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Keywords: International Relations; foreign policy; literature review

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Evolution of Cooperation Between India and the USA in the Field of Civil High Technologies in 2014-2023: Literature Review

The processes of globalization and structural changes in the world economy have led to an increasing role of technologies. Therefore, nowadays technological prowess is not only the most important source of economic well-being but also one of the key indicators of the position of a state on the global stage.

India is one of the world's largest economies and strives to strengthen its influence on the world stage. The Indian authorities claim that it is technological leadership that can be the way to achieve this goal. At the same time, to catch up with the greatest technologically developed countries India needs a strong partner. Thus, the USA took this role and became the largest investor in the Indian economy and the biggest technology supplier. The impetus for strengthening ties between the United States and India was given in May 2022, when US President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a joint initiative On Critical And Emerging Technology (ICET).

The issue of the influence of technologies on political processes has raised significant interest among scholars over the past decades. There is no doubt that technologies have transformed the world of international relations and global politics [Krige & Barth, 2006] Technologies changed the rules of the political game, technology began to be used as a new source of power. Researchers clarify how technology has changed the balance of power and increased the number of actors in the international system, since now technology giants have the opportunity to influence political processes. Anna Wojciuk explores the risks that technological development entails. [Wojciuk, 2018] Researchers argue about positive and negative aspects of technological development, but all agree on the fact that the possession of technologies provides strategic advantages in the economic and political spheres.

Over time, India has become one of the strongest regional players and has also begun to lay claim to world leadership. To strengthen its position, India needs to maintain and promote its own technological production, which Narendra Modi has been saying since he took office as Prime Minister in 2014. Olga Ustyuzhantseva provides a detailed analysis of the factors that contributed to the rise of the Indian tech sector [Устюжанцева, 2015]. The scholars examine the evolution of Indian policy in the field of science, technology and innovation and highlight measures provided by the state: tax incentives, support for small and medium-sized businesses, investments in

scientific developments, creation of innovation clusters. In addition to governmental policy, Sergej Lunev notes the role of the United States in this process, since many Indians went to study and work in the US, afterwards they returned to found their own companies in their country [Лунев, 2008]. Ustyuzhantseva points out the role of offshore programming in the development of India's own information technologies [Устюжанцева, 2018]. ICT development has been facilitated by the creation of industrial parks that are entirely export-oriented. The author notes that 65% of the parks' products are sold to the USA.

New Delhi has become especially important for Washington after the deterioration of relations with Beijing. The Sino-American trade war revealed to the US the need to transfer production from China and to search for new partners [Bhandari, 2023]. Therefore, now India serves as a counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific region. Bhandari explains how India leverages opportunities that advance national interests, for example, the country aims to become a large supplier of semiconductors and is already signing contracts with the USA.

Another strand of literature explores the restrictions that impede US-India interaction. For instance, the American visa policy and the introduction of restrictions on technology transfer are particularly criticized [Шавлай, 2020]. Politi, Kazmin and Pitel explain that trade deficit and conflicts over tariffs presented the reasons why the administration of Donald Trump abolished tax benefits for India under the Generalized System of Preferences, in which India was the main beneficiary [Politi, Kazmin & Pitel, 2019]. The authors claim that if the US continues to pursue this policy or if, for example, Trump wins the upcoming elections, this would bring the relationship back 15 years.

However, most researchers agree on the fact that, despite existing constraints, there are positive trends in US-India technology collaboration. The new ICET technology agreement fostered bilateral cooperation. Studies appeared since the time of establishment of the initiative. In particular, Sameer Patil notes that technological interaction predetermines the US-Indian strategic partnership [Patil, 2023]. The author highlights important areas of future interaction: artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, 5G and innovative systems. Similarly, in the work of Konark Bhandari, Arun Singh and Rudra Chaudhuri common research and innovation ecosystems present measures to strengthen links between academic communities [Bhandari, Singh & Chaudhuri, 2023].

Although the innovative sector of India seems to be a promising avenue for further research, the issue of Indian-US cooperation in civil technologies remains underinvestigated. Most often we can find short news articles that are based on statistics of American businesses opened in India or statements of high-level officials about their intentions to establish cooperation. Also many studies either combine military technologies and civil ones or concentrate on the first ones only. Much

less information focuses on high-technologies for civilian use such as information and communication technologies (ICT), semiconductors production, and artificial intelligence, not including the military sphere.

Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Indian-US relations in the field of high technologies for civilian use.

Liana Bersanova

Specifics of the U.S. Policy on the Use of Military Force Abroad under the Biden Administration (2021-2024): Literature Review

The study of internal factors in conducting U.S. policy on the use of military force abroad is primarily limited to examining legal constraints on the actions of the executive branch. The military powers of Congress and the President of the United States are enshrined in the Constitution, but the question remains open as to the extent to which the President may independently use the armed forces for purposes unrelated to defense against an attack on his country. In 1973, the War Powers Resolution was passed, outlining the conditions that allow the President to participate in military action. Nevertheless, since then, there have often been instances where the executive branch has ignored statutory precepts and acted on its own discretion [Weed, 2019]. The relationship between the legislative and executive powers in regulating these issues is an important criterion in analyzing Joseph Biden's policy in the direction under consideration.

The next internal factor of research interest is the party affiliation of the incumbent U.S. President, which allows us to compare his decisions with the policies of his predecessors representing a similar or opposing party. For example, in 2020, when Congress sought to limit Republican President Donald Trump's ability to use military force against Iran, then-Democratic presidential candidate Joseph Biden said that as President, unlike his predecessor, he would work closely with Congress when making decisions on the use of military force abroad [Herr, 2020]. As a result, Joseph Biden himself initiated a military operation against Yemen in January 2024, but he did send Congress a report on military action within the deadline [Horton et al., 2024]. Further comparison of the approaches of Democrats and Republicans to the use of force abroad will reveal the peculiarities of the Joseph Biden administration's policy in this area.

Public opinion is one of the key domestic factors whose effectiveness has been evaluated by various researchers studying liberalism and democracy. Scholarly works have already identified a link between voter and public support and decisions on the use of military force by the United States. Indeed, voters attach great importance to candidates' positions and statements on security

issues [Tomz, Weeks & Yarhi-Milo, 2019]. For this reason, U.S. election campaigns contain many statements about the incumbent President's use of military and security powers, the dilemma between maintaining the U.S. global presence in the world and reducing military spending. Based on existing research, it is possible to analyze the electorate's attitude towards Joseph Biden's policy on the use of military force, discussions during the 2024 election statements and, thus, compare the opinions of different candidates, parties and the American society on this issue.

External factors influencing the formation of the political course of the current U.S. president on military intervention are represented by the strategic course and plans of Washington, reflected mainly in such documents as the National Security Strategy and the U.S. National Defense Strategy 2022. In such documents, the U.S. government authorities identify the main global and local threats facing American society and ways to combat them, including military confrontation. It is also important to take into account the degree of policy coherence between the United States and its NATO allies, and the views of various countries in the alliance on the prospects to increase or, on the contrary, to reduce their own military power and the extent of their military intervention in interstate conflicts [Wintz, 2010].

The study will also examine the transformation of the world order, which is analyzed mainly on the basis of knowledge developed by the classics of theories and approaches in the discipline of international relations, such as Kenneth Waltz, who is the founder of structural realism (also known as neorealism), Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller.

Although the problem of political and ideological polarization in the United States is of great interest to contemporary researchers, scientific works on the subject in question may lack a comprehensive approach to the analysis of both external and internal factors and internal political discussions for a full understanding of the decision-making process on the use of U.S. military forces abroad and the peculiarities of U.S. policy in this direction.

This study can add to the list of scientific works on the theory, procedure, practice and peculiarities of the use of American military force abroad. Discussions between political figures and US government authorities on the use of military force abroad reflect the fundamental and long-term problem of the clash of American foreign policy traditions represented by the concepts of isolationism and imperialism. The results of this research work will allow, first, to deepen the understanding of current trends in the formation of Washington's foreign policy course in terms of reducing, maintaining or expanding the U.S. military presence in the world, and second, to identify the characteristic features of the U.S. decision-making process on the use of military force abroad, taking into account both external and internal factors and domestic political disputes relevant to the topic of the study.

Transformation of the EU Strategy and Policy of the Green Transition in 2022-2023: Literature Review

The problem of the Green Transition in the European Union (EU) has become highly discussed due to the negative consequences that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict poses to the energy security of the European integration. In 2022 Russian fossil fuels constituted 40% of the European energy demand structure. Thus, after the beginning of the decoupling from Russia, the EU is facing serious issues in realising green transition objectives and satisfying energy demands of the population.

Over the past two decades, the scientific framework of the energy situation in the EU has aroused heated debate among scholars. Andreas Goldthau and Richard Youngs underline that energy crisis strengthens ecological and environmental commitments of the EU as the new core pillars of the European integration project [Goldthau & Youngs, 2023, p. 7]. Further implications are discussed by Paul Calanter and Daniela Zisu who suggest that the only way to eliminate European dependence on hydrocarbons lies through the structural reforms of renewable energy sources (RES) such as *REPowerEU* plan [Calanter & Zisu, 2022, p. 31–32]. Historically the European path during crisis has been determined by the European Commission-mandated structural acts that dramatically change the vector of the development of the whole integration.

