while both datasets measure “protest” per se, both measures ultimately code for different phenomena (2) Specific variations of the mass mobilization variable, such as “mobilization for democracy” and “mobilization for autocracy” go further in explaining *who* protests when populists enter the political arena. Thus, three variables from this dataset were added to the current study: mass mobilization, mobilization for democracy, and mobilization for autocracy. Each of these variables has an ordinal scale from zero to four with “0” denoting “virtually no events”, “1” denoting “several small-scale events”, “2” denoting “many small-scale events”, “3” denoting “several large-scale and small-scale events”, and “4” denoting “many large-scale and small-scale events” (Coppedge, et al., 2020).

### *Operationalization of “Populism”*

The concept of “populism” is notoriously difficult to conceptualize and the underlying theory behind the term necessarily affects which parties, politicians, and movements are included into the

category. Considering that the argument made in the theoretical section is based on the ideas that populists have of politics, data points for the populist variables will be based on the ideational approach (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Cross-national data concerning populist politicians is rather scarce today despite the explosion of interest in the subject. That being said, a number of regional datasets which take the ideational approach as their framework are available for use which identify populist actors based on qualitative literature review, expert validation, and analysis of politicians' speeches and manifestos.

The first variable used denotes the percentage of the vote for all populist parties in a given country and year. So as to identify parties that fill the criteria of being populist according to the ideational approach, I utilize Rooduijn et al.'s (2019) *Popu-List* which lists all populist parties in 31 countries in Europe since 1989. To ensure the accuracy of such classifications, the list is compiled and reviewed by a team of 80 academics. From here, the vote share for these parties is taken from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2019). To create the figures for the panel data, each country-year observation is given the total percentage of the vote for all populist parties. An overview of these figures can be observed in Table A2 in the Appendix.

In order to move beyond the limited scope of European countries, where clear 'populist' parties can actually be identified, a variable designating a populist head of government will be used for the second set of tests. The benefit of using such a variable is two-fold; (1) It permits an analysis of populism in political systems where populist politicians can arise out of non-populist parties; (2) It permits one to examine the effect of populists controlling the executive branch of a given country. This variable is dichotomous in nature and is based on the dataset used by Ruth-Lovell, Lührmann, and Grahn (2019) whose dataset spans both Europe and South America. For European heads of government, the populists identified in Rooduijn et al.'s (2019) *Popu-List* are combined with the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2019) in order to identify when a populist politician held either the Presidency or Prime Ministry. To account for populists in Latin America, I take from Ruth's (2018) list of populist presidents which is based on expert examination. Finally, so as to incorporate more recent populist chief executives, as well as those residing in countries in Central and North America, I code for those individuals who were deemed to be populists in the Global Populism Database (Hawkins, et al. 2019). This database measures the level of populist discourse in the speeches of 215 chief executives from 66 countries around the world. Based on their criteria, individuals were awarded with a score from "somewhat populist" to "very populist". For the purposes of this study, though, those who were given a score of 0.5 or higher (denoting 'somewhat populist') were included in the dataset for this study. All together, the dataset I make use of consists of 45 countries, with 1440 country-year observations from 1989 to 2020.

### *Control Variables*

Democratization is recognized to be an important prerequisite for protests and the operations of social movements. In their classic text entitled *Social Movements: 1768-2008*, Tilly and Wood (2009, pp. 137-9) highlight several points concerning this relationship which a large body of research has made abundantly clear: (1) States which promote regular relationships with their population, in the form of "citizenship", help to facilitate social movement claim-making. Otherwise, state authorities can feel threatened and to protest would be to risk one's life; (2) The expansion of rights to speech, association, assembly go a long way in promoting protest activity. Moreover, certain obligations delegated to a citizen, such as voting, serving on juries, military

service, and others help create social ties which foster movement activity; (3) A general equalization of the rights and obligations of citizens within public politics, such as extending the inclusion of minorities in a society by enshrining their rights in law actively promotes their participation in politics and social movement activity; (4) A principal goal for most social movements is to influence public policy. This can only take place when a politician considers them to be constituents whose voice is worth listening to; (5) Without state protections for minorities and more vulnerable sections of the population, social movements can face mass repression which prevents them from speaking out; (6) The creation of “complementary institutions” such as labor unions, electoral campaigns, political parties, and other societal organizations provide social movements with allies in other fields of politics, legal protection for their campaigns, and “vehicles for their mobilization”. In order to account for the presence or absence of these institutional procedures, the Liberal Component Index from the Varieties of Democracy dataset will be included as a control (Coppedge, et al., 2020). This variable is described as follows: “The V-Dem Liberal Component Index (LCI) captures the central liberal aspect of democracy that ensures citizens’ and minority groups’ protection from the tyranny of the state and of the majority, an important element of a democratic state. It includes the equality before the law and individual liberty as well as judicial and legislative constraints on the executive” (Coppedge, et al., 2020). These figures are operationalized as a decimal figure between “0” and “1” with “1” denoting a theoretically ideal liberal democracy.

