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PRIVACY VERSUS SECURITY IN TRYING TIMES: EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION

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Privacy Versus Security in Trying Times: Evidence from Russian Public Opinion⁶

Abstract⁷

When are citizens willing to give up civil rights to enable governments to deal with large-scale emergencies in non-democracies? Emergency responses are one of the most fundamental public services governments provide. Digital transformations in government services both create new possibilities for effective emergency measures and greater intrusions on civil liberties. Existing work on public support for emergency responses suggests that individuals accept intrusive measures when they are credibly framed as temporary responses to actual emergencies. Such work has largely focused on democracies, however, where institutions constrain government abuses. On the one hand, individuals in non-democracies may be more skeptical of emergency measures due to lack of competition and opportunities for redress. Institutional trust should therefore play an important role in such settings. On the other hand, skepticism may be tempered by exposure to and fear of emergencies being addressed. We test these arguments using an original vignette experiment that manipulates the type of emergency intrusive measures address (terrorism vs. an epidemic) and their duration to support for them. We embed this experiment on a survey of more than 16,250 respondents across 60 Russian regions. Our findings provide important insights into the logic of responses to public safety threats and public opinion about them in non-democracies.

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Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.

-Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790)

Introduction

When are citizens willing to give up civil rights in order to enable governments to deal with large-scale emergencies in non-democracies? Much of what we know about the willingness of individuals to accept infringement on their rights in emergencies is rooted in democracies. Despite the centrality of rights to concepts of liberal democracy (Locke, 1698; Mill, 1859), however, even entrenched democracies tend to tighten up security in the face of crisis in ways that can interfere with human rights, especially privacy and civil freedoms. As Sniderman et al. (1996) note, “arguments over rights are arguments embedded in a context” (1996, 62). For example, within months of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and many other countries took counterterrorism measures that strengthened government powers at the expense of human rights to privacy and civil liberties (Ackerman, 2004; Hardin, 2004). The same is true of health emergencies both before (e.g., Beauchamp, 1980), and during the covid-19 pandemic [Sekalala S, Forman L, Habibi R, et al, 2020]. Such actions are contentious, however, potentially leading to opposition by those that believe crises do not warrant infringement or that powers granted will not remain temporary.⁸

Given the fundamentality of liberty vs security debate for political science [Joyner, 2004; Davis, 2008; Mondak, Hurwitz, 2012; Mitsilegas, 2014, Bauman et al. 2014], however, surprisingly little is known about why and when people are willing to trade-off their rights in emergencies, particularly outside of Western democratic settings. On the one hand, the established consensus in the literature on democracies attests that in times of crisis, people tend to be more willing to trade off their fundamental civic and political rights for the sake of safety (e.g., Davis and Silver, 2004). Generally, citizens tend to favor measures that are credibly pitched as both necessary and temporary (Alsan et al. 2020), which in turn are strongly connected to individuals’ trust in government, relative valuation of civil liberties, and personal sense of insecurity or vulnerability (Svenonius and Björklund, 2018; Davis and Silver, 2004). Little work has been done, however, to examine how the willingness of individuals to accept limits on their rights is shaped by the type of crisis being addressed (i.e. human versus natural) or the time frame of emergency measures. On the other hand, existing

⁸ An recent, infamous example of the former argument came from William Barr, Attorney General of the US, who argued “But putting a national lockdown, stay at home orders, is like house arrest. Other than slavery, which was a different kind of restraint, this is the greatest intrusion on civil liberties in American history.” (Transcript of Attorney General’s Remarks as Delivered and Q&A at Hillsdale College, reproduced by Anna Salvatore at Lawfare, September 17, 2020). For more academic treatment, see Vieten, 2020. For discussion of the latter argument, see Dragu, 2011.

work has primarily been conducted in Western democratic settings, where institutions - human constraints on human interactions (North 1981) - provide citizens some means of redress against government abuses and guarantees of rights. In non-democracies, however, weak institutions enable both rampant misuse of government office (i.e. corruption), while also weakening political accountability. Moreover, in such environments rights are rarely guaranteed *de facto* and may consequently be valued differently (e.g. Neundorf 2010, Siegelbaum 2016, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). Both may alter how individuals arrive at support for emergency powers.

In this paper, we contribute to ongoing debates about public opinion about emergency measures by examining both whether the nature of emergency interventions - the type of threat addressed and duration of measures - and individuals' institutional environments shape attitudes towards emergency measures. We build upon existing work on trade-offs between rights and safety to advance two central arguments. First, we argue that individuals' support for emergency measures is driven by the intensity of the threat rather than its nature (i.e. man made versus natural) and the time horizons proposed. Individuals will support emergency measures more where the threat is viewed as greater and when emergency measures will be of short term duration. Second, we argue that the existing institutional environment in which individuals are embedded also plays a strong role in how they view trade-offs between liberty and security. Institutions - human constraints on human interactions - are crucial to the ability of states to make credible commitments to act in good faith and refrain from abuses of power (North and Weingast 1989, North 1990, North et al. 2009). As in existing literature, we argue that individuals' trust in government proxies for their beliefs that the government is likely to commit abuses. We therefore expect that individuals with greater trust in government will be more likely to support emergency measures, particularly where the purpose and duration of measures are well-defined.⁹

To test our arguments, we take advantage of a cross-regional survey of over 17,000 citizens of the Russian Federation across 60 Russian regions. We make use of an original survey experiment that varies the nature of a hypothetical emergency (or lack thereof) and whether measures are explicitly temporary. In our experiment, we ask about the acceptability of an intrusive government service to track citizens' geolocation, which would constitute a tremendous expansion of the surveillance state and a breach of fundamental liberties. Russia is a central case in much of the literature on electoral authoritarianism, due to its size, geopolitical importance, and somewhat typical characteristics among such regimes (e.g. Reuter 2017, Szakonyi 2020, Rosenfeld 2020). Methodologically, focusing our analysis on within country heterogeneity enables us to account for a large range of unobservables - legal regimes, social capital, historical legacies, culture, constitutional structures, etc. - that would potentially complicate cross-national analysis of the heterogeneous effects of our experiment.¹⁰

⁹ In future versions of the paper, we will also examine whether the institutional environments in which individuals are embedded matter directly by taking advantage of cross regional variation in institutional quality.