A number of studies develop the market-oriented approach towards green transition [Urbano, Kampouropoulos & Romeral, 2023, p. 2031–2032] arguing that realisation of both energy independence and decarbonisation objectives leads to conflicting situations. Their empirical implications show that green transition should be revised in order to meet the short-term needs of the European population. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann and Conall Heussaff underline the need for emergency actions that could maximise domestic energy supply through raising gas output in the Netherlands and continuing to operate German nuclear plants [Zettelmeyer et al., 2022]. Moreover, Yang Liu, Xiaoqing Xie and Mei Wang point to the different phases of the European countries' energy transition, which should be mitigated through the energy import diversification and the construction of liquified natural gas receiving terminals [Liu, Xie & Wang, 2023, p. 128].

Another strand of literature examines deep institutional changes that have taken place as a result of the geopolitics. A study by Christoph Knill, Yves Steinebach and Xavier Fernández-i-Marín investigates the surging role of the European Commission in the green transformation. They found that because of the need to accomplish the green transition, European institutions mitigate

nationl hypocrisy. It can be also inferred that nowadays the European Commission plays the role of an entrepreneur imposing sanctions on deviant national states which oppose more regulation [Knill, Steinebach & Fernández-i-Marín, 2020, p. 372]. Moreover, Piotr Borowski suggests that the decision to determine the way to solve the energy crisis is the European Commission's responsibility [Borowski, 2022, p. 89].

Finally, a number of studies try to find a correlation between the European-wide strategies created and their political implementation on the national level. In one paper [Geels, Pereira & Pinkse, 2022, P. 38] the difference was identified between the German and French approaches in using financial assets of the Recovery and Resilience fund. Germany tends to invest the given amount of money in the automotive sphere in order to gain a competitive advantage, while at the same time France prefers to spread the investments. On the other hand, Paweł Bartoszczuk, Uma Shankar Singh and Małgorzata Rutkowska show that such middle European countries as Poland have fewer advantages on the green transition path due to the lack of development, which is not mitigated by institutionalised financial help of the European Commission [Bartoszczuk, Singh & Rutkowska, 2022, P. 20].

The existing literature fail to conduct the research that would take into account both political and economic factors. Thus, this paper will bridge this gap by analysing the possible economic outcomes for the EU from the modern crisis including diversification of import, developing LNG infrastructure, etc. and by observing the key role of the European institutions pushing forward the common interest.

Kirill Gorenkin

Mechanisms of Influence of the Mexican Diaspora on US Policy Towards Mexico

The question of the specificity of the influence of the Mexican diaspora on the formation of US foreign policy towards Mexico during the presidency of Donald Trump has not been studied in its entirety. The problem with all existing works is that they focusing only towards some aspects of my work, be it diaspora politics, Trump presidency or US-Mexican relations, However, they can be categorized in some clusters to review.

The first cluster includes works on the Latino and Mexican diaspora, the history and context of its formation in the United States. Broad phenomenon of Mexican diaspora in the 21st century is reviewed in the monograph edited by Boris Koval [Латиноамериканские диаспоры, 2003]. The history of the emergence of the Mexican diaspora in the context of an overview of the

emergence of Latino political power is examined by Sharon Navarro and Kim Geron [Navarro & Geron, 2023].

The second cluster consists of works that focus on the phenomenon of diasporas themselves and how they interact with host and home states. Diasporas and the mechanisms of their influence are considered by Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth [Shain & Barth, 2003], developing into the formulation of the place of diasporas in international relations. The phenomenon of ethnic lobbyism in the US was examined by the authors of *The domestic sources* [The domestic sources, 2012]. The specific relationship between diaspora lobbying and the US Congress has been described by the authors of the *Congress and diaspora politics* [Congress and diaspora politics, 2018]. The willingness to engage in foreign policy lobbying by some diasporans and the refusal to do so by others and the reasons for this are examined by Shubha Kamala Prasad and Filip Savatic [Prasad & Savatic, 2021].

The next cluster for this study includes works aimed at examining the current state of Latin American and Mexican diasporas and their specific relations with their host and how they influence the policies of host countries. Pei-te Lien [Lien, 1994] examines the political participation of different ethnic groups and diasporas by comparing the political participation of Asian and Mexican diasporas. Matt Barreto and José Muñoz [Barreto & Muñoz, 2003] make an important point in their study, concluding that Mexicans without U.S. citizenship are no less active in the United States. At the same time, Jorge Dominguez [Dominguez, 2006] pointed out the opposite: Latin American, particularly Mexican, diasporas in his opinion do not participate significantly in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward their homelands for a number of reasons. Melissa Mucci Pineda [Mucci Pineda, 2014] draws an important conclusion by pointing to the particular importance of economic issues in foreign policy for the Mexican diaspora. José López Almejo [López Almejo, 2018] concludes that the Mexican diaspora has become influential through the formation of a large number of local structures and active participation in U.S. politics on legal grounds.

Olga Ivanova

France's Role in Shaping EU Energy Transition Policy (2019–2023)

Launched in 2019, the European Green Deal represents a visionary and comprehensive strategy aimed at achieving full decarbonization by 2050. This initiative is a culmination of an ongoing energy transition policy, marked by a consistent effort to decrease the reliance on fossil fuels in the energy mix across Europe. France, a forefront advocate for sustainable energy and zero-emission initiatives, has notably intensified its commitment to sustainable development in recent years.

France has emerged as a leader in adapting its energy infrastructure, largely due to its significant investment in nuclear power, a cornerstone of its national energy strategy.

The country's proactive approach to energy transformation and climate policy has significantly influenced the development of the EU's strategic energy framework. France's example demonstrates a balance between advancing nuclear power and championing renewable energy sources, reflecting a multifaceted approach to achieving the ambitious goals set forth in the European Green Deal. This leadership and innovation in energy policy underscore France's pivotal role in driving Europe towards a more sustainable and resilient energy future.

Muhammad Farhan Bashir, Amar Rao, Arshian Sharif, Sudeshna Ghosh and Yanchun Pan [Bashir et al., 2024b] analyse how specific policies implemented can influence the transformation and sustainability of economies (the article considers G7 countries), analyses data from 1995 to 2021, and suggests development paths and transformational solutions for policymakers. Arkaitz Usubiaga-Liaño and Paul Ekins [Usubiaga-Liaño and Ekins, 2023] analyzed the effectiveness of EU transformation policies using The Environmental Sustainability Gap (ESGAP) framework index. The index takes into account a large number of factors to assess the effectiveness of transformation policies and predicts the ability of EU countries to achieve the required carbon neutrality targets by 2030. This study aims to provide an objective evaluation of the effectiveness of EU transformation policies.

Mahmoud Hassan, Marc Kouzez, Ji-Yong Lee, Badreddine Msolli and Hatem Rjiba [Hassan et al., 2024] investigate the impact of Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) in OECD countries on the final consumption of renewable sources. The study questions the effectiveness of policy decisions and their impact on achieving carbon neutrality.

Kostas Andriosopoulos and Stephan Silvestre [Andriosopoulos & Silvestre, 2017b] will be used to study the history, formation, formulation, and evolution of energy, climate, and sustainable development policies in France. They describe France's gradual achievement of the best performance in terms of energy consumption per capita, carbon emissions, and energy independence over the 10 years from 2004 to 2014 among OECD and EU28 countries. To analyze France's policies for reducing emissions, we will refer to the article by Ariane Millot, Anna Krook-Riekkola and Nadia Maïzi [Millot, Krook-Riekkola & Mäizi, 2020b]. The authors conduct a comparative analysis with Sweden, which highlights the distinctive path of France's energy transformation and its chosen policies.

Pierre-Yves Galzi (2023b) examines the behaviour of private electricity consumers in France and analyses how the culture of green consumption affects the amount of renewable generation. Community renewable energy projects (CREPs) are another important aspect of research on citizen participation in the energy transition, which has been the subject of many recent studies,

particularly in France [Dudka, Moratal & Bauwens, 2023; Vernay et al., 2023; Vernay, Sebi & Arroyo, 2023].

Arunava Bandyopadhyay, Soumen Rej, Muhammed Ashiq Villanthenkodath and Mantu Kumar Mahalik [Bandyopadhyay et al., 2022] investigated the impact of the nuclear energy sector on the overall 'greenness' of the energy sector in countries that consume nuclear energy. The study identified untapped potential from the nuclear power sector that is not being utilized by producing countries. The authors conclude that these countries could rely more on nuclear energy rather than conventional sources.

Samir Kadyrov

The Evolution of the UK's Foreign Policy towards Nigeria in Modern Age: Literature Review

The aim of my study is to trace the evolution of British foreign policy towards Nigeria in the modern age. The research examines the UK's general political approach towards Sub-Saharan Africa and the character of the former metropolitan power's policy toward a now independent developing country.

A number of studies have covered the topic of the current British foreign policy towards the whole African continent. For instance, Porteous considers the African dimension of the New Labor Cabinet in the early 2000s, highlighting mostly the development aid policy [Porteous, 2005]. However, he does not address the topic of bilateral military cooperation, diplomatic and cultural ties. Similarly, Olga Kulkova focuses mostly on the security factor of the UK's policy towards Africa [Куликова, 2013]. The military dimension as well as any other one cannot be considered without the influence of economic relations, a political situation and cultural ties between two countries. Thus, these studies fail to provide a holistic understanding of the British actions in Nigeria, as all main aspects of a foreign policy tend to be closely intertwined. The comprehensive approach mentioned above that covers the main factors of a foreign policy such as trade and investments, security and political ties, development aid is applied in the works by Dirk Kohnert, Max Mendez-Parra, Sherillyn Raga, Lily Sommer, Nikolaj Medushevskii, Anastasia Busygina and Mikhail Sopot [Kohnert, 2018; Mendez-Parra, Raga & Sommer, 2020; Медушевский, Бусыгина и Сопот, 2021]. However, only a few authors attempt to analyze the UK's foreign policy strategies and to compare them with policy implications [Gaulme, 2021; Медушевский, Бусыгина и Сопот, 2021]. Meanwhile, the correspondence between declared plans and real action is vital for assessing the foreign policy of any country. François Gaulme studies the strategy by

Boris Johnson's Cabinet – *Global Britain in a Competitive Age*, while Medushevskii, Busygina and Sopot look at David Cameron's and Theresa May's African vector plans. At the same time, all works mentioned above do not provide a socioeconomic and systemic analysis of the reasons for such a foreign policy of the UK towards Africa and its transformation throughout the period. This research addresses this gap by using both the socioeconomic approach of Marxism and the world-system framework by Immanuel Wallerstein [Маркс и Энгельс, 1959; Wallerstein, 1974].