Given the rather intuitive fact that countries with larger populations naturally have higher incidences of political protest, a control variable is included which for population size in order to account for this from the United Nations, from the CNTS dataset (Banks & Wilson, 2019). These figures have been logged to ensure a less skewed distribution. From the perspective of the Rational Choice Theory, larger populations allow political entrepreneurs opportunities for communication and organization that are conducive to the outbreak of political protests by offering a solution to what Lichbach (1998) called the “Rebel’s Dilemma” (Nam, 2007). Powell (1982) has also noted that political protest is also a function of population due to the fact that state authorities find it more difficult to curb the outbreak of collective action when the population is larger. Wilson and Dyson (2016) posit that reducing mortality rate, fertility rate, and the age structure can influence democratization in underlying ways, which consequently allows for more protests.

The level of economic development is a relevant indicator to the intensity of political protests and has shown to be consistently correlated with political protest events. A large number of studies have pointed to the fact that levels of GDP per capita tend to promote anti-government protests (Ang, Dinar, & Lucas, 2014; Brancati, 2014; Dalton and van Sickle, 2005; Korotayev, Bilyuga, & Shishkina, 2018; Korotayev, Vaskin, Bilyuga, & Ilyin 2018; Nam, 2007; Su, 2015). This strong correlation can be explained in several ways; (1) economic development is strongly correlated with more democratic regimes (Lipset, 1959; Boix, 2011; Brunk, Caldeira, & Lewis-Beck, 1987; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Cutright, 1963; Dahl, 1971; Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, & O’Halloran, 2006; Londregan & Poole, 1996; Moore, 1996; Rueschemayer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). This is either due to the fact that more economically well-off citizens become less tolerant of repressive regimes and decide to join pro-democracy protests (Lipset, 1959) or that more economically developed countries are less likely to backslide into autocratic regimes (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997); (2) economic development is closely linked to the level of formal education in a given country (Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Benos & Zotou, 2014; Korotayev, 2009; Korotayev & Khaltourina, 2010; Korotayev, Malkov, & Khaltourina, 2006, 2007;

Sadovnichij, Akaev, Korotayev, & Malkov, 2016; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). As those with higher educational attainment (Brody, 1978; McVeigh and Smith, 1999), or those with both higher education levels and higher incomes (Lipset, 1981; Powell, 1982; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978) are more likely to participate in political protests, the proliferation of formal education throughout the modernization process has been identified as an important factor promoting protests; (3) economic development is, as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have shown, accompanied by a transition from material survival values to post-materialist values of self-expression. Through their World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014) they have demonstrated that those respondents adhere to values of self-expression are more likely to report having participated in protest activity or express interest in doing so (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The figures for GDP per capita (ppp) chosen as a control come from the World Bank from the CNTS dataset (Banks & Wilson, 2019). So as to ensure that the distribution used resembles more of a normalized distribution, I make use of logged figures of GDP per capita.

Despite the paradigmatic shift in social movement theory, a large collection of literature continues to thrive in which it is argued that the macroeconomic backdrop to anti-state demonstrations remain relevant, that “misery matters.” Hardship from economic crisis is generally understood to be a catalyst to large-scale anti-state mobilization (Foran, 2005; McVeigh, 2009; Snow, et al., 1998; Snow, Soule, & Cress, 2008). As per the quotidian disruption theory, mobilization can occur in the event that socioeconomic “shocks” interfere with the daily life of an individual, making life untenable, or when growth in demand for resources is larger than available resources (Snow et al., 1998). In a cross-national study of 145 countries from 1960-2006, Caren, Gaby, and Herrold (2017) detected a negative correlation between the number of contentious events and economic growth, with the strongest effects felt in countries experiencing extreme economic decline and in non-democratic regimes. Considering that more protests also tend to occur in times of economic depressions, when citizens have more pressing economic grievances (Brancati, 2014; Ang, Dinar, & Lucas, 2014), a further control for GDP per capita annual growth was also added to our models, originating from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge, et al, 2020). Furthermore, to control for the effect of inflation, which also has a tendency of being an underlying factor which contributes to the intensity of political protest (Korotayev, et al., 2013) an indicator for inflation rate of the consumer price index will be added as a control from the World Bank (World Bank, 2020).

## **Results**

As shown in Figure 4 (see below) the empirical correlation between the share of the vote for populist parties in Europe and the intensity of political protests (both violent and non-violent) is strongly positive.




Figure 4: Populist Party Vote Share and Protest Intensity in Europe (1989-2020)  
*Data sources:* Author; Banks & Wilson, (2018).

From Figure 4, it would seem as if the intensity of political protest continues to increase throughout the entire length of values for the share of the vote for populist parties as expected. The first set of tests in this section will now determine whether this relationship remains significantly significant when controlled with other variables that tend to promote political protest.

