

HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

**RESEARCH ISSUES
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND REGIONAL STUDIES:
materials of the research seminar**

Working Paper WP21/2026/01
Series WP21
International Relations and Regional Studies

Moscow
2026

Editor of the Series WP21
“International Relations and Regional Studies”

Ivan Krivushin

Collective of authors:

Egor Butorin, Aliya Gaifulina, Ekaterina Grekova, Igor Demin, Iuliia Domnikova, Darya Zhilnikova, Yulia Zenokhova, Maxim Ivanov, Ekaterina Ivanova, Madina Kalendarova, Polina Kolba, Dmitry Kononov, Anastasia Maximova, Alina Nurimanova, Nikolai Perminov, Viacheslav Rachkovskiy, Alexandra Sergeeva, Alina Sidorova, Daniil Tverdov, Anna Trifonova, Anastasiia Frolovskaia, Matvej Chulanov, Josyph Shangaraev

Research Issues in International Relations and Regional Studies [Electronic resource]: Working Paper WP21/2026/01 / E. Butorin et al.; HSE University. – Electronic text data (900 Kb). – Moscow: HSE Publishing House, 2026. – 54 p. (Series WP21 “International Relations and Regional Studies”).

The preprint presents research results (primarily in the field of historiography) produced by young scholars from the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the Higher School of Economics (Moscow) within the framework of the research seminar “Research in International Relations: Academic Track”.

Keywords: International Relations, Regional studies, foreign policy, security, cooperation

© Authors, 2026

CONTENTS

- Egor Butorin*. From Normative Power to a Geopolitical Player: The Transformation of EU policy in the South Caucasus... 4
- Aliya Gaifulina*. Jair Bolsonaro and the course of Brazil–Argentina relations: an analysis through the prism of polyheuristic theory and “prospect theory”... 5
- Ekaterina Grekova*. Evolution of the Defence Initiatives in the EU from 1998 to 2016... 7
- Igor Demin*. Evolution of U.S. policy towards South Africa in 2017–2025: Literature Review... 9
- Iuliia Domnikova*. Key Stages in the Evolution of Global AI Regulation... 10
- Darya Zhilnikova*. Evolution of EU migration policy towards Colombia between 2015 and 2025: Literature Review... 12
- Yulia Zenokhova*. Role of the Flower Industry in the Economic Diplomacy of Ecuador and Colombia in 2010–2025... 13
- Maxim Ivanov*. Factors of ASEAN states BRICS integration 2022–2025: Literature Review... 15
- Ekaterina Ivanova*. Evolution des Diskurses deutscher ordoliberaler Expertenakteure zu den Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrisen der Eurozone und den Maßnahmen zu deren Überwindung in den Jahren 2010–2024: Literaturüberblick... 17
- Madina Kalendarova*. Geopolitical Factors in the Implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative Infrastructure Projects in Central Asia in 2013–2025... 18
- Polina Kolba*. Main Features of the Symbolic Policy in Ukraine towards Poland in 2014–2019... 19
- Dmitry Konovalov*. Main stages and a brief description of the emergence of the EAOC (1923–1945)... 21
- Anastasia Maximova*. Evolution of the Discourse on New Caledonian Status in French Media in 2018–2025: Literature Review... 23
- Alina Nurimanova*. Exploring the Evolving Taiwanese-Caribbean Cooperation, 2004–2025: Literature Review... 24
- Nikolai Perminov*. Role of CBP and ICE in Migration Policy during Donald Trump’s First Term... 25
- Viacheslav Rachkovskiy*. El impacto de la integración en el desarrollo económico de los países de la comunidad andina... 27
- Alexandra Sergeeva*. Transformation of the Concept of “Strategic Autonomy” for the European Union in France's Foreign Policy Discourse (2017–2025): Literature review... 29
- Alina Sidorova*. Chinese Official Discourse on the “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” Concept: Literature Review... 30
- Daniil Tverdov*. Características generales de la cooperación energética entre Chile y la UE entre los años 2002 y 2015... 32
- Anna Trifonova*. Japan and India Bilateral Security Cooperation (2022–2025). Evolution of Official Foreign Policy Discourses: Literature review... 34
- Anastasiia Frolovskaia*. Securitisation of EU Climate and Energy Policy in Italian Party Discourses in 2022–2025... 36
- Matvej Chulanov*. Specifics of US Foreign Security Policy Toward Japan under the Joseph Biden Administration... 38
- Josyph Shangaraev*. Structural changes in the global and Russian gas architecture after 2022... 39
- References... 42

*From Normative Power to a Geopolitical Player: The Transformation
of EU policy in the South Caucasus*

The South Caucasus has traditionally held an important place in the architecture of European security. The interests of global and regional actors – Russia, the EU, the USA, China, Turkey, and Iran – intersect in this small region. The high level of conflicts and the buffer position of the South Caucasus explain the sustained research interest in it. The study of European Union policy is particularly relevant in connection with the development of integration processes and the prospects for the Union's enlargement. The specific nature of the implementation of Brussels' instruments in the context of post-Soviet states, where similar mechanisms produce different effects, deserves special attention [Evropeiskij soyuz, 2015].

Over the past decade, the European Union's policy in the South Caucasus has undergone a transformation. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards Armenia and Georgia has evolved from a "soft power" instrument into a more pragmatic approach based on security and geopolitical interests. The key driver of these changes was the inability to ignore the growing geopolitical competition in the region [Pchaladze, 2025].

Initially, the ENP followed two different trajectories for the development of relations. For Armenia, cooperation evolved from a technical cooperation to an expanded partnership agreement. However, the turning point came when Armenia publicly questioned the effectiveness of CSTO security guarantees [Perelman, 2024]. This triggered a rapid reorientation of Yerevan's foreign policy. In contrast, Georgia, which has long been considered a consistent ally by the EU, entered a phase of deteriorating relations after a period of intense rapprochement [Tsuladze, 2023]. Tbilisi's visible distancing from anti-Russian sanctions and the slowdown of European integration processes have led to the restoration of conditionality. In the summer of 2025, Georgia experienced protests caused precisely by a sense of strategic ambiguity and democratic backlash, which contrasted sharply with the pro-European movement in neighboring Armenia. The countries' diverging paths confirmed the EU's new approach: prioritizing substantive reforms over declarations.

By 2025, it can be argued that the ENP has finally ceased to be exclusively a policy of reform and promotion of democracy. Under the influence of external challenges, the focus has shifted to strengthening the EU's resilience [Pascariu, 2025]. The core of this "turn to security" was the integration of the resilience agenda into all aspects of interaction.

A key stage in the institutionalization was the publication of the Eastern Partnership Index [Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2025], which made it possible to more clearly track the progress of countries in adapting to European standards. The EU's financial and technical

assistance, as well as intensified security dialogues, became the tools with which Brussels tried to compensate for its limited role as a security provider. Despite the intensification, by 2025 the EU has not been able to completely replace the traditional security mechanisms. Reliance on "soft power" proved insufficient to gain support and establish lasting influence.

The academic novelty of this research is determined by the following factors: the insufficient study of the evolution of European Union policy towards Armenia and Georgia in the period 2014–2025. In contrast to the previous stage, this time frame, which includes the post-Crimean period, the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the beginning of the special military operation, remains fragmentarily represented in the research literature. Moreover, in contrast to the dominant approaches that focus on the effectiveness of EU policy and mechanisms of conditionality, this study examines the ENP as a form of building hierarchical relations and constructing a regional order.

Thus, the EU's policy in the South Caucasus is still a mechanism for encouraging reforms on the one hand, and a tough instrument for containing and managing crises on the other. The future of the region will now be determined by how effectively the EU can combine its new geopolitical role with the fundamental values that it continues to promote when faced with the harsh reality of this conflict-ridden region.

Aliya Gaifulina

***Jair Bolsonaro and the course of Brazil–Argentina relations:
an analysis through the prism of polyheuristic theory and “prospect theory”***

In 2019, the centre-left candidate A. Fernández won the presidential election in Argentina. Brazil's far-right leader J. Bolsonaro faced the question of how to shape interaction between the states. In the situation of ideological divide, he chose a strategy of aggressive criticism and “freezing” of relations that could be clearly observed until mid-2021 [Shcherbakova, 2022, p. 95].

This article analyses the process of how J. Bolsonaro chose the course of Brazil-Argentina interaction in 2019 through the prism of polyheuristic theory (by A. Mintz and N. Geva) and “prospect theory” (by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky).

First stage of the analysis: polyheuristic theory

Initially, it is necessary to identify the alternatives that J. Bolsonaro could adopt:

A. **“Radically pragmatic strategy”** implies the prioritisation of cooperation; in the case of ideological difference, it requires compromising on almost all points of programme, demonstrating a high political flexibility.

This scenario fits better with ideological convergence, e.g. J. Bolsonaro's dialogue with M. Macri [Bourdin & Pucci, 2023, p. 35–37].

B. “**Moderately pragmatic strategy**” assumes minor ideological tensions and a decrease of political cooperation, but also maintains the level of trade and economic interaction.

This scenario is well suited for use by the right in situations of ideological disagreement; e.g. M. Macri used it during his interaction with D. Rousseff [Bourdin & Pucci, 2023, p. 23–27].

C. “**Moderately ideological strategy**” implies the maintenance of the partnership at a minimum viable level; rhetoric may be aggressive, political cooperation degrades significantly, trade stagnates or declines.

This scenario was ultimately implemented. It was characterized by harsh rhetoric [Kartashov, 2019; Bolsonaro, 2019] and the spread of disinformation [Dos Santos, Fatos & Ribeiro, 2022], as well as a wide range of disagreements (on MERCOSUR, relations with the US and China, nuclear cooperation, etc.) [Doval & Merke, 2022] and trade decline [Resultados, 2026].

D. “**Radically ideological strategy**” is characterized by a complete or partial interruption of cooperation and/or a severing of ties.

This scenario corresponds, for example, to J. Bolsonaro’s approach to N. Maduro consisted of the stop of Venezuela’s membership in MERCOSUR, the withdrawal of Brazilian diplomatic staff, the recognition of H. Guaidó, etc. [Esteves, 2024, p. 594–597]. In relations with Argentina, the possibility of this scenario was hinted at several statements (e.g., threats of expulsion from MERCOSUR [Bolsonaro, 2019]).

Given J. Bolsonaro’s populism and the circumstances of his rise to power [Okuneva, 2018], the most significant **political constraints** for him in this situation could be:

- **Loss of support among the electorate**, e.g., due to a failure to fulfill pre-election promises;
- **Opposition from lobby groups**, consisting of the military, agribusiness and evangelicals (“biblia, boi e bala” or BBB lobby);
- **Unacceptable reputation damage** in cases of demonstration of weakness, etc.

Based on these constraints, the noncompensatory elimination was exercised and the following alternatives were weeded out:

- Alternative A, as it requires J. Bolsonaro to demonstrate the level of flexibility bordering on political spinelessness and could lead to reputational damage;
- Alternative D, as it faces opposition from lobbies (business and the military) [Fausto & Markwald, 2020, p. 32].

In the second stage of decision-making, alternatives B and C remain. The choice could be based on J. Bolsonaro’s knowledge and values (lack of economic understanding [Ribeiro & Scrivano, 2018], pro-US stance, etc.), his personal traits, and so on. This article examines it from the perspective of the psychology of loss.

Second stage of the analysis: “prospect theory”

The status quo from which J. Bolsonaro psychologically departs involves the ideological convergence and experience of successful cooperation with M. Macri. With the election of A. Fernández, an analysis of the risks of each scenario is needed.

Alternative B involves a slight deterioration in political cooperation and maintenance of the maximum possible level of trade (minor losses in cooperation), but requires softening rhetoric in radicalized society [Okuneva, 2018] (risk of reputational losses).

Simultaneously, Alternative C is characterized by greater deterioration in relations across all spheres (moderate losses in cooperation), while it also offers the opportunity to exploit the contrast with a centre-left politician (potential increase of electoral support) [Fausto & Markwald, 2020, p. 31].

The inevitability of losses in cooperation creates a situation in which J. Bolsonaro’s behavior becomes risky. Since trade cooperation with Argentina is not a priority for him [Soares, 2018], the difference between the scenarios in this aspect is minimal. Conversely, in terms of rhetoric, alternative B is perceived as a loss, while alternative C is seen as a risky gain. Thus, J. Bolsonaro seeks to avoid losing electoral support and chooses the “moderately ideological strategy”.

Jair Bolsonaro’s choice of approach to interaction with Argentina in 2019 was complex. The decision-making process was based both on his personal characteristics and on a “cold calculation” of the potential losses and gains in each scenario. For his political objectives, the chosen strategy was optimal.

Ekaterina Grekova

Evolution of the Defence Initiatives in the EU from 1998 to 2016

The formalization of the concept of “strategic autonomy” in the 2016 EU Global Strategy is often seen as a turning point in the development of European defence integration. This document was the result of a long evolutionary process from 1998 to 2016. This article traces this development through four key stages, from a largely declaratory project to an increasingly institutionalized framework.

The first phase (1998–1999) marked the institutional launch of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Franco-British conference in Saint-Malo in 1998 is considered to be the beginning of the European defence project. In a joint declaration, both states announced that Europe needs reliable armed forces and a well-established system of CFSP to respond to new crises

[Rutten, 2001, p. 8]. The 1999 Cologne and Helsinki summits advanced CFSP institutionalization, establishing new organizational structures and developing the concept of a European rapid reaction force [Zhurkin, 2001, p. 57].

The second stage (2000–2007) is characterized by the development of CFSP institutions and of the first EU missions. For example, in 2003 the EU deployed a military mission in Macedonia [EEAS. European Union Military Operation CONCORDIA, 2003] and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [EEAS. ARTEMIS, 2003].

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was also adopted in 2003. The ESS is a basic document that includes the goals and objectives of the CFSP [Andryushin, 2015, p. 100]. As a continuation of the ESS, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) were established, respectively in 2004 and in 2007 [Michaels & Sus, 2025, p. 62].

The third stage (2007–2009) of the development of security initiatives in the EU is their legal consolidation in the EU treaties. The Lisbon Treaty formalized and expanded the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the EU's defence policy by establishing the High Representative, introducing the legal basis for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and expanding crisis management tasks, while also introducing a mutual defence clause. However, it preserved the intergovernmental nature of CFSP by retaining unanimous voting for most decisions and explicitly affirming that member states' obligations under NATO must be respected [Consolidated Version, 2012, art. 42–46].

The fourth stage (2010–2016) was marked by the EU's adaptation to new security challenges, with a series of major crises acting as catalysts for defence integration. The financial crisis reduced national defence budgets [European Parliament. European defence, 2013], while the Ukrainian crisis reshaped Europe's threat perceptions. Political shifts, including the 2016 Brexit referendum and Donald Trump's election, which raised concerns in Europe regarding the future reliability of US security commitments [Euronews, 2016], further accelerated EU initiatives toward greater defence autonomy.

In response to new challenges, the EU launched several defence initiatives, including the 2010 Pooling and Sharing programme [European Defence Agency, 2011] and a 2013 defence summit [European Parliament. December summit, 2013]. The 2016 European Defence Action Plan, prepared by the European Commission, proposed greater investment and a single defence market [European Commission, 2016]. This period culminated in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, which formally introduced the concept of “strategic autonomy”.

In conclusion, the evolution of EU defence initiatives between 1998 and 2016 reveals that the emergence of strategic autonomy as a formal objective in the 2016 Global Strategy represented a

gradual process of institutional and policy development. Throughout this period, the Union succeeded in constructing an institutional architecture of EU defence policy and developing cooperation frameworks, while deliberately preserving the intergovernmental character of decision-making in security and defence matters.

Igor Demin

Evolution of U.S. policy towards South Africa in 2017–2025: Literature Review

The topic of U.S.-South Africa relations in the post-colonial period has been considered in both domestic and foreign literature.

The primary focus of researchers analyzing U.S. policy toward South Africa is on the direct influence of the political context on Washington-Pretoria relations. Thus, Carroll [2017], Kohnert [2025], Hartley and Mills [2025], Farrell [2025], Erasmus and Hartzenberg [2025], Ubi [2025], Istomin [2025], and Parkhomenko [2019, c. 9] identify a number of factors that fundamentally shape the dynamics of relations between the two countries. Researchers largely agree in perceiving that the U.S. view of South Africa as a secondary partner, whose actions in the political sphere must be coordinated with its perceived dominant partner. The main disruptions in Washington-Pretoria relations arise against the backdrop of Pretoria's lack of alignment with Washington on key U.S. issues: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the protection of property rights for white Afrikaner farmers, the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, as well as the intensification of ties with China and South Africa's BRICS membership. These issues intensified during the Trump administrations, as described in articles by Kohnert [2025], Erasmus and Hartzenberg [2025], Hartley and Mills [2025], Parkhomenko [2019, p. 9], and Istomin [2025]. Pretoria's divergent political stance from Washington initially threatened the country's financial aid program. However, under what some analysts call «Trump 2.0», South Africa faced the risk of losing its U.S. financial assistance, while AGOA trade preferences came under political pressure through the imposition of tariffs. The focus of these studies often overlooks the comprehensive impact of South Africa's «non-alignment» policy on bilateral spheres: energy, trade and economic (including investment), healthcare relations, etc. Moreover, works frequently examine only the Trump tenure, neglecting the Biden administration.