Another part of the literature covers the topic of the UK-Nigerian relations – a primary concern of this study. For example, some authors describe the impact of the British colonial policy on the current situation in Nigeria [Ikanone, 2021; Медушевский и Соловьева, 2021]. Their insights not only contribute to understanding of the historical pretext but also explain the current state of bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and Nigeria. By contrast, most other focus on British policy towards Nigeria during post-independence period of 1960-1980s [Maclean, 1970; Akinsanya, 1985; Uche, 2012; Foluke, 2019]. In addition, unlike Osunyikanmi Adebukola Foluke's article, Adeoye Akinsanya's research is rather descriptive as it does not provide detailed critical analysis on the UK's policy in Nigeria. Yet, despite the importance of historic linkages between the ex-colony and the former metropolitan state, the current state of affairs is neglected by the authors. The article titled *Nigeria-UK Relations in the Twenty-First Century* bridged the gap covering all key domains of current bilateral relations, however, the approach applied by the author may be flawed [Enayaba, 2023]. The author is firmly convinced that the UK's foreign policy towards Nigeria stems from the good will and a desire to help the country to reduce the poverty. This implies a naïve understanding of the UK's typically neocolonial goals in Africa, which is proved by naked facts about the UK's and its corporations' activities in African countries, or by some Soviet researchers, who argue that the UK's imperialist policy towards Nigeria still exists, and that the British elites continue to form Nigerian internal policy based on more beneficial terms for them [Curtis, 2016; Пронин и Крешин, 1972]. To sum up, in spite of the abundance of research which relates to the topic, there is no work which both comprehensively addresses various aspects of British foreign policy towards Nigeria throughout the period of 2015-2022 such as a strategic vision, military and diplomatic ties, economic and humanitarian relations and applies a range of methodologies to understand the real character of this policy within the given timeframe.

As has been shown above, the question about the character of the UK's foreign policy plays a significant role and, therefore, needs to be covered more deeply. The relations between former metropolitan powers and independent developing states are explained by Ramón Grosfoguel's concept of coloniality as the existing dependency of the former colony on the former metropolitan state despite the ending of colonial rule or as we put it – neocolonialism. [Grosfoguel, 2002]. However, some experts cast doubt on the idea of neocolonial exploitation, arguing that developed

nations are interested in other countries' development and that is why provide them with financial aid. In his study of the British aid to Africa, Tony Killick considers it as a "post-colonial guilt", likewise Larisa Kapitsa believes that donor-countries will provide "credible, predicable and sufficient financial eloping countries' initiatives [to foster development]" [Killick, 2005; Капица, 2011, с. 97]. However, neocolonial practices, which developed countries have been using to their advantage, still exist in the 21st century despite the liberal slogans [Ziai, 2019]. In addition, Ihonvbere and Falola, for example, claim that economic and political problems of Nigeria are results of the UK's policy and still continuing exploitation of the country by British MNCs such as Shell, BP and others [Ihonvbere & Falola, 1984]. The authors also note that none of the revolutions tried to challenge the companies' influence. Indeed, about 40 years have passed since then, which calls for a need to conduct research on the character of the British policy towards Nigeria in modern times.

Xenia Kozina

Features of Algerian Policy Towards Morocco (2019–2023)

Traditionally, research has paid extensive attention to Algerian-Moroccan relationship dynamics and its influence on the Maghreb. Initially Algeria and Morocco shared similar ideological, religious, and cultural background. However, the idea of the nation state, which was brought to the region by the French colonial rule, has created an incentive for the rivalry based on territorial grounds, as territorial integrity was associated with sovereignty and independence [Stora, 2003; Zoubir, 2000]. Benjamin Stora contributes to the discussion by considering the differences in Algerian and Moroccan perceptions of nationhood and territory shaped by the history, geographic location, and the peculiarities of their political systems [Stora, 2003]. Rashid Kwar identifies the stages of the interaction between Algeria and Morocco and highlights that they were not always conflictual and varied from cooperation to open confrontation [Kayap, 2021, с. 197]. For instance, the period of 1990-2005 represented a positive shift in relations in the political, diplomatic and economic spheres [Сенусси, 2009, с. 177]. The countries pursued policies aimed at developing the relations, yet the existing issues hindered their full normalisation. Some scholars suggest that the conflictual nature of Algerian-Moroccan relationship derives from their ambitions to be a leader in the security field [de Larramendi, 2019].

The question of the Western Sahara remains central to Algerian policy towards Morocco. Some researchers adopt a comprehensive approach by analysing how different actors engage in the conflict and how they shape it [Global, regional and local dimensions, 2017]. Others analyse

it in a broader context of Libyan crisis and destabilisation of the Sahel [Володина, 2015]. Natalia Podgornova traces the evolution of Algerian position on the West Saharan issue and concludes that it remained unchanged due to Algeria's own struggle for independence in the 20th century [Подгорнова, 2015, с. 116]. Michael Jacobs, however, claims that the choice of Algerian strategy concerning the Western Sahara may have been determined by its aspiration to become a regional hegemon [Jacobs, 2012].

Over the past 10 years, scholarship has paid less attention to Algeria's foreign policy. Yet, the Algerian-Moroccan relationship came under scrutiny of some recent analytical works. Morocco's rapprochement with Israel, which upsets the fragile regional balance, the struggle for influence in the Sahel, and states' domestic discourse resulted in sharp deterioration during Abdelmadjid Tebboune's presidency [Василенко, 2023]. The actions of the new Algerian administration showcase that Algeria prioritises the decolonisation of the Western Sahara in its foreign policy and considers Moroccan actions a threat to its national security [Zoubir, 2022]. In Abdenour Benantar's words, "strained relations with Morocco remain a foundational element of Algerian security doctrine" [Benantar, 2022, p. 67]. As Anastasia Vasilenko argues, the situation of "controlled tensions" maintained over the years actually has a potential to get out of control [Василенко, 2023]. Smail Hamoudi, on the opposite, views this possibility as weak [Hamoudi, 2023].

Several conclusions may be drawn from the analysis of the existing literature on the subject of the research. Firstly, in recent years in-depth analyses of Algerian policy towards Morocco have remained scarce. Secondly, studies overaccentuate historic grievances and do not include into the analysis the domestic factors defining the Algerian decision making. This work seeks to fill this gap and identifying the peculiarities of Algeria's policy towards Morocco in 2019-2023.

Alisa Koteneva

Evolution of Russia's Policy Towards the UAE in the Field of High Technologies in 2014–2023

The topic of the development of the cooperation between Russia and the MENA countries has become increasingly significant in Russian state foreign policy. Global and inner-political factors have strengthened Russia's interaction with the MENA region, including sanctions after the reunification of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the partnership with the Middle East countries has become the main focal point of Russian foreign policy since 2022. This led to the termination of the Russian-American cooperation and the confined trade between Russia and China. In this

regard, Russia has been looking for new partners in the HiTech sector, and one of these potential partners is the UAE. The article will analyze the literature on the subject of cooperation between Russia and MENA countries with a focus on the UAE and HiTech sector.

The literature under study was divided into three major parts by research questions. The first part focuses on assessing Russian opportunities and limitations in relation to cooperation with the MENA states. The second part studies articles on Russian-Emirati cooperation and its evolution. The final part addresses cooperation between Russia and the UAE in the field of HiTech.

It is necessary to start with the literature on the history of cooperation and Russia's policy in the countries of the studied region. Nikolaj Surkov examines the USSR and Russian attitude to partnership with MENA states. and notes the key Russian interests among which are “military-political, economic” interests, as well as issues of prestige and security [Сурков, 2022, p. 83]. Moreover, he mentions several limitations of cooperation, for example, the geopolitical instability of the MENA region [Сурков, 2022, p. 84]. Similarly to Surkov, Becca Wasser observes the role of the Syrian crisis in strengthening Russia's political position in the region. She also develops the idea about Russian economic interests and notes Russian diligence to invest in the region. As for limitations, the author describes the sanction’s pressure as a main obstacle for Russian activity in the MENA [Wasser, 2019, p. 4]. Similarly, Izutina develops the idea of the economic interests and notes that another limitation of cooperation is that Russian export of high-value-added goods is still small [Изутина, 2022, p. 100].