In accordance with the previously mentioned causal inference strategy, a negative binomial regression performed on political protests in Europe produces a significant positive relationship with the variable denoting the total share of the vote for populist parties (See Table 2, Model 1). Meanwhile, controls for population size, GDP per capita, and inflation also report significant positive correlations. The control variable for GDP per capita, on the other hand, demonstrates a significant negative correlation as expected. Thus, these results point to a statistically significant relationship between the vote share of populist parties in Europe and increased political protest intensity. Tests which include the intensity of anti-government demonstrations (Model 2) and riots (Model 3) are shown in the next two models. In Model 2, the independent variable of interest still retains its strong and significant positive correlation with anti-government demonstrations. The same can be said for the variables for GDP per capita and the inflation rate while the liberal democracy index demonstrates a strong negative correlation. Model 3, which takes riots as the dependent variable, also shows a strong positive correlation between the share of the vote of populist parties and riots. Of note is the rather strong coefficient for the populist vote share when standardized. Similar positive correlations are revealed with the control for GDP per capita while the control for GDP per capita annual growth demonstrates a negative one. With these results in mind, it can be concluded that the share of the vote for populist parties in Europe is a significant promoter of political protest in general.

In the second series of tests, the effect of having a populist party or politician as the head of government on protest intensity is considered (see Table 3). As mentioned before, due to the ease in identifying populist politicians over populist parties, this dataset includes not only countries in Europe, but also those in Latin America, North America, and India (n=1204 with all controls added). From the dataset, it would seem that having a populist in the highest office of the land is associated with a higher level of political protests, as can be seen in Figure 4.




Figure 5: Populists in Power and Protest Intensity (1989-2020)  
*Data sources:* Author; Banks & Wilson, (2018).

The tests in Table 3 will demonstrate whether this apparent positive correlation is statistically significant when controlled for with other factors that promote political protest. Model 1 includes the combined variable denoting ‘political protest’ as the dependent variable. Upon applying the negative binomial regression, the relationship between populist heads of states and protest intensity turns out to be a significant, positive one. The same can be said for the relationship with control variables as the inflation rate, GDP per capita, and population size, while the liberal democracy index demonstrates a strong negative one as expected. Model 2 takes only (peaceful) anti-government demonstrations and again demonstrates a significant positive relationship with populist heads of government. Again, these tests demonstrate that the level of GDP per capita and the inflation rate show positive correlations, while the liberal democracy index shows a negative one. Finally, in Model 3, violent protests (riots) are considered as the dependent variable which ultimately demonstrates a positive correlation with having a populist as the head of government as well as with controls for GDP per capita and population size. The liberal democracy index and GDP per capita growth, on the other hand, reveal significantly negative correlations.

**Table 2. Negative binomial regression of the intensity of protests in Europe, 1989–2018**

	Model 1 Protests			Model 2 Anti-Government Demonstrations			Model 3 Riots		
	Coef.	St.coef.	IRR (st. IRR)	Coef.	St. Coef	IRR (st. IRR)	Coef.	St. Coef.	IRR (st. IRR)
<b>Vote Share of Populist Parties, %</b>	<b>0.028***</b> (0.005)	<b>0.446</b> (0.082)	<b>1.028</b> (1.562)	<b>0.029***</b> (0.006)	<b>0.459</b> (0.089)	<b>1.029</b> (1.583)	<b>0.056***</b> (0.012)	<b>0.906</b> (0.187)	<b>1.058</b> (2.473)
<b>Population (log)</b>	<b>0.220**</b> (0.085)	<b>0.355</b> (0.138)	<b>1.246</b> (1.427)	<b>0.173+</b> (0.097)	<b>0.279</b> (0.157)	<b>1.189</b> (1.322)	<b>0.256</b> (0.203)	<b>0.413</b> (0.327)	<b>1.291</b> (1.511)
<b>GDP per capita, PPP (log)</b>	<b>2.665***</b> (0.294)	<b>2.137</b> (0.235)	<b>1.437</b> (8.474)	<b>2.807***</b> (0.313)	<b>2.253</b> (0.090)	<b>1.660</b> (9.513)	<b>1.882**</b> (0.583)	<b>1.509</b> (0.467)	<b>6.564</b> (4.521)
<b>Inflation consumer prices</b>	<b>0.004***</b> (0.001)	<b>0.995</b> (0.266)	<b>1.004</b> (2.706)	<b>0.004***</b> (0.001)	<b>1.102</b> (0.248)	<b>1.004</b> (3.011)	<b>-0.003</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.960</b> (1.900)	<b>0.997</b> (0.383)
<b>Liberal Democracy Index</b>	<b>-5.272***</b> (0.907)	<b>-1.038</b> (0.178)	<b>0.005</b> (0.354)	<b>-5.242***</b> (0.919)	<b>-1.032</b> (0.181)	<b>0.005</b> (0.356)	<b>-3.274+</b> (1.904)	<b>-0.645</b> (0.375)	<b>0.038</b> (0.525)
<b>Annual GDP per capita growth</b>	<b>-2.516</b> (0.204)	<b>-0.087</b> (0.070)	<b>0.975</b> (0.917)	<b>-0.004</b> (0.023)	<b>-0.013</b> (0.078)	<b>0.996</b> (0.987)	<b>-0.128***</b> (0.027)	<b>-0.442</b> (0.092)	<b>0.880</b> (0.643)
<b>Observations</b>		<b>849</b>			<b>849</b>			<b>849</b>	
<b>Akaike Inf. Crit.</b>		<b>1884.686</b>			<b>1616.56</b>			<b>919.8606</b>	

*note:* \*\*\* p<0.001 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1; IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. All models have fixed effects for country and time. The unstandardized incidence rate ratio (IRR) indicates how much the rate of the outcome increases for every one-unit increase in the predictor variable, whereas the standardized IRR indicates how much the rate of the outcome increases for every standard deviation increase in the predictor. For example, a standardized IRR of 1.75 indicates that an increase of the predictor by 1 standard deviation increases the rate of outcome by 75 per cent.