U.S. policy toward South Africa is typically analyzed within the broader U.S. strategy for Africa. Urnov [2019, 2022, 2024] describe strategic planning by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, but the analysis is limited to comparisons between strategies, politicians' speeches, and budget statistics but they do not fully trace the evolution of U.S. policy toward South Africa from 2017 to 2025 across three administrations. The author highlights key American policy

tools in Tropical Africa: USAID assistance, AFRICOM activities, and the vital AGOA program for boosting trade and investment ties.

Urnov [2019] notes continuity in Trump's first-term strategy through the «continuation, affirmation, and expansion» of pre-existing initiatives like «Young African Leaders», «African Women's Entrepreneurship» and «Power Africa». Trump's approach was pragmatic: emphasizing financial returns, building policy tools, downplaying democracy and human rights, and reviving Marshall Plan principles («aid must bring benefits»). South Africa receives episodic treatment, noted mainly for its continental importance to the U.S.

In his articles on Biden administration, Urnov [2022, 2024] points to intensified continental engagement: the «US Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa», U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, increased investments, and a return to democratization and human rights rhetoric. Positive dynamics and masking business interests behind a «screen» of human rights were partly driven by the Democratic Party's electoral base, including African Americans with African ties. Washington-Pretoria relations are examined with emphasis on politicization (South Africa's loyalty to China and de facto support for Russia in Ukraine).

U.S. policy toward South Africa and Tropical Africa has been studied by both domestic and foreign researchers. Despite this, existing scholarship lacks the component of relations evolution of U.S. policy from 2017–2025 in trade and economic, politico-diplomatic relations, humanitarian and healthcare cooperation and the energy sector. Many works focus on the influence of political aspects on Pretoria-Washington relations, overlooking broader development trends. Thus, the current study will fill the gap in examining the evolution of U.S. policy toward South Africa across three administrations: the first Trump administration, the Biden administration, and the second Trump administration. This research gap will also be addressed through comprehensive analysis of politico-diplomatic, trade-economic, energy, and humanitarian relations as components of Washington's overall policy toward Pretoria.

Iuliia Domnikova

Key Stages in the Evolution of Global AI Regulation

The rapid development of AI has intensified academic discussions about the need for global regulation. Scholefield et al. [2025] argue that most documents are based largely on voluntary commitments and lack effective enforcement mechanisms which limits their ability to prevent potential risks associated with AI development. Similar concerns are expressed by Cihon et al. [2020], who describe global AI regulation as a dilemma between centralized and decentralized governance models. Ho et al. [2023] propose several institutional models for regulating AI

development, including a Commission on Frontier AI and an Advanced AI Governance Organization. Together, these studies highlight concerns about the limited effectiveness of current regulations and the lack of consensus on future institutional design.

Stages of the Evolution of AI Regulation

One of the first arenas where issues related to AI emerged was the UN. In 2013, States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) placed LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems) on their agenda. Over the next several years, expert meetings were organized within the CCW framework. In 2016, this process led to the establishment of an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS [Dig Watch, 2025]. This became one of the earliest attempts to structure international dialogue on AI-related technologies.

At the same time, governments began to pay increasing attention to the broader implications of artificial intelligence. In 2016, the US released a document addressing AI development [White House, 2016]. In the same year, China identified AI as a strategic priority in its Five-Year Plan [Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC, 2016].

The following period, covering 2017—2018, was marked by a rapid expansion of national strategies. Several countries adopted national AI strategies, including China [State Council of the PRC, 2017], France [Business France, 2018], and Germany [Federal Government, 2018]. At this stage, however, regulatory approaches were largely domestic.

A significant step toward international cooperation occurred in 2019 with the publication of the OECD Principles on AI [OECD, 2019]. Although not legally binding, the document reflects a shared understanding of responsible AI use. The adoption of the OECD Principles marked a new stage characterized by the institutionalization of global AI governance norms in the form of soft law.

Further progress took place in 2020, when the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) was launched with the support of the OECD. Today, GPAI brings together more than 30 member countries and expert groups, which develop policy recommendations [OECD, 2024].

In 2023, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue released a summary of the Forum on Critical and Emerging Technologies. The participants highlighted cybersecurity, space commercialization, and the need for closer AI cooperation as key concerns [NESA Center, 2023].

In 2023 and 2024, two international declarations were adopted. These were the Bletchley Declaration [UK Government, 2023] and the Seoul Declaration [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024]. The first focuses on risk management and the strengthening of coordination, whereas the second places greater emphasis on cooperation in addressing global challenges through an inclusive approach.

In 2024, the EU adopted the AI Act, which became the first regional regulatory document in the form of hard law. It introduced provisions prohibiting certain AI practices, defined the responsibilities of AI users and developers, established certification and monitoring mechanisms [Official Journal of the EU, 2024]. The regulation is binding for EU member states.

Thus, the evolution of AI regulation can be divided into several stages, beginning with a fragmented understanding of the problem in 2013—2016. A key turning point occurred in 2019 with the adoption of the OECD Principles on AI. National regulation continued to develop, which, in turn, contributed to multilateral initiatives such as GPAI. At present, global AI regulation remains at an early stage and is predominantly characterized by soft law instruments.

Darya Zhilnikova

Evolution of EU migration policy towards Colombia between 2015 and 2025:

Literature Review

The study of migration from Colombia to the EU and the regulation of this process by the EU requires understanding which aspects have already been studied. Therefore, this article provides a review of the works and conclusions produced by both Russian and international scholars.

The **first group** of studies devoted to the general theories of international migration. At the systemic level, migration policy is often analyzed through the lens of neoliberal institutionalist theory. R. Keohane emphasizes the possibilities and benefits of international cooperation through institutions [Keohane, 1984]. The externalization of migration policy is considered part of the broader concept of external governance: the diffusion of EU norms and practices to third countries occurs through association agreements, cooperation programs, and other mechanisms of interaction, as noted by S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig [Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 791–812]. Russian scholars such as Delovarova, Mishchuk and Potemkina also emphasize the interdisciplinary nature of migration studies, although they explain migration processes differently — through transformations of the international system, development processes, or political dynamics [Delovarova & Mishchuk, 2018; Potemkina, 2008].

The **second group** includes studies examining EU migration policy. It is noted that EU policy is based on a combination of legal regulation, integration policy, and measures to combat irregular migration, with a gradual strengthening of the supranational level following the Lisbon Treaty [Thomson, 2015, p. 29–52]. Russian researchers also note the increase in migration flows in Europe and highlight the influence of historical and socio-economic factors on migration flows [Zhitin, Krasnov & Shendrik, 2016, p. 75–92]. At the same time, the literature reflects an ongoing debate about the nature of migration crises: Fine and Thiollet interpret the events of 2015 as a

crisis of governance [Fine & Thiollet, 2020], whereas Bistrina and Kungurtsev emphasize institutional problems related to the distribution of responsibilities among EU member states [Bistrina, 2019, p. 49–57; Kungurtsev, 2024, p. 164–169].

The **third group** of studies examines migration processes in Latin America. Researchers note that contemporary mobility patterns in the region combine emigration to developed countries, internal migration, and significant intra-regional flows [Bogatyreva & Krapivnitskaya, 2025, p. 303–331]. Diego Acosta and Luisa Feline Freier highlight that migration governance in South America increasingly operates at the regional level and often relies on relatively liberal legal frameworks emphasizing migrants' rights. At the same time, they point to a gap between liberal discourse and restrictive practices, which they describe as a “reversed liberal paradox” [Acosta & Freier, 2017, p. 69–85].

The **fourth group** includes studies on cooperation between the EU and Latin American countries. Several authors, including Novitskij and Kosevich agree that EU–Latin America interaction is built around political dialogue, economic assistance, and development programs [Novitskij, 2019, p. 54–58; Kosevich, 2023, p. 114–129]. Nadezhda Kudeyarova emphasizes the role of historical and colonial ties in shaping migration to Europe [Kudeyarova, 2018, p. 131–145]. Particular attention is also paid to the impact of the Venezuelan migration crisis: Dmitry Rosenthal with co-authors demonstrate that it significantly altered the migration structure of the region, making Colombia one of the key destinations for migrants [Rozenhal et al., 2021]. However, studies of Colombian migration to the EU remain limited and largely focus on earlier periods [Bermúdez Torres, 2006], indicating that the contemporary stage of migration processes remains insufficiently studied.

The literature review reveals two main gaps. Firstly, most of the studies of EU migration management are devoted to crisis situations. Secondly, Colombia was not considered as a separate example of EU migration management. Thus, it is necessary to conduct a separate study of the Colombian case.

Yulia Zenokhova

***The Role of the Flower Industry in the Economic Diplomacy
of Ecuador and Colombia in 2010–2025***

In contemporary international relations, the economic dimension of foreign policy has become increasingly significant. Competition between states increasingly extends beyond the political and military spheres to include trade, investment, and technological development. Under these conditions, governments seek to support national companies in international markets, increase exports,

and strengthen their positions in the global economy. One of the key instruments used to achieve these goals is economic diplomacy, which combines diplomatic mechanisms with tools of foreign economic policy [Baranai, 2009; Okano-Heijmans, 2011].

For many Latin American countries, exports have long been a key driver of economic development. Historically, the region relied heavily on the export of raw materials and a limited number of agricultural commodities. However, since the late twentieth century, academic and policy discussions have increasingly emphasized the need to diversify export structures and develop new sectors. Against this backdrop, particular attention has been given to non-traditional exports – products outside the historically dominant export sectors [Iizuka & Gebreeyesus, 2017]. Since the early 2010s, the development of such sectors has attracted growing interest in both academic literature and economic policy in Latin America. One of the most notable examples of a successful non-traditional export industry is the flower sector. Ecuador and Colombia have become among the world's leading exporters of cut flowers, benefiting from favourable climatic conditions, developed production infrastructure, and active government support. As a result, floriculture has evolved into a highly competitive export-oriented industry [Guaita-Pradas et al., 2023].

The flower industry also occupies an increasingly visible place in the external economic policies of Ecuador and Colombia. The promotion of floral products in international markets often involves state institutions, diplomatic missions, trade promotion agencies, and industry associations. In this context, the sector functions not only as an important part of the national economy but also as a component of broader foreign policy strategies [Vanegas López et al., 2017].

The concept of economic diplomacy has been widely examined in the international academic literature. Theoretical approaches to economic diplomacy and its role external economic policy are discussed in the works of P. Baranay and M. Okano-Heijmans, as well as in collective studies such as *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* [Baranai, 2009; Okano-Heijmans, 2011; The SAGE Handbook, 2016]. These studies conceptualize economic diplomacy as an interdisciplinary field located at the intersection of international relations, economics, and diplomatic studies.

At the same time, several studies analyze the development of non-traditional agricultural exports in Latin America. Research by M. Iizuka and M. Gebreeyesus examines the institutional mechanisms supporting new export industries and the learning processes behind the emergence of new agricultural sectors [Iizuka & Gebreeyesus, 2017]. Other studies focus specifically on the flower industry and the challenges it faces in international markets. For instance, I. Guaita-Pradas analyzes the competitiveness of Ecuador's flower sector in the global market, while studies by J. G. Vanegas López, J. J. Merlos García, and C. M. Mayorga Abril examine trade barriers and institutional constraints affecting flower exports in several Latin American countries [Guaita-Pradas et al., 2023; Vanegas López et al., 2017].

Despite the extensive literature on economic diplomacy, Latin American foreign policy, and the development of the flower industry, the role of floriculture as an instrument of economic diplomacy remains insufficiently explored. Most studies consider the flower sector primarily as an example of a successful non-traditional export industry and a factor of economic development. At the same time, the diplomatic mechanisms accompanying export promotion, the role of diplomatic institutions in facilitating international market access, and the integration of the industry into broader foreign policy strategies remain understudied. In addition, comparative analyses of how Ecuador and Colombia have incorporated the flower sector into their economic diplomacy strategies during the period 2010–2025 remain largely absent [Carrión von Reckow, 2018; Becerra Cuervo, 2016].

Maxim Ivanov

Factors of ASEAN states BRICS integration 2022–2025:

Literature Review

Neoclassical realism helps us understand how the global situation affects countries' foreign policy decisions. Unlike structural realism (which says countries just react directly to changes in who has power), neoclassical realism argues that internal factors also matter: how political elites see things, whether the government is seen as legitimate, what resources the state has, and how the state relates to society [Konyshev, 2020].

The international situation creates the framework, but countries decide for themselves how to understand that framework and what to do about it. This is especially important for ASEAN countries, which are now caught between several major powers.

The concept of strategic hedging complements this framework by specifying the behavioral strategies available to states seeking to avoid rigid alignment. Hedging is generally understood as a mixed strategy that combines elements of engagement and balancing, allowing states to diversify risk amid uncertainty [Figiaconi, 2025; Vander Vennet & Salman, 2019; Kuik, 2021]. The idea has not entirely won over its proponents, who remember, among other things, its defenders, its too vast character. For example, Gonzalez-Pujol [2024] believes that we should understand hedging as a conscious and deliberate practice of balancing conflicting national interests, rather than a trendy new term for neutrality, as it is often presented.

Several works on Southeast Asia region mostly approach how the countries in the region diversify the range of their partners, actively engage in multilateral instruments, and employ strategic ambiguity in their foreign policy. For example, in the paper by Nahak and Kalisang [2025] on

Indonesia and BRICS, the authors argue that the use of the forum allowed the country to increase its leverage capacity in the international system while preserving its independence.

Lee, Sims, and Lee [2025] examine how BRICS expansion might affect ASEAN, highlighting tools like the New Development Bank (NDB), the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), and initiatives promoting local currency settlements.

Porca-Konjikusic et al. [2024] compare ASEAN and BRICS as institutional models, noting that they may complement each other in development agendas and South–South cooperation. From this perspective, engaging with BRICS does not necessarily challenge ASEAN's central role – it could simply be another layer of multilateral cooperation.

At the same time, the literature highlights significant risks. Rogozhina [2025] points out that the Southeast Asian countries are attracted to BRICS membership not only by the promise of economic benefits but also by the geopolitical trade-offs they will have to make, such as the risk of worsening relations with their Western partners and of becoming more dependent on China.

Studies focusing on individual countries give a better understanding of the internal dynamics. In the case of Indonesia, studies based on a realist approach to politics consider the country's engagement with BRICS as a reaction to the rivalry in the international system and as an effort to increase its influence among the Global South [Yani et al., 2025; Pandito, 2025]. The Indonesian strategy is described as being cautious and calculated, taking advantage of the opportunities for trade and investment that come with BRICS membership while steering clear of getting deeply involved in the politics. Nahak and Kalisang [2025] reinforce this interpretation by emphasizing diversification motives and domestic political calculations.

Thailand's movement toward BRICS-related cooperation similarly reflects an interaction between systemic pressures and domestic legitimacy concerns. Suporn and Bunyavejchewin [2025] demonstrate through process tracing how Thailand's strategic readjustment is shaped both by the stratified international order and by internal regime dynamics. This case illustrates the explanatory strength of neoclassical realism: systemic change alone does not determine policy, domestic filtering mechanisms matter.

Malaysia's engagement is often discussed in economic terms. Quantitative analysis of Malaysia–BRICS trade linkages identifies GDP size, trade openness, and institutional factors as key determinants of connectivity [Abidin et al., 2016].

Evolution des Diskurses deutscher ordoliberaler Expertenakteure zu den Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrisen der Eurozone und den Maßnahmen zu deren Überwindung in den Jahren 2010–2024: Literaturüberblick

Die erste Kategorie der wissenschaftlichen Literatur widmet sich der Rolle von Expertenakteuren in Europa und der Welt sowie theoretischen Ansätzen zu ihrem Verständnis. In diesem Bereich dürfte die Arbeit auf der Dissertation [Polyachenkov, 2023] aufbauen, wo die wichtigsten Ansätze zur Implementierung von Expertenunterstützung für außenpolitische Aktivitäten systematisiert und geordnet wurden. A.Yu. Sungurov und A.A. Balayan [Balayan & Sungurov, 2022] untersuchten die Think Tanks als globales Phänomen. Sie entwickelten eine eigene Typologie der Think Tanks und erweiterten das Konzept eines “Think Tank” im Gegensatz zu dem in der Dissertation von D.G. Zaitsev [Zaitsev, 2009] entwickelten Konzept. Die Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen den Experten- und Lobbyaktivitäten von Expertenakteuren wird im Artikel von S. Jochem [Jochem, 2013] detailliert diskutiert.