¹⁰ Research strategies taking advantage of heterogeneity in Russia's regions has been used to test a wide range of outcomes in political science related to the nature of political competition or

Our work makes several contributions to ongoing empirical and theoretical debates about how individuals assess trade-offs between individual rights and the need for governments to address emergency situations. Theoretically, our work extends existing theories of individual attitudes towards public safety measures that violate rights by problematizing institutions more explicitly. In doing so, we provide new insights into the ability of non-democratic regimes to respond to exogenous, non-political crises. To the extent that the consequences of weak institutions decrease trust in government, our theory suggests that such regimes will often face increased opposition after the advent of emergency measures, as well as difficulty securing compliance absent force or material incentives. Empirically, our work provides new empirical evidence on the relative weight individuals put on two different dimensions of emergency measures, the nature of the emergency and the duration of new powers. By leveraging an experimental design, our work allows us to both document differences across these dimensions, compare their relative magnitudes, and understand how they relate to preferences vis-a-vis “normal times”. To our knowledge, existing contributions have generally focused on one type of emergency and have used observational questions. Our approach allows for a more direct causal interpretation that is less subject to social desirability bias and interference from difficult to observe variables such as cultural values or ideology.¹¹ We also provide novel evidence about the interaction between perceptions (and objective reality) of threats, willingness to trade off rights and liberties, and institutions.

In the following section, we briefly review existing work on trade-offs between rights and safety. In section three, we present our hypotheses. Section four discusses our empirical strategy and measures. Section five presents the results of our preliminary analysis. The final section concludes.

Literature review

More than a century ago, Brandeis and Warren (1890), who defined privacy as the right to be left alone, worried that technological progress might threaten privacy, and rightly so. Much of the literature on the acceptability of emergency measures closely mirrors this concern, because many measures taken to address crisis situations significantly expand the amount of sensitive information about individuals accessible to governments and/or control over their movements and actions. A central theme of this research is whether governments proposing emergency measures can themselves be trusted to use new powers only to address crisis situations and to return them after they have passed (Denemark 2012; Nakhaie and de Lint 2013; Friedewald et al. 2016 ; Patil

selection, including inequality (Remington, 2011), economic growth (Libman, 2012), public goods provision and responsiveness (Beazer and Reuter 2019, 2020), and public-private partnerships and education reform (Marques et al. 2020).

¹¹ The nature of this bias is particularly pernicious, because it is likely tied to difficult to measure or observe variables related to culture, values, social networks, and the content of education. Moreover, the bias can travel in multiple dimensions, as people might be pressured to support the public good over individuals and vice-versa. To the extent that it is systematic, we would expect it to threaten inferences from a design that simply compares within individuals across different scenarios and time frames. By resorting to an experimental design that compares across groups, we mitigate this danger, although not necessarily for our regional-level hypotheses.

et al. 2014).¹² Because emergency measures usually grant governments access to sensitive information it would normally not be able to access or confirm the ability to impose intrusive restrictions on everyday life, such powers can be rife for abuse by government officials acting in bad faith. This research suggests that individuals must therefore carefully balance trust in government's good faith and restraint, privacy concerns, and perceptions of the level of insecurity brought on by the crisis itself (Svenonius and Björklund, 2018; Davis and Silver, 2004).

The relationship between privacy concerns, insecurity, and trust in government is nuanced, however. For example, using survey evidence collected in the aftermath of 9/11, Davis and Silver (2004) show that acceptance of intrusive surveillance measures is correlated with both high levels of trust in government and individual fear of terrorism.¹³ Empirically, however, they show that these two variables condition each other, and that "The effect of trust in the federal government on support for civil liberties is conditioned by a sense of sociotropic threat—concern that the country will come under another terrorist attack—as well as personal threat." (Davis and Silver, 2004: page 43). Thus evidence suggests that individuals are indeed making trade-offs among multiple concerns.

In addition to studies of anti-terrorism emergency measures discussed above, there is also a burgeoning literature that explores public opinion towards emergency measures taken to address the Covid-19 pandemic. At the individual level, people who fear covid-19 are more likely to comply with stringent measures, which indirectly implies tolerating limits on certain rights and freedoms (Harper et al., 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020). At the same time, many studies in the US find that supporters of the Republican party are less likely to comply with anti-covid measures, many of which are liberty-restricting (Allcott, H. et al. 2020; Grossman et al., 2020; Kushner, Goodman, & Pepinsky, 2021). Although the precise mechanism at play is difficult to disentangle, preliminary evidence suggests that elite framing plays a large, although complicated role. For example, Arceneaux et al. (2020) employ conjoint and vignette experiments in the US and UK and find "...that endorsements by an in-group party and trusted experts can shift support for measures that erode civil liberties. However, the evidence also reveals resistance to certain illiberal policy measures, including banning protests and indefinitely postponing elections." (page 2). Thus, framing also matters quite a bit, although there are limits in the ability of elites to manipulate beliefs that are poorly understood. Finally, as with terrorism, there is some preliminary evidence that people react less favorably to emergency measures when the potential for government abuses is pointed out to them (Alsan et al. 2020). Intriguingly, however, the magnitude of this effect appears to be conditioned by cross-national context, with Alsan et al. (2020) showing that the effect is much smaller in China than the US. Schmelz (2021) finds that Germans who grew up under the coercive regime in East Germany are more supportive of the restrictive measures against Covid-19.

¹² However, the exposure to the threat itself might influence trust, and the evidence on whether the empirical effect is positive or negative is mixed. For example, Amat et al. (2020) find that in Spain exposure to the epidemic (in Spain) is correlated with lower support for the incumbent, while Bol et al. (2020) demonstrate that in Europe such exposure is related to higher trust in the incumbent.

¹³ The latter is a common finding in this literature, see Merolla & Zechmeister 2009.

Drawing together the above discussion points to some major remaining questions about the willingness of individuals to support emergency measures that erode their freedoms. First, although much work has been done on attitudes towards emergency measures addressed at singular types of crisis situations to our knowledge none have compared across different types. It is therefore unclear if findings related to terrorism can explain other types of crises such as natural disasters or pandemics. Secondly, the focus of existing work on individual trust in government carries implicit assumptions about individuals' beliefs about the likely duration of emergency powers and the credibility of governments. Empirically, however, it is not clear how these considerations interact with existing findings about the importance of trust in government, the value of rights, perceptions of threats, etc.

Finally, much of the work on trade-offs between rights and freedoms has focused on individual-level determinants of support for emergency measures. Yet preliminary evidence from the COVID-19 crisis suggests substantial cross-national variation in attitudes.¹⁴ Preliminary work by Alsan et al. (2020) covering 15 countries also suggests substantial cross-national variation in both general attitudes towards emergency measures, and the extent to which they responded to experiments seeking to manipulate perceptions of the importance of measures relative to the potential for government abuses. Despite this clear cross-national variation, however, there has not been a great deal of work exploring the determinants of these differences or laying out theoretical frameworks for explaining them.

In this paper, we attempt to contribute to existing work by tackling some of these unanswered questions both empirically and theoretically.

Theory and Hypotheses

As discussed in the previous section, existing work on the acceptability of emergency measures suggests that individuals weigh trade-offs between the rights they are surrendering and the intensity of the emergency. Implicitly, this literature suggests that individuals are more willing to accept government actions that infringe on their rights when such measures are framed as a necessary response to extraordinary circumstances.