**Table 3. Negative binomial regression of the intensity of protests, 1989–2018**

	Model 1 Protests			Model 2 Anti-Government Demonstrations			Model 3 Riots		
	Coef.	St.coef.	IRR (st. IRR)	Coef.	St. Coef	IRR (st. IRR)	Coef.	St. Coef.	IRR (st. IRR)
<b>Populist Chief Executive</b>	<b>0.547***</b> (0.129)	<b>0.211</b> (0.050)	<b>1.727</b> (1.235)	<b>0.531***</b> (0.136)	<b>0.205</b> (0.053)	<b>1.700</b> (1.227)	<b>0.724***</b> (0.190)	<b>0.279</b> (0.073)	<b>2.062</b> (1.322)
<b>Population (log)</b>	<b>0.235***</b> (0.044)	<b>0.381</b> (0.071)	<b>1.264</b> (1.463)	<b>0.225***</b> (0.047)	<b>0.365</b> (0.076)	<b>1.253</b> (1.441)	<b>0.264***</b> (0.080)	<b>0.426</b> (0.129)	<b>1.302</b> (1.531)
<b>GDP per capita, PPP (log)</b>	<b>0.662***</b> (0.106)	<b>0.531</b> (0.085)	<b>1.938</b> (1.701)	<b>0.727***</b> (0.112)	<b>0.584</b> (0.090)	<b>2.069</b> (1.792)	<b>0.533***</b> (0.155)	<b>0.427</b> (0.124)	<b>1.704</b> (1.533)
<b>Inflation consumer prices</b>	<b>-0.001+</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.156</b> (0.085)	<b>0.999</b> (0.856)	<b>-0.001</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.124</b> (0.081)	<b>1.000</b> (0.883)	<b>-0.001+</b> (0.001)	<b>-0.324</b> (0.192)	<b>0.999</b> (0.723)
<b>Liberal Democracy Index</b>	<b>-2.796***</b> (0.397)	<b>-0.551</b> (0.078)	<b>0.061</b> (0.577)	<b>-2.948***</b> (0.423)	<b>-0.581</b> (0.083)	<b>0.052</b> (0.560)	<b>-1.802**</b> (0.658)	<b>-0.355</b> (0.129)	<b>0.165</b> (0.701)
<b>Annual GDP per capita growth</b>	<b>-0.048***</b> (0.014)	<b>-0.164</b> (0.049)	<b>0.953</b> (0.848)	<b>-0.038*</b> (0.015)	<b>-0.131</b> (0.052)	<b>0.963</b> (0.877)	<b>-0.098***</b> (0.021)	<b>-0.337</b> (0.072)	<b>0.907</b> (0.714)
<b>Observations</b>		<b>1204</b>			<b>1204</b>			<b>1204</b>	
<b>Akaike Inf. Crit.</b>		<b>3386.719</b>			<b>2961.912</b>			<b>1672</b>	

*note:* \*\*\* p<0.001 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1; IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. All models have fixed effects for country and time. The unstandardized incidence rate ratio (IRR) indicates how much the rate of the outcome increases for every one-unit increase in the predictor variable, whereas the standardized IRR indicates how much the rate of the outcome increases for every standard deviation increase in the predictor. For example, a standardized IRR of 1.75 indicates that an increase of the predictor by 1 standard deviation increases the rate of outcome by 75 per cent.

While on the whole, the percentage of the vote for populist parties as well as the existence of a populist holding the office of the chief executive in their respective country both demonstrate positive relationships with the intensity of political protests, further testing is performed in the Appendix in order to observe whether this basic relationship still holds across geographic (Table A.3) and temporal (Table A.4) boundaries as well as to investigate the relationship that specifically left-wing, right-wing, and centrist populism (Table A.5) has with protest intensity.

In Table A.3, testing from specific regions demonstrates that aside from strong positive relationships between populism and protest intensity in Europe (and especially Western Europe), significant positive relationships appear in other regions of the world. In fact, in the case of South America, the existence of a populist chief executive even reveals itself to be on the verge of being statistically significant in the negative direction. It would seem that aside from the strong correlation in Western Europe, that this general relationship cannot be explained by regional variation.

In Table A.4, the datasets are instead split between different ‘waves’ of populism. In the first period, from 1989 to 2000, which roughly corresponds to the second wave populists in Latin



America, populist politicians and parties in the new democracies in Eastern Europe, and the emergence of electorally successful parties in Western Europe, significant negative relationships appear between both populist variables and political protest intensity. When the period from 2000 to 2018 is considered, which corresponds to the third wave radical populists in Latin America, the rise of the populist radical right in Europe, India, and the United States, and finally, several instances of left-wing populists in parts of Southern Europe, the relationship turns out to be positively correlated with protest intensity in both cases. From this, it would seem that while populist political actors were promoters of political protests in the 21st century, whereas, in the last decade of the 20th century, they tended to be mitigating factors.