Der Ordoliberalismus ist eine gesellschaftliche Doktrin und Ideologie, die auf der Prämisse beruht, dass die Probleme des Kapitalismus primär aus fehlgeleiteter staatlicher Intervention und Verzerrungen der Wettbewerbsordnung resultieren, nicht aus der Marktwirtschaft selbst. Ordoliberale Expertenakteure dominieren die fachliche Beratung zur deutschen Wirtschaftspolitik, die nicht nur innenpolitische Entscheidungen umfasst, sondern auch die Positionsfindung zur gemeinsamen Politik der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion der EU. Es dürfte unmöglich sein, die theoretischen Prinzipien des Ordoliberalismus zu definieren, ohne auf die Werke der Gründer dieser Doktrin zu verweisen: W. Eucken [Eucken, 1950], A. Rüstow [Rüstow, 1949], W. Röpke [Röpke, 1945] und F. Böhm [Böhm, 1950]. Arbeiten zur Rolle des Ordoliberalismus in Europa und auf globaler Ebene fallen ebenfalls in dieselbe Kategorie. Das bedeutsamste Werk unter ihnen ist das Buch von M. Foucault [Foucault, 2006], das erstmals die Rolle des deutschen Ordoliberalismus bei der Herausbildung des globalen Neoliberalismus nachzeichnet und die Voraussetzungen für die Entstehung des Ordoliberalismus als antitotalitäre Doktrin identifiziert. J. Germann [Germann, 2021] zeichnet ebenfalls die Rolle des Ordoliberalismus nach, stützt sich aber im Unterschied zu M. Foucault auf spezifische ökonomische Mechanismen im Rahmen eines spezifischen deutschen Wirtschaftsmodells, das unter dem Einfluss ordoliberaler Doktrin geschaffen wurde und das gesamte globale Wirtschaftssystem beeinflusste. Eine besondere Stellung in diesem Abschnitt nimmt die Sammelmonographie [Ordoliberalism, 2020] ein, die Artikel zu den historischen Ursprüngen des Ordoliberalismus, seinem gegenwärtigen Zustand, seiner Beziehung zu Krisen und seinen Perspektiven enthält.

In Bezug auf theoretische Konzepte ist das Konzept der epistemischen Gemeinschaften von P. M. Haas [Haas, 1992] von grundlegender Bedeutung, das den Einfluss von Netzwerken wissenschaftlicher Experten auf die internationale Politikkoordination beschreibt.

Die letzte Kategorie besteht deshalb aus Arbeiten, die kritische Theorien auf die Analyse der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrisen in der Eurozone anwenden, sowie aus Arbeiten im Bereich der politischen Ökonomie. Diese sind wichtig für die Herausbildung einer kritischen Haltung gegenüber der ordoliberalen Doktrin. Erwähnenswert sind hier die Arbeiten von J. Stiglitz [Stiglitz, 2016] und J.K. Galbraith [Galbraith, 2016], in denen die Autoren die Methoden zur Bekämpfung der griechischen Schuldenkrise kritisieren, die sie als schweren Schlag für die europäische Integration und zugleich als Indikator für ihre innere Verwundbarkeit betrachten. Eine besondere Stellung in der Historiographie könnten die Publikationen von Y. Varoufakis [Varoufakis, 2016], dem ehemaligen Finanzminister Griechenlands, einnehmen, in denen er das Phänomen der „Black Box“ analysiert – die Verflechtung von Experten und Politikern im gesamteuropäischen Establishment, die die Interessen nordeuropäischer Länder gegenüber südeuropäischen Schuldnerstaaten verteidigen.

Madina Kalendarova

***Geopolitical Factors in the Implementation of China's Belt and Road Initiative
Infrastructure Projects in Central Asia in 2013–2025***

Over the past decade, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has made Central Asia one of the key regions of Chinese foreign policy, as Beijing uses large transport and energy projects to secure access to markets and resources, stabilise its western regions and strengthen its international status. Central Asian states, in turn, view cooperation with China as a source of modernization and regional connectivity but also as a potential risk in terms of debt, political dependence and the regional balance of power between China, Russia and Western actors [Dave, 2018; Reeves, 2018]. A large body of literature has examined BRI in Central Asia in terms of infrastructure gaps, trade and investment flows, and the role of Chinese state-owned enterprises, as well as implications for Russian influence and Western strategies [Dave, 2018; Dodonov, 2019]. However, many studies remain largely descriptive, focus on macroeconomic indicators and policy narratives, and pay less attention to the ways in which foreign policy goals, domestic politics and bargaining between actors shape specific decisions in individual countries [China's Belt and Road Initiative, 2021].

Three major gaps can be identified. First, there is limited theorisation of the driving forces of China's foreign policy in Central Asia, as approaches such as neorealism or geoeconomics are rarely applied, linking systemic pressures, domestic politics and the choice of particular projects

[De Conti, Mozias, 2020; Cheng et al., 2019]. Second, the role of Central Asian governments as independent actors is often underestimated, and there is a lack of systematic cross-country comparisons and in-depth case studies demonstrating how they accept, modify or resist Chinese proposals [Izimov& Muratalieva, 2018; Muratalieva, 2019]. Third, relatively few studies rely extensively on Chinese and Central Asian primary sources to reconstruct decision-making processes and competing narratives around individual projects. Together, these gaps point to the need for systematic comparative case studies and process tracing focused on concrete BRI projects in different Central Asian countries.

This study examines how foreign policy factors shape the implementation of Chinese infrastructure projects under BRI in Central Asia between 2013 and 2025 and asks the following question: Which foreign policy factors influence the implementation of Chinese infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asian countries in 2013–2025? To answer this question, the research applies a foreign policy framework that combines neorealism and neoliberalism [Cheng et al., 2019; Na-Xi, Huang, Lu, 2019], conducts comparative case studies of major BRI infrastructure projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and uses process tracing based on Chinese, Russian, English and, where possible, Central Asian sources. Studies focusing on economic aspects emphasise BRI's contribution to closing infrastructure gaps and deepening economic interdependence, while also noting new forms of leverage and dependence that emerge from transport and energy corridors [Dave, 2018; Reeves, 2018]. Works on Kazakhstan show that Chinese-funded infrastructure has become central to the country's strategy of positioning itself as a regional hub, but also raises concerns about debt, transparency and the distribution of benefits [Dodonov, 2019]. Building on these debates, the present study conceptualises BRI infrastructure projects in Central Asia as instruments of both power and institutionalised cooperation, places particular emphasis on the agency of Central Asian states and seeks to develop a more causal and actor-centred understanding of how BRI functions as a foreign policy tool in the region.

Polina Kolba

Main Features of the Symbolic Policy in Ukraine towards Poland in 2014–2019

Since 2014, Ukraine's symbolic policy towards Poland has been shaped by a redefinition of national identity and a transformation of the country's foreign policy priorities. After the events of Euromaidan and the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, questions of historical memory in Ukraine became a tool for internal consolidation and international positioning. At the same time, unlike the Russian vector of memory policy, the Polish orientation was not seen as a strategic

priority and had a predominantly secondary character, being formed in response to initiatives and interpretive demands from the Polish side [Grytsenko, 2021, p. 42].

The interaction of Ukraine with Poland in the sphere of historical memory during this period (2014–2019) can be described as asymmetric: predominantly the Polish side acted as the initiator of public statements and of certain interpretive frameworks, while Ukraine took the position of "reacting" to these demands [Grytsenko, 2021, p.47]. Ukrainian symbolic politics towards Poland was part of a broader process of national narrative formation, central to which was the legitimization of the 20th century liberation movement. In this regard, issues that were central to Polish historical memory — first and foremost, the Volhynia massacre — were perceived by Ukrainian policymakers as being derived from domestic identity politics, rather than an object of foreign policy strategy.

In 2014–2019, in Ukraine, the institutionalization of a heroic narrative of national resistance was intensified, including the celebration of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as participants in the struggle for independence of the Ukrainian state . This process was part of a broader nation-building project, in which symbolic politics were used to entrench the narrative of national martyrdom and resistance to external domination. At the same time, such a policy inevitably came into conflict with the project of constructing Polish historical memory, where UPA's activities were closely linked to mass violence against the Polish population. As a result of the practice of glorifying members of the Ukrainian liberation movement, they acquired a dual character: in an internal dimension, they have contributed to the consolidation of society, while in an external context they have increased tensions in the historical-political interaction between Ukraine and Poland.

As for the question of the Volhynian tragedy, in the period under consideration it was finally established as a key element of disagreement in the sphere of symbolic interaction between Ukraine and Poland. In 2016, the Polish Sejm adopted a resolution recognizing the events of 1943–1944 as genocide, which was an important moment in the process of institutionalization of Polish historical narrative and caused a strong reaction in the Ukrainian public space. The Ukrainian position in 2016–2019 was more focused on the contextualization of the Volhynian events, abandoning their unilateral legal qualification and emphasizing the mutual nature of violence. This approach did not deny the tragedy, but challenged its interpretation as one-sided "ethnic cleansing," which is interpreted as a form of "interpretive negationism" that acknowledges violence but reviews its causes, scope, and distribution of responsibility [Adamski, 2017].

Another stable characteristic of the Ukrainian-Polish symbolic interaction in 2014–2019 became a constructed asymmetry of the significance of the Volhynian tragedy in the policy of collective memory of two states. In the Polish national discourse, Volhynia occupies a central place

as a symbol of national trauma, while in its Ukrainian counterpart it is regarded as one of the episodes of a broader narrative about the national liberation struggle [Stryjek, 2024]. The difference in interpretations was a driver of the parties' political moves: Poland sought institutional recognition of Ukraine's responsibility for the committed "genocide" (in Polish terminology), Ukraine sought to maintain a balance between "historical reflection" on the Volhynian events and simultaneous legitimization of the liberation movement.

To conclude, in 2014–2019 Ukraine's symbolic politics towards Poland was shaped by the need to address two interrelated tasks simultaneously: internal consolidation of the nation and maintaining a strategic partnership with one of the key partners in the region. The institutionalization of a heroic narrative of the liberation struggle, the asymmetry of historical memory politics and the reactive character of symbolic politics in the Polish direction have led to the formation of a specific model of symbolic interaction between Ukraine and Poland, in which the question of the Volhynian tragedy required a particularly cautious interpretation.

Dmitry Kononov

Main stages and a brief description of the emergence of the EAOC (1923–1945)

To identify the specifics of the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Patriarchate of Constantinople (PC) in Estonia, it is necessary to examine the history of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC). This structure functioned from 1923 on the basis of the Tomos of Patriarch Meletius IV until 1945 [Prekrashchenie, 1945], when its parishes joined the ROC. It was re-established in 1996 by decision of Patriarch Bartholomew [Patriarchal and Synodical Act, 1996].

By the beginning of the 20th century, the territory of Estonia was under the jurisdiction of the Riga Diocese of the ROC. Despite the perception of Orthodoxy as a "Russian faith" due to the use of the Church Slavonic language, the number of Orthodox Estonians increased [Rohtmets & Schvak, 2023, p.6]. In December 1916, the parishioners of the Estonian churches appealed to the Holy Synod with a request for for a separate ecclesiastical structure [Rohtmets & Schvak, 2023, p.6], but were refused due to domestic and foreign policy problems.

After the 1917 revolution, the situation changed. In January 1918, Patriarch Tikhon ordained Archimandrite Platon (Kulbush) Bishop of Reval, vicar of the Diocese of Riga [Balashov, 2010]. An independent diocese was not created, only the Tallinn Vicariate was established, which can be explained by the small number of Orthodox Christians (about 123 thousand) [Rohtmets & Schvak, 2023, p.6].

During the Civil War, Bishop Platon was martyred, and ties with the ROC were severed. In March 1918, the assembly of Estonian parishes declared that "in the interests of the Estonian people and the state sovereignty of Estonia, there should be a separate independent autocephalous Church" [Balashov, 2020].

After Estonia's declaration of independence in May 1919, the Estonian clergy initially sought a settlement with the Mother Church. On May 10, 1920, the Holy Synod and the Supreme Church Council of the ROC recognized the autonomous Estonian Orthodox Church with internal self-government while maintaining canonical ties with the ROC [Balashov, 2010].

The situation of the ROC in Soviet Russia was deteriorating. Anti-religious campaigns, the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon, and the Renovationist schism weakened ties with Estonian parishes. Granting full autocephaly required a decision of the Local Council, which was impossible. Despite the canonical rules (34th Apostolic Canon, 13th Canon of the Council of Trull), the Estonian Church entered into negotiations with the PC.

On July 7, 1923, Patriarch Meletius IV signed a Tomos on the transfer of the Estonian Church to the jurisdiction of PC. The Tomos did not expand self-government, since, according to the document, "the Synod is responsible for its decisions to the Ecumenical Patriarch," [Tomos, 1923] and the metropolitan receives holy myrrh from Constantinople. The Church received the same autonomous status as from the ROC, but with subordination to the PC in matters of ecclesiastical court and foreign relations.

After Estonia's incorporation into the USSR the EAOC reunited with the ROC. On March 30, 1941, Metropolitan Alexander (Paulus) repented [Kudlasevich, 2023, p. 51]. However, with the beginning of the German occupation in December 1942, he again abandoned ties with the ROC, which led to a split. The final reunification took place on March 6, 1945, with the signing of the act of incorporation into the ROC [Kudlasevich, 2023, p. 52] (without restoring autonomy). In 1978, Patriarch Dimitri of Constantinople declared the 1923 Tomos invalid [Deyanie, 1978].

Thus, the precedent of violation of the canonical jurisdiction of the ROC by PC on the territory of Estonia became the first of its kind. An analysis of the events allows us to identify the characteristic features of PC's policy: the desire to weaken the influence of the ROC on the territories of the emerging states (a similar Tomos was given to the Church of Finland in 1923) and the creation of conditions under which structures passing under the omophorion of the PC did not receive real independence, since self-government within the PC did not differ from the status given by the ROC.

Evolution of the Discourse on New Caledonian Status in French Media in 2018–2025:

Literature Review

The question of New Caledonia's political status and the prospect of independence has been widely discussed in academic research across several fields.

Historical studies have explored the colonial legacy and its influence on contemporary political mobilization, for instance, the emergence of Kanak nationalism [Demmer, 2021; Merle, 2020, p. 575]. These works help explain the persistence of political divisions. At the same time, they largely address historical transformations rather than the contemporary articulation of political aspirations.

Institutional analyses have focused on governance arrangements that emerged after the conflicts of the 1980s. Research has examined the Matignon Agreements and Nouméa Accords as frameworks that redefined relations between France and New Caledonia and established mechanisms for political consultation [Magnon, 2009]. Related studies have explored the possibility of political evolution without full sovereignty, emphasizing gradual transformation within the existing constitutional framework [Rumley, 2006, p. 323]. This literature provides a detailed understanding of institutional change but generally would treat independence as a legal or political outcome rather than as a contested discourse concept.

A significant portion of research has concentrated on the referendum cycle beginning in 2018. Studies have addressed the legal and international aspects of the 2018 referendum, including the role of monitoring mechanisms [David, 2018; Bitá Heyeghe, 2018; Gravelat, 2020]. Subsequent analyses of the 2020 and 2021 referendums have explored the influence of political mobilization and state involvement [Brengharth, 2022; Kowasch et al., 2022]. While these studies may deepen understanding of procedural developments, they are more likely to continue to frame independence primarily as an institutional issue.

More recent scholarship has begun to address contemporary developments, including the protests of 2024 [Tevahitua, 2024] and the Bougival Agreement of 2025 [Cornut, 2025]. These works highlight the persistence of political tensions and the evolving nature of negotiations between France and local actors, but appear to focus on political outcomes rather than on how these events are interpreted in public communication.

Research on identity has provided additional perspectives. Studies have examined official and alternative narratives [Leblic, 2022] and the framing of Kanak victimhood in the discourse [Korson, 2018]. Other work has explored representations of power and ideology [Lecompte-Van

Poucke, 2018, p. 429] and interpretations of post-Nouméa identity [Graff, 2016, p. 29]. Analyses of the Nouméa Accord have also applied content-based approaches [Mokaddem, 2018]. These contributions demonstrate the importance of symbolic representation, but do not engage the ongoing media coverage.

In conclusion, the conducted research on evolution of the discourse on New Caledonia Status has addressed multiple research issues, ranging from historical premises to contemporary articulation in public discourse. Nevertheless, there are a number of research gaps that may be closed by future works.