Similarly, we would also expect that the acceptability of measures is tied to the time horizons that individuals believe they will be in place for. History is replete with examples of abusive restrictions that were adopted during extreme situations but were not lifted after the crisis was averted. Long-term measures are therefore more likely to noticeably and adversely impact individuals' rights, as well as more likely to outlive the emergencies they were designed to address. Either should make them less attractive.

¹⁴ Curiously, according to the survey conducted jointly by Romir and Gallup International with 17 000 respondents in 18 countries, 81% of people were ready to tolerate limits on their rights and freedoms if it helped combat covid-19, while 15% disagreed. Pakistan and Iraq (92%), India and Thailand (91%) represent countries with the highest percentage of respondents willing to trade off their rights, while Germany (89%), Austria and Switzerland (86%), and Italy (85%) have slightly lower numbers. Interesting cases are Russia (69%) and the United States (68%). Similar cross-national variation was documented in a 28 country study of 25,000 individuals conducted by Gallup.

The two effects discussed above should reinforce each other. Measures adopted during emergencies with a clearly announced short term character should be most acceptable to individuals, as there is a clear purpose for giving up civil liberties (i.e. the emergency) and a clear time frame for them being returned. We therefore propose the following baseline hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. Measures that infringe on rights adopted during an emergency are more likely to be acceptable relative to those adopted in normal times, *ceteris paribus*.

Hypothesis 2. Measures that infringe on rights adopted for a short duration are more likely to be acceptable relative to those adopted for indefinite periods, *ceteris paribus*.

Hypothesis 3. Measures that infringe on rights adopted for a short duration and during an emergency are most likely to be acceptable.

Ceteris paribus, there is no reason to expect that the nature of emergencies shapes how acceptable individuals view emergency measures to address them. That is, disasters impose real harms on individuals and society regardless of whether they are man made or natural. Existing work suggests, however, that individuals' perceptions of the extent of the harm of a particular crisis, whether due to objective exposure or abstract fears, likely conditions their attitudes towards measures taken to address crises. Individuals are much more likely to support measures taken to address a crisis that they perceive as being harmful than otherwise similar crises that they view as less dangerous. This suggests:

Hypothesis 4. Individuals will be more likely to favor emergency measures taken to address crises to which they have greater exposure, whether objective or perceived. This effect should be stronger if emergencies are clearly defined and the measures temporary.

As noted above various times, individuals' evaluations of the acceptability of emergency measures is also likely to depend on the credibility of governments seeking to impose these measures. Governments seeking additional powers have strong incentives to exaggerate the scope of emergencies in order to justify measures taken to acquire them. Similarly, they also have strong incentives to retain powers for as long as possible after being acquired. Although such phenomena are particularly well-documented in non-democratic settings, where such measures become a useful tool of regime maintenance after emergencies end, there are also numerous examples in more democratic settings. Consequently, individuals' pre-existing trust in government is likely to condition the extent to which governments' justifications are viewed as proper, promises to forgo powers after emergencies end credible, and emergency measures are viewed as acceptable. This suggests:

Hypothesis 5. Individuals with high levels of trust in government will be more likely to favor emergency measures, *ceteris paribus*. This effect should be stronger if emergencies are clearly defined and the measures temporary.

Data and Empirical Design

We test our hypotheses using a factorial framing experiment designed to prompt respondents to think about the circumstances under which they would support intrusive emergency measures, despite the potential violation of rights. Our experiment is embedded in an original online survey carried out across 60 Russian regions conducted between July and September 2021. Our data collection procedure proceeded until we have collected 16,250 completed responses.¹⁵ Our respondents are drawn from an existing panel of over 700,000 participants assembled by a Russian marketing firm to roughly represent the approximately 80% of Russians that use the internet. We make use of a quota based sampling procedure so that the resulting survey sample is roughly representative for each of our regions.¹⁶

Our experiment itself is designed to manipulate both the type of emergency that the government is imposing intrusive emergency measures to address and the timeframe the government has announced for removal of the measures. We do so by proposing simple vignettes that vary across treatment arms. The experiment takes the form:

Imagine that the government proposes [time horizon] a new digital system that automatically tracks the location of all Russians [circumstance]. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Time horizon: {no text} // {to temporarily introduce}

Circumstance: {no text} // {to prevent forthcoming terrorist attacks} // {to contain a dangerous infectious disease like the Coronavirus}

which results in 6 treatment arms, including control conditions in which there is no time horizon, no condition, or both (i.e. no text is provided) that allow us to assess baseline attitudes. Table 1 visually depicts each group. Randomization is carried out independently across individual respondents via an algorithm built into the survey and is set immediately prior to the respondent being shown the experimental pre-amble.

¹⁵ By completed responses, we mean that the respondent goes through the survey and clicks through the final screen. Respondents who complete the survey may still choose not to answer individual questions or make use of “hard to say” responses during its course. In this version of the paper, we retained all respondents who answered our main dependent variable of interest to estimate treatment effects using differences-in-means and all respondents who answered our main dependent variable and relevant controls in regression based analysis.

¹⁶ We constructed our quotas according to data from the last available Russian census (2010) for each region, with quotas set for age, gender, and education. Details on the quotas, our sampling procedure, and how regions were selected can be found in the technical documentation for our survey that is attached to our preregistration report.

Table 1: Treatment Conditions

	Circumstance			
		<i>No Text</i>	Terrorist Attacks	Pandemic
Time Horizon	<i>No Text</i>			
	<i>Temporary</i>			

In our experiment, we selected “a new digital system that automatically tracks the location of all Russians” as our emergency measure, because of the intrusive nature of such an intervention. Recent debates about the government’s use of location tracking highlight the many potential uses of such data beyond the obvious, including to infer individuals’ daily activities, medical or psychological issues, and friendship networks.¹⁷ Within the Russian context specifically, criminal networks have found a number of creative uses for such data in order to carry out fraud¹⁸ and real-world theft against individuals.¹⁹ In untrustworthy hands, such data could be misused for blackmail, repression, or other individual harms. We leave the technical implementation of the system (i.e. mobile app vs. cameras) ambiguous, as we do not think this is of theoretical relevance.

Our main dependent variable is the extent to which subjects agree with the statement “Such a system is necessary even if some people believe that it violates human rights”.²⁰ This question is designed to encourage respondents to directly consider trade-offs between the utility of the system and potential rights violations and is in line with other works (see Davis and Silver, 2001; Alsan, 2020).