Table A.5 displays the results of the testing performed on the effect that populists grouped by their specific host-ideologies (the radical right, the radical left, and the centrist populists) have on the propensity to protest in a given country. As with the previous series of tests, the first two models also divide the sample of observations at the year 2000. In model 1, which consists of all observations from between 1989 and 2000, no significant relationships are revealed between the share of the vote for populist parties of any kind and protest intensity, though, when the larger dataset is taken into account, left-wing populist chief executives are positively correlated with protest intensity while the centrist populist chief executives are negatively correlated. In the period from 2000 to 2018, both the share of the vote for left-wing populist and right-wing populist parties in Europe demonstrate strong positive relationships, while the centrist populist parties report a relationship that is on the verge of being positively significant. When populist chief executives are tested as the dependent using the full dataset, weak positive relationships are observed with both left-wing and centrist populists. Finally, model 3 incorporates the entire span of years. In Europe, both left-wing and right-wing populist parties are shown to be positively correlated with protest intensity, while the centrist populist parties are to a lesser extent. Using the full dataset, populist radical right chief executives are significantly correlated with political protest intensity, and though the radical left is as well, their statistical significance is diminished in strength.

Finally, Table A.6 displays the results for the tests performed using the variables for “mass mobilization” as the dependent variable. What is clear from these tests is that (1) both the left-wing and centrist populists did not receive a significant positive, testifying to the lack of large-scale mobilization that these ideologies can promote or provoke; (2) the populist radical right has demonstrated very strong and significant relationships with both movements for democratization, demonstrating the tendency of these populists to provoke counter-protests, and mobilizations for autocracy, demonstrating a tendency to promote protests.

## **Discussion**

From the tests performed in the previous section, the results suggest that the existence of a populist party in a political system, or their ascendancy to the head of government, has a tendency to provoke political protests. These results would seem to testify to populist political actors being a rather strong predictor of both peaceful and violent protests when controlled for other factors contributing to protest intensity such as GDP per capita, inflation, and population size as well as those that tend to be inhibiting factors as GDP per capita growth and liberal democratic institutions. Moreover, these relationships also hold when considered separately with violent and non-violent forms of political protest. With this in mind, the principle conclusion derived from this study can be found in this result.

That said, further testing indicates that these strong correlations can be explained by specific “waves” of populism, and to a certain extent, by the specific “host ideologies” associated with them. For example, while the rise of populists in the 1990s, principally in either neoliberal or centrist form, demonstrate slightly significant negative relationships with protest intensity, the rise of the radical right and radical left starting in the new millennium demonstrate strong positive relationships. The populist radical right in particular seems to play a rather prominent role in both promoting large-scale mobilizations for autocracy and provoking mobilizations for democracy.

## **Conclusion**

In this study, the influence of populist actors, whether they be a part of the opposition or in power, is evaluated for the effect they have on the intensity of political protest. Based on an examination of the literature on populism and populist attitudes and their influence on the propensity to protest, it was theorized that populism’s close connection to an angry and disenfranchised segment of the population that is dissatisfied with the state of democracy in their country and alienated from the politics of the political establishment, should provoke political protests due to the populist’s ability to redirect this anger towards mainstream establishment figures. The moralistic dimension to populist attitudes, and the feelings of moral outrage associated with them, lead one to be more likely to resort to non-institutional forms of political participation (Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico, 2019). Moreover, given populists’ Manichean views on politics, their support for controversial policies, and their hostile attitude to the institutions of liberal democracy (Enyedi, 2016; Handlin, 2018; Kaltwasser, 2017), the polarizing effect of populism in power is also believed to promote political protests on behalf of the non-populist opposition. Cross-national testing performed in this study demonstrates support for both of this hypothesis as strong positive relationships were revealed between the intensity of political protest in a given country and (1) the share of the vote for populist parties; (2) populist politicians in the highest office of their political system (President or Prime Minister). When controlled for with variables for GDP per capita, GDP per capita annual growth, inflation, the level of liberal democracy, and population size, the results demonstrated strong positive relationships between the two independent variables and the intensity of political protest. Moreover, when the variable for political protest is split into its two constituent groups, anti-government demonstrations, which are peaceful in nature, and riots, which are violent, populism remains a significant predictor of protests of both kinds.

The results shown by the first series of tests, with the variable denoting populists holding the office of the chief executive as the independent variable, contributes to the ever-growing literature on the consequences of populism in power. From these tests, it would seem that the ascension of a populist politician to the office of the President or Prime Minister of their respective country unleashes further protests, most likely due to the polarization that comes along with their rise. Due to the large number of observations from countries outside of the European context, the conclusions which can be extrapolated from this study are helpful in moving away from the “Atlanticist bias” in populist studies (Moffit, 2015) and towards a more universal understanding of the consequences of populism.