Alina Nurimanova

Exploring the Evolving Taiwanese-Caribbean Cooperation, 2004–2025:

Literature Review

Taiwan's diplomatic cooperation with Caribbean states has attracted considerable interest among scholars of cross-Strait competition, especially considering the recurrent diplomatic switches and the intensifying rivalry over formal recognition in the region. The literature spanning the 2004–2025 period largely focuses on the instrumental use of economic resources, detailing how small island nations navigate rival bids from Beijing and Taipei.

A growing number of studies treat foreign aid not primarily as a development tool, but as an instrument of geopolitical influence [Harold et al., 2019]. Research on the early 2000s often frames this dynamic as so-called "checkbook diplomacy." Early quantitative assessments [Tubilewicz & Guilloux, 2011] and case studies [Rich, 2009] establish a direct correlation between financial aid and the retention of diplomatic allies. They highlight the transactional nature of these bilateral ties, where small states leverage their sovereignty to maximize economic rents. The vulnerability of Taiwan's traditional aid model against China's economic rise became evident during Dominica's defection to Beijing in 2004, a turning point mapped extensively by regional overviews [Erikson & Chen, 2007].

The political economy of this regional presence is further explored through the lens of infrastructure projects and foreign direct investments. Scholars such as McElroy and Bai describe Beijing's approach as "stadium diplomacy," prioritizing high-visibility projects to reward diplomatic realignment [McElroy & Bai, 2008]. Similarly, Persaud explores the strategic footprint of Asian powers in the Caribbean [Persaud, 2008], while Braveboy-Wagner demonstrates how the independence of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) states created a distinct market for sovereign rights, allowing them to manipulate the PRC-Taiwan rivalry to their advantage [Braveboy-Wagner, 2008].

However, as resource constraints mounted and PRC pressure persistently grew, Taiwan's strategy underwent a noticeable shift. Rather than engaging in direct bidding wars, Taipei shifted toward targeted and responsive assistance. Field-based research by Alexander (2014) illustrates Taiwan's transition toward engaging foreign publics and promoting shared democratic values [Alexander, 2014]. This observation is further corroborated by research detailing Taipei's transition toward civil society approaches, focusing on technological transfers in agriculture, healthcare, and disaster relief aligned with sustainable development goals [Teh-Chang Lin & Yen-Chun, 2017].

Recent literature also accounts for the institutional intervention of the United States in preserving Taiwan's formal recognition amid PRC counterpressure. Following a series of diplomatic losses, comprehensive assessments evaluated the mechanisms Beijing uses to isolate Taipei and proposed potential countermeasures [Harold et al., 2019]. The enactment of the TAIPEI Act in 2020 prompted detailed policy analyses exploring whether American diplomatic and economic pressure can act as an effective deterrent against further defections among Taiwan's remaining Caribbean holdouts [Larus, 2020].

While the existing literature provides a robust foundation regarding economic statecraft and aid patterns, the specific mechanics of severing diplomatic ties invite deeper theoretical application. For instance, the economic payoff of diplomatic switches is increasingly contested, suggesting that small states' foreign policy choices require further conceptualization. To move beyond historical description, this empirical landscape is particularly compelling to examine through the lens of the theory of state de-recognition [Tudoroiu, 2017] and Womack's theory of asymmetric relations, which explains how smaller actors such as Caribbean microstates maintain agency and autonomy despite a massive disparity in material capabilities [Womack, 2016].

Nikolai Perminov

Role of CBP and ICE in Migration Policy during Donald Trump's First Term

Traditionally, a central role in the implementation of migration policy within the U.S. political system has been assigned to the Department of Homeland Security, which possesses a broad range of powers, including border administration, the execution of deportations, the adjudication of asylum claims, and participation in various migration programs (such as DACA or TPS), among others. The Department's principal agencies responsible for carrying out these functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). By the time Donald Trump took office, these agencies already possessed extensive statutory authority and institutional capacity, which would become central to the implementation of the administration's migration agenda.

CBP significantly expanded its operational capacity and funding during Trump's first term. This expansion was driven by a series of executive actions, most notably Executive Order No. 13767, which authorized an increase of 5,000 border patrol officers [Executive Order 13767, 2017, p. 3]. The agency leveraged these enhanced resources to rapidly enlarge the scope of its activities and to intensify border control and enforcement measures. These efforts contributed to an increase in criminal prosecutions, family separations, and deportations. [Hipsman & Meissner, 2017, p. 9-10]. However, CBP's performance in managing migration flows from the Northern Triangle countries during this period can hardly be characterized as effective. Most migrants returned by the agency to Mexico or other countries in the region faced limited opportunities for integration into local communities, which in turn incentivized repeated attempts to cross the U.S. southern border [Pope, 2020, p. 15]. Such policies required substantial federal resources while producing limited measurable improvements in deterrence. Nevertheless, for President Trump, CBP remained one of the key instruments for implementing his intended policy course. Consequently, this allocation of resources was largely welcomed by the administration. Therefore, CBP acquired considerable institutional weight within the system, enjoying broad discretion in operational decision-making.

ICE primarily focused on the removal of migrants with criminal records [Pope, 2020, p. 16]. Its responsibilities overlapped to a significant extent with those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which often relegated ICE to a secondary role in the most consequential issues within its sphere, including counterterrorism and counterintelligence [Pope, 2020, p. 16]. This institutional positioning compelled the agency to concentrate on issues that did not directly implicate national security. Combined with the heightened level of trust from the White House, this shift produced immediate results. Within the first eight months of the new administration, ICE carried out 42 percent more arrests and 37 percent more deportations than during the same period of the previous fiscal year [Capps et al., 2018, p. 2]. In the overwhelming majority of cases, arrests resulted in subsequent deportation or detention, with a very limited number of releases [Capps et al., 2018, p. 4]. An increasing share of arrests targeted individuals who were not previously in custody, and enforcement practices saw a marked rise in so-called "collateral arrests" (i.e., the detention of bystanders or individuals incidentally encountered at the scene of an operation) [Capps et al., 2018, p. 3]. Taken together, these developments indicate a growth in both trust and operational autonomy comparable to that observed in CBP, driven by support from the White House and resulting in a strengthening of ICE's institutional weight in decision-making related to U.S. migration policy under the Trump administration.

To conclude, both CBP and ICE substantially expanded their capacities and strengthened their institutional positions during Donald Trump's first presidential term. This development was primarily driven by shifts in the administration's migration policy: in seeking to strictly limit inflows

of migrants, the president delegated greater autonomy to these agencies in the implementation of enforcement and adjudication powers. As a result, the number of deportations increased, while the volume of lawful entries declined, marking a new stage in U.S. migration enforcement.

Viacheslav Rachkovskiy

*El impacto de la integración en el desarrollo económico de los países
de la comunidad andina*

Desde la concertación del pacto andino hasta la década de 1990, la integración económica de los países de Cartagena no ha tenido un marcado carácter neoliberal. Se adoptó una estrategia de independencia y aislamiento del capital extranjero, que tiene sus ventajas y desventajas. Entre 1968 y 1982, el comercio interno entre los países de la región de Asia y el Pacífico representó el 4,8% del valor total de las exportaciones. En Venezuela, a principios de la década de 1980, comenzó una fuga masiva de capitales después de que la deuda nacional alcanzara los \$25 mil millones [McCoy & Smith, 1995, p. 113], lo que dificultó a Herrera Campins atraer inversiones extranjeras. Fue un período de “regionalismo cerrado”.

En la primera mitad de la última década del siglo XX no hubo integración entre los países miembros de la comunidad. Los conflictos territoriales entre Ecuador y Perú continuaron: la Guerra Del alto Cenepa [Borzova & Medina Gonzalez, 2023], Venezuela rompió relaciones diplomáticas con Perú después de fujimorazo en 1992, y guerrillas colombianas atacaron un puesto militar venezolano.

La integración no consiste sólo en las relaciones dentro de la comunidad, sino también en la relación de los países miembros con los procesos alternativos de integración. En este caso, el apoyo político y económico de los países al unirse a otras organizaciones, así como al firmar acuerdos bilaterales y Tratado de Libre Comercio, demuestra las estrechas relaciones entre los aliados del bloque. Es posible que esta cooperación externa haya fortalecido la posición internacional de los países andinos y haya contribuido a ampliar sus mercados comerciales.

Por ejemplo, en 1995 entró en vigor la asociación económica y comercial “Grupo de los tres” entre Venezuela, Colombia y México. El ejemplo del Grupo de los tres ilustra cómo la comunidad andina ha servido de punto de encuentro para que los países profundicen su integración. Como resultado, para 1997, el comercio interno entre los países se había quintuplicado desde fines de la década de 1980 y había alcanzado los 5 mil millones de dólares. En 1996, representantes de los países de la CAN (Comunidad Andina de Naciones) ofrecieron cooperación comercial con el recién creado Mercosur. Después de una serie de reuniones en 1998, se firmó un acuerdo. Podría suponerse que este acuerdo no sólo buscaba ampliar el comercio regional, sino también crear las

condiciones para una mayor coordinación económica entre los bloques latinoamericanos. Este acuerdo sentó las bases para la convergencia de los bloques regionales.

Además, después de la liberalización del comercio, los países de la CAN comenzaron a atraer inversión extranjera directa [Feigin, Bobrovnikova & Afanaseva, 2025]. La inversión extranjera directa en Colombia se quintuplicó en 1998. Durante el mismo período, hubo un salto significativo en Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú. El valor de las exportaciones a los países CAN también aumentaron. Es probable que la apertura de los mercados y la reducción de las barreras comerciales hayan desempeñado un papel importante en este crecimiento económico y comercial.

Para 2023, en comparación con 1998, las importaciones a los países CAN se cuadruplicaron, mientras que las exportaciones también aumentaron significativamente. Sin embargo, si consideramos las tendencias recientes, las importaciones disminuyeron un 11,7% y las exportaciones un 6%. Según las estadísticas de la comunidad andina, las exportaciones nacionales de los países entre 2017 y 2023 fueron: 2017: 7.572.227; 2018: 8.902.471; 2019: 8.309.869; 2020: 6.557.312; 2021: 8.662.214; 2022: 10.626.872; 2023: 9 386 272. Si consideramos el PIB de PPA como un indicador del impacto de la integración dentro del bloque comercial en el desarrollo económico, podemos observar cómo el PIB total de CAN aumenta con el tiempo. La única disminución del PIB se observó en el segundo trimestre de 2020, cuando comenzó la pandemia de COVID-19. Posteriormente, el PIB creció significativamente en 2021, aunque nuevamente disminuyó ligeramente en 2022 debido a la crisis política. Probablemente estas fluctuaciones estén relacionadas con factores externos, como las crisis sanitarias globales y la inestabilidad política regional.

En los últimos ocho años, la evolución general del PIB ha sido positiva. El crecimiento promedio anual del PIB es de aproximadamente 2,4%. De 2017 a 2024, el PIB creció un 18%. Además, las remesas intrarregionales también afectan el desarrollo económico de los países de la CAN. Estas transacciones contribuyen al crecimiento del PIB y al apoyo de los hogares. Se puede suponer que el aumento de las remesas refleja una mayor movilidad laboral dentro de la región y una creciente interdependencia económica entre los países miembros. El análisis de las estadísticas de 2017 a 2023 muestra un aumento significativo en las remesas interregionales en casi todos los países miembros.

Los procesos de integración dentro de la comunidad andina han contribuido gradualmente al crecimiento del comercio mutuo, la expansión de las relaciones económicas exteriores y la atracción de inversiones extranjeras directas, lo que en general ha tenido un efecto positivo en el desarrollo económico de los países miembros. A pesar de las recesiones periódicas causadas por las crisis externas y la inestabilidad política, a largo plazo la integración ha fortalecido la interdependencia económica de los países de la región y ha contribuido al crecimiento sostenido de sus principales indicadores macroeconómicos.

*Transformation of the Concept of “Strategic Autonomy” for the European Union
in France's Foreign Policy Discourse (2017–2025): Literature review*

The concept of the EU's "strategic autonomy" has attracted growing scholarly interest since its first use in the 2016 EU Global Strategy [Mauro, 2018; Michaels & Sus, 2025]. However, most research has focused on defining the concept or comparing member states' interpretations, with relatively little attention to how the discourse of a single leading state has evolved over a prolonged, crisis-filled period. This review examines two strands: debates over the scope of strategic autonomy and comparative analyses of member states' approaches, particularly France's role.

Early studies sought to define strategic autonomy and identify its dimensions. Mauro [Mauro, 2018] defines it as the ability to make decisions and conduct military operations autonomously, distinguishing between political, operational, and industrial aspects. Ianni [Ianni, 2019] highlights similar components, warning that without autonomous capabilities the EU faces geopolitical insignificance. Järvenpää, Major and Sakkov [Järvenpää, Major & Sakkov, 2019] propose four dimensions – political, institutional, capability-based, and industrial – characterizing autonomy as a gradual achievement. While sharing practical goals, these works differ in scope: Mauro [Mauro, 2018] and Ianni [Ianni, 2019] focus on defense, whereas Järvenpää, Major and Sakkov [Järvenpää, Major & Sakkov, 2019] expand the analysis to institutional prerequisites.

Subsequent studies revealed the limitations of a purely military interpretation. Maulny [Maulny, 2019] argues that reducing strategic autonomy to defense is a fundamental error, as the concept encompasses energy security, raw materials, and technological independence. Darnis [Darnis, 2021] shows the concept has expanded to include "technological sovereignty" as a potential unifying goal. Lille [Lille, 2024] links strategic autonomy to the EU's identity as a "Normative Power Europe," while Beaucillon [Beaucillon, 2023] suggests autonomy has become a defining element of the EU's global identity, distinguishing "hard power" and "soft power" applications. However, broadening has created clarity problems. Mauro [Mauro, 2021] identifies three "faces" of strategic autonomy – original (crisis management), extended (territorial defense), and global (economic-financial independence) – arguing that progress in one area cannot compensate for weakness in others.

Another strand examines divergent member-state interpretations. Charbonneau [Charbonneau, 2024], using role theory, finds gradual Franco-German convergence: France integrates its strategic ambitions into European mechanisms, while post-2022 Germany recognizes the need for autonomous actions but with greater regard for the USA. Yet convergence is not universal. Timofei

[Timofei, 2025] shows that Poland may favor technological and energy autonomy but opposes defense autonomy that could undermine NATO.

Recent studies question whether crises have united member states. Helnarska [Helnarska, 2022] argues that Russia's special military operation, which began in 2022, was an "existential test" that the concept of "strategic autonomy" largely failed, as Macron's diplomatic engagement with Russia before 2022 undermined confidence in French leadership in Central and Eastern Europe. Michaels and Sus [Michaels & Sus, 2025] similarly argue the Atlanticist-Europeanist split makes strategic autonomy largely inapplicable in defense. At the institutional level, Romanova and Mazanik [Romanova & Mazanik, 2022] show that the discourse has expanded the European Commission's powers in traditionally intergovernmental areas, suggesting debates also function as mechanisms for redistributing institutional power.

The existing literature provides a solid foundation, yet less attention has been paid to how an individual state's discourse has changed over time under specific crises. Relatively few studies have traced how French foreign policy discourse reconceptualized EU strategic autonomy throughout Emmanuel Macron's presidency (2017–2025). This leads to the following research question: *How has France's foreign policy discourse regarding the concept of EU "strategic autonomy" changed between 2017 and 2025?*

Alina Sidorova

Chinese Official Discourse on the “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” Concept: Literature Review

The concept of a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” has gradually become one of the central elements of contemporary Chinese diplomacy. First introduced by Hu Jintao in 2007 and later actively promoted by Xi Jinping, the idea has attracted considerable scholarly attention as many researchers have attempted to understand its role in China's foreign policy discourse.

The study of Chinese political discourse has become increasingly important in contemporary scholarship. Analysis of diplomatic language allows scholars to identify possible shifts in the PRC's foreign policy ambitions and to better understand Beijing's attempts to promote multipolarity through soft power and discursive strategies. Several studies have examined the transformation of China's discursive practices in this context. Denisov and Zuenko argue that Chinese discourse on international politics demonstrates a transition from soft power to discursive power [Denisov & Zuenko, 2022]. Their research highlights the ideological dimension of Beijing's international activity and explores different interpretations of these concepts in academic literature. Similarly, Thibaut examines China's understanding of discursive power (话语权) and emphasizes

its importance for shaping the world order [Thibaut, 2022]. The author places this concept within a broader historical context and notes the significance of acquiring both the “power to speak” and the “power to be heard” in international politics.