The second block of literature is devoted to the issues of bilateral cooperation between Russia and the UAE. Hassan Shehab emphasizes that geopolitical, natural, socio-economic and socio-cultural factors play a role in cooperation between Russia and the UAE [Шехаб, 2009, p. 3]. Li-Chen Sim and Jonathan Fulton consider that political aspects play a meaningful role in building partnership between Russia and the UAE. [Sim & Fulton, 2021, p. 11]. Moreover, Alexandrov outlines the role of the Ukrainian crisis as a factor that influenced the deepening of cooperation between Russia and the UAE [Александров, 2023, p. 17]. However, Ludmila Shkvarya and Sergej Rodin evaluate the benefits of cooperation, including in the field of HiTech through the prism of economic metrics [Shkvarya & Rodin, 2019, p. 1932].

Furthermore, it is important to consider how the authors assessed the cooperation between Russia and the UAE in the field of high technologies in the 21st century. For instance, Surkov notes that the UAE is one of Russia's largest trading partners in the GCC region. However, the article focuses on cooperation in the energy sector. The energy technologies are considered to be HiTech, which allows Russia to exploit this niche taking into account its focus on energy [Сурков, 2022, с. 85]. Other authors, for example, Rodin, examine the issues of cooperation between Russia and the UAE in more detail. In particular, the author focuses on technologies in the space segment,

as well as evaluates the problems and achievements in this area. The author believes that both countries are encountered with the need to enhance their technological capabilities, searching for new favorable opportunities [Родин, 2019, с. 54].

Analyzing the authors' works, it can be marked that the main gap of the literature on this topic is that the research does not describe and analyze the issues of changed patterns of cooperation policy of studied countries in the period from 2014 to 2023. The articles do not provide an overview of both the UAE's demand for cooperation and the changes in the strategy of cooperation between Russia and the UAE.

Olga Kotlyar

The evolution of military-technical cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea in 2017–2023

Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea has been a topic of discussion and research since the end of the Korean war in 1953. Consequently, foreign policy of the Republic of Korea has been influenced by the “American factor” that has been present throughout the whole period of independence. The primary objective of this research is to delve into the contributions of both nations to their strategic alliance in the recent 6 years.

As it stated in the neorealism theory of the International Relations states are living and surviving with their own power in the world of anarchy [Waltz, 1959]. Thereby, the subject of the state's ability to grow their national security presents as a main task of the government. In offensive realism, main IR states are highly concerned with maximizing their own power with a help of high presence in the world arena. John Mearsheimer [Mearsheimer, 2003] argues that states are rarely satisfied with their influence in the world system, hence tend to ensure their own security by establishing hard power dominance on other states.

Contrastingly, states are also primarily concerned with their own survival, consequently pursuing national security against threat without urgent need for power expansion [Jervis, 1976], [Walt, 1990; Snyder, 1991]. In this framework the Republic of Korea inclines as an example of the state with the defensive realism paradigm, gaining profit from the alliances with the great powers (USA) and balancing external security threats (North Korean accumulation of the military power on the Korean Peninsula).

The case of the military and technical cooperation between the USA and the Republic of Korea is perceived as the main active sphere in the bilateral relations. The main focus of the contemporary relations between above-mentioned states are far from being in the status of patron-

client [Snyder, 2018]. Military and technical cooperation, in this sense, is viewed as a bilaterally beneficial exchange of the technologies, territories and arms that will ensure stability and prosperity of both states national securities and foreign policy goals. Mainly following research of the set goals will be based on the national documents, as *National Security Strategy* of the USA (2017, 2022); *National Defense Strategy* of the Republic of Korea (2018); *National Security Strategy* of the Republic of Korea (2023). Additionally, *Indo-Pacific strategies* of the USA (2019, 2021), *Indo-Pacific strategy* of the Republic of Korea (2022). Furthermore, this particular research may consult with the governmental documents of the official hearings at the Committee on Armed Services in the United States Senate (2018, 2022) and *Congressional Research Service Reports* (2022, 2023) which stress on the point of the discussed above alliance.

Correspondingly, evolution of the military and technical cooperation between the USA is going to be researched on the basis of the separate studies on the following topic. As an example, Richard Weitz [Weitz, 2013], stresses stable mutual commitment of the states into military alliance during the administrations of Park Geun Hye and Barack Obama with a high involvement of the South Korean ‘middle power’ diplomacy on the international arena [Kim, 2016]. The subject of military and technical cooperation will be viewed through the development of the strategic alliance with its evolution and changes. For instance, the work of Benjamin Zimmer [Zimmer, 2020] discusses the drastic transformation of the strategic partnership between Seoul and Washington during the presidency of Donald Trump and Moon Jae In with the adoption of the *General Security of Military Information Agreement* and South Korea's regional foreign policy targeted mainly on the cooperation and strengthening bilateral ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and People's Republic of China.

Elaborating on the point of the South Korean foreign policy and additional research on the potential security trade offs leads to the discussion of the nuclear state of Seoul. Main focus of this idea is mentioned by Jagannath Panda [Panda, 2023] stressing the development of the ongoing nuclear debate with the recently introduced possibility of building nuclear weapons by ROK's president Yoon Seok Yeol in 2022.

At the current stage of the research it is possible to present some preliminary results of an overview that is retrieved from a primary source analysis and neorealism theory. Consequently, the Republic of Korea pursuing defensive realism form of foreign policy and, subsequently influencing it on the national security, values strategic partnership with the United States of America in the military and technical sphere insuring an additional guarantee of a safe protection of a national interest on the Korean Peninsula and Indo Pacific region. Preliminary it is not in Seoul's interests to compete with the USA and raise their own military power to be the next potential

regional leader in the region of East Asia, as it seems that Seoul tends to choose deterrence policy ways rather than offensive ones.

Daniil Makukhin

Russian Arctic LNG and Japan: a Case of Energy Security

Substantial technical complexity as well as unfavourable political environment undermine the viability of large-scale industrial projects in the High North based on commercial incentives only. State support plays a crucial role in the establishment of a robust economic activity in terms of oil and gas resources development in the Russian Arctic. In other words, resource extraction in the Arctic, in order to be viable, has to correspond with certain policy objectives – namely, energy security. Among all the state actors involved in Russian ventures in the region Japan represents a case of particular interest .

The Russian perspective on energy cooperation with Japan remains a somewhat complex issue. The relevance of Japan for Moscow’s overall energy strategy can be assessed on two levels – global and regional. The former has gained substantial momentum since the emergence of Crimean crisis, when it became evident that Russia’s excessive reliance on European market could backfire for the national resource-dependent economy. Moreover, goal of maximising gas revenues pushed Russia towards alternative export options, as shrinking gas demand combined with deteriorating market access decreased the EU’s importance as a lucrative gas consumer [Shadrina, 2014, c. 56]. This coincided with gradual transformation of Northeast Asia – a less institutionalised market with poorer bargaining power – into the key LNG market globally.

As for the regional level, Russia pursues the following goals in the course of its energy policy in the Northeast Asia – expansion of its political influence as a major supplier of resources for regional power-generation capabilities, facilitate the development of the Northern Sea Route as a tool for achieving greater trans-Eurasian connectivity and ensuring its leverage against other LNG suppliers by means of a common gas hub [Kun-Chin, & Reilly, 2024, c. 110]. For the most part, they coincide with Japanese (this will be briefly discussed below) long-term energy security strategies which in its own turn lays the foundation for mutual cooperation. Apart from the intersection of interests, Russian energy policy towards Japan enjoyed less securitisation, as opposed to China with its growing concerns over possible pipeline dependency [Stulberg, 2015, c. 145]. Such favourable environment was reinforced by the attempts of Japanese government to establish linkage between energy cooperation and prospective concessions on bilateral territorial dispute [Yennie-Lindgre, 2018, c. 158].

Indeed, as the latest developments demonstrate, Japan, albeit an integral part of the West, is reluctant to abandon gas cooperation with Russia even in the wake of a severe U.S. sanctions regime against key Russian energy projects in the High North. It is clear that Tokyo possesses certain interests in maintaining stable energy ties with Moscow. Namely, greater mutual energy partnership promotes diversification of supply chains followed by a partial resolution of the “Malacca Dilemma” and expands the natural gas imports structure [Streltsov, 2021, c. 15]. Moreover, Arctic liquefied gas is sold at a more competitive price, which is achieved owing to lower costs for condensation process in a colder environment, and is not a subject to “Asian premium”. Recent infrastructure advancements (such as Kamchatka transshipment plant) along the NSR deprive Russian Arctic LNG supplies from Arctic environment-related risks and therefore to align it with Japanese strategy for developing the pan-Asian liquefied gas market, which can eventually strengthen the market power of both parties.

Japan also takes substantial interest in further maintaining its presence in LNG projects in the High North due to concerns about the interception of business initiatives by China. As if it were a classic security dilemma, Tokyo due to the limited LNG market generally perceives Beijing's increased presence in the production of natural gas in the High North as a case of a decrease in its own gains (both in terms of security and economic profits), which provides it with an additional incentive to withhold investments in energy projects in the Russian Arctic [Yennie-Lindgren, 2022].

While both countries seem to have a matched scope of interests, Russian gas policy towards Japan remains a multifaceted and largely understudied process. There were few attempts to put the issue of Russian energy strategies in a broader geopolitical context. To a large extent, the energy leadership will be gained by the gas supplier actor, who will most successfully fit in the evolving system of Northeast Asian energy market institutions. In this regard, the Russian energy policy towards Japan requires additional insights in terms of its overarching endeavours of market power expansion in the region. The upcoming research will try to address this issue.

Igor Molvinskikh

Studies of the French Foreign Policy Approaches to North Africa in 2007–2023

Nowadays, the scientific literature, regarding the topic of the French foreign policy in North Africa is becoming a lot more developed and profound in comparison with previous studies. In fact, the majority of papers cover the North African policy of France under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) as, in this regard, the French governance assigned a “neo-Gaullist”

approach in relation to the countries of the given region. Meanwhile, the overall research disposes of comparatively little number of publications and articles devoted to the North African policy of France under the Francois Hollande (2012–2017) and Emmanuel Macron (from 2017) administrations.