¹⁷ The general problem of geolocation data and its potential for abuse has been well covered in the media, see, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy. Mode of access: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html> (accessed: 8.06.2021);

¹⁸ More complex or unique issues: geolocation data can be a necessary part and / or element of complex processes for fraudulent transactions with bank cards and financial information. Moshennichestvo s bankovskimi kartami / Bank card fraud. Mode of access: https://www.tadviser.ru/index.php/Статья:Мошенничество_с_банковскими_картами (accessed: 8.06.2021)

¹⁹ For example, in Russia, after the announcement that fines would be levied for violating the rules of self-isolation, a large number of false sites appeared, which, among other things, used geolocation data to collect fines. Mode of access: <https://utv.ru/material/onlajn-ginekolog-potreboval-u-rossiyanki-200-000-rublej/> (accessed: 8.06.2021)

²⁰ Answer categories are on a 7 point scale ranging from “1 - Totally disagree” to “7 - Totally Agree”.

Independent Variables of Interest

Our main independent variables of interest are a vector of dummy variables for each treatment condition. These allow us to compare attitudes towards the acceptability of location tracking across various potential justifications (terrorism, pandemics, no justification) and depending on whether the system is for temporary use or not, *ceteris paribus* (H1 - H3). The reference category for this vector of dummy variables is the treatment arm in which respondents are not provided information on either circumstances being justified or duration (i.e. {no text} {no text}).

To test our hypotheses about the heterogeneous effects of treatment on different groups, we must make use of observational data. Our first hypothesis (H4) explores how exposure to crisis shapes attitudes towards emergency situations. To test it, we make use of two sets of independent variables that capture slightly different aspects of the threat of exposure to crisis: individual perceptions vs. objective risk. Both have been linked to support for emergency measures in existing work and are plausible given our theory. At the individual level, we make use of two questions that capture individuals' perceptions of exposure and the extent to which they worry about being infected with COVID-19 or caught in terrorist attacks.²¹ At the regional-level, we include variables that capture objective exposure to COVID-19 and violence (as a proxy for terrorism). The former is simply data on year-to-date excess deaths that occurred in each of our regions calculated using data collected by Karlinsky and Kobak (2021). The latter is a measure of personal safety adapted from a regionally representative survey conducted by LSCR in 2019-20 across 60 regions.²² As the regional overlap between our survey and LSCR is imperfect, we make use of only those regions present in both surveys in these specifications.

Our last hypothesis (H5) explores the role of expectations about how the government will (mis)use emergency powers. We construct an individual-level index of trust in government for each individual using answers to a series of questions from our survey that ask: "What do you think, do people like you trust..."²³ Respondents are asked to answer the question for the President, Government, Governor of their region, and Mayor of their city. Our measure of individual-level trust in government is simply an additive index of these scores.

Estimation Strategy

In our analysis, we make use of two sets of strategies. As a first cut, we employ simple differences-in-means estimates and standard t-tests to assess unconditional differences between our various treatment groups and the

²¹ The COVID-19 question is worded "To what extent do you worry about getting infected with Coronavirus?". The terrorism question is worded "To what extent do you worry right now that your or loved ones could be caught in a terrorist attack?" Both questions have responses that vary from "1 - Completely unafraid" to "7 - Very Afraid". Both are also taken from standard questions in their respective literatures used to capture fear of exposure (see, for example, Arseneaux et al., 2020).

²² This question is worded "How satisfied are you with... your level of personal safety". Responses range from "1 - Totally unsatisfied" to "5 - Totally satisfied".

²³ Responses range from "1 - Do not trust at all" to "5 - Trust completely".

relevant controls. This allows us to gauge relative differences across different emergency justifications (or lack thereof), temporary versus undefined durations for measures, and their permutations (*H1-H3*).

We then check the robustness of these results to various randomization failures by using a simple multi-level hierarchical (MLH) ordered-probit regression with the functional form:

$$Y_{ir} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Covid_treatment}_i + \beta_2 \text{terror_treatment}_i + \beta_3 \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \beta_4 \text{COVID_treatment} * \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \beta_5 \text{terror_treatment} * \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \beta_6 X_i + \gamma_1 Z_r + \eta_r + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Where Y_{ir} is the response to our question on the acceptability of government policy for individual i in region r discussed above. X_i represents a vector of demographic and experiential controls -- age, gender, education²⁴, interest in politics²⁵, household size (adults), household size (children under 18), share of respondent's family budget spent on food and rent²⁶, risk aversion²⁷, beliefs about whether the vignette actually violate rights²⁸, actual exposure to COVID-19²⁹, and two dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is permanently employed or temporarily employed³⁰ for individual i . Z_r is a vector of regional-level controls - the log of GRP per capita and a regional unemployment rate for region r (rescaled from 0-1).³¹ Finally, η_r and ε_i

²⁴ The question wording is "What is the highest level of education you have attained?". Response categories include "1. Primary", "2. Secondary education (school, lyceum, gymnasium)", "3. Incomplete secondary plus primary vocational (vocational school, professional technical school, industrial school without a secondary education)", "4. Specialist-secondary or professional technical (professional technical school, technical college, school)", "5. Incomplete higher education (at least three years at university)", "6. Higher education (bachelor's and specialist's programs)", "7. Higher education (master's programs)", and "8. Academic degree (PhD, Doctor of Science)". We treat this variable as an ordinal variable and rescale it so that the lowest category (Primary education) is equal to 0.

²⁵ This question takes the form "How interested are you in Politics" with responses ranging from "1. Not interested at all" to "7. Very Interested". We rescale this variable such that the lowest answer category is equal to zero.

²⁶ The precise question wording is "What is the approximate share of your family's monthly budget that is spent on food and housing?". Respondents are then provided 10 response categories, which capture 10% increments ranging from 0 to 100%.

²⁷ The question wording is "To what extent are you willing to take risks" with responses ranging from "1-I am absolutely unprepared to take risks" to "10-I am absolutely prepared to take risks."

²⁸ Immediately after the experimental preamble, we ask respondents to evaluate to what extent they agree with the statement: "Such a system would violate human rights". Response categories range from "1 - Totally disagree" to "5 - Totally agree".

²⁹ We use a dummy variable equal to one if respondents answer that they, members of their family, or close relatives received a positive COVID-19 diagnosis to a question about COVID-19 diagnoses in their social circle.

³⁰ Respondents are asked "What is your current job Situation?" and can choose from among multiple responses. These two dummies are equal to one if the respondent selects "Permanently employed" or "Temporary employment" respectively and zero if any other response is chosen.

³¹ To make interpretation simpler, we make several transformations to all of our substantive variables of interest and controls. We subtract one from all variables, such that the lowest category is always 0. We recode the gender variable such that female respondents take a value of one. We also transform our age variable by taking its log. Finally, we mean center our regional-level variables to aid model convergence and interpretation (Gelman 2007).

represents a region-specific random intercept and an individual level error term, respectively. Following Gelman 2007, the random intercept in this MLH model should capture regional level unobservable features. The quantities of interest here are the coefficients of the dummies for the various treatment conditions (*_treatment) and their interactions. The reference category is the control group, defined as the group that received no justification for emergency measures and no time horizon is specified. We make use of cluster-corrected standard errors (at the regional level).