Within this scholarly debate, the concept of a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” is often viewed as a key component of Chinese international discourse. Piatachkova provides both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the use of the concept as an example of Beijing’s discursive power [Piatachkova, 2025]. According to her research, references to the concept increased significantly between 2017 and 2023. The study also suggests that the idea tends to receive a more positive reception among countries of the Global South.

A number of scholars have also studied the ideological meaning of the concept and its connectedness with China’s foreign policy initiatives. Bunskoek and Shih interpret the “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” as a form of post-Western regionalism that aims to link different societies without requiring ideological convergence [Bunskoek & Shih, 2021]. They also point out that the concept is closely linked with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Earlier research by Zeng likewise associates the idea with the construction of a regional community with a shared future through the BRI [Zeng, 2016].

In many Russian, Chinese and English-language publications, the concept is discussed as a major discursive instrument of Chinese diplomacy. Scholars frequently view it as a framework through which Beijing promotes cooperation within its international initiatives and articulates its vision of the global order. Khan and his co-authors examine the transformation of the concept from its first introduction in Chinese political discourse in the mid-2000s and formal articulation by Hu Jintao in 2007 to its active promotion during Xi Jinping’s tenure [Khan et al., 2021]. The publication also highlights the philosophical foundations of the community with a shared future, which they associate with Confucius, Mencius, traditional Chinese philosophy and Marxism. Similarly, Zhang traces the evolution of the concept and shows that its scope has expanded from regional cooperation to addressing global challenges [Zhang, 2018]. The author also emphasizes the discursive flexibility of the concept and analyzes its meaning, motivations and possible implications.

Many scholars attribute the growing international dissemination of the concept to Xi Jinping’s personal ideas and approach to international politics. Verchenko emphasizes Xi’s role in incorporating the idea into official speeches, doctrines and documents [Verchenko, 2022]. Zuenko identifies the “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” and the “Chinese Dream” as two major elements of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy discourse [Zuenko, 2025]. According to his interpretation, this concept functions as an umbrella term that encompasses a number of more specific initiatives and ideas. Nasirova also examines these two ideologemes of contemporary Chinese diplomacy and focuses on their semantic and cognitive characteristics while also stressing the connection

between the concept and traditional Chinese philosophical ideas of “great unity” and “Tianxia” [Nasirova, 2020].

Despite the growing body of literature, relatively little attention has been paid to how the concept is constructed and reproduced in official Chinese discourse.

Daniil Tverdov

*Características generales de la cooperación energética entre Chile y la UE
entre los años 2002 y 2015*

El Acuerdo de Asociación entre la UE y Chile, firmado en 2002 y en vigor desde 2003, constituyó un hito significativo en las relaciones bilaterales. Como primer acuerdo de este tipo entre la UE y un país latinoamericano, tenía por objetivo profundizar los vínculos políticos, ampliar el comercio y fomentar la cooperación en ámbitos como la educación, la tecnología y los derechos humanos. El acuerdo eliminó los aranceles sobre el 97% del comercio bilateral; no obstante, la cooperación energética no quedó incorporada en el marco formal bilateral hasta los desarrollos posteriores a 2015, lo que reflejaba el contexto energético global de principios de la década de 2000, cuando las energías renovables aún no se consideraban recursos estratégicos prioritarios.

Como señala el informe de la agencia ITAQA SARL, elaborado a petición de la Comisión Europea en 2012, el acuerdo tuvo un impacto limitado en la demanda energética de Chile. Entre 1996 y 2012, el aumento del consumo de energía en Chile superó significativamente el crecimiento económico en términos de tasas anuales. Hasta 2009, se basaba en el gas natural procedente de Argentina, sin embargo, debido a problemas de suministro, se produjo una transición parcial hacia el uso del carbón. Además, en su aspiración de contribuir a la reducción global de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero, Chile comenzó a buscar alternativas en el ámbito de las energías renovables. Dados los altos riesgos asociados a la energía nuclear, las autoridades chilenas apostaron por el desarrollo de la hidroelectricidad y la energía solar.

El Acuerdo de Asociación entre la UE y Chile también contribuyó a un ligero aumento de los ingresos y, por consiguiente, la requiera energética de los hogares. No obstante, el papel de este acuerdo en el crecimiento de la economía chilena también fue limitado. Los cambios en la demanda energética derivados del aumento de las exportaciones hacia la UE representaron apenas el 1% de la demanda energética total del país. Sin embargo, el Acuerdo de Asociación UE-Chile condujo a la reducción de aranceles sobre tecnologías limpias, energías renovables y equipos de eficiencia energética incluidos en la lista HS6 de la OCDE, sentando con ello las bases para el desarrollo posterior de las energías renovables [Steenblik, 2005].

A partir de 2010, la UE se convirtió uno de los principales inversores extranjeros de Chile en materia de inversión extranjera directa, aportando el alrededor del 36% del volumen total. A diferencia de las inversiones procedentes de Estados Unidos, Canadá y China, los proyectos europeos no se limitaron al sector minero, sino que también se orientaron hacia las energías renovables [Hernández, 2022, p.6]: la energía solar ocupó el primer puesto en 2012 y 2013, y la hidroeléctrica el segundo en 2011 y 2013, impulsadas por proyectos en el desierto de Atacama. La UE se convirtió en uno de los principales socios comerciales de Chile, y Chile obtuvo acceso a una serie de programas europeos, como las iniciativas científicas en el marco de Horizon 2020. Paralelamente, el diálogo político estuvo acompañado por la participación de Chile en las cumbres regulares UE-América Latina, donde el país se consolidaba como un socio fiable y estable, con instituciones sólidas [Bustamante & Delev, 2023].

Entre los proyectos energéticos concretos ejecutados en este período destacan los siguientes: El Programa Chileno de Energía Solar (2014–2022), financiado por el banco alemán KfW a través del LACIF con una aportación de la UE de 15,3 millones de euros en subvenciones, apoyó al Gobierno de Chile en su objetivo de disociar el crecimiento económico de las emisiones de GEI. El Programa financió centrales de energía solar de concentración (CSP) y grandes proyectos fotovoltaicos, incluyendo la construcción de la primera central CSP de América del Sur con una potencia de 110 MW. El Fondo de Desarrollo de la Energía Geotérmica para América Latina (2014–2026), con una contribución de la UE de 20,5 millones de euros, tuvo por objetivo superar los obstáculos al desarrollo geotérmico en diez países de la región, entre ellos Chile. El proyecto «Autoabastecimiento de Energía Renovable en Chile» (SSRE, 2015–2024), ejecutado por GIZ y KfW en colaboración con ministerios chilenos con una financiación de 18 millones de euros, fomentó la implantación de sistemas renovables descentralizados en las pequeña y medianas empresas. Finalmente, en julio de 2014 el Banco Europeo de Inversiones (BEI) concedió al Banco Santander Chile un crédito marco de 150 millones de dólares para financiar proyectos de energía eólica, solar fotovoltaica, solar de concentración, biomasa y modernización de redes de transmisión.

No obstante, ya en la primera mitad de la década de 2010 empezaron a ser evidentes los signos de estancamiento en las relaciones bilaterales. China y Estados Unidos desplazaron a la UE de su posición de liderazgo en términos de comercio, y la estructura de intercambios apenas variaba: Chile exportaba principalmente materias primas, mientras que la UE exportaba manufacturas y tecnología. Además, desde 2010 las reuniones bilaterales UE-Chile dejaron de celebrarse anualmente y pasaron a celebrarse cada dos años, reflejando la menor intensidad de la cooperación, y las negociaciones para modernizar el acuerdo de asociación avanzaron con lentitud. Un factor

adicional fue la expiración del Protocolo de Kioto y la lenta ratificación de la Enmienda de Doha, lo que eliminó un estímulo importante para la cooperación en energías renovables hasta 2015.

En síntesis, el período 2002–2015 sentó las bases institucionales y financieras de la cooperación energética entre la UE y Chile. A pesar del impacto limitado del Acuerdo de Asociación en la demanda energética, se pusieron en marcha los primeros proyectos concretos en energías renovables, en particular en energía solar y geotérmica, y se establecieron los mecanismos de inversión, como el LACIF y el BEI, que definirían la agenda bilateral posterior. No obstante, el pleno desarrollo de esta cooperación quedó condicionado a los nuevos impulsos normativos y climáticos globales surgidos a partir de 2015, especialmente tras la adopción del Acuerdo de París y el posterior lanzamiento del Pacto Verde Europeo.

Anna Trifonova

***Japan and India Bilateral Security Cooperation (2022–2025):
Evolution of Official Foreign Policy Discourses. Literature review***

As geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific intensifies, Japan and India are playing increasingly important roles in shaping the region's security order. Japan, one of the world's largest economies measured by GDP [The World Bank, 2026], has long served as a key US ally in the region while building its own network of ties with "like-minded countries", including India [ANI, 2026]. Japan's foreign policy emphasizes liberal values such as the "rules-based international order", democracy, human rights [Romanenko, 2026] and localizes these norms in the Indo-Pacific through its FOIP vision [Nakano, 2023], India positions itself as a Global South leader while maintaining ties with both Western and non-Western powers through through the G20, BRICS and other multilateral formats.

Despite different geopolitical identities, the strategic interests of the two countries increasingly overlap. Yet, beyond institutional cooperation, the discourses through which each country frames security threats deserve scholarly attention This article reviews existing scholarship on Japan–India security cooperation, focusing on official discourses, and identifies areas requiring further research.

Scholars have examined how both states frame security threats through language. Some focus on one country, e.g., Japan [Alekshev, 2024; Streltsov, 2024], while others compare both. Chand and Garcia show that both countries portray China as undermining freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific [Chand & Garcia, 2021]. Dobrinskaya notes that Japan focuses on China's military expansion, whereas India reads its actions as a strategy of encirclement [Dobrinskaya, 2019].

Japan's discursive evolution is well documented. Abe's speeches popularized the term "Indo-Pacific" and cast China as the main threat [Chand & Garcia, 2021], while promoting proactive contribution to peace [Basu, 2016]. Kishida later adopted a softer tone, occasionally borrowing India's rhetoric [Ito, 2023]. Nakano shows that Japan's discourse has broadly promoted a rules-based, multilateral order through FOIP [Nakano, 2023].

India's discourse follows a different logic. Under Modi, New Delhi endorses FOIP principles but avoids naming adversaries [Scott, 2019]. Ito links this to India's postcolonial narrative, which allows it to retain flexibility in relations with Japan, Russia, and China alike [Ito, 2024; Zabella, Penkova & Fivejskaya, 2021].

These differences reflect broader realities. The literature traces Japan–India ties through strategic and economic factors [Japan, 2023; Dobrinskaya, 2019; Kireeva, 2020]. Japan views India as an important FOIP partner [Japan, 2023], while India regards Japan as a key source of finance and technology [Kumar, 2023].

China's rise is widely identified as a key driver of rapprochement, with scholars arguing that shared concern over China's military build-up has pushed both countries toward cooperation [Dobrinskaya, 2019; Keerthiraj & Sekiyama, 2023, p. 333; Panov, 2024; Regnovskij, 2022]. Institutionally, the partnership spans the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, joint exercises, defence agreements, and QUAD [Chansoria, 2024; Keerthiraj & Sekiyama, 2023, p. 333].

Despite this breadth, several notable gaps remain, which this study seeks to address. Most studies examine each country's narratives separately or at a single point in time, rarely tracing how both discourses evolved in the 2022–2025 period. Scholars have also overlooked how Japan and India engage with global security issues. A comparative discourse analysis of the 2022–2025 period could reveal how each country's framing of security challenges shapes bilateral cooperation.

Securitisation of EU Climate and Energy Policy in Italian Party Discourses in 2022–2025

This study analyses the features of public discourses of the five leading Italian political parties – Fratelli d'Italia (FDI), Lega per Salvini Premier (Lega), Forza Italia (FI), Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), and Partito Democratico (PD) – regarding the EU's climate and energy policy in 2022–2025.

Since 2022, the EU's climate and energy policy has found itself in the grip of two strategic priorities: accelerated decarbonization within the framework of the European Green Deal and ensuring energy autonomy in times of crisis. This internal contradiction has shifted the debate to the national level, turning it into an arena of ideological contestation. Here, political parties compete to define the problem and legitimise their solutions. This dynamic is particularly evident in Italy, where a structurally vulnerable energy system, characterised by high import dependence [Eurostat, 2024], interacts with the acute short-term costs of supply diversification and the green transition.

The study addresses the following question: What discursive strategies do Italian political parties employ when framing the EU's climate and energy policy, and to what extent do these strategies follow securitisation logic?

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Applying securitisation theory from the Copenhagen School [Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998], we examine how parties employ competing strategies to construct the EU's climate and energy policy as an existential threat, or alternatively, resist such securitisation. Securitisation theory conceptualises security as a “speech act” through which political actors construct issues as existential threats to a referent object, thereby legitimising extraordinary measures [Balzacq, 2011].

The study employs qualitative discourse analysis structured through an analytical matrix derived from securitisation theory, examining: (1) key frames; (2) referent objects; (3) articulated threats and their sources; (4) securitisation level; (5) overall stance toward the EU's policy.

The analysis covers 210 parliamentary debates (2022–2025), 5 party programs, and over 50 public statements by party leaders.

Findings: Securitisation and De-securitisation

Table 1. Analytical Matrix of Italian Party Discourse on the EU’s Climate and Energy Policy (2022–2025)

Party	Key Frames	Referent Object	Threats & Sources	Securitisation Level	Overall Stance
Lega	National sovereignty; economic protectionism	Italian nation; national economy; households	EU institutions; "eco-dictatorship"	Strong	Opposition
FDI	National interest; industrial competitiveness; energy security	National economy; households	External constraints on national policy	Strong	Selective resistance
FI	Market efficiency; pragmatic adaptation	National economy; business sector	Poorly designed EU regulation	Weak	Conditional support
M5S	Social justice; climate action	Citizens; future generations	Inadequate social protection	Weak	Support
PD	European integration; long-term governance; social justice	Vulnerable groups; future generations	Climate inaction; lack of coordination	Absent	Strong support

Source: Author's own analysis based on Chamber of Deputies debates, party programs, and public statements (2022–2025)

The analysis reveals strategic divergence: only Lega and Fratelli d'Italia employ classical securitisation, constructing the EU’s climate policy as an existential threat. Forza Italia, Movimento 5 Stelle, and Partito Democratico resist securitisation through market pragmatism, social governance, or institutional coordination.

The greatest concentration of classical securitising moves characterises the discourses of Lega and FDI. In their rhetoric, EU measures within the framework of the European Green Deal and REPowerEU are systematically constructed as a threat to national industry and competitiveness, a factor in rising energy prices and social instability, as well as a tool for limiting national sovereignty by supranational institutions. For instance, FDI Deputy Giovanni Bignami employs existential threat language, characterising current climate-energy policy as “thermodynamic suicide” that forces Italy to abandon domestic resources in favour of foreign imports, potentially replacing Russian dependence with Chinese [Camera dei Deputati, 2022, p. 30].

At the same time, FI, PD, and M5S are largely resisting the logic of securitisation. In their statements, traditional speech acts of securitisation are rare and fragmentary. Instead, climate and energy issues are predominantly embedded in the framework of a de-securitised discourse focused on economic governance.

FI, despite belonging to the right-wing spectrum, focuses on market and management arguments, avoiding the rhetoric of existential threat. The findings suggest that FI performs the role of a “moderating voice”, which allows the coalition to balance between euroscepticism and pragmatism.

PD and M5S, in turn, interpret the climate policy agenda as primarily a structural challenge requiring long-term political solutions and coordination at the EU level, rather than as a basis for emergency measures. M5S positions the EU as a platform for advancing national interests through participation rather than confrontation. PD employs governance and opportunity discourse, framing climate policy through rational management, fair cost distribution, and crisis as a modernisation opportunity.

Overall, securitisation is dynamic and has evolved from the shock phase of 2022 to the phase of institutional adaptation, which is manifested in a shift from radical rhetoric to more pragmatic and hybrid narratives, as well as partial borrowing of frames between ideological camps, for example, the inclusion of the social dimension of the “green transition” in the right-wing discourses and the recognition of short-term economic costs by the left.

Conclusion

The discourses of Italian political parties on the EU’s climate and energy security policy in 2022–2025 are structured around competing discursive strategies ranging from strong securitisation to active de-securitisation. Although the climate and energy issues – and EU policy responses to them – are generally interpreted as politically significant, only two parties consistently use the logic of securitisation, presenting these issues as existential threats requiring emergency measures. Ultimately, the Italian case demonstrates that energy crises, rather than automatically generating consensus, become arenas for contesting the legitimacy of EU governance and the distribution of transition costs.

Matvej Chulanov

Specifics of U.S. Foreign Security Policy Toward Japan under the Joseph Biden Administration

This topic has received extensive coverage in the literature, but the dynamics of recent years require a systematization of new approaches. The main literature can be divided into several streams.