The French understanding of North Africa as a political and economic landscape is possible to examine addressing the paradigm of hegemony. Antonio Gramsci [Gramsci, 2011], Perry Anderson [Anderson, 2017] and Joseph Woolcock [Woolcock, 1985] elaborate on the proposition that any power acts in a hegemonic way, by the time it attempts to adjust a new political order with a strict ideology and the cultural domination. Moreover, the concept of hegemony itself can be categorized as “hard”, “intermediate” and “soft” and, in addition to that, be distinguished between “empire” and “leadership” [Destradi, 2010, p. 926].

Taking into consideration the complex of the literature devoted to the French policy in North Africa in the era of the “post-colonialism”, some scholars emphasize that the general position in 1960-1990 served as a “Gaullist” vision of the neocolonialism, which incorporated latent methods of political, economic, cultural and military supremacy of France in North Africa [Bozo, 2016, p. 135]. Furthermore, Guy Martin [Martin, 1985] and John McKesson [McKesson, 1990] depict the types of the French interests in the given region concerning the period between 1960s and 1990s such as “resource”, “prestige” and “security”.

Daria Kareva [Kapeва, 2015, c. 70] provides in-depth analysis of Sarkozy’s initiative of the Union for Mediterranean, thus identifying the historical assumptions of this project, describing its peculiarities and the reasons for the subsequent ineffectiveness of such an interstate integration. Several scholars examine more accurately the breaking point between the French liberal approach in relation to North Africa and the offensive and expansionist methods applied by the Sarkozy administration in the context of the Arab Spring of 2010-2011 [Lakomy, 2012, p. 80]. In addition to that, Jason Davidson analyzed within a conceptual framework the strategic operation of France alongside with NATO in Libya in 2011 and he drew attention to the fact Sarkozy fulfilled the extreme transition “from integration to Realpolitik” in his North African policy [Davidson, 2013, p. 318]. The North African strategy of France under the presidency of Francois Hollande is virtually undiscovered in the scholar community, though several experts indicate that the immediate return to the military aspect of the North African policy became intact as soon as the terrorist hazard proved its prominence in Mali in 2013 [Mathias, 2014, p. 162].

The publications devoted to the principal issue of the conceptual evolution of the French policy in North Africa imply the research of some continuation in the perspective of several leaders of France. In this regard, some scholars put the emphasis especially on the continuation between Sarkozy and Macron, by which both leaders claimed about the necessity to revisit the “neo-

colonialist” concept and at the same time were prepared to accomplish military interventions in the region, if the French national interests become challenged [Duclos, 2021]. Concerning the presidency of Emmanuel Macron, the majority of scholars appeal to the statement that his African policy has no differences in comparison with his predecessors, as he also attempted to establish the mechanisms, which would allow France to ameliorate its cultural and economic hegemony in Africa (Филиппов, 2018, с. 117). The more detailed interpretation inferred that Macron tried to adopt the liberal and more offensive military approaches simultaneously, thus providing a balance of the possible effective engagement of France in Africa these days [Duclos, 2021].

Therefore, it is necessary to provide several studies, which could encompass more deeply the conceptual and systematic evolution of the French vision of the given region in the period between 2007 and 2023. In addition to that, the research should be more focused on the North African policy of the president Macron, especially within the last 2 years (2021–2023), because some significant events (like the series of coups d'états in the countries of West Africa in 2023) are possible to hamper and worsen the strategic status of France in Africa in general and in North Africa in particular.

Daria Selyauskina

Features of Saudi Arabia's policy towards Iran in 2016–2023

The ingrained idea of Saudi Arabia and Iran as two permanently warring regional players has been changing recently. Indeed, the repeated rupture of diplomatic relations between the two states of the Middle East, the loud statements of both sides about the irreconcilability of their foreign policy views, as well as the expansion and aggravation of the conflict by taking opposing positions in the hot spots of the Middle East make us believe that the rivalry will continue for a long time. However, the recent warming of relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) suggests otherwise. Surprisingly, regional detente, or in other words, the tendency to resolve existing conflicts, has not bypassed these two regional countries. But it is still unclear whether this “thaw” will last for a long time, or is it a temporary phenomenon?

I consider it necessary to start with the background of the conflict. It is important to note here that Iran-Saudi relations have developed very dynamically throughout the 20th-21st centuries. Diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) were established in 1929. As you can see, they have a long history, but the greatest research interest is the fact that they were interrupted twice: in 1988–1991 and 2016.

An important event that had a significant effect on both the development of interaction between these two states and the balance of power in the Middle East region was the revolution in Iran in 1979. The Saudis reacted negatively to the change of power in Iran and the proclamation of a republic. Against the backdrop of the formation of a state with limited supreme power, the strength of the monarchical regime in KSA was shaken. It was after the Iranian revolution that Iranian-Saudi relations developed into a stage of rivalry in the region [Кузнецов, 2014].

So, the first break in diplomatic relations between KSA and Iran occurred in 1988 as a result of the murder of Iranian citizens who were performing the Hajj to Mecca and organizing a demonstration in support of the revolution in Iran. However, after the end of Iran's war with Iraq, with Iran's significant desire to reduce tensions in relations with Arab states, diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were restored in 1991. Normalization gave way to a new round of tension in 2016. The change in KSA's foreign policy priorities and the strengthening of the geopolitical role of Iran became the main reasons for the escalation of the conflict. The execution of a Shiite preacher in Riyadh sparked protests in Tehran, which resulted in the Saudi Arabian embassy in Iran being set on fire. After this event, KSA considered it necessary to sever diplomatic relations with Iran [Бирюков, 2017, с. 21-38].

Thus, it is necessary to highlight the main reasons for the conflict in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran:

Religious contradictions [Музыкаина, 2016, с. 87–97]. The states practice two different sects of Islam: Sunnis in Saudi Arabia and Shiites in Iran. The ethno-confessional factor is manifested, on the one hand, in Tehran's concern about violations of the rights of the Shiite population of KSA, and on the other hand, in Riyadh's fears of Iran's influence on the Shiite population living in Saudi Arabia. However, religious factors are often used by the authorities for political purposes to control the mood of the masses [Сваранц, 2023]. That is, in fact, the struggle for leadership in the region takes on ideological overtones, which to some extent justifies this rivalry.

Geopolitical contradictions. The interests of the two states collided in Iraq [McMillan, 2006, p. 14], especially after Tehran's growing influence in Baghdad. Another hot spot was Lebanon [Liban, 2008], where the pro-Iran coalition managed to get ahead and get more votes than their Sunni rivals, the same goes for the conflict in Syria [Molavi, 2010], Bahrain and Yemen. Here we can also mention concerns about the creation of a "Shiite crescent", which would become a bridge between Iran and the Mediterranean

Iran's nuclear program. Iran's nuclear weapons program has fueled fears of the monarchy and a desire to pursue confrontation with the republic. Since this could lead to a violation of the status quo in a region where other states do not have nuclear weapons [Мелкумян, 2006].

Competition for leadership in the Islamic world. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are striving to become first in the Middle East. Having all the necessary resources, countries are fighting to gain the opportunity to influence other states in the region and dictate terms in the Middle East.

Oil Export Policy. The economic aspect has also become a reason for the rivalry between the two states. Both KSA and Iran depend on oil exports (they are one of the main suppliers of energy). This is where competition arises within OPEC, since countries are focused on exporting oil, which is the main source of income [Мохаммад, 2014, p. 199-207].

The US factor [Пострыгань, 2023]. Due to the fact that Saudi Arabia is not able to fully ensure the security of its borders on its own, it is forced to seek cooperation with the United States. The latter, in turn, are interested in maintaining “balance” in the American sense (containing Iran).

Thus, a whole complex of internal and external contradictions contributed to the growing confrontation between the two regional leaders. Moreover, the main reason for the rivalry, in my opinion, is precisely the desire to gain leadership and supremacy in the Middle East; this reason fuels all other contradictions.

Sumbelya Khuzzyatova

The Specifics of US Climate Policy towards the EU under Joseph Biden Administration

Despite the fact that the US was one of the main initiators of the creation and development of the international climate regime, American climate policy is unstable due to the polarity of the attitude of the US political parties towards it. After Trump's anti-environmental agenda, the Biden administration has re-engaged the US in the international climate regime, in particular, many efforts are aimed at cooperation with the EU. This study contributes to a strand of research that focuses on the return of climate security to the agenda in the US and the resumption of proactive climate policy under the Joseph Biden administration. It specifically looks at the growth of US cooperation with the EU in this area and identifies different features of US climate policy during the Biden presidency compared to the polarizing approach to climate change under the Trump presidency.

A number of researches have examined the polarization of views on climate policy among US political parties and defined it as one of the features of US climate policy [Grassle, 2021; Landsman, 2021; Mildenerger, 2021]. The studies examine the evolution of US climate policy and the development of climate institutions in the country. Also, researches promote the idea that the formation of polarization has developed through the transformation of scientific discourse in

the media into political. In addition, Frank Wendler in his research [Wendler, 2022, p. 5] claims that despite the US return to the international climate regime under Joseph Biden, the country's climate policy still retains its "volatility and fragmentation". Furthermore, there are studies that focus on the differences in the perception of climate threats between Trump and Biden during their administrations, as well as in their climate policies. In his research, Shyam Pandey [Pandey, 2024] examines the differences between Trump's and Biden's climate change speeches. He has found that both presidents use the same frames with different interpretations to argue their climate policies. Moreover, a study by Joey Wolongevicz [Wolongevicz, 2022] also claims that the key difference in the climate policies of the Trump and Biden administrations is Trump's commitment to "nationalist" policies to protect and improve domestic interests, while Biden provides "globalist" policies, seeking to advance American national interests in the international arena through climate policy. Yet, these studies ignore the climate policies of the Biden and Trump administrations towards the EU and how their climate policies affected the relationship between these international relations actors.