To test our hypotheses about the heterogeneous effects of treatment on various sub-categories, we make use of two additional specifications. The first simply extends the above equation to include an interaction between our treatment dummies and our individual measures of interest: sense of threat and trust in government. The equation for trust takes the form:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{ir} = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Covid_treatment}_i + \beta_2 \text{terror_treatment}_i + \\
& \beta_3 \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \beta_4 \text{COVID_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i \\
& + \beta_5 \text{terror_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \beta_6 \text{trust}_i + \beta_7 X_i \\
& + \rho_1 \text{Covid_treatment}_i * \text{trust}_i + \rho_2 \text{terror_treatment}_i * \text{trust}_i + \\
& \rho_3 \text{temporary_treatment}_i * \text{trust}_i + \\
& \rho_4 \text{Covid_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i * \text{trust}_i + \\
& \rho_5 \text{terror_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i * \text{trust}_i + \gamma_1 Z_r + \eta_r + \varepsilon_i
\end{aligned}
\tag{2}$$

All control variables remain the same as in the previous equation, however here the quantities of interest are the interactions between the vector of dummies for the treatment groups (treatment) and our individual measure of trust in government (trust). Our specification for individual-perceptions of threat is similar to equation 2, however in it the variables that go into our interactions vary based on which (and whether) treatment conditions reference emergency situations. Again, we make use of cluster-corrected standard errors (at the regional level).

The second extension of our baseline specification instead examines the interactions between our regional level variables introduced in the previous section and the treatment groups. For our institutional variables, this equation takes the generalized form:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{ir} = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Covid_treatment}_i + \beta_2 \text{terror_treatment}_i + \\
& \beta_3 \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \beta_4 \text{Covid_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \\
& \beta_5 \text{terror_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i + \beta_6 X_i + \gamma_1 \text{threat}_r \\
& + \rho_1 \text{Covid_treatment}_i * \text{threat}_r + \rho_2 \text{terror_treatment}_i * \text{threat}_r + \\
& \rho_3 \text{temporary_treatment}_i * \text{threat}_r + \\
& \rho_4 \text{Covid_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i * \text{threat}_r + \\
& \rho_5 \text{terror_treatment}_i * \text{temporary_treatment}_i * \text{threat}_r + \\
& \gamma_2 Z_r + \xi_{1c} + \eta_c + \varepsilon_i
\end{aligned}
\tag{3}$$

Again, our controls remain the same as in the previous equations. The additional parameters ξ_{1c} , represents random slopes on the treatment dummies needed for the cross-level interaction to be identified. Here our quantities of interest are the coefficients of the interactions between our treatment dummies (treatment)

and our regional level measure of the threat of exposure (in separate regressions for COVID and safety threats). As before, we make use of cluster-corrected errors (at the regional level).

Results

In Figure 1, we plot means for each of our treatment conditions and their 95% confidence intervals.³² The figure provides mixed evidence for our unconditional hypotheses. Justifying geolocation tracking to combat terrorism is more acceptable to respondents than either the control (i.e. no justification) or justifications based on COVID ($p < 0.001$). Differences between the control condition and COVID are not significant at conventional levels, however. We therefore find only partial support for the idea that justifications make emergency measures more acceptable (H1).

Figure 1: Support for Geolocation System under Various Frames (Unconditional)




Figure 1 also shows that framing measures as temporary actually decreases support for the geolocation system regardless of justification (or lack thereof) at conventional levels of significance. This is the opposite of our prediction that short-term framing would increase support for measures (H2). Finally, our results flatly contradict the notion that short-term measures with a

³² Means, first-differences, and t-values for each treatment arm are also reported in Table 2.


clear justification are the most acceptable (H3). While geolocation systems as an anti-terrorism measure are viewed as most acceptable, providing an explicit, short-term time frame decreases support relative to no time-frame. As before, approval for measures justified by fighting COVID is indistinguishable from approval absent any justification, regardless of the time horizons mentioned.

Altogether, these results paint a complicated picture of support for intrusive geolocation systems as an emergency measure in Russia. On the one hand, fighting terrorism is clearly viewed as a reasonable justification for implementing such systems, while COVID appears to not be. One potential explanation for these differences may lie in contextual features, which make terrorism more salient in the minds of Russians and COVID less so. To probe this, we first explore whether exposure to crises moderates support for geolocation based emergency measures (H4). Recall that exposure can be captured at both the individual level (i.e. fears and perceptions of crisis) and at the macro-level (i.e. intensity of the crisis in one's environment).

Table 5 presents the results of a set of regression models, in which we interact our various measures of individual fear and macro-level crisis intensity with our treatment conditions. Model 1 provides the baseline results of our model without interactions, confirming the results of our comparisons of differences in means are robust to inclusion of controls. Models 2 and 3 interact our treatment variables with a question on respondents' fear of COVID and terrorism attacks (respectively), and Models 4 and 5 interact our treatment variables with our macro-level measures of intensity - excess mortality and regional aggregates of personal safety perceptions - respectively. Examining coefficients and p-values for interactions with continuous terms can be misleading, however, because interactions may only be significant across some of the range of the continuous variable(s). We therefore generate plots of the predicted probability of support for the system among our control, terrorism, and pandemic treatment groups across the range of our measures of exposure. The results are presented in the various panels of Figure 2.³³ For each panel, the three plots on the left show differences between the temporary and no duration conditions across our three circumstances, while the plots on the right show differences between our three circumstances across our two duration conditions.

³³ Predicted probabilities are calculated using the `plot.model` function in R, which uses the standard formula-based method for generating predicted probabilities across the range of our continuous variable of interest. Our predicted probabilities hold all other continuous variables to their means and factor variables to the reference category.

Figure 2: Support for Emergency Measures and Exposure to Emergencies



Beginning with individual-level fears, Figure 2 suggests a positive, significant relationship between fear of getting infected by the Coronavirus and support for measures in all of our treatment conditions (Panel A). Contrary to expectations, however, the confidence intervals for the COVID treatment overlap those of the control group across the entire range suggesting the two are statistically indistinguishable. This suggests fear of COVID does not increase the salience (and acceptability of anti-COVID measures). Intriguingly, however, individual fear of COVID does increase support for measures in the anti-terrorism treatment at conventional levels of significance: its confidence intervals never overlap the other treatment groups.

Similar dynamics are at play with individual fear of terrorism (Panel B), which increases support for all measures. While differences between the control and COVID treatment groups are statistically insignificant, however, differences between both of these groups and the terrorism condition in support for emergency measures are significantly different at conventional levels and only become larger as fear of terror grows. While personal fears appear to intensify support for emergency measures in the terrorism condition, Panels A and B suggest that they do not moderate the treatment effect of being told measures are explicitly short term. Confidence intervals for support across both duration conditions overlap across the entire range of both of our fear measures.