The first stream consists of works analyzing the alliance's transformation at the initial stage of the Biden administration. Tatsumi Yu emphasizes deepening technological and economic cooperation as a response to regional challenges [US-Japan Alliance Cooperation, 2022]. The report by Armitage and Nye substantiates the need to transition to an "integrated partnership," including

the modernization of military command and intelligence systems to counter China's political and economic pressure [Armitage & Nye, 2024].

The second group consists of studies of U.S.-Japanese relations in the context of a broader strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. In works edited by Cannon and Hakata, Japan is characterized as the "anchor" of regional security, upon which the entire architecture of American presence in Asia is based [Indo-Pacific Strategies, 2021]. Joshi and Atmaguri emphasize the specifics of Tokyo's policy, which seeks to balance strengthening the defense alliance with Washington and maintaining deep economic ties in the region [Joshi & Atmaguri, 2021].

Works on the growth of Japan's strategic subjectivity have made a significant contribution to the study of this topic. Analysts at the RAND Corporation note that Tokyo acts as an intellectual leader in the region, whose concepts (for example, the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific") are integrated into American foreign policy doctrine [Lin & Garafola, 2022]. Priebe and his co-authors' study document Japan's historic transition from "defense minimalism" to a strategy of active balancing, focusing on Tokyo's ability to independently counter threats in the "gray zone" (e.g., around the Senkaku Islands), transforming the country from a security recipient into a full-fledged guarantor [Priebe et al., 2022].

Specialized military-technical studies form a separate category. Nouwens and his co-authors analyze Japan's acquisition of second-strike capabilities and long-range missile systems (including the Tomahawk), concluding that these measures eliminate "deterrence gaps" against threats from China and North Korea, fundamentally altering the regional balance of power [Nouwens et al., 2024].

Despite its comprehensiveness, the existing literature is limited by its timeframe: most studies rely on data from the first two years of Joe Biden's presidency. The processes of restructuring command structures and implementing Japan's rearmament programs are evolutionary in nature and require analysis over a longer period. In modern scholarship, there remains a need for a comprehensive study that allows us to assess the sustainability of the identified trends throughout the term of the current U.S. administration.

Josyph Shangaraev

Structural changes in the global and Russian gas architecture after 2022

Following the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in February 2022, the European Union introduced twenty packages of sanctions against Russia, making the country the global leader in the number of imposed sanctions. These restrictive measures affected the financial sector (including the freezing of assets of the Central Bank and other financial institutions), the operations

of major Russian industrial and energy companies, a diplomatic boycott, personal and cultural sanctions, as well as the introduction of a price cap on Russian oil and a gradual phasing out of Russian energy resources.

In terms of scale, this set of measures represents the largest sanctions regime in modern history and has led to the disruption of established trade and economic supply chains across many sectors. The European energy plan REPowerEU, adopted on 18 May 2022, called on EU member states to abandon Russian energy resources through reduced consumption and a transition to alternative sources.

The decline in imports of Russian hydrocarbons was caused not only by institutional and political factors but also by the physical disruptions. On 26 September 2022, acts of sabotage occurred against the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines. As a result, Russian gas supplies, which accounted for about 45% of the European market before the SMO, decreased significantly [Kardas, 2023].

The EU managed to adapt to the loss of Russian imports through several mechanisms. First, imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) increased from 57.27 million tonnes in 2021 to 94.73 million tonnes in 2022, representing a growth of 65%. This increase was largely driven by LNG exports from the United States (41% of supplies), as well as increased purchases of Russian LNG from the company Novatek (16% of supplies). In addition, European countries increased imports of pipeline gas from Norway and Azerbaijan while simultaneously reducing gas consumption by 10–12% through energy-saving measures.

At the global level, LNG trade has continued to grow for eleven consecutive years [International Gas Union, 2025]. Under current conditions, this form of fuel transportation is the fastest-growing segment of the global energy market. According to a report by the International Gas Union (IGU), global LNG trade increased by 6.8%, reaching a record level of 401.5 million tonnes in 2022 [International Gas Union, 2023]. Growth continued in 2023 and 2024, reaching 2.1% and 2.4%, respectively.

This expansion was driven by increased liquefaction capacity, primarily in the United States, which became the leading exporter in 2024 with exports reaching 88.4 million tonnes, accounting for 21.5% of global production. Australia and Qatar maintained comparable volumes of 81 and 77 million tonnes respectively. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region remain the largest LNG importers. The European Union reduced LNG consumption in 2024 following the peak purchases made in 2022.

The use of floating regasification units to accelerate the transition to LNG helped Europe rapidly restructure its energy supply system after the beginning of the energy confrontation with Russia. Despite the subsequent decline in LNG demand in Europe, this case demonstrated the

effectiveness of the technology in enabling rapid increases in gas imports. Experts from the IGU forecast continued growth in global demand for LNG. Thus, the gas market has become increasingly globalized through stronger interregional integration, replacing the previously dominant regional pipeline-based structure.

The radical changes of 2022 affected not only the physical supply of resources but also the institutional framework of the gas market. The previous model of long-term contracts based on the “take-or-pay” principle and linked to oil prices underwent significant transformation. After the outbreak of the conflict, uncertainty increased, and contracts gradually shifted toward short-term agreements, resulting in greater price volatility. The gas issue has also become highly politicized, as some EU countries are reluctant to sign long-term contracts with U.S. LNG operators due to concerns about increasing dependence on American gas.

The sharp decline in hydrocarbon exports caused serious damage to the Russian state budget. While oil exports were largely redirected to Asian markets, gas exports were unable to adapt as quickly and find alternative buyers. This is largely due to the fact that oil is a more flexible commodity, whereas gas is predominantly exported via pipelines and is therefore more dependent on geography and infrastructure [Evseeva, 2025].

In 2023, Russia recorded its lowest level of gas production since 2016, when 640.2 billion cubic meters were produced. According to the Forecast of the Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for 2025 and the Planning Period of 2026–2027 issued by the Ministry of Economic Development, Russian gas exports are unlikely to return to their 2021 levels in the foreseeable future.

Increasing exports of natural gas requires the development of new infrastructure, such as the proposed Power of Siberia–2 pipeline. At the same time, the Russian LNG industry, under conditions of technological and political sanctions is not yet able to provide sufficient export volumes. An alternative strategy for finding new markets for Russian gas is the modernization of existing infrastructure and the reassessment of previously established ties with friendly countries. Central Asia has become one such example.

References

1. *Abidin I.S.Z., Haseeb M., Chiat L. W., & Islam M. R.* Determinants of Malaysia-BRICS trade linkages: Gravity model approach // *Investment Management and Financial Innovations*. 2016. Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 389–398.
2. *Acosta D., Freier L. F.* Regional Governance of Migration in South America // *Handbook of Migration and Globalisation*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017. P. 69–85.
3. *Adamski Ł.* Kyiv's "Volhynian Negationism: Reflections on the 2016 Polish–Ukrainian Memory Conflict // *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society*. 2017. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 253–290.
4. *Alekseev D.S.* Inostranets v sovremennom iaponskom gosudarstvennom diskurse: konstruirovaniye razlichij mezhdru natsiej i Drugimi // *Japonskie issledovaniya*. 2024. No. 3. S. 6–29.
5. *Alexander C.R.* China and Taiwan in Central America: Engaging Foreign Publics in Diplomacy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
6. *Andryushin S.V.* Strategicheskij potentsial Evropeyskogo oboronogo agentstva // *Vestnik SPbGU*. Ser. 6. 2015. Vyp. 1. S. 97–110.
7. *ANI.* Japan sees India as a natural partner, values ties with like-minded countries // *The Tribune India*. 16 January 2026. URL: <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/japan-sees-india-as-a-natural-partner-values-ties-with-like-minded-countries-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-toshihiro-kitamura/>
8. *Armitage R., Nye J.* The US-Japan Alliance in 2024: Toward an Integrated Partnership. A Report of the CSIS Japan Chair. April 2024. URL: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-04/240404_Armitage_USJapan_2024.pdf?VersionId=PdawHvNzZEMSK4CJwzyh7AZ2Nbx_g7Th
9. *Balashov N.* Avtonomiya Estonskoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi: stranitsy istorii // *Pravoslavie.ru*. URL: <https://pravoslavie.ru/135677.html>
10. *Balayan A.A., Sungurov A.Iu.* Fabriki mysli v usloviyakh globalnykh transformatsij. Sankt-Peterburg: Aleteiya, 2022.
11. *Balzacq T.* Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. London: Routledge, 2011.
12. *Baranai P.* Sovremennaya ekonomicheskaya diplomatiya. Budapesht, 2009. URL: https://www.dec.lv/mi/Baranay_Pavol.pdf
13. *Basu T.* Decoding Japan's security discourse: Diverse perspectives // *India Quarterly*. 2016. Vol. 72. No. 1. P. 30–49.
14. *Beaucillon C.* Strategic Autonomy: A New Identity for the EU as a Global Actor // *European Papers*. 2023. Vol. 8. No. 2. P. 417–428.
15. *Becerra Cuervo C. A.* Análisis de la política para la competitividad del sector floricultor colombiano: Trabajo de grado. Universidad military Nueva Granada, 2016. URL: <https://repository.umng.edu.co/server/api/core/bitstreams/5f31200d-6354-4b41-831c-eb4fa4bb4add/content>
16. *Bermúdez Torres A.* Colombian Migration to Europe: Political Transnationalism in the Middle of Conflict: Working Paper. Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford, 2006. No. 39.
17. *Bistrina M.* Migratsionnaya politika Evropeyskogo soyuza // *PolitBook*. 2019. No. 1. S. 49–57.
18. *Bita Heyeghe H.* Le référendum d'autodétermination en Nouvelle-Calédonie: de quel droit? // *Civitas Europa*. 2018. Vol. 41. No. 2 P. 155–161.
19. *Bogatyreva O.N., Krapivnitskaya E.D.* Izmeneniye migratsionnogo landshafta v Latinskoy Amerike v XXI veke // *Nauchnyj dialog*. 2025. T. 14. No. 3. S. 303–331.
20. *Böhm F.* Die Idee des ORDO im Denken Walter Euckens: Dem Freunde und Mitherausgeber zum Gedächtnis // *ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. 1950. Bd. 3. S. XV–LXIV.
21. Bolsonaro, enojado con el triunfo de Alberto Fernández // *Pagina12*. 29.10.2019.

22. *Borzova A.Iu., Medina Gonzalez V.K.* Rol posrednichestva v uregulirovanii konfliktov mezhdou Ekvadorom i Peru // Vestnik RUDN. Ser.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. 2023. T. 23. No. 2. S. 296–306.
23. *Bourdin M. C., Pucci A. A.* Análisis de la Política Exterior Argentina hacia Brasil durante la gestión Cambiemos: Tesis. Buenos Aires: Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, 2023.
24. *Braveboy-Wagner J. A.* Small States in Global Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
25. *Brengarth V.* Nouvelle-Calédonie: quand le Conseil d’État rejoint la réticence du Gouvernement à la pleine souveraineté: À propos de CE, Juge des référés, 7 décembre 2021. No. 459131 // Revue des droits de l’homme. Mai 2022. URL: <https://journals.openedition.org/revdh/pdf/14625>
26. *Bunskoek R., Shih C.* “Community of Common Destiny” as Post-Western Regionalism: Rethinking China’s Belt and Road Initiative from a Confucian Perspective // Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations. 2021. Vol. 18. No. 70. P. 85–101.
27. *Business France.* Artificial Intelligence (AI). 2018. URL: <https://www.businessfrance.fr/en/invest-in-france/key-sectors/artificial-intelligence>
28. *Bustamante J.C., Delev C.* Where to next? Modernizing environmental commitments in EU-Latin America free trade agreements // Legal Issues of Economic Integration. 2023. Vol. 50. No. 3. P. 239–265.
29. *Buzan B., Wæver O., de Wilde J.* Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
30. *Camera dei Deputati.* Resoconto stenografico della seduta di martedì 24 maggio 2022. XVIII Legislatura. No. 700. Rome: Italian Chamber of Deputies, 2022.
31. *Capps R., Chishti M., Gelatt J., Bolter J., Ruiz Soto A.* Revving Up the Deportation Machinery: Enforcement under Trump and the Pushback. Washington (DC): Migration Policy Institute. May 2018. URL: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revving-deportation-machinery-under-trump-and-pushback>
32. *Carrión von Reckow M. M.* Internationalization Strategies in the Ecuadorian Flower Industry. Montreal, 2018. URL: <https://reflexion.hec.ca/docs/memoires/m2018a603456.pdf>
33. *Carroll A.* Forging a new era in US-South African relations. Washington: Atlantic Council, 2017. URL: https://atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Forging_a_New_Era_in_US-South_African_Relations_1128_web.pdf
34. *Chand B., Garcia Z.* Constituting the Indo-Pacific: Securitisation and the processes of region-making // International Quarterly for Asian Studies. 2021. Vol. 52. No. 1–2. P. 15–34.
35. *Chansoria M.* Japan-India cooperation in the realm of defense and security. Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2024.
36. *Charbonneau L.* La France et l’Allemagne face à l’autonomie stratégique européenne: mém. de maîtrise. Montréal: Université de Montréal, 2024.
37. *Cheng G., Degterev D. A., Zhao J., Chen L.* Implications of “One Belt, One Road” strategy for China and Eurasia // Vestnik Rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Ser.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. 2019. T. 19. № 1. S. 77–88.
38. *China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic and economic impacts on Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Eastern Europe / eds. A. Gerstl & U. Wallenböck.* London: Routledge, 2021.
39. *Cihon P. et al.* Should Artificial Intelligence Governance Be Centralised? // Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. 2020. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3375627.3375857>
40. *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union // Official Journal of the European Union.* 2012. No. 326. P. 13–390.
41. *Cornut E.* L’évolution statutaire de la Nouvelle-Calédonie de 1946 à 2018: perspectives d’évolution institutionnelle et accord de Bougival // Le processus d’autodétermination de la Nouvelle-Calédonie: enjeux et perspectives. Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale de France François-Mitterrand, 2025.

42. *Darnis J.-P.* L'Union européenne entre autonomie stratégique et souveraineté technologique. No. 8/2021. Paris: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, 2021.
43. *Dave B., Kobayashi Y.* China's Silk Road Economic Belt initiative in Central Asia: Economic and security implications // *Asia Europe Journal*. 2018. Vol. 16. No. 3. P. 267–281.
44. *David C.* Le référendum d'autodétermination du 4 novembre 2018 en Nouvelle-Calédonie // *Les Cahiers de l'Association française des auditeurs de l'Académie internationale de droit constitutionnel*. 2018. No. 34. R. 3–25.
45. *De Conti B., Moziás P.* “Belt and Road Initiative”: Challenges and opportunities for China and for the world // *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. 2020. Vol. 9. No. 17. P. 212–228.
46. *Delovarova, L.F., Mishchuk, S.N.* Migratsiya: ot razvitiya k ustoichivomu razvitiyu, novaya povestka i analiz teoreticheskikh aspektov // *Nauka. Kultura. Obshchestvo*. 2018. T. 24. No. 4. S. 8–18.
47. *Demmer S.* Kanak mining nationalism and “positioning” of mining and metallurgic companies in Nouvelle Calédonie // *Anthropologies*. 2021. No. 1. P. 49–61.
48. *Denisov I.E., Zuenko I.Iu.* Ot miagkoj sily k diskursivnoj sile: novye ideologemy vneshnej politiki KNR. M.: MGIMO-Universitet, 2022.
49. Deyanie Patriarkha Konstantinopolskogo Dimitriya i Svyashchennogo Sinoda Konstantinopolskogo Patriarkhata o prekrashchenii dejstviya Tomosa Patriarkha Konstantinopolskogo Meletiya IV ot 1923 g. 3 aprelya 1978 g. // *Azbyka very*. URL: https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Istorija_Tserkvi/pravoslavie-v-estonii-tom-2/69
50. *Dig Watch*. GGE on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. 2025. URL: <https://dig.watch/processes/gge-laws>
51. *Dobrinskaya O.A.* Indiya vo vneshnej politike S. Abe // *Ezhegodnik Iaponiya*. 2019. No. 48. S. 25–55.
52. *Dodonov V. Yu.* Economic cooperation of Kazakhstan and China in the early years of the Belt and Road Initiative implementation // *Post-Soviet Issues*. 2019. Vol. 6. No. 2. P. 129–148.
53. *Dos Santos L.F., Fatos A., Ribeiro A.* Bolsonaro ataca a un país imaginario al desinformar sobre América Latina // *Centro Latinoamericano de Investigación Periodística*. 30.11.2022.
54. *Doval G.P., Merke F.* The growing divide: Preferences, interests, and the shadow of the future in Argentina–Brazil relations // *Latin American Policy*. 2020. No. 13. P. 405–431.
55. *Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum*. Eastern Partnership Index 2025. URL: <https://eap-csf.eu/content/uploads/2025/06/EaP-Index-2025-online.pdf>
56. *EEAS*. ARTEMIS / DRC: EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2003. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/artemis-drc/index_en.htm
57. *EEAS*. European Union Military Operation CONCORDIA. 2003. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/concordia/index_en.htm
58. *Erasmus G, Hartzenberg T.* Navigating the turbulent waters of US-SA Relations // *tralacBlog: Perspectives on Africa's trade and integration*. 10 February 2025. URL: <https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/16670-navigating-the-turbulent-waters-of-us-sa-relations.html>
59. *Erikson D.P., Chen J.* China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America // *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. 2007. Vol. 31. No. 2. P. 69–89.
60. *Esteves A.L.* Latinoamerikanskaya dezintegratsiya pri Zhaire Bolsonaru vo vremya mandata kantslera Brazili Ernesto Arauzhu v 2019–2021 gg. // *Vestnik Rossijskogo universiteta druzhby narodov*. 2024. T. 24. No. 4. S. 588–605.
61. *Eucken W.* Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie. 6. Aufl. Berlin; Göttingen; Heidelberg: Springer, 1950.
62. *Euronews*. Transatlantic trade and defense cooperation after the US elections. 28 October 2016. URL: <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2016/10/28/transatlantic-trade-and-defense-cooperation-after-the-us-elections>
63. *European Commission*. European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund. 2016. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_16_4088