Another strand of research examines the idea of the relationship between the US and the EU on the climate issue during the Trump and Biden administrations. Some studies [Mai'a, 2020; Petri & Biedenkopf, 2020] focus on American climate policy during the presidency of Trump and how the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 has affected US-EU relations. The authors argue that even if the EU has responded to these actions with restraint, the relationship between the two actors has weakened. It is noteworthy that these researches examine the state policies and the relationships of actors in the international arena on climate issues through the theory of international regimes. The studies by Joan Villoslada Camps and Angel Saz-Carranza [Camps & Saz-Carranza, 2023] and Don Smith [Smith, 2021] focus on the US-EU relationship on climate issues during the Biden administration. According to them although the US and the EU have had more cooperation during Biden's presidency, the longevity and reliability of these relationships are still in question due to the polarized attitudes of US political parties and some aspects of the Biden administration's climate policies that are causing economic harm to EU companies.

Yet, there are only a few researches that examine US climate policy towards the EU under the Biden administration and its features compared with the Trump presidency. In addition, the idea of using the climate agenda as an economic and soft power tool, which is expected to be one of the features of US climate policy under the Biden administration, is not explored sufficiently. The present studies aim only to determine the main directions of the policies of the two presidents on the climate issue and focus more on issues of continuity of climate policy in the United States. This research aims to close the gap in the literature by identifying the specifics of the US climate policy towards the EU under the Biden administration.

The Peculiarities of Inter-Party Struggle in Shaping German Foreign Policy towards Russia (2021–2023)

Today the fact that outstanding connections in politics, economy and culture between Germany and Russia were destroyed after the start of the special military operation in Ukraine has increased uncertainty in relations between the countries. Political parties are meant to be one of the main actors in the German political system – it tends to be impossible to enter politics without a party membership and the government is formed by a coalition of parties. As the party system is becoming fragmented, it is worth studying the changing balance of power in German parliament and its influence on the foreign policy.

However, scholars tend to undermine the role of political parties, as well as of other inner political actors that are minor to the state, in this process. According to the neoclassical realist theory of international relations, domestic policy and inner situation in a state contribute to the explanation of its approach towards foreign policy [Rose, 1998]. Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro and Steven Lobell consider inner factors (public opinion, legislature, media, groups of interests) as interfering ones, while the influence of the international system still plays the main role [Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016]. From the other side, Fordham argues that inner and external situations form foreign policy of a state in an interactive manner. Moreover, the external situation, jointly with values, influences the interests of the inner actors [Fordham, 2009]. In this sense we can talk about a shift in the German parties' perspectives towards Russia after the start of the special military operation in Ukraine.

A number of studies have focused on the broader issue of the party system of Germany. Ekaterina Timoshenkova examines the period previous to the focus of this research and outlines the role of the former chancellor Angela Merkel in spurring changes that the political system has faced during 2005-2020 [Тимошенкова, 2020]. Correspondingly, Fedor Basov highlights the following trends in the party system of Germany: transformation of a 2,5-party system due to the growing role of the Green party, establishment of the new Left party in 2007 and AfD in 2013, gradual recognition of the Left party by other actors as a possible coalition partner, inner-party struggles in the union of CDU and CSU as well as between wings of AfD and crisis of the two main parties - CDU and SPD [Басов, 2021]. The major conclusion that can be drawn from both studies is that during the first years after the reunification of Germany and Merkel's administration

significant changes in the public political preferences have occurred. They have resulted in the transformation of the German political system.

The evolution of the German policy towards Russia during Angela Merkel's administration from the perspective of the political parties is taken under scrutiny by Dzhemma Petrosyan. Although the Ukrainian crisis 2014 seems to mark a new milestone in relations between Russia and the West, including Germany, the major changes in views of the German political elite were already noticeable after the 2007 Munich speech given by Vladimir Putin, and the 2008 War in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As a result, the vision of politics towards Russia went through changes from strategic partnership in 2009 and partnership for modernisation in 2013 to rivalry in 2016 [Петросян, 2022].

As SPD viewed Russia as an integral part of Europe and a partner of Germany, and CDU was rather more critical, their coalition agreement in 2017 balanced these opinions. The most criticism was raised by The Greens and FDP, due to the prevalence of human rights protection in their core values. On the contrary The Left party and AfD opposed sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, until 2022 all the German parties supported the dialogue with Russia as the most effective mechanism to establish peace and security in Europe. Moreover, the spheres of economy and energy, as well as global problems solutions, have always been the foundation of cooperation between Germany and Russia for most parties [Петросян, 2022].

Correspondingly to these observations Stephanie Hofmann argues that in comparison to the German state policy, parties have diverse views on the foreign policy, that is why they should be considered when the foreign policy is studied. In addition, the researcher regards foreign policy of a party to be rather stable, although values tend to be differently interpreted by various factions in one party, which was demonstrated by a stable main line of each party's views [Hofmann, 2019].

Nonetheless, due to escalation of conflict in Ukraine in 2022 the position of the state and the political parties has shifted to the degradation of relations between two countries and reorientation of German foreign policy [Белов, 2023; Соколов, 2023; Fröhlich, 2023]. It was made evident by the German chancellor through the declaration of *Zeitenwende* (turning point), which contradicted the position of SPD and its adherence to the dialogue with Russia. Likewise, the representative of *Die Linke* party Amira Mohamed Ali confirmed that in contrast to the enacted criticism of NATO politics towards Russia, the current "aggressive war has no excuse" [Plenarprotokoll 20/19]. However, in general the first statements of most parties after the start of the Russian special military operation were in line with election programs presented the year before.

Considering all mentioned above, shaping German foreign policy towards Russia was and still is a matter of debate between inner forces in the German state. Gradual degradation of readiness to cooperate was stimulated by a changing position of Russia in the international system, as

well as by stable values of the German parties. After the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022 the overall position towards Russia seems to become more consolidated among parties. Nevertheless, the issue of the instruments of policy is thorny for German parties as well as for inner-party groups.

Richard Shevkun

Specifics of International Economic Relations of Argentine Republic with The United States of America and The People's Republic of China in the Years 2015–2023

The views on the liberalization of trade are split: while such institutions such as IMF argue that international trade opens up possibilities for faster economic growth, some world leaders, including the president of Argentina from 2019-2023 have voiced their discontent with the current model of international trade [International Monetary Fund, 2001; Fernández, 2023].

Argentina faced a high inflation rate, which made taking effective economic decisions difficult. What is more, in such conditions international investors had become more hesitant in investing into the country [ЯКОВЛЕВ, 2018, P. 14].

Despite that, there were several sectors that seemed to China lucrative enough to invest in. According to the authors of the book *Inversiones de China, Corea y Japón en Argentina (Investments of China, South Korea and Japan in Argentina)*, the share of China's FDI has been increasing as well as there is a shift in the sector of investment – from manufacturing to service economy [Inversiones de China, 2017, P. 17].

In 2023 Ministry of economy of Argentina published a series of reports on foreign capital of the US and the PRC in Argentina. By analyzing the provided reports, we observe that over the past decade, China (PRC) has significantly amplified its mineral imports from Argentina, tripling their value [Ministerio de Economía Argentina, 2023]. In contrast, mineral imports from Argentina to the United States exhibited more modest growth during the same period [Ministerio de Economía Argentina, 2023]. The growing influence of the PRC in South America is evident in Argentina as well. Moreover, Argentina continues to be predominantly perceived by global superpowers as a supplier of raw materials.

Guido D'Angelo and Emilce Terré [D'Angelo & Terré, 2023] highlight that the United States still remain the first country by the investment stock (by value of investment position) in Argentine businesses. Moreover, while products of agriculture represent 63% of Argentina exports to China, in the export to the US their share is below 20%. Thus, exports to the US are more diversified. Foreign economic relations of Argentina are also studied in detail by Iлона Gricenko.

He focuses his research not only on the relations with the US, but also looks at the relations with IMF and analyses whether or not there is a link between decisions made [Гриценко, 2022, с. 219].

Conclusions:

Argentina continued to grow despite its economic problems, although there was no significant change in how the superpowers conducted their trade with the country. Despite that, there are differences in investment and trade behavior between the US and the PRC. Based on the conducted research; it can be concluded that:

- Trade between Argentina and the US and the PRC remains primarily raw materials.
- The role of the PRC in Argentina is growing, which is consistent with a general trend in the region.
- Trade with the US is more diversified, while the PRC is more active in the investment field.
- Administration of Alberto Fernández was more cautious when it comes to FDI, however, it didn't have a significant effect on structure of exports

Anastasia Shestova

The Specifics of Institutional Changes and Transformation of the Agenda in BRICS from 2016 to 2023: Literature Review

The current erosion of multilateralism in International Relations in the form of partial disintegration in the EU, the crisis of traditional institutions, correlates with the ability of BRICS to fill a niche which is in crisis. Amid these events, as well as taking into account the increasing trends of globalization, the study of BRICS activities has become highly relevant. While there has been extensive research on the field of analyzing the prospects of the group, the subject of the group's activities in the context of chaotic International Relations has not been studied enough, especially in the domains different from economy. Furthermore, there is still no consensus in the literature on the status of BRICS.