Using regional level variables produces slightly different results. Here, larger excess death totals increase support for COVID measures modestly but this effect is statistically indistinguishable from the control group across the range (Panel C). While there is a negative effect of rising excess deaths on support for measures in the Terrorism condition, the magnitude of the interaction effect is small. As before, we see no difference between the control

group and the group told emergency measures will be short-term in duration across the range of the excess deaths measure.

Panel D tells a more nuanced story about the relationship between how emergency measures are justified as the aggregate sense of safety in regions increases. On the one hand, support for emergency measures among the treatment group told they are meant to combat terrorism increases as the regional aggregate sense of safety increases. The predicted probability of support for the system among the terrorism condition is statistically distinguishable from the other treatments at all but the lowest levels of aggregate personal safety. By contrast, support among the COVID and control groups overlap across most of their ranges. On the other hand, support for emergency measures among the terrorism treatment group are modestly negative when measures are also framed as temporary. Here, the effect is statistically distinguishable from the other treatment conditions at all but the very highest levels of aggregate safety. The differences between these two conditions can be confirmed by examining differences in the predicted probability of support for emergency measures between those given no duration and those in short-term duration treatment for the terrorism condition (left side of Panel D). These predicted probabilities have the opposite slopes, as expected. Although they overlap, they do so only slightly at the highest levels of aggregate safety.

Taken together, these results suggest a few key findings. First, individuals' exposure to emergencies does not moderate their support for emergency measures in straightforward ways. While fear of terrorism and living in environments that are considered less safe generally increases support for anti-terror measures relative to the control, the same is not true for fear of COVID and excess deaths affects on anti-COVID measures. The effect is nuanced, however, because fear of COVID (at the individual level) does moderate support for anti-terrorism measures. Coupled with our unconditional results, this suggests that the nature of the crises is also important for understanding how exposure to it shapes support. Because COVID is not viewed as sufficient justification for emergency measures, *ceteris paribus*, exposure does not appear to shape attitudes much. The opposite is true for terrorism, however. Future work will be needed to unpack what aspects of crises matter, however. Our empirical design does not allow us to unpack whether differences between COVID and Terrorism have something to do with the nature of the emergency (natural vs. manmade) or with how it is perceived (i.e. greater COVID skepticism and conspiricism).

Secondly, we find that exposure does not really moderate the effects (or lack thereof) of providing a time frame for emergency measures. Explicit framing of the duration of measures continues to do little to alter attitudes even where the crises are most acute. This suggests that individuals may already have preconceived notions about the likely duration of measures and are therefore insensitive to additional information. We explore this in the following section.

Finally, both our measures of individual-level exposure (fear of terrorism and of COVID) moderate the relationship between an anti-terror framing and support for measures (but not COVID framing). This suggests that exposure to (and fear of) concrete crises may be less important than more generalized fears conditional on a type of crisis being viewed as salient in the first place. Put differently, an environment of fear may be more predictive of support for

emergency measures than specific exposure. We should not that our measure of regional-level exposure to terrorism (aggregate feelings of safety) is rather generalized and therefore would also be consistent with this interpretation.

Figure 3: Support for Emergency Measures and Trust in Government




Figure 3 repeats the exercise above for our measure of individualized trust in various government institutions. Here we see that as trust rises, so does support for both anti-terror and control measures. At all but the highest levels of trust, respondents are much more likely to support measures justified as anti-terror than measures taken with no justification at conventional levels of significance. Duration appears to have no effect on this relationship. Interestingly, however, duration does seem to matter when it comes to understanding the effect of anti-COVID framings. Whereas support in the anti-COVID treatment is statistically indistinguishable from the control group across the range of the trust variable when measures are framed as temporary, at low levels of trust support is much lower in the anti-COVID treatment group than in the control when no time frame is given (at conventional levels).

Our results suggest partial support for (H5). As a rule support for measures across all groups increases as trust does, although the control and COVID treatment groups are only distinguishable when no duration for measures is provided. Interestingly, however, at low levels of trust there is less support when COVID is the justification than other conditions. Given that the opposite is true when terrorism is the justification, this again suggests that the nature of justifications given for emergency measures matters in a more nuanced way than expected. COVID related measures are again viewed more skeptically than terrorism related ones and this framing has no value added relative to simply stating measures will be imposed (i.e. the control).

Mechanism Checks

In order to understand the mechanisms behind our main findings, we examine whether our results are driven by two potential dynamics. On the one hand, it could be the case that the acceptability of emergency measures is linked to beliefs about whether they are temporary. Such beliefs may be stronger for measures justified by some types of crises than others even when the government does not explicitly state a duration for measures. If this is the case, our results are driven by differing beliefs about the probable duration of emergency measures rather than willingness to accept them. On the other hand, our results may also be driven by beliefs about the extent to which emergency measures taken during different types of crises or for different durations actually violate rights. If this is the case, then our results are driven by variation in the extent that respondents believe that measures trade off rights for safety, rather than variation in willingness to make this trade-off.

To test beliefs about whether measures are in fact temporary or not, we make use of a question that follows our experimental preamble and asks individuals if they agree that the proposed system will be temporary.³⁴ To test beliefs about whether the proposed measures violate rights, we make use of a similar question asking if respondents agree: “Such a system would violate human rights”. In this version of this paper, we present only the unconditional relationships by comparing differences-in-means across our treatment conditions using standard t-tests. In future versions, we will examine whether these effects are moderated by our measures of exposure/threat of the crisis and trust in government.

³⁴ This question takes the form: “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Usage of such a system is only of a temporary nature?” Responses categories vary from “1 - Totally disagree” to “7 - Completely Agree”.

Figure 4: Perception the System Violates Rights (Unconditional)





Figure 4 shows the means for each of our treatment groups and the confidence intervals around them for beliefs about whether the system will indeed be temporary. As a rule, respondents seem divided on beliefs about the duration of the system with average agreement with the statement that the system will be temporary ranging between 3.15 and 2.55 (on a seven-point scale). Across all three justifications, there is no difference between beliefs about the duration of the system between those explicitly told the system would be temporary and those provided no information at conventional levels of significance. Interestingly, however, respondents told the system was meant to address specific types of emergencies (regardless of the type) were more likely to agree that the system will be temporary than those provided no justification. The magnitude of the effect is approximately ~ 0.4 in all cases. Both measures framed as addressing COVID and Terror were viewed as approximately just as likely to be temporary.