64. *European Defence Agency*. EDA's Pooling & Sharing. 2011. URL: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/factsheet_-_pooling_sharing_-_301111.pdf
65. *European Parliament*. December summit: MEPs call for a change of mindset and a boost for European defence. 2013. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20131021IPR22723/december-summit-meps-call-for-a-change-of-mindset-and-a-boost-for-eu-defence>
66. *European Parliament*. European defence in times of austerity. 2013. URL: <https://epthinktank.eu/2013/07/04/european-defence-in-times-of-austerity/>
67. *Eurostat*. Energy import dependency by products, 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/product/page/SDG_07_50
68. Evropeiskij soyuz v poiske globalnoj roli: politika, ekonomika, bezopasnost / pod red. A.A. Gromyko i M.G. Nosova. Moscow: Ves Mir, 2015.
69. *Evseeva O.V.* Vliyanie geopoliticheskogo krizisa na mirovoj gazovyy rynek i perspektivy razvitiya rossijskoj gazovoj otrasli // *Energeticheskaya politika*. 2025. No. 8 (211). S. 24–39.
70. Executive Order 13767. Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements // *Federal Register*. Vol. 82. No. 18. 30 January 2017. P. 8793–8797.
71. *Farrell N.* Trump's America: Socio-economic policy and strategy implications for South Africa. 2025. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/391761452_Trump's_America_Socio-economic_policy_and_strategy_implications_for_South_Africa
72. *Fausto S., Markwald R.* Brasil e Argentina: Para Onde Vai a Relação? // *Interesse Nacional*. 2020. Vol. 12. No. 48. P. 27–32.
73. *Feigin G.F., Bobrovnikova E.A., Afanaseva K.V.* Perspektivy regionalnoj integratsii stran BRIKS+: Sravnitelnyj analiz BRIKS+ i Andskogo soobshchestva natsij // *Gumanitarnye, sotsialno-ekonomicheskie i obshchestvennye nauki*. 2025. No. 7. S. 216–222.
74. *Figiaroni P.* Choosing not to choose: Hedging as a category of neutrality // *European Journal of International Security*. 2025. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2025.10009>
75. *Fine S., Thiollet H.* Does crisis matter for European migration governance? A framework paper. MAGYC Working Paper. 2020. URL: <https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-02951421v1/file/d2.1-does-crisis-matter-for-european-migration-governance-a-framework-paper.pdf>
76. *Foucault M.* Die Geburt der Biopolitik: Geschichte der Gouvernementalität II. Vorlesung am Collège de France 1978–1979 / übers. von J. Schröder. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006.
77. *Galbraith J.K.* Welcome to the Poisoned Chalice: The Destruction of Greece and the Future of Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
78. *Germann J.* Unwitting Architect: German Primacy and the Origins of Neoliberalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021.
79. *Gonzalez-Pujol A.* Strategic hedging and competing national interests // *All Azimuth*. 2024. Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 193–214.
80. *Graff S.* Visibilité du destin commun et invisibilité de l'histoire: discours, célébrations et construction de la citoyenneté en Nouvelle-Calédonie // *Anthrovision*. 2016. Vol. 4. No. 1. URL: <https://journals.openedition.org/anthrovision/pdf/2250>
81. *Gravelat C.* L'ONU au service du processus d'émancipation de la Nouvelle-Calédonie. Australian National University. Department of Pacific Affairs. Working paper 2024/4. URL: https://larje.unc.nc/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/10/DPA-DP2020_4-Gravelat-New-Caledonia-French-online-final2.pdf
82. *Grytsenko O.* Politics of memory in Ukrainian-Polish relations: Poland's hyper-activeness and Ukraine's reactiveness // *The Politics of Memory in Poland and Ukraine*. London: Routledge, 2021. P. 36–52.
83. *Guaita-Pradas I., Rodríguez-Mañay L.O., Marques-Perez I.* Competitiveness of Ecuador's Flower Industry in the Global Market in the Period 2016–2020 // *Sustainability*. 2023. Vol. 15. No. 7. URL: <https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/7/5821>
84. *Haas P.M.* Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination // *International Organization*. 1992. Vol. 46. No. 1. P. 1–35.

85. *Harold S.W., Morris L.J., Ma L.* Countering China's Efforts to Isolate Taiwan Diplomatically in Latin America and the Caribbean. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2019.
86. *Hartley R., Mills G.* South Africa and the US: A new low in relations // RUSI. 19 March 2025. URL: <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/south-africa-and-us-new-low-relations>.
87. *Helnarska K.J.* Strategic Autonomy of the EU in the Politics of France before and after Russian Aggression in Ukraine // Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. 2022. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 25–34.
88. *Hernández B.* Modernising the EU-Chile Association Agreement: strengthening an alliance for social inclusion and environmental sustainability:—Occasional Paper FC/EU-LAC (5) EN. May 2022. URL: https://eulacfoundation.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Especial_FC_EU-LAC_5_EN.pdf
89. *Hipsman F., Meissner D.* Trump Executive Order and DHS Implementation Memo on Border Enforcement: A Brief Review. Washington (DC): Migration Policy Institute. April 2017. URL: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trump-executive-order-and-dhs-implementation-memo-border-enforcement-brief-review>
90. *Ho L. et al.* International Institutions for Advanced AI // arXiv. 2023. URL: <https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2307.04699>
91. *Ianni P.* L'autonomie stratégique européenne face au risque de l'insignifiance // Les Cahiers de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur. 2019. P. 51–63.
92. *Iizuka M., Gebreyesus M.* “Discovery” of Non-Traditional Agricultural Exports in Latin America: Diverging Pathways through Learning and Innovation // Innovation and Development. 2017. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 58–78.
93. Indo-Pacific Strategies: Navigating Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Era: A Collection / ed. B. Cannon & S. Hakata. London: Routledge, 2021.
94. *International Gas Union.* World LNG Report 2023. URL: <https://www.igu.org/igu-reports/lng2023-world-lng-report>
95. *International Gas Union.* World LNG Report 2025. URL: <https://www.igu.org/igu-reports/2025-world-lng-report>
96. *Istomin I.* Politika Trampa v otnoshenii IuAR: poiski svoikh sredi chuzhykh // Valdai. Mezhdunarodnyj diskussionnyj klub. 25 iyulya 2025. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/politika-trampa-v-otnoshenii-yuar-poiski-svoikh/>.
97. *Ito T.* インド・モディ政権における脱植民地主義言説と外交 [Postcolonial discourse and diplomacy under the Modi administration in India] // 一般財団法人国際経済連携推進センター. 2024. P. 1–7.
98. *Ito T.* インドの「グローバルサウス」外交と日本の向き合い方 [India's "Global South" diplomacy and Japan's approach] // 一般財団法人鹿島平和研究所. 2023. Vol. 5. No. 4. P. 11–26.
99. *Izimov R.Iu., Muratalieva Z.T.* Tsentralnoaziatskij trek initsiativy “Poyas i put”: vozmozhnosti i riski // Vestnik mezhdunarodnykh organizatsij. 2018. T. 13. No. 3. S. 128–142.
100. Japan and its partners in the Indo-Pacific: Engagements and alignment / ed. S.R. Choudhury. Taylor & Francis, 2023.
101. *Järvenpää P., Major C., Sakkov S.* European Strategic Autonomy: Operationalising a Buzzword. ICDS Report. Tallinn, 2019.
102. *Jochem S.* Think Tanks: Bridging Beltway and Ivory Tower? // Policy Analysis in Germany / eds. S. Blum & K. Schubert. Bristol: Policy Press, 2013. P. 245–258.
103. *Joshi R., Atmaguri S.* Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Expectations and Challenges. Institute of South Asian Studies, Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Special Report Issue No. 12. February 2021. URL: <http://spf.org/global-data/user34/1stReport.pdf>
104. *Kardas S.* Conscious uncoupling: Europeans’ Russian gas challenge in 2023 // European Council on Foreign Relations. 13 February 2023. URL: <https://ecfr.eu/article/conscious-uncoupling-europeans-russian-gas-challenge-in-2023/>

105. *Kartashov I.* Bolsonaro pugaet braziltsev potokom argentinskikh bezhentsev // Rossijskaya gazeta (RG.RU). 13.08.2019.
106. *Keerthiraj R., Sekiyama T.* The rise of China and evolving defense cooperation between India and Japan // *Social Sciences*. 2023. Vol. 12. No. 6.
107. *Keohane R.O.* After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: University Press. 1984.
108. *Khan U., Wang H., Ali I.* A Sustainable Community of Shared Future for Mankind: Origin, Evolution and Philosophical Foundation // *Sustainability*. 2021. Vol. 13. No. 9352.
109. *Kireeva A.A.* Japoniya i Indii: strategicheskoe partnerstvo na Indo-Tikhookeanskom prostanstve // *Vostochnaya Aziya: proshloe, nastoyashchee, budushchee*. 2020. No. 7. S. 91–102.
110. *Kohnert D.* Impact of Trump 2.0 on Sub-Saharan Africa. MPRA Paper No. 123735. 18 February 2025. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/123735/1/MPRA_paper_123735.pdf%202025.
111. *Konyshev V.N.* Neoklassicheskij realizm v teorii mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenij // *Polis*. 2020. No. 4. S. 94–111.
112. *Korson C.* Framing social rebalancing, national identity, and victimhood in Kanaky/New Caledonia // *Social & Cultural Geography*. 2018. Vol. 19. No. 5. P. 549–575.
113. *Kosevich E.Iu.* ES – Latinskaya Amerika: instituty sotrudnichestva i doverie k nim latinoamerikantssev // *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*. 2023. T. 67. No. 2. S. 114–129.
114. *Kowasch M. et al.* The third independence referendum in New Caledonia – a fallback to colonialism? // *Pacific Geographies*. 2022. No. 57. P. 11–15.
115. *Kudayarova N.Iu.* Evropa – Latinskaya Amerika: migratsionnye protsessy na novom vitke globalizatsii // *Aktualnye problemy Evropy*. 2018. No. 3. S. 131–145.
116. *Kudlasevich N.N.* Estonskaya Apostolskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov pod omoforom Konstantinopolskogo Patriarkhata (1923–1978) // *Chelovecheskij kapital*. 2023. No. 172. S. 48–54.
117. *Kuik C.* Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective // *China International Strategy Review*. 2021. Vol. 3. No. 1. P. 300–315.
118. *Kumar S.* The evolving landscape of India-Japan economic relations: Exploring the possibilities and challenges // *International Journal of Social Science*. 2023. Vol. 8. No. 12. P. 4031–4041.
119. *Kungurtsev D.A.* Osobennosti regionalnoj migratsionnoj politiki v stranakh Evrosoyuza posle migratsionnogo krizisa 2022 g. // *Materialy I Belorusskogo geograficheskogo kongressa*. Minsk: BGU, 2024. S. 164–169.
120. *Larus E. F.* The TAIPEI Act: well intended but uncertain? // *Taiwan Insight*. 2020.
121. *Lavenex S., Schimmelfennig F.* EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics // *Journal of European Public Policy*. 2009. Vol. 16. No. 6. P. 791–812.
122. *Leblic I.* Sovereignty and Coloniality in the French-Speaking Pacific: A Reflection on the Case of New Caledonia, 1980–2021 // *Oceania. Special Issue: France and Oceanian Sovereignties*. 2022. Vol. 92. No. 1. P. 107–132.
123. *Lecompte-Van Poucke M.* Power and Ideology in the New Caledonian Independence Debate: A Pragma-functional Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis: DPh Thesis. Macquarie University, 2018.
124. *Lee B.T.F., Sims J.P., Lee G.* BRICS expansion: Threat or opportunity for ASEAN? // *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, 2025. Vol. 81. No. 2. P. 130–157.
125. *Liao J.X.* China's energy diplomacy towards Central Asia and the implications for its Belt and Road Initiative // *The Pacific Review*. 2021. Vol. 34. No. 3. P. 490–522.
126. *Lille N.* L'Union européenne, entre autonomie stratégique et puissance normative // *Revue LexSociété*. 2024. P. 1–33.
127. *Lin B., Garafola K.* Competing in the Gray Zone: Countering China's Coercion of US Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific. RAND Corporation. Research Report. Santa-Monica, 2022. URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR594-1/RAND_RRA594-1.pdf

128. *Magnon X.* La Nouvelle-Calédonie: un "pays à souveraineté partagée"? 2009. URL: [https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/13664/1/La Nouvelle-Cal%C3%A9donie__un__pays_%C3%A0_souverainet%C3%A9_partag%C3%A9____.pdf](https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/13664/1/La_Nouvelle-Cal%C3%A9donie__un__pays_%C3%A0_souverainet%C3%A9_partag%C3%A9____.pdf)
129. *Maulny J.-P.* Vers une autonomie stratégique européenne // *Revue Défense Nationale*. 2019. No. 821. P. 82–87.
130. *Mauro F.* Autonomie stratégique: Le nouveau Graal de la défense européenne. Rapport du GRIP 2018/1. Bruxelles, 2018.
131. *Mauro F.* L'autonomie stratégique, cet obscur objet du désir. Analyse No. 13. Paris: IRIS, 2021.
132. *McCoy J.L., Smith W.C.* Democratic Disequilibrium in Venezuela // *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. 1995. Vol. 37. No. 2. P. 113–180.
133. *McElroy J.L., Bai W.* The Political Economy of China's Incursion into the Caribbean and Pacific // *Island Studies Journal*. 2008. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 225–246.
134. *Merle I.* Expériences coloniales. La Nouvelle-Calédonie. 1853–1920. Paris: Belin, 2020.
135. *Michaels E., Sus M.* Strategic Autonomy in Security and Defence as an Impracticability? How the European Union's Rhetoric Meets Reality // *EU Foreign Policy in a Fragmenting International Order* / eds. O. Costa, E. Soler i Lecha & M.C. Vlaskamp. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025. P. 55–83.
136. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.* Seoul Declaration for Safe, Innovative and Inclusive AI. 2024. URL: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100672517.pdf>
137. *Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China.* Notice of the State Council on Issuing the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Scientific and Technological Innovation. 2016. URL: https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/201608/t20160810_127174.html
138. *Mokaddem H.* L'accord de Nouméa. Pratique de discours et forclusion de la souveraineté de Kanaky // *Journal de la Société des Océanistes*. 2018. Vol. 147. P. 319–328.
139. *Muratalieva N.T.* Vliyanie initsiativy "Poyas i put" na Tsentralnuyu Aziyu: keis Kyrgyzstana // *Central Asian Analytical Network. Analiticheskij doklad*. 23 sentyabria 2019.
140. *Na-Xi L., Huang M.-F., Lu S.-B.* How the Belt and Road Initiative can help strengthen the role of the SCO and deepen China's cooperation with Russia and the countries of Central Asia // *India Quarterly*. 2019. Vol. 75. No. 1. P. 56–68.
141. *Nahak S., Kalisang M.* Strategic hedging act: An assessment of Indonesia's decision to join BRICS // *Andalas Journal of International Studies*. 2025. Vol. 14. No. 1. P. 1–14.
142. *Nakano R.* Japan and the Liberal International Order: Rules-based, Multilateral, Inclusive, and Localized // *International Affairs*. 2023. Vol. 99. No. 4. P. 1421–1438.
143. *Nasirova S.A.* Ideologems in Xi Jinping's Political Discourse (Concepts 中国梦想 "Chinese Dream" and 人类命运共同体 "Community of the Common Destiny of Mankind") // *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Analysis*. 2020. Vol. 3. No. 8. P. 73–79.
144. *NESA Center.* Quad Critical & Emerging Technology Forum (Executive Summary). 2023. URL: https://nesa-center.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Quad-Critical-and-Emerging-Technology_2023-AUGw.pdf
145. *Nouwens V., Wright T., Graham E., Herzinger B.* Long-Range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. January 2024. URL: <https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2024/01/long-range-strike/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific--implications-for-regional-stability.pdf>
146. *Novitskij E.R.* Vzaimodeistvie gosudarstv Latinskoj Ameriki s SShA i stranami ES // *Iberoamerikanske tetradi*. 2019. No. 3(25). S. 54–58.
147. *OECD.* About the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI). 2024. URL: <https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/global-partnership-on-artificial-intelligence.html>
148. *OECD.* AI Principles overview. 2019. URL: <https://oecd.ai/en/ai-principles>
149. *Official Journal of the European Union.* Artificial Intelligence Act. 2024. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401689