While this relationship may hold generally, when the dataset is split along the decades associated with various “waves” of populism, and by each populists’ “host ideology”, testing indicates a divergence in protest intensity when populists are present in the political arena. Prior to the year 2000, when Latin America and Eastern Europe experienced a rise in neoliberal populists, these

actors tended to be mitigating factors for political protests, possibly due to their attempts to stabilize their economies during times of rising inflation and transitions to the market. After 2000, however, the radicals on both the left and the right have shown to be rather strong promoters of political protest, with the radical right consistently demonstrating the strongest correlations.

A pertinent question which arises from these findings is the question of who exactly is being mobilized to protest when populist actors begin inhabiting spaces in the political sphere? Inglehart and Welzel's (2005, also see Inglehart et al. 2014) position argues that due to the "silent revolution" of post-materialist values, those who hold these values are more likely to report having protested or are open to doing so. That being said, a number of scholars, (Inglehart included), have also recognized that 'authoritarian' populism arises as the result of a materialist backlash against the rise of postmaterialist values, or a "silent counter-revolution" (Ignazi, 1992; Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Faced with ever-increasing economic insecurity and rapid cultural changes, those who still hold onto materialist values become more likely to vote for the nativist and authoritarian political parties of the radical right (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Hutter and Kriesi (2013) have stated that this generally leads to a political paradox. While generally, for populists on both the right and the left the "medium is the message" in terms of the form of political participation they take, this often results in a strategy of what they call "double differentiation". Despite being critical of mainstream electoral politics, on the whole, the populist radical right tends to choose the electoral channel, and not the protest arena, to mobilize supporters, leading to an either-or-logic. The tests performed in Table A.6 provide support for this theory; as electoral support for the populist radical right rises, there is a corresponding increase in mobilizations for autocracy, though, once in power, this relationship becomes weaker. Moreover, a clear polarization or provocation effect can be observed as the populist radical right comes to power; movements for democracy also become more prominent.

Possessing post-materialist values, the left, on the other hand, has a tendency to both protest and participate in electoral politics in tandem. This would tend to explain Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico's (2019) positive correlations between populist attitudes and propensity to protest in countries such as Spain and Greece which have large radical left-wing populist parties, and the insignificant (and even negative) relationships in those with large radical right-wing parties (Italy, Poland, and Switzerland) and Zaslove, et al.'s (2020) negative result in their study on the Netherlands. While the tests performed with the CNTS figures for political protest do indeed demonstrate significant positive relationships with the radical left, the V-Dem variables for mass mobilization do not. It is not clear whether this has to do with the specifics of the V-Dem variables, the lower number of observations, or simply a result that does not conform to the theory advanced in previous studies. With this in mind, a logical next step would be to test for the comparative strength that radical left-wing populists and radical right-wing populists have in promoting political protests. This would seem to be a promising direction for future research.

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## Appendix



**Table A.1. List of Populist Chief Executives**

<b>Populist Chief Executive (Period in Office)</b>	<b>Country</b>
Carlos Menem (1989-1999)	Argentina
Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003)	Argentina
Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007)	Argentina
Evo Morales (2006-2019)	Bolivia
Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992)	Brazil
Jair Bolsonaro (2019- )	Brazil
Sakskoburggotski (Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori) (2001-2004)	Bulgaria
Borisov (Grazhdani za Evropeysko Razvitie na Balgariya) (2009-2012, 2014-2017, 2017- )	Bulgaria
Gerdzhikov (Natsionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori) (2017- )	Bulgaria
Topolanek (2006-2009)	Czech Republic
Babis (Akce nespokojených občanů) (2017- )	Czech Republic
Hipólito Mejía (2000-2004)	Dominican Republic
Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997)	Ecuador
Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005)	Ecuador
Rafael Correa (2007-2017)	Ecuador
Antonio Saca (2004-2009)	El Salvador
Mauricio Funes (2009-2014)	El Salvador
Salvador Sánchez Cerén (2014-2019)	El Salvador
Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA) (2015-2018)	Greece
Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009)	Honduras
Juan Orlando Hernández (2014-)	Honduras
Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) (2010-)	Hungary
Narendra Modi (2014-)	India

Berlusconi (Forza Italia) (1994-1995, 2001-2006, 2008-2011)	Italy
Giuseppe Conte (Movimento 5 Stelle) (2018-)	Italy
Kalvitis (Tautas Partija) (2002-2007)	Latvia
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-)	Mexico
Daniel Ortega (1979-1990, 2007-)	Nicaragua
Mireya Moscoso (1999-2004)	Panama
Ricardo Martinelli (2009-2014)	Panama
Juan Carlos Varela (2014-2019)	Panama
Nicanor Duarte (2003-2008)	Paraguay
Alan García (1985-1990, 2006-2011)	Peru
Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000)	Peru
Ollanta Humala (2011-2016)	Peru
Kaczynski (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) (2001-2003)	Poland
Duda (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) (2015-)	Poland
Fico (Smer – sociálna demokracia) (2006-2010, 2012-2018)	Slovakia
Pellegrini (Smer – sociálna demokracia) (2018-)	Slovakia
Janša (Slovenska demokratska stranka) (2004-2007, 2012-2013, 2020-)	Slovenia
Marjan Šarec (Lista Marjana Sarca) (2018-2020)	Slovenia
Donald Trump (2017-)	United States
Carlos Pérez (1989-1993)	Venezuela
Rafael Caldera (1994-1999)	Venezuela
Hugo Chávez (1999-2013)	Venezuela

**Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Min/Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Vote Share of Populist Parties, %	0/69.40	14.85	9.94	16.092

Populist Chief Executive	0/1	0.181	0	0.385
Political Protest	0/197	2.854	0	10.909
Anti-Government Demonstrations	0/149	2.11	0	8.612
Riots	0/51	0.744	0	2.706
Population	252.4/1383198	54343.9	8869.9	175909.5
GDP Per Capita (ppp)	1750/115415	29904	28002	19567.4
Inflation of Consumer Prices	-4.48/7481.66	31.86	2.93	276.330
Liberal Democracy Index	0.034/0.891	0.671	0.762	0.197
GDP Per Capita Annual Growth	-14.269/23.986	2.139	2.131	3.451

**Table A.3. Negative binomial regression of the intensity of protests by continent, 1989–2018**

	Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Europe	South America
	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.
<b>Populist Chief Executive</b>		<b>-0.041</b> (0.148)		<b>0.086</b> (0.105)	<b>0.187*</b> (0.079)	<b>-0.189+</b> (0.103)
<b>Vote Share of Populist Parties, %</b>	<b>0.511***</b> (0.153)		<b>0.185</b> (0.116)			
<b>Population</b>	<b>0.351*</b> (0.163)	<b>0.407*</b> (0.159)	<b>0.792+</b> (0.471)	<b>0.801+</b> (0.469)	<b>0.313*</b> (0.132)	<b>-0.751*</b> (0.382)
<b>GDP per capita, PPP</b>	<b>1.370**</b> (0.462)	<b>1.936***</b> (0.438)	<b>3.678***</b> (0.425)	<b>3.665***</b> (0.409)	<b>2.215***</b> (0.242)	<b>2.259***</b> (0.523)
<b>Inflation consumer prices</b>	<b>-66.371***</b> (13.404)	<b>-72.810***</b> (14.327)	<b>1.206***</b> (0.238)	<b>1.111***</b> (0.234)	<b>0.862**</b> (0.287)	<b>-0.131</b> (0.086)
<b>Liberal Democracy Index</b>	<b>0.105</b> (0.518)	<b>-0.641</b> (0.484)	<b>-1.063***</b> (0.186)	<b>-1.132***</b> (0.161)	<b>-1.198***</b> (0.152)	<b>-0.059</b> (0.191)
<b>Annual GDP per capita growth</b>	<b>-0.034</b> (0.101)	<b>-0.030</b> (0.104)	<b>-0.122</b> (0.093)	<b>-0.157+</b> (0.086)	<b>-0.101</b> (0.068)	<b>-0.401**</b> (0.124)
<b>Observations</b>	<b>567</b>	<b>567</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>854</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>Akaike Inf. Crit.</b>	<b>1357.494</b>	<b>1369.031</b>	<b>483.1137</b>	<b>499.4285</b>	<b>1925.634</b>	<b>431.3283</b>

*note:* \*\*\* p<0.001 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1; All models have fixed effects for country and time.

**Table A.4. Negative binomial regression of the intensity of protests by “wave”**

	1989-2000		2000-2018	
	Europe	Full Dataset	Europe	Full Dataset
	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.
<b>Populist Chief Executive</b>		<b>-0.464*</b> (0.215)		<b>0.142*</b> (0.058)
<b>Vote Share of Populist Parties, %</b>	<b>-0.709*</b> (0.361)		<b>0.416***</b> (0.106)	
<b>Population</b>	<b>1.083*</b> (0.538)	<b>0.406*</b> (0.186)	<b>0.256</b> (0.167)	<b>0.350***</b> (0.084)
<b>GDP per capita, PPP</b>	<b>0.218</b> (1.082)	<b>0.143</b> (0.186)	<b>1.737***</b> (0.309)	<b>0.732***</b> (0.120)
<b>Inflation consumer prices</b>	<b>1.228***</b> (0.339)	<b>-0.073</b> (0.078)	<b>-80.216***</b> (10.734)	<b>-13.997*</b> (5.811)
<b>Liberal Democracy Index</b>	<b>-0.131</b> (0.628)	<b>-0.181</b> (0.166)	<b>-1.273***</b> (0.258)	<b>-0.942***</b> (0.130)
<b>Annual GDP per capita growth</b>	<b>-0.304+</b> (0.160)	<b>-0.225*</b> (0.094)	<b>0.106</b> (0.074)	<b>-0.091</b> (0.061)
<b>Observations</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>567</b>	<b>796</b>
<b>Akaike Inf. Crit.</b>	<b>311.8063</b>	<b>742.0176</b>	<b>1392.495</b>	<b>2415.452</b>

*note:* \*\*\* p<0.001 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1; All models have fixed effects for country and time.