These findings suggest a nuanced relationship between treatments providing specific justifications for our measure and beliefs about duration. On the one hand these results provide some support for the notion that justifications shape support for emergency powers by changing beliefs about the probable duration of powers. In the case of measures justified as anti-terrorism, this test is consistent with the notion that such measures become more acceptable due to a stronger belief they will be temporary. On the other hand, a similar relationship does not appear to be at play with measures justified as anti-

COVID. Despite the fact that specificity about the purpose of measures increases beliefs measures will be temporary, there is no difference in acceptance of the system between groups simply told measures will be implemented and those provided COVID as a justification. Consequently, although justifications alter beliefs about the probable duration of measures, the evidence suggests that this channel does not drive the effect or that it is only plausible for measures taken to address some types of crises.

Figure 5 shows the mean level of agreement across our treatment groups with the notion that the system is a violation of rights. As a rule, respondents generally agreed that the system violates right with average responses ranging between 4.625 and 4.9. Respondents who were told the system was temporary were just as likely to agree that the system violated rights as those provided no time frame, regardless of the justification given. Respondents told that the system was designed to combat terror were slightly less likely to believe that the system violated rights than those in the other treatment groups at conventional levels of significance, although the effect was generally modest (~ 0.25 in all cases). While this test does not allow us to rule out that the justifications given for systems matter for perceptions of the extent to which they violate rights, it again suggests the need for nuance in any claims. Evidence for the terrorism justification is again consistent with the story, while it appears to not explain the results for pandemic justifications. Thus we again see that while justifications matter, they are not all created equal.

Figure 5: Perception the System is Temporary (Unconditional)



Conclusion

This paper has explored the conditions under which individuals in non-democracies are willing to accept emergency measures that intrude on their civil liberties. Using a novel survey experiment that explores attitudes towards an intrusive tracking system, our results suggest that the ways in which these measures are critical to public acceptance. On the one hand, the nature of the measure matters. Respondents were much more likely to accept the measure if justified to combat terrorism, while using COVID was no better than no justification at all. On the other hand, respondents actually reacted negatively to being told the systems were temporary. We also show that the effects of these justifications are moderated by exposure to crises, albeit in complex ways. Individuals with greater fear, whether of COVID or Terrorism, and in regions that were more unsafe were much more accepting of terrorism measures, while these had little effect on support for measures generally (i.e. without justification) or of those justified to fight COVID. Finally, our work shows that trust in government is also a key moderator that increases support for all measures. Taken together, our results suggest that although the framing of emergency measures matters, not all justifications for them are created equally.

Why Russians were more moved by restrictions justified as anti-terrorism rather than anti-COVID remains somewhat of a puzzle. On the one hand, we show that this has little to do with beliefs about whether the system will actually be temporary, and is unlikely to be caused by variation in perceptions that measures under these two circumstances actually violate rights. On the other hand, our current paper does not fully unpack whether respondents believe that these measures are simply more effective for terrorism than for COVID or are more likely to be subject to abuse if used to combat the latter. The moderating effect of trust in government provides some clues, however, since anti-terrorism justifications result in more support at lower levels of trust than anti-COVID ones. Since support for these measures then converges as trust increases, this suggests that beliefs about the severity of COVID (as a general problem) *via-a-vis* terrorism or potential for abuse are the key channels. In future versions of the paper, we also plan a follow-up experiment that will better disentangle these potential channels.

A major limitation of our work is that we focus on only one type of emergency measure. Although we choose one that is both general and intrusive, this leaves open the possibility that our findings may be specific to the technology itself. One might worry that the specifics of geolocation tracking may color both which crises the technology is viewed as effective against and perceptions of the threats it can address. One might also worry that tracking is not a particularly flagrant abuse, meaning our results may not travel to other types of measures that are even more subject to abuse. History is replete with examples of autocrats taking advantage of crisis situations to impose emergency measures that limit liberties (cancellation of election, shutting of legislatures, etc.) but seem unlikely to actually address the crisis at hand. Future work should therefore explore a wider range of measures that intrude on liberty in different and more fundamental ways in order to better understand the limits of

autocrats' ability to manipulate the framing of emergency measures in order to gain popular acquiescence to them.

This said, our work does provide important insights into how non-democratic governments may be able to secure public support for emergency measures. Taken together, it suggests that not all crises are created equally. Because the mass public is more likely to only accept emergency measures taken to address some types of crises, our work suggests autocratic regimes are at times constrained in the emergency responses they can implement. Whereas they appear to have greater room for maneuver when crises are widely viewed as serious and threatening, they must be more careful for crises that are not taken as seriously by the populace. Our work also suggests that perceptions of the seriousness of the crisis do not necessarily map onto objective, real world conditions. Despite the fact that COVID has resulted in more deaths in Russia than terrorism by nearly any measure, the populace remains resistant to measures justified as combating COVID. Moreover, while fear of safety moderates these relationships, we found that the intensity of COVID measured by excess deaths did not.

One potential explanation lies in the ways in which crises themselves are framed. "Terrorism" has a historically difficult definition in Russia and is a part of its political culture and background. Historical experiences with terror, as well as the large-scale information agenda on the part of the authorities that has woven it into the fabric of Russian politics, forms a strong narrative that terrorism is the worst ill of all. This might therefore make the populace more accepting of anti-terror measures, due to perceptions of threats and risks related to it that are higher emergencies. By contrast, there are no experiences with pandemics such as COVID and the authorities' messages about its threat have been mixed. Thus, future work would do well to also explore a wider range of potential crises in order to understand how differences across them, such as natural vs. manmade origins or the ways in which they are framed, can shape the ability of autocrats to use them to justify encroachments on liberty.

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Table 2: Support for Geolocation System under Various Frames (Unconditional Effects)

	Control	COVID	Terror	FD: Covid - Control	FD: Terror - Control	FD: Covid - Terror
No Time Frame	2.966 (2.905, 3.026)	2.900 (2.834, 2.966)	3.468 (3.408, 3.527)	-0.066 (-0.155, 0.023)	0.502*** (0.417, 0.587)	-0.568*** (-0.657, -0.479)
Temporary	2.805 (2.745, 2.866)	2.831 (2.767, 2.895)	3.308 (3.246, 3.369)	0.026 (-0.064, 0.115)	0.503*** (0.415, 0.590)	-0.477 *** (-0.565, -0.388)
FD: Temporary - No Time Frame	-0.161*** (-0.246, -0.074)	-0.158*** (-0.219, -0.096)	-0.160*** (-0.246, -0.075)			

Table 3: Perception of Rights Violation under Various Frames (Unconditional Effects)