150. *Okano-Heijmans M.* Conceptualizing Economic Diplomacy. The Crossroads of International Relations, Economics, IPE and Diplomatic Studies // *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*. 2011. Vol. 6. No. 1–2. P. 7–36.
151. *Okuneva L.S.* Prezidentskie vybory 2018 g. v Brazilii: buria i natisk // *Latinskaya Amerika*. 2018. No. 12. S. 22–36.
152. *Ordoliberalism and European Economic Policy: Between Realpolitik and Economic Utopia* / eds. M. Dold & T. Krieger. London: Routledge, 2020.
153. *Pandito T.* The BRICS Advantage: What’s at Stake for Indonesia in a Multipolar World? // *IR-UI Commentaries*. 2025. Vol. 6. No. 3. P. 1–8.
154. *Panov A.N.* Vneshnepoliticheskoe nasledstvo premjer-ministra Japonii Abe Sindzo // *Japonskie issledovaniya*. 2024. No. 2. S. 21–40.
155. *Parkhomenko V.K.* Afrikanskaia politika Trampa, pervye shagi // *Rossii i Amerika v XXI veke*. 2019. № 3. S. 9.
156. *Pascariu G.C.* Resilience: From Theoretical Thinking to a New Paradigm and Normative Approaches in EU’ Foreign and Security Policy // *Resilience and the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Countries: Crisis, Transformations and Policies* / eds. G. Rouet & G.C. Pascariu. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025. P. 17–46.
157. Patriarchal and Synodical Act concerning the Reactivation of the Patriarchal and Synodical Tomos of 1923 regarding the Orthodox Metropolitanate of Estonia of February 20, 1996 // *Orthodox Church of Estonia*. URL: <https://orthodoxa.org/GB/estonia/documentsEOC/tomos1923.htm>
158. *Pchaladze T.* Navigating geopolitical realities: The EU's strategic positioning in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. *ECIPE Policy Brief*, No.10/2025. URL: https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/ECI_25_PolicyBrief_10-2025_LY01.pdf
159. *Perelman M.* "L'Azerbaïdjan prépare une attaque contre l'Arménie", selon le Premier ministre arménien // *France24*. 22 février 2024. URL: <https://www.france24.com/fr/émissions/en-tête-à-tête/20240222-l-azerbaïdjan-prépare-une-attaque-contre-l-arménie-selon-le-premier-ministre-arméniend>
160. *Persaud R. B.* China and Taiwan in the Caribbean and Central America: The Strategic Competition over Sovereignty // *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*. 2008. Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 119–146.
161. *Piatachkova A.S.* Osobennosti realizatsii kontseptsii “soobshchestvo edinoi sudby” kak instrumenta diskursivnoj sily KNR pri Si Tszinpine // *Analiz i prognoz. Zhurnal IMEMO RAN*. 2025. No. 1. S. 37–45.
162. *Polyachenkov A.V.* Osobennosti ekspertizy germanskimi analiticheskimi tsentrami voenno-politicheskogo sotrudnichestva FRG so stranami Afriki yuzhnee Sakhary: Dissertation. Moscow: NRE HSE, 2023.
163. *Pope A.* Immigration and U.S. National Security: The State of Play Since 9/11. Washington (DC): Migration Policy Institute. April 2020. URL: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-us-national-security-since-911>
164. *Porca-Konjikusic J. et al.* Global Economic Integration: How do ASEAN and BRICS organisations contribute to the process? // *BRICS Journal of Economics*. 2024. Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 155–168.
165. *Potemkina T.V.* Migratsionnye protsessy v sovremennoj sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenij // *Znanie. Ponimanie. Umenie*. 2008. No. 3. S. 116–122.
166. *Prekrashchenie Estonskoi Skhizmy* // *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii*. 1945. No. 4. S. 3–6.
167. *Priebe M., Gunness K., Mueller K.P., Burdett Z.* The Limits of Restraint: The Military Consequences of a Restrained US Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific. RAND Corporation Research Report. Santa-Monica, 2022. URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA739-4/RAND_RRA739-4.pdf
168. *Reeves J.* China’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative: Network and influence formation in Central Asia // *Journal of Contemporary China*. 2018. Vol. 27. No. 112. P. 28–43.
169. *Regnovskij V.I.* Vliyanie vneshnikh krupnykh igrokov na regionalnyu bezopasnost v Jugo-Vostochnoj Azii // *Vostochnaya Aziya: fakty i analitika*. 2022. No. 2. S. 23–31.

170. Resultados do Comércio Exterior Brasileiro — Dados Consolidados // Gov.br. 05.03.2026.
171. *Ribeiro A. P., Scrivano R.* A investidores financeiros, Bolsonaro diz: “não entendo nada de economia” // O Globo. 07.02.2018.
172. *Rich T.S.* Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition // *Issues & Studies*. 2009. Vol. 45. No. 4. P. 159–188.
173. *Rogozhina N.G.* Osobennosti rasshireniya BRIKS v Jugo-Vostochnoj Azii // *Kontury globalnykh transformatsij: politika, ekonomika, pravo*. 2025. T. 18. No. 1. S. 72–89.
174. *Rohtmets P., Schvak T.* The establishment of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church: history and interpretations // *Usuteaduslik Ajakiri*. 2023. T. 84. № 1. S. 1–35.
175. *Romanenko D.* Japan's Understanding of the Rules-Based International Order // *Journal of New Eastern Outlook*. 2026. URL: <https://journal-neo.su/2026/02/06/japans-understanding-of-the-rules-based-international-order/>
176. *Romanova T.A., Mazanik S.V.* Vliyanie koordinatsionnogo diskursa o “strategicheskom suverenitete” ES na ego institutsionalnyi balans // *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta*. 2022. T. 15. No. 5. S. 79–112.
177. *Röpke W.* *Internationale Ordnung*. Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch, 1945.
178. *Rozenthal D.M. et al.* *Gordiev uzel venesuelskogo krizisa*. Moscow: Institut Latinskoj Ameriki RAN, 2021.
179. *Rumley D.* The French Geopolitical Project in New Caledonia // *Australia’s Arc of Instability: The political and cultural dynamics of regional security* / eds. D. Rumley et al. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. P. 229–246.
180. *Rüstow A.* *Zwischen Kapitalismus und Kommunismus* // *ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. 1949. Bd. 2. S. 100–169.
181. *Rutten M.* *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents: Chaillot Paper No. 47*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 2001.
182. *Scholefield R. et al.* International Agreements on AI Safety: Review and Recommendations for a Conditional AI Safety Treaty // arXiv. 2025. URL: <https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2503.18956>
183. *Scott D.* India and the Indo-Pacific Discourse // *New Directions in India's Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis* / ed. H.V. Pant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. P. 195–214.
184. *Shcherbakova A.D.* Argentino-brazilskie protivorechiya kak faktor dezintegratsii v Juzhnoi Amerike // *Iberoamerikanskije tetradi*. 2022. T. 10. No. 1. S. 84–98.
185. *Soares J.* Paulo Guedes diz que ‘Mercosul não será prioridade’ em governo Bolsonaro // *Jornal O Globo*. 28.10.2018.
186. *State Council of the People’s Republic of China.* Notice of the State Council on Issuing the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. 2017. URL: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm
187. *Steenblik R.* Liberalising trade in 'environmental goods': Some practical considerations. OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers 2005/05. 16 December 2005. URL: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2005/12/liberalising-trade-in-environmental-goods_g17a1760/888676434604.pdf
188. *Stiglitz J.E.* *Europa spart sich kaputt: Warum die Krisenpolitik gescheitert ist und der Euro einen Neustart braucht*. München: Siedler, 2016.
189. *Streltsov D.V.* Narrativ o “severnnykh territoriyakh” v obshchestvenno-politicheskom diskurse sovremennoj Japonii // *Japonskie issledovaniya*. 2024. No. 3. S. 65–85.
190. *Stryjek T.* “An Unexploded Mine”: Explaining the Sources of the Contemporary Memory Conflict between Poland and Ukraine // *Studia Polityczne*. 2024. T. 52. No. 3. P. 257–287.
191. *Suporn T., Bunyavejchewin P.* Thailand’s BRICS move revisited // *Cogent Social Sciences*, 2025. Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 1–14.
192. *Teh-Chang Lin, Yen-Chun Lin J.* Taiwan’s foreign aid in transition: From ODA to civil society approaches // *Japanese Journal of Political Science*. 2017. Vol. 18. No. 4. P. 469–490.

193. *Tevahitua R.* A Destiny by Choice: New Caledonia's Riots in 2024. Australian National University. Department of Pacific Affairs. Working paper 2024/3. URL: <https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/server/api/core/bitstreams/6220df75-a912-4e0f-8dc2-ea61923f9305/content>
194. *The Federal Government.* Artificial Intelligence Strategy. November 2018. URL: https://www.ki-strategie-deutschland.de/files/downloads/Nationale_KI-Strategie_engl.pdf
195. *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* / eds. C. M. Constantinou, P. Kerr & P. Sharp. Los Angeles; London: SAGE Publications, 2016.
196. *The White House.* Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence. 2016. URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf
197. *The World Bank.* GDP (current US\$). URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true
198. *Thibaut K.* China's Understanding of Discourse Power and World Order // *Chinese Discourse Power: Aspirations, Reality, and Ambitions in the Digital Domain* / ed. by I. Robertson. Washington: Atlantic Council, 2022. P. 5–17.
199. *Thomson L.* Migración en Europa: Tendencias Actuales y Retos Emergentes // *Anuario de la Inmigración en España*. 2015. P. 29–52.
200. *Timofei E.N.* European Strategic Autonomy Revisited: Understanding Its Meaning for France and Poland: MA thesis. Budapest: Central European University, 2025.
201. Tomos Svyatejshego Patriarkha Konstantinopolskogo Meletiya IV. 7 iyulia 1923 g. // *Azbuka very*. URL: https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Istorija_Tserkvi/pravoslavie-v-estonii-tom-2/17
202. *Tsuladze L.* Georgia's Contested European Trajectory // *Current History*. 2023. Vol. 122. No. 846. P. 255–260.
203. *Tubilewicz C., Guilloux A.* Does size matter? Foreign aid in Taiwan's diplomatic strategy, 2000–8 // *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. 2011. Vol. 65. No. 3. P. 322–339.
204. *Tudoroiu T.* Taiwan in the Caribbean: a case study in state de-recognition // *Asian Journal of Political Science*. 2017. Vol. 25. No. 2. P. 194–211.
205. *Ubi E.N.* Beyond rhetoric: Africa-US relations and the search for a rapprochement // *Journal for Inclusive Public Policy*. 2025. Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 7–16.
206. *UK Government.* The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit. 2023. URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023>
207. *Urnov A.Iu.* Novaya afrikanskaya strategiya administratsii D. Trampa // *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*. 2019. No. 4. S. 2–8.
208. *Urnov A.Iu.* Politika SShA v Afrike (konets 2022 – nachalo 2024 g.). Moscow.: Institut Afriki RAN, 2024.
209. *Urnov A.Iu.* Politika SShA v Afrike k yugu ot Sakhary // *Uchenye zapiski Instituta Afriki RAN*. 2022. No. 3(60). S. 6–25.
210. *US-Japan Alliance Cooperation in a Post-Pandemic World* / eds. Y. Tatsumi et P. Kennedy. Washington (DC): Stimson Center, 2022. URL: <https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Views-Next-Generation-March-2022-031522.pdf>
211. *Vander Vennet N., Salman M.* Strategic Hedging and Changes in Geopolitical Capabilities for Second-Tier States // *Chinese Political Science Review*. 2019. Vol. 4. No. 1. P. 86–134.
212. *Vanegas López J.G., Merlos García J.J., Mayorga Abril C.M.* Flower Export Barriers: A Comparative Study in Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador // *Latin American Business Review*. 2017. Vol. 18. No. 3–4. P. 227–250.
213. *Varoufakis Y.* Das Euro-Paradox: Wie eine andere Geldpolitik Europa wieder zusammenführen kann / übers. von U. Schäfer. München: Kunstmann, 2016.
214. *Verchenko A.L.* Kitajskaja kontseptsija “soobshchestva edinoj sudby chelovechestva” i diplomatiya pervogo litsa // *Kitai v mirovoj i regionalnoj politike. Istoriya i sovremennost*. 2022. No. 27. S. 71–83.

215. *Womack B.* Asymmetry and International Relationships. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
216. *Yani Y.M., Tseen Fu Lee B. et al.* Indonesia in BRICS: A realist perspective // *Journal of Strategic and Global Studies*. 2025. Vol. 8. No. 2. P. 193–209.
217. *Zabella A.A., Penkova E.A., Fivejskaya M.S.* “Odin poyas, odin put” vs. “svobodnyj i otkrytyj Indo-Tikhookeanskij region”: sopernichestvo za regionalnuyu integratsiyu (vzgliad iz Indii i Japonii) // *Jugo-Vostochnaya Aziya: aktualnye problemy razvitiya*. 2021. No. 4(53). S. 5–19.
218. *Zaitsev D.G.* Analiticheskie tsentry kak subekty politicheskogo protsessa: Dissertation. Moscow: NRU HSE, 2009.
219. *Zeng L.* Conceptual Analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Road towards a Regional Community of Common Destiny // *Chinese Journal of International Law*. 2016. Vol. 15. No. 3. P. 517–541.
220. *Zhang D.* The Concept of “Community of Common Destiny” in China’s Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications // *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*. 2018. Vol. 5. P. 196–207.
221. *Zhitin D.V., Krasnov A.I., Shendrik A.V.* Geograficheskie osobennosti migratsionnykh svyazey Evropy // *Baltijskij region*. 2016. T. 8. No. 3. S. 75–92.
222. *Zhurkin V.V.* Evropejskaya oborona: ot mifa k realnosti // *Sovremennaya Evropa*. 2001. No. 3. S. 52–65.
223. *Zuenko I.Iu.* Tendentsii razvitiya vneshnepoliticheskoy ideologii v period pravleniya Si Tszinpinga // *Sovremennaya ideologiya KNR: idei Si Tszinpinga kak osnova politiki Kitaya / pod red. K.V. Babaeva*. Moscow: ICCA RAS, 2025. S. 124–148.

Проблемы изучения международных отношений и зарубежных региональных исследований: материалы научно-исследовательского семинара [Электронный ресурс] : препринт WP21/2026/01 / Е. Буторин и др.; Нац. исслед. ун-т «Высшая школа экономики». – Электрон. текст. дан. (900 Кб). – М. : Изд. дом Высшей школы экономики, 2026. – 54 с. (Серия WP21 «Международные отношения и зарубежные региональные исследования»). (На англ., нем. и исп. яз.)

Препринт содержит результаты исследований (в первую очередь в области историографии) молодых ученых факультета мировой экономики и мировой политики Высшей школы экономики (Москва), проведенных в рамках исследовательского семинара «Научные исследования в области международных отношений: академический трек».

Ключевые слова: международные отношения; зарубежные региональные исследования; внешняя политика; безопасность; сотрудничество

Препринты Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики» размещаются по адресу:

<http://www.hse.ru/org/hse/wp>

Электронное научное издание

*Препринт WP21/2026/01
Серия WP21
Международные отношения
и зарубежные региональные исследования*

**Проблемы изучения международных отношений
и зарубежных региональных исследований**

(на английском, немецком и испанском языках)

Публикуется в авторской редакции

Изд. № 3077

Национальный исследовательский университет
«Высшая школа экономики»
101000, Москва, ул. Мясницкая, 20
Тел.: +7 495 772-95-90 доб. 15285