**Table A.5. Negative binomial regression of the intensity of protests by “host-ideology”**

	1989-2000		2000-2018		Full Range	
	Europe	Full Dataset	Europe	Full Dataset	Europe	Full Dataset
	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.
Vote Share of Left-Wing Populist Parties, %	-0.416 (0.539)		0.178** (0.065)		0.316*** (0.066)	
Vote Share of Right-Wing Populist Parties, %	-0.051 (0.442)		0.378*** (0.113)		0.371*** (0.086)	
Vote Share of Centrist Populist Parties, %	-0.949 (0.674)		0.180+ (0.097)		0.182* (0.079)	
Left-Wing Populist Chief Executive		0.738* (0.343)		0.027 (0.062)		0.119* (0.053)
Right-Wing Populist Chief Executive		-0.075 (0.258)		0.108+ (0.055)		0.194*** (0.049)
Centrist Populist Chief Executive		-0.731* (0.305)		0.102+ (0.053)		0.054 (0.049)
Population	1.166* (0.551)	0.300 (0.205)	0.251 (0.168)	0.351*** (0.084)	0.372** (0.138)	0.396*** (0.071)
GDP per capita, PPP	0.170 (1.076)	-0.001 (0.200)	1.662*** (0.311)	0.735*** (0.120)	2.049*** (0.233)	0.528*** (0.085)
Inflation consumer prices	1.276*** (0.354)	-0.009 (0.077)	- 79.978*** (10.784)	-14.588* (5.827)	0.929*** (0.280)	-0.130 (0.082)
Liberal Democracy Index	-0.087 (0.638)	-0.011 (0.193)	-1.268*** (0.252)	-0.981*** (0.132)	- 1.011*** (0.176)	-0.554*** (0.080)
Annual GDP per capita growth	-0.320* (0.158)	-0.218* (0.100)	0.102 (0.075)	-0.092 (0.061)	-0.084 (0.070)	-0.159** (0.049)
Observations	312	448	567	796	849	1202
Akaike Inf. Crit.	313.6751	726.3067	1393.828	2418.268	1879.433	3376.666

*note:* \*\*\* p<0.001 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1; IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. All models have fixed effects for country and time.




Figure 6: Populism and Mass Mobilization

**Table A.6. OLS regression with fixed effects of the propensity for mass mobilization by populist host ideology**

	Mass Mobilization		Mobilization for Democracy		Mobilization for Autocracy	
	Europe	Full Dataset	Europe	Full Dataset	Europe	Full Dataset
	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.	St.coef.
Vote Share of Left-Wing Populist Parties, %	-0.038 (0.041)		-0.009 (0.046)		0.002 (0.015)	
Vote Share of Right-Wing Populist Parties, %	0.042 (0.033)		0.145*** (0.035)		0.187*** (0.011)	
Vote Share of Centrist Populist Parties, %	0.025 (0.032)		0.045 (0.034)		-0.004 (0.011)	
Left-Wing Populist Chief Executive		0.026 (0.042)		-0.080* (0.039)		-0.027 (0.023)
Right-Wing Populist Chief Executive		0.108*** (0.024)		0.132*** (0.022)		0.022+ (0.013)
Centrist Populist Chief Executive		0.041+ (0.024)		-0.004 (0.022)		-0.011 (0.013)
Population	0.722*** (0.192)	0.540*** (0.132)	0.099 (0.213)	0.254+ (0.130)	-0.070 (0.090)	0.022 (0.081)
GDP per capita, PPP	0.496*** (0.090)	0.348*** (0.070)	0.233* (0.096)	0.303*** (0.066)	-0.067* (0.031)	0.124** (0.039)
Inflation consumer prices	0.565*** (0.133)	0.023 (0.018)	0.210 (0.139)	0.005 (0.017)	0.027 (0.045)	-0.017+ (0.010)
Liberal Democracy Index	-0.280** (0.086)	-0.139** (0.053)	-0.481*** (0.090)	-0.454*** (0.049)	0.078** (0.030)	-0.247*** (0.029)
Annual GDP per capita growth	-0.065** (0.021)	-0.094*** (0.021)	-0.065** (0.023)	-0.075*** (0.020)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.022+ (0.011)
Observations	683	913	633	860	663	890
P-Value	< 2.22e-16	< 2.22e-16	< 2.22e-16	< 2.22e-16	< 2.22e-16	1.6675e-15
Adj. R-Squared	0.12587	0.10719	0.12335	0.16582	0.30719	0.081894

*note:* \*\*\* p<0.001 \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1; All models have fixed effects for country and time.



**Table A.6. Construction of the ‘Populist’ Variable.**

<b>Characteristic of Populist Ideology</b>	<b>CSES Question</b>	<b>Highest Score</b>
Anti-elitism	Most politicians are trustworthy.	Strongly Disagree
Manichaenism, anti-pluralism	What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	Strongly Agree
Homogeneity of “the elite”, anti-elitism	Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful.	Strongly Agree
Homogeneity of “the people” and “the elite”, people-centrism	The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	Strongly Agree
Anti-pluralism, majoritarianism	In a democracy, it is important to seek compromise among different viewpoints.	Strongly Disagree
Manichaenism, anti-elitism	Most politicians do not care about the people.	Strongly Agree
Anti-elitism, Manichaenism	How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is among politicians in [COUNTRY]:	Very Widespread

*Note:* The “Populist” Variable used in Figure 1 consists of a number of survey questions which indicate components of populist attitudes.

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