The historiographical review of the BRICS helps to identify the main areas of research, as well as to trace the evolution of approaches to the issue under study.

It seems logical to start a review from the general — the global infrastructure and the possibility of including new players in it, to the subject of the study, namely, the analysis of literature on the activities of BRICS and the specifics of its institutional changes.

Firstly, many Western experts put forward the idea of the exclusive hegemony of the United States or the West in the formation of a stable system of International Relations and the

impossibility of including non-Western countries. Many scholars [Kapoor, Lewis and Webb, 1997; Woods, 2003; Joyce, 2012; Kindleberger, 2015] have directed their attention to the dominant player as a historically established hegemon who, starting from its economic power, smoothly flows into political one. Such hegemon is guided by its own interests and forms an effective regulatory system in the field of the global economy. However, researchers focus mainly on the economic component and there is practically no research in the field of socio-humanitarian policy and the hegemonic role of the West with quantitative analysis.

The second group of authors points out the idea of the need to reform the system of International Relations and the Bretton Woods system, which is facing an increasing number of risks and challenges as society develops. The studies of Lawrence Summers [Summers, 2015], Christine Lagarde [Lagarde, 2016] and en Clift [Clift, 2018] are equally important. Scientists do not deny the influence of the United States on development in the developing world but wonder whether the organization is fulfilling its mandate to promote sustainable economic growth, raise people out of poverty, prevent or mitigate the effects of crises and instability. However, this research presents little empirical evidence regarding real changes in the field of culture and ecology to show how the conjuncture has changed, moving away from the absolute emphasis on economics and military superiority.

A third, less popular idea which still is open for debate is a new vision for the transformation of the international order. The authors have written that not just reform is needed, but a revolution of consciousness: it is necessary to give more votes to “non-Western” countries, something qualitatively new is needed. Some researchers [Abugre, 1998; Bwalya & Mutula, 2014] offer a new perspective on the study of the interaction between the structure of the global financial system, political institutions and the interests of “non-Western” actors. They affirm that IMF's conditions are too harsh for developing countries and are not adapted to their specific needs. According to Kelvin Bwalya and Stephen Mutula, the West needs to take a step back, giving way to new players, non-governmental organizations, new development banks, new humanitarian aid systems, so as not to aggravate the turbulent system of International Relations [Bwalia, 2014]. A number of Russian studies have found that there are certain formats of global governance in general, which are in crisis and which have been waiting for a player to fill in the gaps for more than a decade [Баталов, 2005; Гаджиев, 2014].

The analysis of the literature on BRICS activities can be divided into two groups. Firstly, many researchers outline opinion that BRICS is only emerging as a player on the international stage and does not yet have much weight as an actor who is able to change something. According to this opinion, some analysts even argue that “BRICS is a mirage if BRICS exist” [Herz & Dutra, 2013], as they believed that the difficulties of formulating a group due to deep geographical,

economic, political and cultural differences prevent the construction of a common identity and goals. A similar idea can be formulated in the research of Ricardo Sennes [Sennes, 2012], who argues that BRICS is unlikely to be able to gain a foothold as an important political player in the international arena, since its components lack political motivation and a specific agenda, because it has changed since its foundation, has become broader.

Russian researchers have also devoted a lot of attention to the problems of BRICS. For instance, Yuriy Davydov [ДАВЫДОВ, 2002] affirms that BRICS is a tool for implementing the member countries' own interests through the prism of an international institution. It is worth noting that considering the possibilities of BRICS as an alternative to the West is underinvestigated in the Russian literature. Scholars pay attention to the inefficiency of institutions such as the IMF and others, suggesting that they should be reformed and given more votes, "expand" justice for developing countries. Nevertheless, no concrete steps are proposed to create alternative institutions during the chaotic global financial architecture.

The second group of researchers point out that BRICS is already a powerful player in the international arena, which has managed to overcome the problems of selfish national interests of the participating countries and act as a single institute with a single broad agenda. The authors of the book *Emerging powers in a comparative perspective* [Emerging powers, 2013] consider BRICS as a new center of influence, building a new multipolar international order, changing the balance of world power. However, Danielle Regina Ullrich and Rosinha Machado Carrion [Ullrich & Machado Carrion, 2014] emphasize that countries that emerged as new developing powers and, having a certain level of economic power, sought greater representativeness and political power. Thus, a new model of international cooperation was created, based on a more egalitarian solidarity relationship dominated by the countries of the South.

Further research is needed on the issue of BRICS activities to understand whether this institution can create an alternative to the West and to analyze the transformation of BRICS agenda.

Ekaterina Shmakova

Domestic Policy Factors in the Formation of US Sanctions Policy Against Russia from 2017 to 2023: Literature Review

The question of the application of sanctions has attracted considerable interest in the last decade due to the United States' increasing use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Compared to other countries and international organizations, the US initiates sanctions more frequently [Hufbauer et al., 2009].

Scholars defined sanctions as an economic instrument of foreign policy imposed by a country, a group of countries, or an international organization against an individual, a legal entity, a state, or a non-state actor to force the object to comply with political requirements [Targeted sanctions, 2016].

Over the past two decades, there has been heated debate among scholars regarding the theoretical framework of sanctions policy. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg [Hufbauer et al., 2009] were among the first to attempt a comprehensive analysis of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool, utilizing a case study approach. However, it is important to note that this study has certain limitations. Firstly, it was conducted during a period when the United States primarily imposed unilateral sanctions on Iran, rather than Russia. Additionally, while the study examined numerous restrictions, the scale and severity of these sanctions cannot be compared to those imposed on the Russian Federation. Consequently, Ivan Timofeev [Тимофеев, 2023], a prominent Russian expert on sanctions policy, criticizes the reliance on individual cases as it restricts the ability to make broader generalizations without considering the context.

Many studies have been conducted to examine the comprehensive effects of sanctions, utilizing different methodologies, and presenting their own findings [Peksen, 2019; Kavaklı, Chatagnier & Hatipoğlu, 2020]. Consequently, the application of sanctions can be simultaneously viewed as effective and ineffective in different studies, resulting in an ongoing controversy among researchers.

Thus, the focus of studies has predominantly been on the consequences of sanctions, particularly their economic impact. However, there is a lack of research exploring the factors that shape the development of sanction policies.

Additionally, when analyzing sanction policies, it is important to consider the achievement of both foreign policy and domestic policy goals. One of the crucial domestic factors that should be considered is lobbying, which can take various forms, including lobbying by diasporas in the United States. According to a study by Jerry Urtuzuastigui [Urtuzuastigui, 2023], lobbyists in Congress and the White House have significant influence over the enactment of laws imposing sanctions.

Finally, few studies have analyzed the perceptions of stakeholders regarding their country's sanction policy. Some attempts have been made to establish a link between decision-making in government bodies and the interests of American society [Smeltz, Wlجتowicz, & Goncharov, 2018]. A report provides an analysis of statistical survey data, revealing that most Americans support the maintenance and strengthening of sanctions pressure (77%) due to Russia's actions in Ukraine and its violation of sovereignty. It is also important to note that this study considers the

political affiliation of respondents. This criterion is crucial to examine how the political polarization between the US parties influences decision-making. However, the strengthening of sanction policy is the only issue where Democrats and Republicans share the same opinion [Jones, 2023]. Thus, sanctions can serve as a consolidating factor in American society.

In conclusion, due to the introduction of new packages of sanctions against Russia by the US, the issue of sanction policy remains highly relevant and is attracting increasing interest. While there has been extensive research on the consequences and effectiveness of sanction pressure, there is a lack of sufficient study on the process of forming sanction policy, specifically the influence of various domestic political factors such as lobbying, public opinion, and the political goals of political parties. Therefore, further research is necessary to fully comprehend the role of domestic factors in shaping sanction policy.

Elena Yakovenko

The role of cultural diplomacy in French politics

The very first approach to the subject of cultural diplomacy and its role in French politics reveals two dimensions of the question: the historical perspective and the modern. Furthermore, a logical question arises: what is cultural diplomacy? How is it different from cultural cooperation, “public diplomacy” or “soft power”? Is it equivalent to Nye’s “soft power” or does “soft power” comprise cultural diplomacy? Where is that theoretical line between the notions?

These theoretical concepts tend to be very vague because they depend a lot on the author, the country to which the notion is applied, the period when it was formulated, but generally, they still cover very close areas. It is more difficult to explain those terms than to recognize them.

It is necessary to begin with the wider term “soft power” that embraces other aforementioned notions. The concept of “soft power” appeared in the 1980s. It was developed and popularized by the American political scientist Joseph Nye. In his *Soft Power* [Nye, 1990], *The Changing Nature of World Power* [Nye, 1990], and *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* [Nye, 2004] Joseph Nye contrasted “soft power” with “hard power”, highlighting that “soft power” is based not on the military potential and strength of the country, but on the ability of the state to make its values and ideas attractive to others. The main goal is to create a positive image of a country, thus persuading others to cooperate and follow your lead.

The integrity and seriousness of the French approach to cultural diplomacy that is a part of “soft power” can be proved by its revision of the term “soft power”. If we look at France in comparison to other countries, for example, Russia, we will see the difference in the attitudes towards

“soft power” on the state level. In the official political discourse, Russia uses the American term but differs American “soft power” from the general term “soft power”. However, France does not follow the Russian example considering the term highly politicized and creates its own term “diplomacy of influence” with a very similar meaning.