	Control	COVID	Terror	FD: Covid - Control	FD: Terror - Control	FD: Covid - Terror
No Time Frame	3.902 (3.830, 3.95)	3.894 (3.819, 3.969)	3.618 (3.554, 3.682)	-0.008 (-0.112, 0.096)	-0.284*** (-0.380, -0.188)	0.276*** (0.178, 0.375)
Temporary	3.866 (3.789, 3.942)	3.905 (3.837, 3.972)	3.654 (3.586, 3.721)	0.039 (-0.068, 0.146)	-0.212*** (-0.314, -0.110)	0.251*** (0.151, 0.351)
FD: Temporary - No time frame	-0.037 (-0.142, 0.069)	0.010 (0.095, 0.116)	0.036 (-0.057, 0.128)			

Table 4: Perception of the Measure as Temporary under Various Frames (Unconditional Effects)

	Control	COVID	Terror	FD: Covid - Control	FD: Terror - Control	FD: Covid - Terror
No Time Frame	3.08 (3.020, 3.141)	3.515 (3.445, 3.584)	3.543 (3.484, 3.602)	0.434*** (0.342, 0.526)	0.463*** (0.378, 0.547)	-0.028 (-0.119, 0.063)

Temporary	3.078 (3.014, 3.142)	3.454 (3.384, 3.524)	3.468 (3.406, 3.531)	0.376*** (0.281, 0.471)	0.390*** (0.300, 0.479)	-0.179 (-0.108, 0.080)
FD: Temporary - No time frame	-0.002 (-0.089, 0.086)	-0.060 (0.159, 0.038)	-0.075* (-0.161, 0.012)			

Table 5: Support for Geolocation System under Various Frames (Heterogeneous Effects)

	<i>Dependent variable</i>					
	Support for the System					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
COVID-19 Treatment	-0.062 (0.046)	-0.216* (0.090)	-0.066 (0.127)	-0.064 (0.049)	-0.054 (0.052)	-0.468*** (0.128)
Terrorism Treatment	0.452*** (0.045)	0.484*** (0.088)	0.266* (0.124)	0.453*** (0.048)	0.485*** (0.054)	0.413*** (0.124)
Temporary Treatment	-0.151*** (0.046)	-0.126 (0.088)	0.050 (0.125)	-0.151** (0.050)	-0.141* (0.057)	-0.277* (0.125)
Terrorism Treatment * Temporary	0.011 (0.064)	-0.149 (0.124)	-0.083 (0.175)	0.010 (0.072)	-0.030 (0.081)	-0.130 (0.177)
COVID-19 Treatment * Temporary	0.078 (0.065)	-0.032 (0.126)	0.015 (0.178)	0.079 (0.074)	0.074 (0.085)	0.508** (0.180)
Worry about Getting Infected with the Virus (Covid Individual)		0.110*** (0.018)				
Worry about Being Caught in a Terrorist Attack (Terrorism Individual)			0.091*** (0.019)			
Excess Mortality				0.005 (0.052)		
Satisfaction with Personal Safety (Region-level)					0.409 (0.423)	
Trust in Government						0.088*** (0.008)
COVID-19 Treatment * Temporary * COVID (Individual)		0.037 (0.037)				
COVID-19 Treatment * Temporary * Terrorism (Individual)			0.016 (0.038)			
COVID-19 Treatment * Temporary * Excess Mortality				-0.081 (0.102)		
COVID-19 Treatment * Temporary * Regional Safety					0.834 (0.903)	
COVID-19 Treatment * Temporary * Trust						-0.041* (0.017)
Terrorism Treatment * Temporary * COVID (Individual)		0.054 (0.037)				
Terrorism Treatment * Temporary * Terrorism (Individual)			0.022 (0.038)			
Terrorism Treatment * Temporary * Excess Mortality				-0.028 (0.099)		
Terrorism Treatment * Temporary * Regional Safety					-0.899 (0.856)	
Terrorism Treatment * Temporary * Trust						0.015 (0.017)
COVID-19 Treatment * COVID (Individual)		0.053* (0.026)				
COVID-19 Treatment * Terrorism (Individual)			0.0003 (0.027)			
COVID-19 Treatment * Excess Mortality				0.068 (0.068)		
COVID-19 Treatment * Regional Safety					-0.903 (0.562)	
COVID-19 Treatment * Trust						0.040*** (0.012)
Terrorism Treatment * COVID (Individual)		-0.009 (0.026)				
Terrorism Treatment * Terrorism (Individual)			0.044			

			(0.027)			
Terrorism Treatment * Excess Mortality				-0.024		
				(0.066)		
Terrorism Treatment * Regional Safety					0.013	
					(0.575)	
Terrorism Treatment * Trust						0.004
						(0.012)
Temporary * COVID (Individual)	-0.007					
	(0.026)					
Temporary * Terrorism (Individual)			-0.047 [†]			
			(0.027)			
Temporary * Excess Mortality				0.015		
				(0.068)		
Temporary * Regional Safety					0.098	
					(0.604)	
Temporary * Trust						0.011
						(0.012)
In Age	0.139**	0.051	0.173***	0.138**	0.125**	0.133**
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.042)
Gender	0.075*	0.022	0.027	0.075*	0.065*	0.040
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Education	-0.011	-0.019*	-0.009	-0.011	-0.010	-0.020*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Adult Family Members	0.020	0.017	0.016	0.020	0.005	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Children under 17	0.044***	0.047***	0.037**	0.044***	0.046**	0.032*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Monthly Expenditures on Utility Services	-0.053***	-0.050***	-0.054***	-0.053***	-0.053***	-0.033***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Willing to Take Risk	0.009	0.017**	0.011 [†]	0.009	0.015*	0.012*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
The System Violates Human Rights	-0.217***	-0.210***	-0.213***	-0.217***	-0.217***	-0.188**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Cases of Virus Infection in the Family	-0.020	-0.008	-0.016	-0.020	-0.027	0.005
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.033)
Permanent Employment	-0.161***	-0.121***	-0.159***	-0.162***	-0.159***	-0.091**
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Temporary Employment	-0.158**	-0.128*	-0.157**	-0.160**	-0.151**	-0.125*
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.050)
Regional Unemployment	0.329	0.189	0.586	0.542	-0.679	0.294
	(1.319)	(1.254)	(1.295)	(1.467)	(1.357)	(1.276)
GRP per capita (2019)	-0.003	0.007	-0.004	-0.017	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Constant	3.529***	3.497***	3.025***	3.531***	3.552***	2.533***
	(0.174)	(0.179)	(0.194)	(0.175)	(0.192)	(0.189)
<hr/>						
Treatment Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Varying Intercept	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,812	14,800	14,796	14,812	12,188	14,812
Log Likelihood	-28,158.88	-27,989.98	-28,070.72	-28,167.20	-23,211.24	-27,754.70
Akaike Inf. Crit.	56,355.76	56,073.96	56,235.45	56,428.40	46,516.47	55,603.40
	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	56,500.23	56,431.27	56,592.75	56,785.75	46,864.66	55,960.75
	0	0	0	0	0	0
<hr/>						
Notes:	*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$					

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