According to Programme n° 185 [Diplomatie culturelle et d’influence], “diplomacy of influence” is regarded as an essential part of French foreign policy and focuses on 4 main goals: the promotion of the French language; strengthening the attractiveness of the territory, higher education and research; the promotion of culture; economic and tourist development. Consequently, cultural diplomacy is a fragment of the diplomacy of influence.

According to Oliver Bennett [Cultural Diplomacy, 2020] and Simon Mark [Mark, 2009], cultural diplomacy is an integral part of public diplomacy, which is a term used to describe a country's actions, the policy aimed at forming its positive and appealing image in the international arena and mainly fostering favorable perception among the citizens of the other states. In those cases where it is done with the help of cultural products, instruments, and institutions the term cultural diplomacy is usually used. Although the term itself is quite new, it appeared in the 1950s in the USA, all non-violent actions of states aimed at gaining the trust of others through culture, such as gifts, cultural events, exhibitions, and cultural and educational exchanges — all that can be classified as cultural diplomacy.

Cultural diplomacy is one of the main pillars of French policy. Regardless of some minor setbacks (for example, the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, when cultural diplomacy experienced a noticeable decline [Косенко, 2014]), the overall French approach to cultural diplomacy has remained unchanged throughout history. Cultural diplomacy is one of the country’s oldest instruments. Furthermore, cultural diplomacy abroad has a longer history and was initially developed with greater attention than cultural diplomacy within the country [Kessler, 1999].

Another example of France's commitment to cultural diplomacy is that France was one of the first countries that created a vast network of governmental and non-governmental institutions responsible for conducting cultural diplomacy. Besides, the funds allocated to Programme n° 185 gradually increase from year to year. The number of tools and instruments at the disposal of France is impressive: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of Culture, Alliance française, Francophonie, Institut français, Campus France, Expertise France, UniFrance, France Media Monde, TV5 Monde, Agence France-Presse, Film France, The Agency for French Education Abroad, etc. These institutions allow France to disseminate its cultural influence all over the world in all possible forms and ways. Furthermore, cultural diplomacy’s significance was repeatedly emphasized on the official level. On the one hand, culture is perceived as a common good, which can become a solid foundation for dialogue between France and other countries. On the other hand, it is seen

as a key to spreading the country's influence and maintaining its presence all over the world, for example, in Africa. It is important to note that the role and positioning of French cultural diplomacy in relation to Africa has undergone serious changes. First of all, it has faced a serious threat of being viewed as France's attempt to promote neocolonialism. One of the first cultural institutes was Alliance française whose main goal was to spread its influence in French colonies. Even though it had been realized in the form of education and dissemination of the language, the main goal was still propaganda of French cultural dominance [Chaubet, 2004]. In the second part of the 20th century, France shifted the focus from its colonial past to a new model that was eventually incarnated in 1970 in Francophone — an organization for multilateral cooperation. That was the country's remedy to that sensitive problem.

France's cultural diplomacy plays a significant role in its politics and is seen as a valuable competitive advantage in the international arena. French cultural diplomacy is a very flexible and adjustable tool that has a detailed strategy, pursues clear goals and can be regarded as a role model for the international community.

Mikhail Yakovlev

Application of the concept of energy diplomacy to Argentina in 1989–2012

Recently, energy diplomacy studies have been of increasing interest to the academic community; yet the term “energy diplomacy” itself is ambiguous and requires conceptualization. One of the definitions was proposed by Anna Herranz-Surrallés in his study of EU energy diplomacy. He defines energy diplomacy as a set of government policies aimed at achieving energy security and promoting national interests [Herranz-Surrallés, 2016]. However, this definition does not define energy security. A number of scholars address this issue, from which one of the most prominent researchers is Stanislav Zhiznin (MGIMO University), who defines it as the long-term, reliable, and economically viable provision of energy resources for sustainable social and economic development [Жизнин, 2010].

Latin America is of particular interest in this context. After the construction of the first power lines between Argentina and Chile in the 1970s, which is used for electricity exports, researchers began to study the reasons and consequences of such bilateral agreements, noting that regardless of secondary motives, ensuring and maintaining energy security is the main goal for all parties involved [Moneta, 1984]. However, the rise of the neoliberal government of Carlos Menem in Argentina and the subsequent radical liberalization of the energy sector, which included the privatization of the country's national energy company YPF, gave rise to new ideas. It was suggested

that this process was part of a global shift from “security-based” to “cooperation-based” policies, a global transition from realism to liberalism [Hufty, 1996, p. 219–240]. Supporters of this idea question the very possibility of using the terms “energy policy” and “energy diplomacy”. Marina Recalde, a professor at the National Southern University (Buenos Aires), argues that due to the insignificant state participation in this sector in the 1990s, there was no actual state energy policy, and the actions of actors in the energy sector were determined solely by economic factors [Recalde, 2011].

The default in Argentina in 2001 and the subsequent “left turn” in Argentine politics showed that such changes were temporary [Salama, 2012]; in this context, constructivist approaches gained popularity. Some researchers concluded that the reason lay in the subjectivity of individual administrations [Stone, 2010], and claimed that Argentina's energy policy and, consequently, its energy diplomacy, depended on the political orientation of the government and other short-term factors [Яковлев, 2005].

The next stage of the country's energy policy was the presidency of Néstor Kirchner. Noteworthy for the analysis of the actions of this administration is the application of the securitization theory by María Almudena Cabezas Gonzalez, who argues that the issue of energy security became securitized during this period [Cabezas González, 2010, p. 325]. The culmination of the securitization process can be considered to have happened during the administration of Cristina Kirchner, whose policy goal was to achieve “energy sovereignty” [Яковлева и Яковлев, 2012]. Any external influence on the country's energy sector was perceived as a threat to “energy sovereignty”: the main consequence of this was the nationalization of YPF corporation in 2012, albeit with a small compensation. This action was economically disadvantageous: foreign direct investments decreased from \$15.3bn to \$5.1bn. This decrease of 66.7% ultimately became one of the reasons of the 2014 default. Nevertheless, the political goal was achieved.

It can be seen that the country's energy diplomacy is highly volatile, and while liberal administration's view energy diplomacy mostly as a part of economic policy, pursuing economic goals with it, left-wing governments use this tool to achieve political goals. Hence the analysis of these processes through the prism of the concept of energy diplomacy can make the comparison of energy policies of different historical periods more objective, even though it has certain limitations.

Ekaterina Yaroslavskaya

The Specifics of Diplomatic Relations and Trade and Economic Policy of Turkey towards Iran During the Presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdogan

During the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, economic relations, trade and economic policy of Turkey in relations with Iran are characterized by the interaction of political geopolitical, economic and cultural factors. This study aims to explore the intricacies of Turkey's foreign policy toward Iran, with an emphasis on how Ankara managed its relationship with Tehran in the face of regional constraints, international constraints, and changing alliances. The study will analyze bilateral trade agreements, energy partnerships and economic initiatives taken by Turkey to maintain balanced relations with Iran. Using varied and quantitative data, including trade volumes, agreed correspondence and policy documents, the policy framework adheres to the strategic objectives behind Turkey's approach to Iran. The study will also look at the influence of external factors such as US external political factors and the Syrian conflict on Turkey-Iran relations. Through a comprehensive analysis, this study intends to provide insight into the dynamics of regional politics in the East and contribute to the understanding of how states manage the mechanisms of bilateral relations in a changing surface landscape.

A wide range of scholarly works address the geopolitical changes that are shaping the relationship between Turkey and Iran. A number of researchers carry out a detailed analysis of the ways in which these states overcome possible territorial and ideological contradictions, finding common points for cooperation in ensuring regional stability and economic progress [Uygur, 2017, p. 5; Lindenstrauss & Shine, 2016]. Their work highlights the importance of multilateral diplomatic efforts in which Turkey and Iran actively act as mediators aimed at resolving conflicts and building mutual trust among Middle Eastern states. This research approach illuminates the subtleties of the relationship between Turkey and Iran, indicating that shared strategic goals often trump historical competition.

The literature review also focuses on economic relations and trade between Turkey and Iran. Researchers delve into the study of the economic aspects of diplomatic interaction between the two countries, paying special attention to the energy partnership and trade ties as fundamental factors of their cooperation. This body of literature examines Turkey's desire to maintain active economic relations with Iran despite international restrictions, and examines how such policies affect regional economic conditions and global market dynamics. The analyses presented offer a nuanced understanding of the economic motivations driving Turkey's foreign policy towards Iran, emphasizing the strategic importance of maintaining a balanced relationship.

The consequences of international sanctions on Iran and Turkey's strategy to overcome them are an important topic in research. The works of scientists study the position of Turkey, which seeks to reconcile its economic interests with Iran in accordance with international sanctions [Lindenstrauss, 2018; Crosston, 2014; Bhat, 2016]. These studies reveal the cultural arts that Turkey

uses to mitigate negative consequences in its relations with Iran, as well as critical understanding of the complex balancing process between global norms and national interests.

Moreover, academic discussions focus on the domestic politics of Turkey's foreign policy towards Iran. The studies analyze how Erdogan's political ideology and domestic imperatives shape Turkey's constitutional position in relations with Iran [International Crisis Group, 2016]. This analysis reveals a deep relationship between Turkey's continental context and its ongoing security efforts, concluding that underlying factors may weigh more heavily in foreign policy orientations.

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(на английском языке)

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